„INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS IN PEACEBUILDING: CRITICAL ASSESSMENTS AND FUTURE IMPULSES“
ASPR REPORT No 2
Over the past two decades, international organisations [IOs] have increasingly focused on the field of post-conflict peacebuilding, devoting significant resources to this task, frequently emerging as the dominant actors in specific missions, and sometimes even restructuring their broader organisational missions around this function. This trend has played out in parallel to a general strengthening of IO agency as „self-directed actors” with significant control over their own agendas, which not only served to further boost their relevance in peacebuilding efforts, but also raises questions over their accountability and legitimacy. Accordingly, it is both necessary and timely to provide a critical assessment of IO activity in the field of peacebuilding, analysing not only specific actions they are undertaking, but also the normative underpinnings, self-conceptions and ontological models which they apply to post-conflict reconstruction.

Against this backdrop, the ASPR convened its annual „State of Peacebuilding” (StoP) conference in November 2017, focusing on „the Practics, Politics and Paradigms of IO Peacebuilding”. Organised by Andrea Warnecke (now at the University of Aberystwyth), it featured input from leading international peacebuilding researchers and practitioners like Oliver Ramsbotham (University of Bradford), Nicolas Lemay-Herbert (University of Birmingham), Gezim Vioska (University of Dublin), Andy Carl (Conciliation Resources) and Veronique Duduet (Berghof Foundation). Discussions at the conference quickly identified major structural trends shaping IO involvement in peacebuilding - most notably, an increasingly crowded field due to the proliferation of involved actors and sometimes competing mandates, which has also resulted in a relative weakening of the position of traditional heavyweights in this field like the UN and OSCE. In a second step, panelists analyzed how IOs deal with these challenges, e.g. by sharpening their normative profiles and mission statements, but also through exploration of new approaches to peacebuilding beyond the hitherto dominant liberal peace paradigm.
This report represents a consolidation and continuation of the debates launched at the conference. To this end, we invited some of the participants to expand and consolidate their input into brief research papers, which form the chapters of this volume.

Oliver Ramsbotham opens up with a discussion of the need for IOs to engage in “strategic peacebuilding” in post-war societies - operating within a framework that clearly defines their own role, the context they operate in, mission requirements and aims, and possible courses of action. Starting from a historic overview of IO involvement in peacebuilding, he identifies the difficulties posed by new, complex and highly contested post-conflict landscapes and the resulting challenges to IO effectiveness and legitimacy, before offering a possible remedy in the form of a template that can guide practical strategic responses.

The second piece, contributed by Jan Pospisil, takes stock of the EU’s performance as an aspirational “peace power” and a heavyweight in global peacebuilding efforts. He finds that despite the abundant resources that have been made available to EU efforts in this field, they have not yielded commensurate successes, with conflicts actually intensifying in the EU’s neighbourhood and further abroad. He attributes these failures to an overreliance on integration policy, structural problems like internal disagreements, and most importantly, an inflexible and outdated model of linear progression towards inclusive, peaceful societies despite the availability of more innovative and realistic approaches.

Maria Stage subsequently shifts the focus to the most prominent and nominally highest-level IO actor in the field of peacebuilding, the UN and suborgans like the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC). She focuses on the adaptation of expertise in UN peacebuilding organs, particularly the often difficult processes of learning from practitioners with first-hand knowledge of operating in complex post-conflict societies. Focusing on the PBC, she offers some empirical evidence of how frequent personnel rotations in this body often result in a loss of “meta-knowledge” on peacebuilding and thus suboptimal judgements on whose external expertise to tap into.

Finally, Jan Daniel provides a case study for how UN peacebuilding mandates are being implemented to fit realities on the ground, focusing on the efforts of the UNIFIL II mission in Lebanon. He finds that despite a mandate to coordinate exclusively with sovereign authorities, the need to reduce local resistance to the mission and deal with Hezbollah’s de facto sovereignty in parts of the country made it necessary to stretch this requirement. From this experience, he also identifies several best practices - like delivering local development assistance and obtaining input from opinion surveys - that will be of interest to other practitioners in the field.

We would like to thank the four authors and all the other panelists and participants at the 2017 StoP conference on peacebuilding for their input and the spirited discussions. Our hope is that this report will make them accessible to a broader audience and, ideally, inspire them to join in this much-needed debate. We would also like to extend special thanks to the convenor of the conference, Dr. Andrea Warnecke, without whom the event and this publication would not have been possible.

Jan Pospisil, Pascal Abb
This paper addresses the challenge of post-war peacebuilding in those cases where ceasefires and agreements may end the war, but do not yet end the conflict. I call this ‘Clausewitz in reverse’ – ‘peace is the continuation of the war by other means’. I argue that this is what happens in most complex, protracted and hitherto intractable conflicts. I suggest that in response to the severe ethical and practical challenges of working in these intensely politicized fields, International Organizations (IOs) need from the outset to operate within a clearly defined strategic framework that is capable of accommodating the resulting trade-offs and dilemmas. I call this ‘strategic peacebuilding’. Conflict resolution needs to learn how to work with strategic studies in formulating such a framework. The paper concludes by offering an outline strategic peacebuilding template as an example of what such an approach might entail.

THE EVOLUTION OF IO POST-WAR PEACEBUILDING

The first section of the paper reviews the evolution of post-war International Organization (IO) peacebuilding since the end of the Cold War. This was when the term ‘peacebuilding’ itself, hitherto more marginal in international political discourse, moved centre-stage and entered the vocabulary of a number of IOs which had not previously seen their roles in that light – both International Governmental Organizations (IGOs) and International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs). It was the shift in the nature of the conflict environment, together with its attendant turbulence, that shaped the evolution of IO peacebuilding during this period. This provides the necessary context for the argument that follows.

International organizations – both governmental and non-governmental – evolve at particular moments in history in response to wider political movements. At geopolitical level they cluster around decisive shifts in global politics such as 1648 (Westphalia), 1713 (Utrecht), 1815 (Vienna), 1919 (Paris), 1945 (San Francisco) – and 1990 (end of the Cold War). Regional level organizations such as the EU, African Union, Arab League, Organization of American States, etc., reflect similar dynamics. Sometimes an IGO can reinvent itself – as in the transition from CSCE to OSCE at the end of the cold war. The World Bank and IMF reflected one such moment – so did the original UN agencies, including slightly later the DPKO. The Red Cross/Red Crescent has its own origin and history reaching back into the nineteenth century, as do a host of human rights, humanitarian and development INGOs. All of them are conditioned by their histories. Many would not have been created today, but nevertheless survive to help shape current events. Most were initiated in different environments and have to adapt – as best they can - to play a role in circumstances that their originators did not foresee. This includes the UN itself. The Warsaw Pact is defunct, while NATO continues to search for its role in the post-Cold War world. In short, it is a question of ongoing adaptation to constantly changing conditions, insofar as this is possible.

In the story of the evolution of IOs in post-war peacebuilding, few foresaw the sudden explosion of activity that followed the reconstitution of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in 1989 and the way that this unremarkable ten-year old Cold War decolonization initiative became the template for a frenzy of post-Cold War peacebuilding in general. The heroic period of the early 1990s followed with the Boutros Ghali Agenda for Peace and its successors and the evolution of ‘second-generation’ (and ‘third-generation’) peacekeeping. Some thought that perhaps the original concept of the United Nations might be realized after all as the UNSC set up a host of UN-led missions to underpin what US President Bush senior reluctantly called a ‘New World Order’.

But then came the debacles of the mid-1990s, particularly in Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda. Never again (it appears) will US troops wear blue helmets under UN command. This ushered in a more complex period when the post-war peacebuilding roles of IOs were caught up in attempts to reform the UN system itself (2000 Brahimi report) and most missions were led by a variable mix of regional organizations and ‘coalitions of the willing’ with or without official UNSC blessing. It became clear that ‘post-war’ did not mean ‘post-conflict’ in the more turbulent post-Cold War environment.

The first decade of the twenty-first century brought another sudden lurch with the apogee of the ‘neo-con’ reaction associated with the administration of US President George W. Bush and its coincidence with 11/9/2001. Now the entire fabric of IO post-war peacebuilding was threatened with co-optation into the ‘global war on terror’. Post-war reconstruction in Iraq in 2003 was originally to be run by the USDoD not the UN and its agencies. The disastrous unravelling of post-war peacebuilding efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq showed how delusional was the idea that this might be a repeat of 1945 Germany and Japan. Previous European imperial co-
Colonial offices had been closed down, and the UN Trusteeship Council had been effectively mothballed. This left ‘a gaping hole in the United Nations institutional machinery’ in relation to the ‘challenge of helping countries with the transition from war to lasting peace’ (Annan 2005 para. 114). The UN Peacebuilding Commission was set up at international level. Hasty attempts were made to supplement ‘conflict prevention pools’ with postwar peacebuilding capacities that would link defence, foreign policy and development in national capitals.

Equally unexpected was the subsequent economic upheaval of 2008. Nemesis had remarkably quickly followed the hubris of US military-political overreach in Afghanistan and Iraq. Now the 2008 financial crisis indicated the moment when the US economy on its own was no longer able to sustain the world financial system, including as it now did China, India and Russia. The reluctance of the US to intervene in the post-2011 Arab revolutions highlighted the suddenness of the transition from US ‘hyperpower’ to a global multipolar rebalancing shaped by Chinese economic advance and Russian readiness, if not to challenge, then to disrupt what had been the global status quo. As a result IO post-war peacebuilding now entered an even more uncertain, unpredictable and contested environment – all three aspects further accentuated by the maverick advent of US President Trump.

Any study of IO roles in post-war peacebuilding, therefore, must try to take these tumultuous upheavals into account. It is hard to generalize about the prevailing patterns of what I and my colleagues call ‘transnational conflict’ that resulted (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall, 2016, 110-143), but an attempt must be made since this is the contextual environment for this paper.

In brief, transnational conflict is a global-local upheaval in which global-level conflict impact the local level (where most of the suffering is experienced) and local level conflict can have global repercussions (as in the case of the self-immolation of a Tunisian fruit seller in December 2011). Transnational conflicts can rapidly change character and mutate, with transnational connectors – cross-border flows of people, weapons, resources, information, ideas - acting like veins and arteries in linking and animating the different parts of the system. Many of the deep drivers of transnational conflict originate at global level, where changes in the global balance of power have led to a loss of central control in comparison with the cold war period and a consequent ‘regionalization’ of international politics. Economic imbalance fuels wars to control the resources of the state. Global ideological contestation – democratic, socialist, nationalist, and now most strikingly religious - intensifies struggles to determine the nature of the state. And discrepancies between state borders - imposed during and after the colonial period - and much older and more numerous distributions of peoples breed wars of secession that challenge the very existence of the state. It is still at state level that the critical battles are fought out. The state remains, at least formally, the main satisfier of internal needs, and the most significant player on the international scene. That is why such emphasis is placed on shoring up ‘fragile states’. And that is why such alarm is expressed about what is widely seen as a systemic crisis in the post-colonial state structure itself for example in the MENA (Middle East North Africa) area. It is into these gaps that newer players - using existing conflict formations and deploying the methodology of international terror and the communications revolution – are now able to challenge traditional political and military centres of power.

This is the context for the severe challenges now facing IO post-war peacebuilding. There are marked regional and sub-regional variations here that we can do no more than touch on – for example between areas where there are strong states (e.g. Colombia), areas where there are weak states (e.g. Somalia) and areas where there are contested states and systemic state crisis (e.g. Iraq and Libya – Syria has not entered the stage of post-war peacebuilding at the time of writing). In Afghanistan peacebuilding is still accompanied by war; in Sri Lanka post-war peacebuilding takes place after decisive military victory.

We should note that all of this impacts across the range of interconnected ‘peacebuilding matrices’ which, since the early 1990s, have characterised successive international attempts to create adequate integrated responses. These typically try to link levels and sectors (e.g. security, law and order, government, economy, society) to the successive ‘nested phases’ that, it is hoped, may progressively enable and ease the passage from war to sustainable peace. Account has to be taken of the unique features of each environment and type of mission, including the likelihood of unexpected setbacks and unforeseen ‘events’. Unavoidable trade-offs and dilemmas must be faced, as noted below, and continu-
ing tensions and controversies surround the various goals of stabilization, state building, nation building and postwar reconstruction.

Confronted with all this, the key question for IOs in the post-Cold War context is whether they can learn to adapt, however different the conditions that determined their first emergence and that shaped their subsequent evolution. Faced by the highly volatile demands of a constantly changing post-war environment, do they have – or can they be given - a sufficient capacity for ‘second order social learning’?

We can now focus on the intense politicization of the post-war peacebuilding arena that results from these radical changes. And, in the light of this, we can indicate some of the main elements making up a strategic peacebuilding approach for IOs that follow from this.

CLAUSEWITZ IN REVERSE: WHEN POST-WAR DOES NOT MEAN POST-CONFLICT

The second section of the paper considers the fact that in many cases ‘post-war’ does not mean ‘post-conflict’ – indeed necessarily so if there is to be sufficient agreement to end the main fighting – and explores the ways in which this poses a central challenge – ethical as well as practical - to international peacebuilding interveners, notably IOs.

The famous observation of von Clausewitz that war is ‘a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means’ also applies in reverse in many, if not most, previously intractable intense political conflicts. This is not surprising given the complex and multi-layered nature of the wars in question, as seen above, and the subsequent deep compromises made in the agreements to end them:

It can be claimed that the ambiguity of the language of the Good Friday agreement in Northern Ireland has allowed the creation of a discursively paradoxical reality which manifested through manifold nuances of discourse, which, in turn, lie at the heart of the success of the peace process as we know it today, (Filardo-Llamas, 2008)

For example, having analyzed 646 documents ‘which could lay claim to the name peace agreements’ signed between 1990 and 2007, addressing 102 conflicts in 85 jurisdictions, Christine Bell – following my concept of Clausewitz in reverse – concludes that peace agreements do not end the most complex conflicts, but transmute them (Ramsbotham, 2000, 169; Bell, 2008, 201). Her main argument is that this ongoing flood of agreements makes up a rapidly evolving ‘law of peace’ in which ‘peace agreements assert their own legaliz- ation, and force changes in international law’s core doctrines’ (Bell, 2008, 22). In these cases the myriad aspects of ‘hybrid self-determination’ and ‘constructive ambiguity’ reflected in these documents are ultimately derived from the attempt to ‘translate the conflict from violent to non-violent forms, rather than resolve it’. In order to achieve this, competing ideologies, interests, and identity groups have to be permanently accommodated by the adaptation of existing power structures in a wide variety of different ways. This forces innovatory forms of ‘disaggregated’ and ‘dislocated’ power arrangements that progressively redefine the nature of the state itself. She concludes that ‘international law appears to be moving towards underwriting a more complex and ambiguous mix of repre- sentative and participative democracy linked to a more fluid concept of statehood with fuzzy sovereignty’ (ibid. 236).

To put this another way, in many of the peace agreements ending overt war in hitherto intense and intractable politi- cal conflicts, the key move has been to separate what I call ‘extremists of ends’, who continue to pursue their political goals, from ‘extremists of means’, who want to use violent ways of doing so. Mahondas Gandhi and Martin Luther King were extremists of ends but not extremists of means. In Northern Ireland the 1998 Good Friday agreement did not end the conflict. Nor did the 2006 St Andrews agreement, which eventually brought the biggest Unionist party, the DUP, into the peace process. Sinn Fein continues to battle for a united Ireland, albeit via the route of power sharing and the ballot-box, not the armed struggle. Were this not the case, the Republicans would not have entered the peace process in the first place.

In other words, in these cases peace is the continuation of war by other means – a development foreseen, with his usual perspicacity, by von Clausewitz himself:

The main lines along which military events progress, and to which they are restricted, are political lines that continue throughout the war and into the subsequent peace. (1832/1976, 70)

So in these cases the political framework for post-war peacebuilding is one of intense continuing conflict ‘along the lines’ etched deeply into the society in question during the
preceding war and what had earlier led up to it. IO peacebuilders have to shape their interventions accordingly. This accentuates the more familiar ‘dilemmas’ of post-war peacebuilding, such as tensions between peace and justice, or peace and democracy [for example see Jarstad and Sisk, 2008]. Although I prefer to see these as necessary trade-offs and unavoidable tensions or paradoxes – not so much dilemmas [two incompatible alternatives neither of which is desirable] as combinations of options that are at the same time both mutually dependent (there cannot be one without the other) and mutually in tension [each has a tendency to undermine the other]. This includes the fact that only the strong intervene in the weak so that ‘effectiveness’ is in tension with the aim of building independent indigenous capacity. The shorter-term ‘negative’ goal of ending direct violence is in a number of arenas in tension with the longer-term ‘positive’ goal of building sustainable peace. And statebuilding and peacebuilding are often both in mutual tension and in mutual dependency.

The challenge to IO legitimacy

The intensity of the conflictual post-war environment means that everything is politicized. This has often dismayed emergency relief, human rights, and development INGOs and NGOs who want to see their role as ‘non-political’. But since the turbulent 1990s it has become more widely understood that self-perception is not the decisive factor here. In a highly politicized conflict context it is not up to the interveners to define their own neutrality, impartiality and disinterestedness. If third parties bring resources into an intense conflict zone they will become part of the struggle. If they are seen to help one party they will be seen to threaten another. It they subsequently disappoint the expectations of indigenous actors who originally welcomed them in, these will then turn against the third parties. The ideological principles of interveners will conflict with local traditions, power relations and practices – which are also in mutual conflict. Even UNSC resolutions do not resolve this – the UNSC is more often than not internally divided itself, despite the careful wording of communiqués, and is in any case seen to be politicized by those who oppose its decisions.

All of this was foreshadowed in the painful experience of what used to be called ‘humanitarian intervention’ in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. This was when relief and humanitarian INGOs and NGOs, who thought that they were ‘non-political’, found that they were not – witness the intense soul-searching that went on in the ICRC about the foundational Red Cross/Red Crescent ethical principles. Often newer INGOs - like Medecins Sans Frontieres - had no such compunctions. Something similar applied to development INGOs and others [we may think of Mary Anderson’s Do No Harm later in the 1990s]. In post-war, but not post-conflict, environments peacebuilding IOs are not ‘non-political’.

The challenge to IO effectiveness

This directly affects the question of IO peacebuilding effectiveness for reasons emphasized below. The intensity of the politicized arena can be likened to a minefield. It is essential for IO post-war peacebuilders to relate their complex cross-sectoral aims, and short-term, medium-term and long-term goals, to the political reality of ongoing conflict at all levels – local, national, regional and international. Without this they are going blind into a hornets’ nest.

In other words, in situations where post-war does not yet mean post-conflict, in addition to the more familiar tensions and paradoxes, IOs do well to see themselves as part of the struggle. So they, too, need a capacity for strategic thinking in relation to the wider internal and external conflict dynamics. The requirement is for Strategic Peacebuilding.

STRATEGIC PEACEBUILDING

The third section of the paper, therefore, proposes to outline an IO Strategic Peacebuilding Template in environments of ongoing political conflict. Its aim is to assist IOs in addressing the challenges to their legitimacy and effectiveness resulting from the politicization of the post-war peacebuilding field, as indicated above.

Legitimacy and the ethics of IO intervention

Legitimacy is not just a major source of IO relative strength in terms of effectiveness, as emphasized below, it lies at the very heart of what IO post-war peacebuilders are – how they are defined in UN documents and resolutions, for example.

So legitimacy permeates the IO Strategic Peacebuilding Template that follows. On the one hand it is strategically clear that IO perceived legitimacy is constantly challenged and in jeopardy in the continuing post-war conflict environment. On the other hand, it is equally clear that the
fight for perceived legitimacy at all levels is nevertheless a central peacebuilding strategic goal. IOs are – or should be - **guardians of international peacebuilding values**.

What does this mean? What are international peacebuilding values? How do they relate to the UN and its agencies, or to associated international entities, including the whole contested notion of international law? These are central strategic questions. For example, are these values marginalized by great power politics? In that case peacebuilding collapses into expedient stabilization. Or do they represent a somewhat minimal area of international agreement that suits state interests? Or are they more than this - do they genuinely embody internationally recognized standards and principles endorsed trans-culturally? Or is all of this in turn only a 70-year phase in world history, to be superseded by a ‘transvaluation of all values’ in the wake of the passing of Western hegemony?

These questions are too large for this paper. But they lie at the centre of the nature and overall purpose of the IO post-war peacebuilding strategy.

**Effectiveness and the pragmatics of IO intervention**

Legitimacy and effectiveness are closely related in IO post-war peacebuilding. To the extent that IOs are indeed seen to be guardians of international post-war peacebuilding norms, their relative capacity to act effectively is greatly advanced. Conversely, loss of perceived legitimacy threatens to be fatal to their practical efficacy. In relation to state power, for example, in 2003 US military capacity was able to topple Saddam Hussein remarkably quickly. But post-war peacebuilding proved to be beyond the power, not only of the US Department of Defence, but of the entire US government. IOs had to be brought in. And the subsequent struggle for legitimacy was central to their task.

The Template that follows is intended to be indicative only. It is derived from a methodology for collective strategic thinking in general pioneered between 2008 and 2018 in the Israeli/Palestinian conflict.¹ The headings can be changed. So can the order. Since the sequence interconnects at almost every point ordering is in any case only an initial convenience. The template can be used by individual IOs, and, where appropriate, by groups of IOs. It reaches out into the notorious complexity of the multi-dimensional conflict reality. But it should itself attempt to preserve simplicity and an easily understood form or it will be too complicated to be helpful. More detailed conflict mapping and conflict analyses can be introduced wherever needed without sacrificing overall coherence and clarity. The same applies to the often elaborate ‘spaghetti’ conflict mapping diagrams with all their arrows, which can be useful, but sometimes seem rather arbitrary in the diverse ‘factors’ that they include, and sporadic in the ‘causal’ interconnection directions that the arrows are meant to indicate. One of the benefits of a collective strategic thinking approach is to enable new participants to join in, make criticisms and suggest amendments, and thus feel ownership. Another is the possibility of sharing and developing a common strategic vocabulary as a result.

The brief comments that follow the Template aim only to indicate possible elaborations in the space available.

**Remarks on the Template for IO Strategic Peacebuilding**

1. **For whose strategic benefit?** The needs of host country populations lie at the heart of the IO international peacebuilding norms. But the word ‘conflicting’ shows that it is strategically clear from the start that this will need to be negotiated across diverse and conflicting internal constituencies at local, provincial and national levels. Some conflict mapping is needed here. This commitment underpins the peacebuilding values of which IOs are the international guardians.

2. **Whose strategy?** This refers to the IOs themselves. The principle of complementarity demands, if not direct coordination (this will vary from mission to mission), then compatibility across and between the different IOs that cover the diverse and overlapping peacebuilding sectors (see below). Professional jealousies must be set aside. This is a strategic requirement.

3. **Strategic context.** The basic political map appears here. The *status quo post bellum* (situation at the end of the war) is analysed as a complex conflict system. The interconnections need to be understood both internally across local and national levels, and externally across regional and international levels. Who are the main actors and what are their strategic interests and aims?

¹ This was based on the work of the Palestine Strategy Group (PSG), the Israeli Strategic Forum (ISF) and the Palestinian Citizens of Israel Strategy Group (PCISG)and is summed up in Ramsbotham (2017) *When Conflict Resolution Fails*. 
[4] Strategic balance of power. What are the strategic strengths and weaknesses of the IOs in question in relation to their capacity to satisfy host population requirements (1) when compared with those of other peacebuilders (2), and cross-cutting internal and external political interests (3)? IOs are certain to have obvious weaknesses compared to governments (including the host government) and states, but also compensating strengths and leverage. (This corresponds to the strength and weakness components of a SWOT analysis)

[5] Strategic scenarios. Here consideration is given to possible political outcomes in the ongoing conflict context. Are there

A TEMPLATE FOR IO STRATEGIC PEACEBUILDING

WHO ARE WE?

• For whose strategic benefit?
  Determining central IO missions: to meet the (conflicting) needs of host country populations. IOs as guardians of international peacebuilding values.

• Whose strategy?
  Attaining sufficient complementarity within, across and between different IOs – a strategic prerequisite.

WHERE ARE WE?

• Strategic context
  The status quo post bellum as a complex system: sectors, levels and phases in post-war reconstruction – identifying competing internal identity groups and the interests of external state parties.

• Strategic balance of power
  Weighing strengths and weaknesses in IO legitimacy and capacity to meet the requirements identified under strategic benefit and strategic context above in relation to other interveners, continuing internal conflicts, and external interested parties.

WHERE DO WE WANT TO GO?

• Strategic scenarios
  Evaluating possible futures to be promoted or blocked – desirability, attainability, likelihood.

• Strategic goals
  Determining short-term, medium-term and long-term destinations in light of the above: the dynamics of post-war peacebuilding, including exit strategies.

HOW DO WE GET THERE?

• Strategic paths
  Orchestrating complementary options to mirror the complexity of the strategic context: how to get to strategic goals – a phased post-war peacebuilding matrix.

• Strategic alternatives
  Preparing for either-or choices: Plan A, Plan B, etc. in the light of possible future scenarios – readiness to compromise; accept unpalatable ‘bedfellows’; change sequencing; work under unwelcome constraints/leadership – or pull out.

• Strategic means
  Assessing how best to move down strategic paths in light of comparative strategic strengths and weaknesses above: the relative efficacy of different forms of power - threat (peacekeeping, peace enforcement), exchange (resources), integrative (legitimacy) etc. IO comparative advantage in peacebuilding capacity.

OTHER DIMENSIONS

• Strategic opponents
  Looking at the chessboard from the perspective of potential or actual opponents: anticipating and responding to blockers and spoilers at all levels.

• Strategic allies
  Identifying internal and external peacebuilding allies as force multipliers.

• Strategic communication
  Winning the war of words: convincing host populations and external backers of the importance of sustaining support during what is likely to be a long, complicated, tortuous – and contested - process. Retaining perceived legitimacy.
possible political futures that are more or less desirable from an IO peacebuilding perspective? If so, how attainable and likely are these, and to what extent can they be encouraged or blocked by the peacebuilding process itself? This provides the fundamental strategic framework for the preparation of peacebuilding contingencies. Based on (4), how much can or should IOs themselves do to help bring desirable political futures about? (This corresponds to the opportunity and threat components of a SWOT analysis).

(6) Strategic goals. The determination of strategic peacebuilding goals in the light of (5) into short-term, medium-term and long-term is of central strategic significance. Goals can be further specified in terms of sectors (see (7)), although these ought to be coordinated where possible. Short-term advantages to host populations are seen to be important. But, as noted above, controversial ‘trade-offs’ cannot be avoided. Longer-term flexibility includes ‘exit strategies’ in case the conflict situation intensifies to that point.

(7) Strategic paths. Here we reach the central ‘peacebuilding matrix’ discussed earlier. These are the strategic routes for reaching the goals specified under (6). An attempt is made to orchestrate levels, sectors and phases to match the systemic complexity of the post bellum strategic context analyzed under (3). These are the compatible options. IOs may plan strategically in conjunction with other IOs and NGOs (2) and with internal and external governments. Individual IOs may also want their own strategic peacebuilding matrices.

(8) Strategic alternatives. But sometimes, particularly in areas of continuing conflict, the options may be incompatible. These are the ‘forks in the road’. IO peacebuilders may be reluctant to have to choose, but would be wise to prepare Plans B, C etc. in the light of contingencies looked at under (5), and the staging posts where these might be reviewed. This includes readiness to compromise, accept unpalatable ‘bedfellows’, work under unwelcome constraints/leadership etc. – or pull out.

(9) Strategic means. This refers to how best to move down strategic paths in the light of comparative strengths and weaknesses (4). If power is the ability to get what you want done, what forms of power are available to peacebuilding IOs? Forcible options are rarely directly available or appropriate for IO peacebuilders, although peacekeeping and other military options are often coordinated particularly early on. ‘Exchange power’ (for example in the form of deployment of resources) and ‘integrative power’ (for example via the conveying or withholding of legitimacy) also need to be weighed up. The strategic thinking requirement here is that strategic means should continually be assessed in relation to their efficacy in attaining strategic goals (6) within the changing strategic context (3) - and adapted accordingly.

(10) Strategic opponents. The recognition of strategic opponents is strictly defined in terms of who blocks IO strategic peacebuilding goals (6) – as is the appropriate response. ‘Opponents’ refers to those potentially or actually blocking those goals. Analysis under (1), (3) and (4) is drawn on here. The strategic aim is to look at the conflictive chess-board from the perspective of actual or potential blockers at all levels – internal (local, provincial, national/governmental) and external (regional and international) in order to anticipate problems and determine how best to minimize them. Subsequent communication with amenable constituencies within the obstructive parties is a major strategic priority here.

(11) Strategic allies. Similarly important strategically is the identification of internal and external third parties – sometimes surprising – who can play a positive role in the peacebuilding enterprise in general and in helping to minimize or overcome opposition (10). Potential strategic allies may not be clearly prominent to begin with among the initial peacebuilding players. This can be seen as a ‘force-multiplier’.

(12) Strategic communication. Underpinning all this is strategic communication – the capacity of IO peacebuilder(s) in general to communicate appropriately and effectively with all those identified under (1) to (11) above – and wider national audiences within host countries and regional and wider international audiences beyond. Since in IO post-war but not post-conflict peacebuilding IOs are themselves part of the struggle, ‘winning the war of words’ is an integral part of their own strategy. This means – to repeat the words above – convincing host populations and external backers of the importance of sustaining support during what is likely to be a long, complicated, tortuous – and contested – process.

All of this will vary according to context, as noted earlier. In wealthy mature democratic states IO peacebuilding can be relatively easily coordinated through host governments. In disintegrated states IO peacebuilding may have to be bar-
gained for across the Hobbesian ‘political market-place’ (de Waal, 2016). In authoritarian states IO peacebuilding must be negotiated with sometimes unrepresentative and predatory governments. In general, in contested states IO peacebuilding has to be pursued in relation to the sometimes incompatible political interests of diverse identity groups. These are not mutually exclusive alternatives. IOs also have to operate within constraining international mandates and the sometimes competing interests of donor countries.

CONCLUSION

In situations where ‘Clausewitz in reverse’ applies, IO post-war peacebuilders need a capacity for collective strategic thinking that helps them to identify challenges associated with the intense and politicized ongoing conflict field. They are participating as major players in a highly complex process, admittedly largely out of their control, but one which may nevertheless be critically influenced by the skill and determination with which the peacebuilding enterprise in general is sustained and pursued. IOs have a central function here both in terms of technical expertise and in terms of legitimacy as the primary ‘guardians of international peacebuilding values’.

In the task of formulating and adapting a peacebuilding strategic approach in these circumstances I suggest, in conclusion, that conflict resolution and strategic studies need to be combined. Conflict resolution needs to learn how to deal with intractable conflict and forcible forms of power, and strategic studies needs to learn how to put its understanding of statist interest at the service of building a sustainable peace. For example, given the complexity of patterns of unresolved conflict in a number of states across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, the huge task of what is hoped may eventually be post-war peacebuilding even in Syria and Yemen, will undoubtedly demand herculean capacities guided by clear, pragmatic but also principled strategic thinking. In many states the aspirations of minority identity groups (such as Sunnis and Kurds in Iraq, Alawites and Kurds in Syria, diverse cross-cutting identity groups in Yemen) have to be factored in to IO strategic thinking. Further complications are provided by the rival interventions of powerful regional and wider international players.

All of this is almost comparable to the task of reconstructing Europe - and other parts of the world - after 1945. The burst of creativity that produced so many IGOs and INGOs at that time, which remain key players seventy years later, sets a standard of strategic energy that we may want to try to emulate today.

References


---

2 In 2016 I presented a paper on combining conflict resolution and strategic studies to the MENA Regional Strategic Studies Center, Cairo, subsequently published in Arabic in Resolving Conflicts in the Middle East: An Integrative Perspective.
COMPLICATION INSTEAD OF COMPLEXITY: THE EU AS A GLOBAL PEACEBUILDING ACTOR

Jan Pospisil
Head of Research, ASPR Vienna

Summary
The peace efforts of the European Union face increasing challenges: in large parts of the EU’s neighbourhood regions armed conflicts are ongoing. The often-cited link between integration and peace, for which the EU has even received the Nobel Peace Prize, shows only limited effectiveness at current. In contrast to numerous opinions that cite technical deficiencies, disagreement or the lack of political as possible reasons for the problem, this contribution argues that the misguided neo-functionalist understanding of peace is at the core the issue. Peace through integration works only in historically exceptional circumstances and is in no way a law of international politics. The EU is therefore called upon a profound political engagement in situations of complex conflict.

Introduction
The achievements of the European Union in international peacebuilding repeatedly give rise to controversial assessments and discussions. Undoubtedly there is now a considerable number of political and armed EU interventions, with a significant rise after the end of the Cold War [Freire & Galatino, 2015: 1]. These interventions are not limited to the military or security missions, but are highly diversified, with a pronounced focus on socioeconomic development and humanitarian conditions. This is accompanied by a strong political commitment, which is inextricably linked to the history of the Union. The EU understands itself by virtue of its existence as a peace actor. It has received the Nobel Peace Prize in 2012. In terms of its main narrative, a functionalist interpretation of institutionalism, the EU has coined the idea of peace through integration, based, on the one hand, on a solid normative framework peppered with soft power, and, on the other hand, on a pragmatic understanding of state sovereignty with a strong focus on inter-state cooperation. The success of the Union, however, is undeniably mixed: Despite massive funds used in its external efforts – for example, the accumulated funds of the EU and its Member States (MS) in development cooperation in the year 2014 are 58.3 billion Euros – the violent conflicts in the EU’s vicinity are increasing. This particularly applies to the regions of the so-called European Neighbourhood Policy, where violent conflicts rise. This paper aims to explore the reasons for the, at least in terms of the resources used, lack of success of the EU efforts in the international peace development. Such a discussion can draw on considerable degree of self-criticism. Even if these findings may be controversial in its clarity, the technical and structural deficiencies of the EU external relation policy have been discussed in depth. Further, there is the constant political challenge of stringent strategy development: a total of 32 EU peacebuilding actors (28 Member States, the European Commission, the Council, the European Parliament and the European External Action Service EAD) do not simply create synergies and give accumulative power, but rather result in a cacophony of messages and short-term initiatives which are hardly ever on a common line. However, the argument presented here goes a step further. It argues that at the current stage the EU’s neo-functionalist core story has turned into a serious obstacle for their international engagement. This is especially true for the field of peacebuilding, where promising theoretical and conceptual initiatives, such as the EU-Commission’s 2013 Action Plan for Resilience in Crisis Prone Countries, are doomed to fail in the face of the predominant liberal institutionalist paradigm. Despite, or perhaps precisely because of the political differences among the EU MS, neo-functionalism, especially in its expression as ‘peace through integration’, has developed into an unquestioned policy myth shared by most involved stakeholders.

Yet, as the present debate on the so-called ‘local turn’ [Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013] shows, peacebuilding needs to be locally contextualized in order to deal with the complex and hybrid processes on the ground. Neo-functionalism cannot operate in complexity, as it just works in clearly defined and highly specific areas, and it is likely determined by broader conditions [such as long-lasting economic boom phases]. As a political model for building, developing or forming peace it is unusable. The EU’s inability to accept a more flexible, resilience-based approach of dealing with complexity – which, after all, it itself has suggested – makes matters even more complicated: inconsistent political approaches, structural disorder, technical overstretch. The existing diversity of approaches is not seen as a strength, but understood and treated as a problem: a self-critique of the complications instead of accepting and engaging with complexity.

In order to explore this argument, the article in its first part empirically examines the developments in the immediate vicinity of the Union. The conceptual and institutional framework of the EU are discussed in the second part. In the third section, the article engages with the concept of ‘compromised peacebuilding’. The fourth part discusses the theoretical foundations of the EU’ peacebuilding involvement, and the effects and the
Violent conflict also increases in other neighbourhood regions, as such violent conflicts. The final considerations discuss the consequences of these limitations.

‘Peace Power’ Europe - Surrounded by War?
Armed conflicts within the EU, the current candidate countries and the EU neighbourhood policy countries have led to 135,000 violent deaths in the past 15 years. The large share of this figure is accounted for by the extremely violent conflict in Syria, whose incredible dimension of course blurs any statistical trend. Still it is hardly possible to neglect the empirical fact that the once so prominent Barcelona process, a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership that aimed to create ‘common space of peace, prosperity and progress’ [see, for example, Jünemann, 2005] never became reality. Without a doubt, the EU’s regional environment has developed unfavourably in the course of the last two decades with regard to this objective.

While the much-cited ‘integration pull’ certainly showed effects, a concentric expansion of a zone of peace certainly did not realise. The political and public debate usually focuses on partial aspects: the problematic and conflictual progression of the Arab Spring is often mentioned. Emphasis is given to the agent-level, for example the personal responsibility of Bashar al-Assad and Vladimir Putin for the violent events in core regions of the EU Neighbourhood Policy (Syria, Ukraine), which in both cases resulted in a sanctions regime. To empirically substantiate the finding of the failure of the EU peacebuilding, it is necessary to assess the current geographical environment of the EU. The current escalation in relation with Russia is the first element that needs to be highlighted. At current, it is controversially debated whether there is a conflict of values and power at play, or if this conflict is a result of geo-politically motivated dispute of competing integration efforts. A turnover of the latter into the former is likely, what raises the question of the co-responsibility of the EU for this conflict [cf. Haukkala, 2015]. Was the current escalation inevitable? Is it really true that the Ukraine war is solely Russian’s responsibility, especially when analysed in a medium-term perspective? These questions cannot be explored further at this point, yet EU’s relations with Russia can hardly be described as a strategic peace policy.

Violent conflict also increases in other neighbourhood regions.

In March 2016, the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh, frozen for almost two decades, escalated again. A positive impact of the EU on a transformation of this conflict is – and has been in the past two decades, partly due to simple overstretch (Wolff, 2007) – not detectable. Geographically even closer is Transnistria; here, too, the situation is significantly complicated by the conclusion of a new free trade agreement of the EU with Moldova [Pospisil & Rodehau-Noack, 2015: 5], without any viable solution in sight. The official EU position is largely passive and restricted to appease nationalist hardliners on the Moldovan side, even though politics in Chisinau are highly fluid after mass protests in 2016. Similar to the Ukraine, the EU’s policy could be overtaken by reality. The Arab Spring has, in the last instance, also developed into a disaster for the EU foreign policy. Any approaches to peacebuilding, apart from measures to curb migration from the regions, are barely noticeable. In all three ongoing violent conflicts in the region, Syria, Libya and, currently with a lower level of escalation, Egypt 2, the EU initially launched a campaign for value-oriented political change, only to learn that the persistence and long-term nature of the transformation processes would far overwhelm its existing policy instruments [cf. Hollis, 2012]. Instead of continuing such a value-oriented peace policy with a strategic integration perspective, as the neo-functionalist myth would require, meanwhile the focus has shifted on a limitation of the migration from the region. The current initiatives to re-establish a single government in Libya, hardly embedded in the regional context, are primarily motivated by this reasoning. The handling of the in mid-2015 again escalated armed conflict in Turkey is probably the largest downfall of the EU peace policy: Despite obvious political responsibilities – the Turkish government began the war in the Kurdish regions as an immediate response to their relative defeat in the parliamentary elections in June 2015 – the EU behaves passively. This attitude aggravates during the year 2016, when Turkey became the central partner in the mitigation of the so-called ‘refugee crisis’, which were in fact migration flows triggered by the further escalation of the Syrian conflict. This eventually resulted in the ‘readmission agreement’ in March 2016.3

---

1 This number is based on a calculation of the conflicts in the years 2000 to 2014 based on the data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, www.ucdp.uu.se.

2 The ongoing war in Yemen is not included in this list, because Yemen is not a country targeted by the EU neighbourhood policy instrument. In contrast to Libya, where negotiations for an integration into this instrument have started in 2008, there are also no steps in this direction.

3 European Council, EU-Turkey statement, 18 March 2016, Press release, 144/16.
Mixed Success of the Enlargement Policy

In the Treaty of Lisbon (EU, 2007, type 2 para 8), the European Union explicitly commits itself to the development of global peace: ‘It [the European Union] shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development of the earth […]’. As noted above, this commitment is a direct result of its founding story, which frames the EU as a central element of the intra-European reconciliation in the post-World War II era. The enlargement policy is the primary peace-creating instrument to implement this idea. The ‘integration pull’, generated by the prospect of EU accession, should ensure – by the immediate expansion process as well as by the candidate status – that the zone of peace and prosperity, as which the Union understands itself, is expanding further. At first glance, the concept shows remarkable success: the integration of the Central European parts of the former Soviet bloc countries in several rounds of enlargement, as well as the inclusion of Slovenia and Croatia as the historical consequence of the post-Yugoslav wars are impressive achievements of a historical dimension. Furthermore, the pacification and partial transformation of intra-European conflicts could be completed, in particular the armed conflicts in the Basque Country and in Northern Ireland for a critical assessment of the achievements of the EU in the Northern Ireland peace process in the context of their neo-functionalist orientation see Tannam, 2006). Even if the idea of separatism in both concerned member states is by no means at its end (Basque Country and Catalonia in Spain, Scotland in the UK), the political methods remain on the non-violent level. However, there are also less successful outcomes of this policy. With the accession of a divided Cyprus before a solution to the conflict between the Greek and Turkish part of the island the EU created a problematic precedent that is beyond any quick solution (Akbulut, 2013: 12-19). Almost paradoxically the ‘peace through integration’ narrative was turned on its head, as the EU integration of Cyprus arguably made any solution much more difficult. The situation in the candidate country Turkey is highly problematic as well. The Kurdistan ‘peace process’, if it ever existed, did not only end formally, it has turned into open warfare in the Kurdish regions. The EU policy is fickle, and, in view of the ‘refugee crisis’, vis-a-vis the Turkish AKP government opportunist. Any belief in eventual positive effects of EU integration on the developments in Kurdistan is wishful thinking at best. At second glance, the results in South-Eastern Europe are as well far from encouraging. Neither Bosnia Herzegovina nor Kosovo are at the brink of a new outbreak of war. Yet, both situations are stabilized on the issue of the Stabilization paradigm see Mac Ginty, 2012) at best – in a decidedly negative meaning – and far from being solved. In Bosnia, a situation of ‘political unsettlement’ (Bell, 2015: 13) has institutionalised and formalised, the development of any nation-state is virtually impossible. This has been well documented and analysed, and the responsibility of the international community – which de facto legitimised the ethnic cleansing during the war through the imposture of the Dayton post-war settlement – has been clearly emphasised (see Chandler, 2005). The interesting dimension especially when the European Union is concerned is the conceptual framework responsible for this situation. It is the combination of the creation of an institutionally unsettled framework based on separated ethno-political entities, which is practically externally enforced, with the rock-solid conviction that the EU integration processes could bridge these now institutionalised ethno-political cleavages. Meanwhile it became obvious that this approach failed, at least in the case of Bosnia. The political conflict over Kosovo as well has yet to turn a positive shift. There are encouraging developments: certainly motivated by the perspective of EU integration, the current Serbian government shows flexibility. A sustainable institutional solution, however, lies in the distant future. Without further expanding on the complex causes of the present challenges in Kosovo it is fair to assume that the idea that offering a concrete integration perspective would result in institutional dynamics that could work towards solving the conflict has been misguided. Yet, the EU policy indeed has a pull factor: migration from the region into the EU is permanently ongoing, which is, however, not welcomed by the EU member states. The example of Kosovo shows that the EU is indeed recognised as a successful model, especially by the populations of the countries in the formalised neighbourhood area. Where the idea of an ‘integration pull’ has not materialised, however, is the neo-functionalised promise of an institutional transformation in the respective regions. This sobering balance sheet can be explained by different reasons. The common explanation pattern (see, for example, Tocci, 2015) focuses on technical and structural shortcomings. The EU would not have the ability – in terms of its capabilities and instruments – to appropriately respond to these challenges in its regional environment. A number of initiatives, such as the debates on a common EU army, the European „Global Strategy“, or the European diplomatic
service, established by the Lisbon Treaty in 2007, point in this direction. The existing instruments and funds would therefore suffer from a coordination problem, impeding an effective implementation.

Also starting with these technical and structural weakness, a second line of argumentation identifies the lack of political will as the root cause of this issue. EU foreign policy hence needs to be a highly coordinated, but ultimately technocratic and unpolitical endeavour in order to function. Since a genuine common foreign policy in the EU-28 is not feasible, given the widely divergent interests and, historical reasons, different partnership structures of the Member States (for a constructivist approach to this issue see, for example, Diez, 2014).

Finally, there is the option to explain the failure of EU’s peace policy by an underlying ontological problem, the idea of peace through integration. This article suggests this argument, and interprets the other two explanations – technical-structural issues and political issues – as subordinate to this ontological problem. In contrast to the founding myth of the EU, the argument developed here assumes that neo-functionalism working through political integration has never worked in a peacebuilding manner. Its partial successes were due to a highly favourable framework and context. Apart from that, the idea of a neo-functionalist peace has always been a theoretical, if not even an ideological chimera. As such it has devastating external effects because of its domination of the political discourse.

**Institutional and Structural Causes of the EU’s Peacebuilding Conundrum**

It has been shown that the EU faces massive challenges from the worsening situation in the regions of the EU neighbourhood policy, mainly due to the aftermath of the Arab Spring, and in the other areas of influence, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, linked to the EU by the ACP-partnership agreement. The worsening of the situation is of course acknowledged by the EU institutions. A policy realignment, especially along the issue of a structural unification of the EU foreign and security policy, is therefore constantly discussed and even implemented in various forms. For example, the activities of the EU in peacebuilding have increased and have become more dynamic, particularly since the European External Action Service EAAS has started its work. Therefore, a total of 18 Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions in the broader sphere of influence of the Union, six of them involving a military component. In addition, there is a variety of development policy instruments with veritable funding allocations (in absolute, cumulative, the EU is by far the largest international development donor); in addition to the Neighbourhood policy instruments and the broad European Development Fund (EDF), there are specialized instruments in the peacebuilding field (Instrument for Stability, African Peace Facility). Relatively new programmes based on the concept of resilience pursue innovative approaches by attempting to bundle all levels of intervention, particularly in the Sahel zone (AGIR) and in the Horn of Africa (SHARE). Recently, an EU Trust Funds for Syria was incorporated into these programme lines, with the aim of opening a local perspective for the so-called ‘lost generation’ of the Syrian war (cf. Hauck et al, 2015). Additionally, there are significant activities of the Member States that are too multi-faceted to be discussed here, however, they may not always be in line with the EU policy.

There are considerable difficulties in the implementation of the peacebuilding beyond the regions of the immediate neighbourhood. A telling example is the involvement in the Central African Republic (CAR) in the year 2013. A coup d’état leads to a strong increase of armed clashes, resulting in the call for an international intervention. After the United States declined to intervene, the international pressure on the EU increased. After a common European solution proved to be unfeasible, however, it all came down to a military intervention by France, the former colonial power with the dubious reputation of understanding CAR as its ‘backyard’ (on the history of the often-unfortunate overlaps between EU military intervention and French interests in the region see Bono, 2011).

The EU mediation activities in key conflict areas, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, are also not convincing. The initiatives in CAR and in Mali (see, for example, Rouppert, 2015) can even broadly account for positive examples. Yet in other conflicts in the region, despite relevant diplomatic and political investment, the EU’s efforts, apart from some bilateral development activities (e.g. by the UK) did not contribute added value, especially in hotspots such as Sudan/Darfur, Southern Sudan or Somalia. In Burkina Faso, it was rather the resilience of the Burkinabe society that prevented a collapse after the fall of Blaise Compaoré in October/November 2014. Despite full awareness about the upcoming problem the EU decided not to intervene in the run-up to the fall of Compaoré. A similar problem occurs in Burundi in 2015 as
a result of unconstitutional term extension of Burundian president Pierre Nkurunziza. Here too, the EU has virtually nothing to offer politically, it’s value-based peace policy again fails the reality check, though this time at least the conflict at least did not fully escalate. Despite generally well-developed capabilities (militarily, such as the EU battle groups, or politically, such as through the appointment of special representatives in the context of the EAD), the EU’s role in international peacebuilding remains severely limited. Concrete EU initiatives are restricted to small-scale tasks such as security provision at the Juba airport in the context of the massive violent struggles in South Sudan in 2013. Large-scale peacebuilding or security operations are out of question in virtually all violent conflicts in the EU neighbourhood policy area: Syria, Somalia, or the Ukraine, to name the three most prominent examples. Neither is there is any sufficient common political will, nor is there any concept of how a comprehensive peacebuilding engagement in such situations could be practically implemented. The prevailing political uncertainty is an obvious cause for this problem, yet a distinction must be made between two levels: the basic motivation for a stronger international commitment on the one hand, and the diverging geopolitical orientations of the EU Member States on the other. The former can be well examined by looked at the EU peacebuilding initiatives in sub-Saharan Africa. This can be exemplified not just by the shown difficulties in any military engagement, but also by the strategic inability to use the so-called EU battle groups, a structure designed as a rapid deployment force in such crises. However, their only real purpose appears to be their mere existence, since it seems impossible to take any political decision on their use. In spite of all the instruments and initiatives, peacebuilding is not a defined policy focus of the Union. This is especially true in comparison to international peacebuilding ‘heavyweights’ like Norway or Switzerland. In comparison to other EU policies, the subject has only minor relevance, especially in relation to areas such as agricultural or competition policy. Without a clear demonstration of political will by all EU peacebuilding actors, including the Member States, a neo-functionalist peace agenda is difficult to implement. The respective expectations in the Lisbon Treaty (see, for example, Keohane, 2011) have, up until now, proved to be unrealistic. The second level is the structural problem which may be rendered as a state of mutual irresponsibility. This problem is not a result of wilful failure, flawed political decision making, or a lack of technical skills. It is caused by the shortcomings of common foreign policy structure. The dominant political narrative argues that these shortcomings could be solved by appropriate, courageous, pro-European decision making. However, this assessment is present since the introduction of the common foreign and security policy (CFSP), almost a quarter of a century ago. In spite all coordination mechanisms and structure changes in the Lisbon Treaty, a noticeable political shift towards a unified foreign policy has not materialised. The main challenge is of course the necessary unanimity in CFSP issues since its inception by the Maastricht Treaty in 1993. The Member States are still not willing to give up their strategic interests, which can be exemplified by the sometimes naive and often irrational debate on a single European army. Without recognising the structural constraints and their long-term implications, all the scenario building exercises in the scores of integrationist think tanks and strategy groups are pointless. This is especially true for the political processes around the EU Global Strategy [on this initiative cf. Howorth, 2010; Missiroli, 2015]. The driving idea behind such a global strategy – according to the High Representative Mogherini the establishment of a ‘peaceful global order’, utilising the available instruments of the EU (Tocci, 2015: 116) – is per se neo-functionalist. The development and subsequent existence of the strategy is meant to facilitate a bundling of the current multitude of European foreign policies and instruments. This should go hand in hand with a rigorous EU peacebuilding approach, which is a central component of such a strategy. The given institutional and structural conditions, and, most importantly, the historical experience, these goals appear doubtful. It is the neo-functionalist idea that raises illusive hopes while, at the same time, preventing more pragmatic, and perhaps more effective methods in pro-peace engagement from taking roots.

The EU as a prototypical Compromised Peacebuilding Actor

Michael Barnet and Christoph Zürcher (2009) developed a heuristic, but realistic and very appropriate typology of international peacebuilding. They propose the categories of ‘cooperative’, ‘captured’, ‘conflictive’ and ‘compromised’ peacebuilding, of which the compromised type characterises the majority of international efforts. Cooperative peacebuilding rests on genuinely shared (external) peacebuilders
and (internal) political actors and, therefore, may effectively contribute to the reconfiguration of a formalised ‘political settlement’ (cf. Bell, 2015). However, this is a rare instance compared with the other three, non-ideal types.

‘Captured’ peacebuilding refers to a wide-ranging takeover of peacebuilding efforts along the particular interests of the national elites, and ‘conflictive’ peacebuilding to the enforcement of liberal institutionalism by external actors against the power and the will of the national elites. ‘Compromised’ peacebuilding, in contrast, has a mid-level position in this typology, and is, according to Barnet and Zürcher (2009) the most common case. What does it mean? ‘Local elites and peacebuilders negotiate a peacebuilding program that reflects the desire of peacebuilders for stability and the legitimacy of peacebuilding and the desire of local elites to ensure that reforms do not threaten their power base’ (Barnett & Zürcher, 2009: 24).

In some way or the other, peacebuilders and national, regional and local elites tacitly agree on a specific discourse along which general objectives are formulated in a way that does not hamper both sides from pursuing their respective interests. Such an approach resembles the idea of an ‘organised hypocrisy’, which has already been discussed with reference to international peacekeeping (Lipson, 2007). Yet, Barnett and Zürcher take it a step further and argue that this approach may even be the best approach possible, exactly because of its inherent opportunism, which may translate into policy pragmatism on both ends. This idea certainly deserves attention and cannot be rejected from the outset. However, for the EU this remains a constant challenge, due to the contradiction in between its strong theoretical-ideological corset and the need to often act on the basis of the lowest common denominator; a contradiction which commonly results in denominator purely tactical-oriented decisions and ineffective action.

In view of these institutional and structural weaknesses, the EU is the prototype of a compromised peacebuilding actor. The given structural and technical deficiencies, as well as the political heterogeneity are forcing the EU in such compromised situations, which at the same time helps to cover internal disaccord through technocratic activism. The discrepancy between the ‘peace power’ claim and the reality in the EU’s neighbourhood regions is a good indicator of that. The Union depends on the explicit recognition of their value claims, both by its member states and by external actors. At the same time, it proves to be impossible to uphold these values: neither by the partners in the regions, where a peacebuilding effort is undertaken, nor by the Union itself, since its internal political contradictions become visible in almost every intervention. Thus, a compromised approach may offer the only chance of common action, even more as it shows results than can be communicated as ‘success stories’ (Kosovo or Mali, to name two examples already discussed above).

The Resilience Initiative and the Non-Resonance of the ‘Local Turn’

Initiated by the developmental sector, the year 2009 saw a short shockwave disturbing this long-term deadlock. The inaugural European Report on Development (ERD, 2009) focussed on the question of state- and peacebuilding in Africa and suggested the concept of resilience as a possible common entry point for an original European approach in this area. The lack of context-sensitivity was identified as the main shortcoming of the respective European commitment (ibid.: 4). As a possibly effective cure, resilience was suggested as a new approach in state- and peacebuilding, in remarkable theoretical depth. The report did what seemed impossible in the preceding decades: rendering peacebuilding as a dynamic, complex process that starts from the situation on the ground and eschews linear explanations (on such an approach see, for example, de Coning, 2016).

However, this approach also reveals the weaknesses of the report. Albeit, without doubt, the insights offered were innovative and potentially ground-breaking, the suggestions never made it into implementation. This is mainly due to two reasons:

On the one hand, the ERD failed to connect with existing process structures and to speak to the existing realities at the policy level. The concrete starting point for policy change offered remained severely limited. At the same time, the purpose of the report had already been fulfilled with its publication, a serious debate about its content has never been intended.

On the other hand, the ERD fails to reflect upon the debates on the ‘local turn’ in state- and peacebuilding (see Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013), which started to gain momentum at the
time of its publication. The main argument of this ‘local turn’ is to start with the given context rather than with ideal types of peace, and to start engaging at community rather than on the national level. Further, the idea that peace can be ‘built’ is challenged in principle terms, suggested alternatives include ‘enabling peace’ or ‘peace formation’ (Richmond, 2016). These discussions are by no means limited to the academic level: The ‘local turn’ has significant influence on the approaches of various leading international peacebuilding actors, even within the EU. As a response to the ‘local turn’, the United Kingdom started to use the conceptual idea of ‘inclusive political settlements’ at the policy level (on the adoption of the concept in UK development policy, see Whaites, 2008). ‘Inclusive political settlements’ are based on a hybrid approach of explicitly political work at the elite level, especially in the Mediation area recognized and parallel efforts at the community level.

At EU level such ideas have no uptake. Yet, the resilience initiative has not been dropped. In 2013, in accordance with preparatory publications by the Council and the European Parliament, the EU Commission started to use the conceptual idea of ‘inclusive political settlements’ at the policy level (on the adoption of the concept in UK development policy, see Whaites, 2008). ‘Inclusive political settlements’ are based on a hybrid approach of explicitly political work at the elite level, especially in the Mediation area recognized and parallel efforts at the community level.

The implementation of this policy initiative almost immediately becomes technocratised: the primary aim is building an institutional bridge between the Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (DG DEVCO) and the one for Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid (ECHO). This bridging is pursued in Brussels, but also in two large-scale pilot programmes in Africa (AGIR in the Horn of Africa, and SHARE in the Sahel, see Pospisil & Besancenot, 2014). These programmes encapsulate all existing programme lines in the region and aim to develop new elements based on the resilience paradigm.

In theory, a resilience paradigm has a lot to offer in such settings, since it rests on a broad, systematic understanding of innovation spaces (market structures in particular). For this to happen, though, it needs a political dimension, which is completely missing, as is any strategic link to peacebuilding efforts. Thus, resilience becomes restricted to a purely technocratic tool. While there is an acknowledgement of the complexity of the context at the level of development policy and humanitarian aid, this is not the case at the political level. Here, the meta-narrative of peace through integration, which paradoxically comes along with confusing and at times erratic policy responses, remains in place.

The Boundaries and Limits of the European Neo-Functionalism

Why did the idea of resilience - and the related recognition of peacebuilding as a political engagement in complex social systems – fail in the EU policy framework? The argument put forward here suggests that the domination of a ‘neo-functional peace’ (Visoka & Doyle, 2015) is responsible for this failure. Such a destructive effect of neo-functionalism arises precisely because its dominance as the fundamental guideline of the EU peace policy (cf. Richmond et al, 2011: 460) and as the main storyline behind the success of the Union as such, to which all relevant actors can agree upon notwithstanding their political differences and divergent geo-strategic interests.

Decisive for this historical development is also a specific political interpretation of neo-functionalism: Whereas for example Mitrany (2014: 123) explicitly refutes a political interpretation of a functionalist interpretation of cooperation (‘the political way is too ambitious’) and others warn of its inherent ‘fallacies of grand theorizing’ (Moravcsik, 2005: 351), EU peace policy interprets this approach as a method of anchoring of political values.

Along the idea of the EU as a ‘normative power’, its peacebuilding commitment, according to Ian Manners (2002), rests upon nine ‘core values’: sustainable peace, social freedom, consensual democracy, human rights, rule of law, inclusive equality, social solidarity, sustainable development, and good governance. Manners (2008: 47) sees these fundamental values as fundamentally tied to a global ethic: ‘The ethics of the EU’s normative power are located in the ability to normalize a more just, cosmopolitical world.’ Such a value-based global orientation resembles the three-decade-old figure of the so-called ‘civilisatory hexagon’, suggested by Dieter Senghaas (2004), which rests on the six cornerstones state monopoly on violence, democracy, rule of law, social justice, a culture of conflict transformation and interdependencies and affect control. This concept has proven to be highly influential particularly in the German peace policy (Pospisil, 2009: 275).

Implicitly, these core values are also linked to what John
Ruggie (1993: 140) has called the postmodern option – ‘the community may constitute nothing less than the emergence of the first truly postmodern international political form’ – and to what Borg and Diez (2016: 137) characterise as an alternative horizon of citizenship ‘in which citizens no longer attach themselves to exclusionary identities’. Out of this superstructure emerges a programme that is comprehensive and surprisingly simply at the same time [see Anastasiou, 2007: 48-49]. It does not emerge from any particular context, but is rather a top-down defined programme resting on three main pillars: powerful and capable institutions, democracy and rule of law, and economic integration. The logic of the interaction between technocracy and political integration thus is indicative of a grand civilisation narrative (Visoka & Doyle, 2015: 12). Senghaas (1992) was referring to this exact idea when he was arguing for a ‘positive eurocentrism’. At the same time, the lack of uptake of the ‘local turn’ can be explained as well by this narrative [Richmond et al, 2011: 463-467].

The particular danger of this programme is that it is widely seen as a success story. It is, for example, the reasoning behind the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to the EU, which was awarded precisely for the EU as the example of a zone of peace, freedom and prosperity. In turn, the fundamental neo-functionalist claim was reconfirmed by Herman van Rompuy and Manuel Barroso (2012) in their Nobel Prize Lecture, in which the EU is praised ‘as a successful example of peaceful reconciliation based on economic integration’. This is understood as a global claim. All too often, in this argument the longer historical perspective of is lost. The process of the formation of the European nation states, which forms the basis of today’s integration efforts, not only lasted for centuries, but was also very violent and bloody (see, for example, Tilly, 1985). The political idea of neo-functionalism turns this history upside down and argues for a rationalist interpretation of institutions: if social settings are put in the right institutional framework, they can resettle and transform, ideally into peaceful social welfare states. Jean Monnet (1963: 204) writes: ‘But in the European Communities, common rules applied by joint institutions give each a responsibility for the effective working of the Community as a whole. This leads the nations, within the discipline of the Community, to seek a solution to the problems themselves, instead of trading temporary advantages.’ Clearly, this idea does not only sound optimistic, but progressive, especially in contrast to the realist and later neo-realist domination of international politics in the first half of the 20th century.

Yet there is the issue of the uniqueness of historic processes and constellations: just because something has worked once – as the process of European integration from the 1950s to the 1990s – does not mean that it will work again, in different times, under different circumstances. Further, the ontological foundations of the neo-functionalist interpretation of this process are considered as outdated in economic theory. New Institutional Economics impressively demonstrated the complexity and interdependency of interactions between people and institutions. For this reason, Douglass North (1990: 3-5) has suggested the famous metaphor of institutions as the ‘rules of the game’, which are permanently reconstructed, but also reconfigured in the course of the game, and are therefore subject to permanent change. This metaphor also implies something more: the rules of the game do not necessarily determine the outcome of the game, which would be the core assumption of neo-functionalism. Particularly the work of Elinor Ostrom embeds the question of the role and form of institutions in the broader context of complexity thinking: social systems, she claims, work in a non-linear, aka complex way, and are thus not accessible through a cause- and effect-based linear logic (cf. Ostrom & Janssen, 2004). There are no reliable predictions, and it is meanwhile empirically substantiated that the effect of the institutions is dependent first and foremost by their context. Contrary to claims of accounts such as the influential, but surprisingly unreflective work of Ghani and Lockhart (2008), there is no ‘right’ institutional setting which only had to be implemented correctly in order to work. If the basic assumption of the complexity is taken seriously, it can never be assumed that such an institutional setting results in the desired effects.

Against the background of the efforts towards an EU approach to resilience mentioned above, these insights lead to a paradox assessment. While the EU had been an early adopter of innovative and complexity-based approaches in conceptual discussions and concept development, the implementation fails because of its ideological foundations. Instead of taking on a pioneering role when it comes to practically introducing a complexity-based and also ‘local’ approach to the international peacebuilding mainstream, the EU cannot help but to remain restricted to the traditional ‘muddling through’ of ‘compromised peacebuilding’.

In the course of the contemporary political challenges –
especially the challenge to the European project not only from the political margins, but from core constituencies, such as in the UK or also in the Netherlands and other countries – any doubt or critique of the success through neo-functionalist integration is seen as heresy by so-called pro-Europeans. This is also true for academia, and thus highly problematic since it prevents substantial reflection of the EU’s peacebuilding engagement. Things out not to happen: while a discussion on technical shortcomings and even structural problems is indeed welcomed and put forward by the EU itself (see for example Tocci, 2007), there cannot be any contestation of the fundamental ‘idea Europe’. Against the background of the so perceived need to uphold an ideological narrative, complications appear to be easier to digest than complexity.

Any doubt of the ‘idea Europe’ and the neo-functionalist approach of crafting political institutions globally along a theoretically long outdated ‘liberal peacebuilding’ paradigm as the foundation of any European peace policy is countered with principled or even moral arguments. At the same time, this idea has meanwhile discursively solidified (cf. Dietz, 1999: 610-611). In a state of weakness, any open acceptance of this ontological problem might indeed serve as the beginning of the integration idea. Yet, this in turn would mean if the EU wants to be a global peace power, it is doomed to follow a liberal peacebuilding approach. If recent academic insights – and practical examples – are taken seriously, this almost certainly has to result in permanent failure (cf. Richmond, 2009).

Final considerations

The picture painted here may sound excessively negative, especially because there seems to be no viable solution on the horizon. In the last instance, the European Union must come to terms with its guiding neo-functionalist ‘idea Europe’ and the resulting ‘compromised peacebuilding’, which, furthermore, may have to face challenges in the upcoming future due to wider global shifts. Apart from exceptional processes under exceptional circumstances, the ‘idea Europe’ will not be able to serve as a tool to ‘make’ or build ‘peace’. Nevertheless, there are several options for the EU as peacebuilding actor to address this problem. For of them, realistic to a varying degree, are briefly discussed in the following:

1. The EU decides to fundamentally change its orientation in its peacebuilding commitment towards complexity and context, and, as a consequence, refocuses its efforts on taking up the already seeded resilience approach as a pan-European project of pro-peace engagement. Given what has been discussed above, this option is highly unrealistic. However, it needs to be taken into account that individual initiatives – such as the European Development Report 2009 and the EU Action Plan for 2013 – show remarkable resilience themselves, and are now even reflected in the debates about the European Global Strategy. For this reason alone, it is necessary to keep this option in this list.

2. The EU sticks with its current ‘muddling through’ and decides to continue the current ‘compromised peacebuilding’ practice, possibly going along with an improvement of the structural and technical framework conditions. But even if such improvement is to succeed, the present global constellation suggests that the space for such an endeavour is constantly shrinking. Not just because of the widely visible lack of success: rather, there is a growing critical awareness by ‘partner countries’ about international peacebuilding efforts, and they are less and less willing to unconditionally acquiesce to this compromised approach. The ‘global marketplace of political change’ (Carothers & Samet-Marram, 2015) has become much more diverse. The g7+ group of fragile states may serve as one example in this regard, the increasingly self-confident rejection of institutions of global governance, in particular of the International Criminal Court, by African states as another. ‘Compromised peacebuilding’, especially in the context of the strong value-oriented EU discourse, may reach its endpoint in the foreseeable future.

3. The EU constricts its peacebuilding efforts and focuses on a purely technocratic, unpolitical ‘management of effects’ (Chandler, 2015: 84), which may be rendered as a resilience-based approach, yet is fundamentally different from the approach listed here as option (1). The current trust fund approach, to be found for example in the border regions to Syria as the so-called ‘EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis’, can be interpreted as a first step towards this logic. It rests upon the principle of the lowest common denominator in between EU member states, which not only corresponds with the traditions of EU external affairs, but may be appropriate given the current disintegrationist tendencies. It is therefore a highly realistic option, especially against the background of the massive resources that are available, yet it may be argued that it is ethically questionable.

4. The EU retains its fundamental political claim to peace,
but focuses on realistic goal setting along a clearly outlined political agenda, and with a clear focus on what is doable given the existing political and financial commitment: a pooling of funds and resources, to be allocated to worthwhile initiatives by single or groups of member states, which are interpreted as complementary. Political diversity is no longer rendered as an integration political problem, but as an opportunity. This necessarily implies giving up on the idea of a common EU peace policy. Such a perspective may be controversial and highly disappointing for those who argue that a deeper integration along a neo-functionalist paradigm is the only way forward. However, it may be the probably best option on the table in the current political environment. And it is certainly the only realistic option for the EU that is able to cope with the complexity of the peacebuilding task.

Literature


Hauck, Volker, Anna Knoll, and Alisa Herrero Cangas. 2015. EU Trust Funds – Shaping more comprehensive external action? ecdpm Briefing Note No. 81. Maastricht: European Centre for Development Policy Management.


THE NATURE OF PEACEBUILDING EXPERTISE IN THE UNITED NATIONS PEACEBUILDING COMMISSION: POSSIBILITIES AND LIMITS FOR SUSTAINING PEACE

Maria Stage
Research Assistant, Centre for Resolution of International Conflicts, University of Copenhagen

Introduction
Inclusivity takes a centre stage in recent UN policy on peacebuilding and conflict prevention. At the same time, inclusive approaches to peacebuilding and conflict prevention practices are rarely carried out in a comprehensive manner. Inclusivity is here understood as multi-stakeholder approaches across sectors and levels and with the affected people at the centre. This article reflects upon how the selection of expertise within the UN impacts opportunities and challenges for inclusive approaches to conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

The concurrently adopted resolutions on the UN Peacebuilding Architecture (PBA) by the UN Security Council and the UN General Assembly (GA, 2016; UNSC, 2016) concluded the intergovernmental negotiations of the second review of the PBA. With the resolutions the sustaining peace agenda was introduced. Sustaining peace is to be "broadly understood as a goal and a process to building a common vision of a society, ensuring that the needs of all segments of the population are taken into account..." (GA and UNSC, 2016). It highlights the expansion of peacebuilding efforts of the UN to include all stages of the so-called conflict circle. Furthermore, it emphasises the inclusiveness of all segments of society, the primacy of national ownership and the relevance of peacebuilding across different sectors. The "Pathways for Peace: Inclusive approaches to preventing violent conflict" report by the UN and the World Bank (WB) (2018) directs attention to the need for inclusivity and addressing exclusion. Further - the UN and the World Bank (WB) (2018) directs attention to report by Inclusive approaches to preventing violent conflict” Pathways for Peace: building across different sectors. The primacy of national ownership and the relevance of peacebuilding hasises the inclusiveness of all segments of society, the stages of the so-called conflict circle. Furthermore, it emp-... expansion of peacebuilding efforts of the UN to include all... taking... PBA. With the resolutions the sustaining peace agenda was introduced. Sustaining peace is to be “broadly understood as a goal and a process to building a common vision of a society, ensuring that the needs of all segments of the population are taken into account...” (GA and UNSC, 2016). It highlights the expansion of peacebuilding efforts of the UN to include all stages of the so-called conflict circle. Furthermore, it emphasises the inclusiveness of all segments of society, the primacy of national ownership and the relevance of peacebuilding across different sectors. The “Pathways for Peace: Inclusive approaches to preventing violent conflict” report by the UN and the World Bank (WB) (2018) directs attention to the need for inclusivity and addressing exclusion. Furthermore, it describes the cost-effectiveness of peacebuilding and prevention in terms of avoiding massive human and economic cost of violent conflict as well as contributing to the long-term effects of peacebuilding efforts. Evident from UN policy is a focus on inclusivity and at the same time the leading role of nation-states to effect the needed changes in society at large. Also, the point of departure is a vision of society, not a focus on conflict or violence. Following the agreed policy agendas come the processes of implementation and socialisation – and the challenge of moving from theory to practice. Sustaining peace requires a paradigm shift within the UN, necessitating a sea change in how international interventions are conducted (IPI, 2017). Civil society actors have urged that for such change to happen, operationalisation is needed. Operationalisation implies contextualisation, conflict sensitiveness, building upon mea-...
external expertise (Philipsen, 2013: 284–285). The selection of expertise illustrates the still difficult application of people-centred and inclusive approaches to sustaining peace. Decision-making in global policy concerns continuous struggles stabilising and re-stabilising the social order (Kennedy, 2016). This is interesting in the context of a needed paradigm shift to sustain peace, as common practices need changing within the UN and social order re-stabilised. To understand these struggles of order, attention is directed to actors within the system – e.g. the Peacebuilding Commission – which can actually affect this order (Kennedy, 2016: 110-111). An integral part of the struggles over expertise and power within the system is strategic deliberation, which can lead to the exclusion of ideas and expertise in the system (Kennedy, 2016: ch. 2). The focus on strategic deliberation in decision-making seems mismatched to the call for context sensitiveness and local expertise in the field of peacebuilding. Yet this might be a common challenge of international politics. As Wæver (2010) proposes, the discipline of international relations is in general focused on power and institutions. Furthermore, decision-making in IOs often takes place in spaces remote from conflict-affected societies. On the one hand, the UN is considered an extraordinary agenda-setter and attention-bringer to world matters (Jolly, Emmerij, & Weiss, 2009) – knowledge is easily accessible for the UN due to its broad membership and presence around the world. On the other hand, while the UN is in a unique position, it often does not take full advantage of this in regard to knowledge and ideas (Svenson, 2016: 213, 225), with consequences for peacebuilding efforts – for instance, the review of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture (PBA), describes limited involvement of local actors and recommends enhanced inclusivity in peace efforts in order to sustain peace.

A classification of expertise

This section addresses the question of participation in decision-making by reflecting upon different ways of mastering the domain of peacebuilding. Inclusivity and the participation of relevant stakeholders in peacebuilding approaches are important for the potential of sustaining peace. Participation of ordinary people is a way of making science, technology and decision-making more accountable to the broader population, but when to rely upon experts and when to rely upon ordinary people remains a question. The relation between expertise and participation concerns when and how expertise or participation respectively dominates decisions on peacebuilding. For instance, when decision-making relies upon knowledge of bureaucratic entities remote from conflict-affected societies and when decision-making relies upon local knowledge. To accommodate the question of whom to rely upon in decision-making, Collins and Evans (2007) suggest taking into consideration different forms of expertise. The ability to distinguish forms of expertise in itself provides insights to the quality and nature of expertise (Collins & Evans, 2007a: 613–614, 620–622). Non-experts have expertise, but it is another quality of expertise than experts. This means that expertise can be found in many places, and that experts emphasise some aspects of knowledge at the expense of others. In other words, the nature of expertise matters; if expertise is entirely about social attributions, a distinction between scientific and lay expertise loses its meaning (Collins & Evans, 2007a: 609-610). In other words, the object of analysis should be the nature of expertise itself. With this point of view, Collins and Evans break with what they describe as a tendency in Science and Technology Studies (STS) to favour a relational theory of expertise, in which social acceptance and interaction is pivotal for the process of what becomes authoritative expertise.

In a classification of expertise Collins and Evans present distinct forms of expertise and elaborates on quality. A slightly moderated version of the classification of expertise is illustrated in table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Specialist expertise</th>
<th>Ubiquitous tacit knowledge</th>
<th>Specialist tacit knowledge</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Different levels of knowledge</td>
<td>Interactional expertise</td>
<td>Contributive expertise</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Meta-expertise</th>
<th>External</th>
<th>Internal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ubiquitous discrimination</td>
<td>Local discrimination</td>
<td>Technical connoisseurship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dow-nward discrimination</td>
<td>Referred exper-tise</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Classification of expertise. Source: Collins and Evans (2007)

1 The table is slightly moderated, because the analysis refrains from going into detail with additional features introduced by Collins and Evans.
Introduced are two overall forms of expertise that can be found in the rows of the table: Specialist expertise and meta-expertise. Specialist expertise is the expertise of the actor, which provides insights into the role of the actor and the possibilities and limitations of action. Meta-expertise concerns how expertise is judged and provides a point of departure for a discussion of participation and selection of knowledge in decision-making. This article uses the distinction in forms of expertise to understand the selection of expertise in the PBC. As Collins and Evans note, each of the forms of expertise have quality. Yet the qualities differ, and consciousness about the quality of expertise is important to understand the limits of possibility, and how the balance between participation and expertise should be stabilised (Collins & Evans, 2007a: 622; Collins & Evans, 2007b: 14, 72). Before turning to the analysis of the PBC, I wish briefly to elaborate on the two forms of expertise:

Specialist expertise implies expertise held by an actor. Collins and Evans distinguish between formal and informal ways of knowing as two overall categories of specialist expertise. Formal ways of knowing entail skills in formal rules and facts, which is denoted ubiquitous tacit knowledge; whereas informal ways of knowing implies mastering an entire way of life in the domain in question, and is denoted specialist tacit knowledge (Collins & Evans, 2007b: 28–29). Specialist tacit knowledge refers to a way of mastering a certain domain, in this case, a way of mastering peacebuilding. Collins and Evans distinguish between interactional and contributive expertise. Contributive expertise is at a higher level than interactional expertise, because contributive expertise includes practical competence (Collins & Evans, 2007a: 620–622; Collins & Evans, 2007b: 14–15). Roles that entail contributive expertise are mediators or police officers that act out the peacebuilding activities in practice. For example, the mediator participating in the altering of relations between different parties in a conflict (Collins & Evans, 2007b: 24–25). Roles that entail interactional expertise are evaluators of projects and specialised journalists. In those roles individuals or groups work within a certain domain and they interpret and communicate the activities in that domain, but do not themselves carry out such activities. Accordingly, it is significant to keep the role of the actor in mind to understand the form of expertise.

Meta-expertise concerns the way expertise is judged, and why expertise is included or excluded, depending on whether it is considered legitimate to the public. Jasanoff (2012) has shown that in legal processes at the national level, courts have the ability to differentiate between genuine and false experts and expert claims, even though the court might not have practical experience with the area in question. Despite the lack of experience, the court is able to make judgements (Jasanoff, 2012: 197, 213). Central functions of the PBC are to create awareness and advocate on peacebuilding matters, which entails assembling and disseminating expertise at meetings and in reports and statements. Collins and Evans differentiate between two types of meta-expertise: internal and external meta-expertise. This distinction allows for insights into the aforementioned trade-off between participation and expertise (Collins & Evans, 2007a: 622; Collins & Evans, 2007b: 63). To what extent should the public be involved? To what extent should the experts decide?

External meta-expertise relates to judgement made by actors without expertise on a given issue – actors that are external to the specialised domain. Such judgements concern the consistency of arguments, behaviour and appropriateness of the expert, rather than the practice as such. In other words, the judgement of technical expertise becomes social (Collins & Evans, 2007b: 15). Two subcategories of external meta-expertise are described: ubiquitous discrimination and local discrimination. Ubiquitous discrimination relates to judgements on who should be agreed with rather than the content of the argument. In the same way, local discrimination is about judgement of actors. The difference is that the actor making the judgement through local discrimination has expertise in the same domain, but not the same expertise as the judged (Collins & Evans, 2007b: 47–48, 51). For instance, an individual assisting with constitution writing and a facilitator of reconciliation workshops are both part of the national peacebuilding domain; both take part in activities intended to foster an agreed future of the society, but with different expertise and roles.

Internal expertise relates to three levels of possessing the expertise in question. This ranges from technical connoisseurship (expertise to understand the issue) to downward discrimination (that is the judgement by an expert of other experts with more expertise in the same domain) to referred expertise (judgements using expertise from one domain to assess expertise in another domain).

The classification of expertise provides insights into the pos-
sibilities and limits of the selection of expertise. However, as noted by Collins and Evans, a question left open is to what extent practical experience can be left out, while the domain in question keeps functioning (Collins & Evans, 2007b: 141–142). This seems particularly relevant for the peacebuilding field, in which, as mentioned above, the practical component is profoundly important.

An illustrative example: the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission
Twenty-one interviews were conducted for this research in the month prior to the adoption of the sustaining peace resolutions. Interviewees were individuals involved in the PBA as civil society actors, UN officials or member state representatives. Interviewees reflected upon the role and concept of peacebuilding within the UN, which related to the comparative advantage of the PBC, how peacebuilding as an activity could add to the broader UN effort, and the capabilities and expertise of the PBC. The concept of peacebuilding was described as an almost all-encompassing concept, which is political in nature. The interviews provide insights into the role of different forms of expertise in the PBA, permitting the following analysis. This will illustrate what is considered common sense about general peacebuilding issues, technology applied and decision-making. It enables a discussion of how much practical peacebuilding expertise is needed for the PBC – as a bureaucratic entity – to successfully carry out functions such as generating awareness of challenges and advocating for peacebuilding needs.

Specialist expertise: Sustaining peace or coordinating the UN system?
The PBC was established as part of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture (PBA) in 2005. The PBC has no field presence, which by many interviewees was considered a boundary for action and an indication of the role of the PBC. This indicates that the limited practical component of the PBC is not a problem per se. Rather, attention should be devoted to what is needed in the role of the PBC at UN Headquarters, such as bringing actors and knowledge together.

The PBC coordinates, advocates and raises attention. Meetings of the PBC address context-specific crisis and conflict situations, transnational threats, and lessons learned on peacebuilding practices. In the following this role of the PBC is considered in relation to interactional and contributive expertise as different ways of mastering the peacebuilding domain.

Interactional expertise seems pronounced in the role of the PBC, as it brings stakeholders together, for example by convening meetings on matters of peacebuilding. Whereas the elaboration on the classification of expertise illustrated how the practical component of contributive expertise is not needed in some roles – roles in which interactional expertise is adequate – the elaboration on the field of peacebuilding put emphasis on the component of practical experience in its undertaking.

An example of activity relating to contributive expertise in the PBC is political accompaniment, which concerns institutionalising national ownership through the diplomatic support of the PBC to crisis-affected countries. Political accompaniment entails external diplomats supporting national peacebuilding efforts of other societies (de Coning & Stamnes, 2016a: 10). Despite activities such as political accompaniment, the PBC has been criticised for failing to deliver, in particular in regard to prevent escalation of violence in countries on its agenda (van Beijnum, 2016: 78). While the role of the PBC involves both interactional and contributive expertise, the former seems more pronounced and in line with the PBC being headquarters-based. The classification of expertise introduced interactional expertise as a lower level of mastering the domain than contributive expertise, but this might not disrupt the function of the PBC. What can be considered contributive expertise depends upon the role and function. A journalist is a good example of how interactive ability may be part of the contributive expertise. A journalist needs capacities to interact with informants, as it is part of the role of a journalist. However, as noted by Collins and Evans, expertise needs to be attained. The question raised by Collins and Evans is the question to what degree interactional expertise can be attained without contributive expertise, because the lack of the physical aspect consequently changes the language about the domain (Collins & Evans, 2007b: 36–40). A physical aspect can, in this case, be considered to have conflict and peacebuilding consequences on the ground. For instance, interactional expertise in peacebuilding needs continued contact with peacebuilding on the ground in conflict-affected societies to develop. As mentioned by one of the diplomats interviewed (Diplomat 1, 2016), everyday obligations such as reporting back to the office leave little room for reflection on, for instance, policy development.
Meta-expertise: peacebuilding experience and judgements

In the following I turn to a reflection on the ability of the individuals involved in the PBC to judge peacebuilding knowledge. A central feature of the role of individuals involved in the PBC is the capacity to judge the knowledge and expertise presented to the PBC. Members of the PBC interact in discussions about peacebuilding matters such as the traditional justice system in Liberia or the political dialogue among stakeholders in the conflict in Burundi. The capacity to make judgements by individuals is difficult to measure, but in line with Collins and Evans I presume experience impacts upon the capacity to undertake judgements (Collins & Evans, 2007b: 68). Experience is here understood as experience in judging and/or experience within the domain of peacebuilding. Without those two types of experience there will be no specialist expertise such as interactional and contributive expertise. And without those two types of experience, it will be difficult to interact and contribute to the work of the PBC.

Longstanding members of the PBC have experience in judging peacebuilding knowledge – with or without a practical competence in peacebuilding. However, not all members are experienced PBC members. Diplomats rotate, which influences meetings and discussions. As a PBSO official describes, some new PBC members need an introduction to the purpose and role of the PBC in meetings of the Country-Specific-Configurations, interrupting discussions of peacebuilding matters. At the same time, some members have a good understanding of the UN system and the PBC, which is helpful (PBSO official 1, 2016). The extent of an individual's experience in managing the PBC will necessarily limit how much can be achieved within meetings. Diplomats might not stay on the PBC for long. Therefore, relying on a PBC background as expertise to make judgement of peacebuilding knowledge may in some instances be insufficient for attaining the interactive expertise of the PBC due to the regular replacement of individual members of the PBC. The experience of the informants ranges from thorough knowledge of, and longstanding experience with matters regarding the PBC, to short-term experience and a need to consult papers during the interview that I conducted, in order to remember core parts of the work between the PBC and the countries in question.

Another option for achieving peacebuilding experience concerns knowledge of the specific domain, in this case, by including more members with hands-on peacebuilding experience in the PBC. In the interviews I conducted, experience in peacebuilding did not come across as a preference for membership, compared to having a background within the PBC and understanding of the UN system. Furthermore, peacebuilding is a different priority from member state to member state.

Another aspect concerning the expertise within the PBC is the actors invited to and expertise included in meetings beyond the members of the PBC. The PBC convenes meetings with a variety of actors with and without practical peacebuilding experience. Judgements about expertise are made in such meetings. This is illustrative of how experts with interactional expertise can also acceptably judge experts with contributory expertise, or at least, an operational function (Collins & Evans, 2007b: 37–38, 136–137).

Conclusion

Decision-making in the UN relies upon expertise, but the selection of expertise tends to be mismatched to the suggested expertise found in theory and policy on peacebuilding. On the one hand, the illustrative example of the UN Peacebuilding Commission indicates a role to coordinate and manoeuvre the domain of peacebuilding, rather than contributing with a peacebuilding component. Individuals involved in the PBC describe the role of the PBC as an interpreter of peacebuilding challenges and opportunities and as an intermediary between different stakeholders. On the other hand, this article also illustrates that the ability of PBC members to interpret peacebuilding matters and local conditions in conflict-affected countries should not be taken for granted. Drawing on the classification of expertise by Collins and Evans (2007b) enabled an analysis, which considered the quality of different forms of expertise. The forms of expertise relied upon in the PBC indicates that bureaucratic entities of the UN function without a practical peacebuilding component in the overall system. It also suggests that without a practical peacebuilding component, expertise in the PBC must improve in order for UN peacebuilding to be fit for purpose in the modern world. This article has described a need to actively confront the selection of expertise within UN Headquarters to foster meaningful inclusion in decision-making on peacebuilding.
Bibliography


PBSO official 1. (2016, April 5). Interview [Recorded].


Diplomat 1. (2016, April 25). Interview [Recorded].
Drawing on a study of UNIFIL II, the UN peacekeeping operation in South Lebanon, the paper explores practices of peacekeeping in a social space, which is marked by close entanglements between state and non-state authorities and armed actors. Building on debates in practice-oriented approaches and research on liberal governmentality, it makes a case for focusing on peacekeepers’ engagement with the ‘local’ political order on the level of strategies of governmental intervention and its localized practice. While the mandate of UNIFIL II tasks peacekeepers to support the restoration of internationally acceptable sovereign authority of the state as the sole actor able to legally possess weapons on its territory, their everyday peacekeeping practices are by necessity shaped by interactions with Hezbollah authorities and civilian supporters of the Shiite movement. The resulting peacekeeping practice is thus marked by constant negotiations over what is acceptable both locally and internationally and specific forms of engagement with acceptable versions of the ‘local’. In conclusion, the paper seeks to advance the debate on local hybridity of peace operations, as well as engagement of liberal actors with non-Western forms of political order.

This paper explores the practice of peacekeeping and it inquires how an internationally-designed peacekeeping mandate is translated into a local practice. In particular, it investigates how the UN peacekeeping mission deployed in South Lebanon (United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon - UNIFIL) functions in a social setting, which is defined by close entanglement between state and non-state actors – a condition described by some scholars as a hybrid sovereignty or a hybrid political order (Boege, Brown, and Clements 2009; Hourani 2013; Fregonese 2012). The paper thus points to range of different practices, knowledges and compromises, which keeps a peacekeeping mission in place in such a social setting and contributes to its local acceptance.

Going beyond the focus on local resistance and hybridization of peace programmes and practices (Brown 2017; Mac Ginty 2011; Richmond and Mitchell 2011), it focuses on the perspective of the peacekeeping mission and its adaptation to local conditions. As ethnographic explorations of governmental interventions aptly highlight, there is a range of both formal and informal practices needed to secure the programme of reform and translate it to the conditions, which might not correspond fully to the original plan of intervention and its underlying imagery (Clarke 2012; Li 2007c; Scott 1998). As Tanya Li observed, some of the necessary practices of intervention could take the form of negotiation and compromises over the specific components of the plan, informal agreements, ‘looking the other way’ when the rules are broken, or practical and informal arrangements which ‘keep the system going’ amid unfavourable circumstances (Li 2007a, 280–281).

To paraphrase the processes that make up the ‘assemblage of intervention’ (Li 2007b; Ryan 2015) – the peacekeeping mission must engage in (among other) mobilizing relevant forms of knowledge, constructing routines (i.e. identifying the key issues threatening the order and finding the ways to deal with them) and forging local alliances and containing contradictions stemming from the implementation of the programme. Such continuous ‘work’ and knowledge it requires is the focus of this text. The paper points to three main issues: 1) the adaptation and reformulation of the peacekeeping programme in the face of local resistance, 2) the set of practices and connected forms of knowledge which the peacekeeping mission uses to manage order as well as to maintain its presence in the country and finally, 3) the activities through which peacekeepers seek to enter local communities and align their interests with them.

The paper proceeds as follows. It first briefly reviews UNIFIL’s mandate and intended purpose of its activities. The second part moves on to UNIFIL’s peacekeeping practices and management of local resistance. The third part discusses civil-military outreach activities and the work of ‘winning the hearts and mind’ of the local communities.

**UNIFIL, Lebanese sovereignty and local resistance**

**Resolution 1701: Keeping South Lebanon without non-state weapons and bringing the state back in**

While UNIFIL had been present in the region in various forms since 1978, its peacekeeping role changed significantly in the summer of 2006 in a reaction to the war between Hezbollah and Israel and Israeli campaign in Lebanon (Mermier and Picard 2007). The so-called UNIFIL II, created by the UNSC Resolution 1701 of August 2006 (UN SC 2006a), was strengthened from 4000 up to 12 000 - 15 000 peacekeepers and also acquired a set of new duties. These complemented and expanded the original mandate from the late 1970s, which was mostly oriented on ensuring the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanese territory and enabling the return of state authority to the southern regions of the country (UN SC 1978a; UN SC 1978b).
UNSC Resolution 1701 shifted the focus more strongly (though indirectly) on Hezbollah and its autonomous armed forces. It identified the roots of the 2006 conflict in the lack of control exercised by the Lebanese state over its southern territories – a situation which posed a ‘threat for international peace and security.’ [UNSC 2006a, preamble] as it enabled Hezbollah units to operate outside of the control and oversight of the Lebanese state.

Seeing the main threat for peace in the presence of non-state armed actors represented a continuation of the particular internationalized discourse on Lebanese statehood contained already in Resolution 1559 with its concern about the ‘continued presence of armed militias in Lebanon, which prevent the Lebanese Government from exercising its full sovereignty’ [UNSC 2004; for detailed discussion see Makdisi 2011]. Following this framing, the conditions of future peace have been equated primarily with strengthening the sovereign authority of the state over its territory and limiting the presence of non-state armed actors [UNSC 2006a, para 8]. As stated by the UN Secretary-General during the discussion on the resolution in the UNSC:

‘Only when there is one authority, and one gun, will there be a chance of lasting stability. The Lebanese State, like any other sovereign State, must have a monopoly on the use of force on its own territory.’ [UNSC 2006b, 3]

The main prerequisite for a lasting ceasefire was thus identified in enhancing the control of the Lebanese government and armed forces over its territory. Accordingly, the mandate defined by UNSC Resolution 1701 tasked UNIFIL to concentrate on assistance to the Lebanese authorities in strengthening their presence in the southern regions and on support of the ceasefire between Lebanon and Israel. UNIFIL thus works with a specific reading of Lebanese sovereignty, where the state-controlled armed and security forces are the sole authority able to legitimately employ violence on its territory.

While such a notion of sovereignty conforms to international norms, it contradicts the perspective on and practice of independent Hezbollah armed forces as part of the national ‘resistance’ against foreign interveners. This view is supported by a part of Lebanon’s political class and population and it is particularly strong among the Shiite communities in the southern regions [Abboud and Muller 2012; Makdisi 2014]. Although Hezbollah’s credentials as a force of the ‘resistance’ were a result of the era of its struggle against the Israeli occupation of the South Lebanon in 1980s and 1990s, the party has since the Israeli withdrawal from the region in 2000 claimed that Israel continues to occupy a part of Lebanese land along the contested border between the two countries. Therefore, its resistance campaign against the occupation has not been concluded and it needs to retain its weapons in order to liberate the entire Lebanese territory as well as deter further foreign aggression. Moreover, while Hezbollah operates its own armed force, it defies a simple categorization as a non-state armed actor [Harb and Leenders 2005]. The group runs several organizations oriented on reconstruction or public services, it is represented in the parliament and it controls a number of municipalities [Daher 2016; Meier 2016].

In sum, despite its independent armed wing, Hezbollah as an actor transcends the simple categories of a state or non-state actor, as it is simultaneously present in state institutions and separated from them. Hezbollah’s members hold positions within the state apparatus, local municipalities as well as in civil society in general. This enables the Shiite movement to draw its authority simultaneously both from its formal institutional and informal positions and act accordingly [see Albrecht and Moe 2015]. Similarly, on certain occasions, it works independently from state agencies, while on others it cooperates with them.

**UNIFIL’s peacekeeping strategy: Ambiguities and resistance**

While UNSC Resolution 1701 clearly identified the problem to be tackled by international peacekeeping force, it was less clear about the specific steps which should be taken. In broader terms, the strategy of the mission after its deployment rested in supporting the (re)establishment of the Lebanese Armed Forces’ (LAF) presence in the southern regions and deterring either overt presence of Hezbollah’s militants or Israeli incursions to the region. During the first months of its deployment, UNIFIL also established itself as the main link between the Lebanese and Israeli armed forces and it introduced mechanisms to support the de-escalation of potential incidents on the line of withdrawal separating Lebanon and Israel [the Blue Line] [Mattelaer 2013, 96–97].

While these ‘traditional’ peacekeeping tasks were accomplished quite easily, those focused on reestablishment of Lebanon’s sovereign control over its territory proved to be
more problematic and ambiguous. The peace-enforcement mission authorized under Chapter VII, which had been originally proposed by Israel and the US and which would seek to disarm Hezbollah fighters by force, was not acceptable to the Lebanese government (which included Hezbollah representatives) and potential troops-contributing countries (Guéhenno 2015, 220–224). The mandate of UNIFIL II, therefore, represents a compromise between various competing preferences and oscillates between the language used in the mandates of robust peacekeeping operations [hinted at by the words ‘...take all necessary action to ensure that its area of operation... is not used for hostile activities...’] and a limited autonomy from the Lebanese national authorities given to the operation itself (Murphy 2012, 391).

The ambiguities of the mandate and unclear expectations from all sides resulted in many incidents between peacekeepers and local civilians, which the mission experienced after its deployment to the region (Larzillière 2012, 18; Mattelaer 2013, 108). These originated on the national level, where heated disputes over Hezbollah’s weapons and means of implementation of the UN resolutions defined the political debate, as well as on the local level, where especially Shiite communities disputed the mission’s credibility and impartiality (Makdisi 2011). The newly deployed force was viewed with intense suspicion, and some questioned whether UNIFIL would not play the role of an occupation force. Negative perceptions of UNIFIL were subsequently strengthened by assertive behaviour of some members of the French and Spanish contingents. Following an extensive interpretation of the mandate, the units started entering private premises, monitoring and documenting suspicious activities beyond their area of operations or dismantling pre-war Hezbollah military positions (Murphy 2012, 392–393). The tensions in some towns and villages escalated to blocking and stoning of UN forces by civilian Hezbollah sympathizers. In June 2007, these incidents were followed by a bomb attack on a Spanish patrol, which killed six peacekeepers (Murphy 2012, 398; Young 2007). In response, the mission shifted to a more deterrence-oriented practice of peacekeeping and prioritised the support to the national authorities, rather than being the main implementing actor of UNSC Resolution 1701 (Makdisi et al. 2009). Thus, the active engagement of peacekeepers ‘in the field’ and their visibility is supposed to limit the presence of non-state armed actors and to support transformation of the region to a space where the Lebanese government (along with UNIFIL) represents the only authority which possesses weapons and is able of using violence. However, the manifested control is crucial also for managing the international dimension of the conflict, as it shows to Israel that the armed elements are under some level of control (Newby 2017, 5–6).

Designing the Peacekeeping Programme

Given the focus on patrolling, UNIFIL’s practice of control of local space cannot be pursued without the support of the civilian population. In response to local opposition, UNIFIL sought to adapt its peacekeeping strategy and practices and mitigate the frictions with local civilians, which have been identified as potential obstacles for the operation. The mission started to invest heavily in various techniques of community outreach and communication to tackle the negative perceptions of peacekeepers and ensure local consent and a secure operational environment (Makdisi et al. 2009, 25–26). Initial overt resistance against the mission and suspicion of direct collaboration with Israel against Hezbollah was to a certain extent mitigated by the end of 2007 and reappeared only in connection to some local or international controversies (see Newby 2017). However, low-level hostility to international forces among certain communities persisted, as did the concerns over potential wider clashes with members of the Shiite movement on the side of UNIFIL.

Integrating local knowledge

Concerns over the acceptance by the local population and increased emphasis on outreach activities required a mobilization of novel types of knowledge. As a first institutional reaction, UNIFIL enhanced the role of its civil and political affairs sections and increased the number of Lebanese staff officers, who were supposed to contribute a better understanding of the local context. This specific kind of ‘local expertise’ fed to the mission by these officers contributed to a calibration of peacekeeping practices and ensured a better reaction to frictions between the mission and local communities. However, the knowledge on local politics

---

1 Personal interview, a journalist covering south Lebanon, Beirut, November 25, 2014; Personal interview, a former UNIFIL spokesperson, Beirut, December 3, 2014.

2 Personal interview with the UNIFIL Spokesperson, Tyre, 12 January 2015.
and its nuances does not extend to (most of) the military peacekeepers in the field, who serve in the country for shorter periods of time and continue to be baffled by both the complexity of Lebanon’s politics and its governance system.3 Drawing on the long-standing presence of the mission in the region, UNIFIL turned also to the veterans of the pre-2006 mission, who were supposed to provide their local contacts, understanding of the cultural context and the local ‘rules of the game’ at the strategic level of Lebanese politics, relations between Israel and Hezbollah, and on the level of everyday conflict management.4 Furthermore, as opposed to many new members of the mission, they were perceived as being trusted by the local communities and their leaders with whom they have previously had extensive contacts.5 In the context of fast turnovers of personnel and lacking institutional memory, UNIFIL veterans have proved to be essential brokers, who informally mediated between local communities, Lebanese authorities and military peacekeepers in case of crisis. The civilian section of UNIFIL has also explored new avenues of mapping and understanding the local context, which was supposed to calibrate and justify the practices and technologies of intervention. Being one of the pioneers of the practice among the UN peacekeeping operations, UNIFIL has repeatedly performed a series of public opinion surveys among local populations since 2007. These have sought to map people’s attitudes and increase the knowledge of the local social sphere, focusing primarily on understanding the reasons of local discontent and resistance towards the mission, needs and perceptions of local communities in terms of security, welfare, satisfaction with state-led governance initiatives and finally their political and social preferences [UN DPKO 2012, 146]. While the results of the surveys are not made public by the UN, they in general identified the perceived lack of state public services in the region, strong support for the Lebanese Armed Forces and initially also mixed perceptions of peacekeepers, especially among Shiite communities.6 Beyond these, UNIFIL relies also on another type of knowledge related to its outreach to the civilian population. Some of the practices and methods of this outreach, which UNIFIL uses to ‘enter’ the local communities and raise its acceptance among the population, stem from the military perception of the population in the area of deployment. While the interviewed peacekeepers have acknowledged that the social environments in various countries highly differ, at the same time, they noted that their practices and techniques of community outreach are similar to those they employed in Afghanistan, Kosovo or during other deployments. As an illustration of this issue, an Italian officer deployed to UNIFIL noted how his unit adopted a practice of ‘market walks’, which originated in Iraq and was later institutionalized as a ‘best practice’ (see also Vio 2016).7

Seeing Like UNIFIL: The (non-)acknowledgment of parallel authorities

While UNIFIL has acknowledged the presence of Hezbollah on the territory under its authority and has adapted some of its peacekeeping practices in order not to provoke overt conflict with the Shiite movement, it has not been authorized to officially interact with it. Beyond the fact that the ‘military wing’ of the party is considered a terrorist organization by the EU and European TCCs (Newby 2017, 9–10), the image evoked by UNSC Resolution 1701 was of sovereign states as sole legitimate authorities in a given territorial space (Elden 2009). The area under the authority of UNIFIL has thus been treated as a ‘sovereign state space’, which needs to be reconnected to the central governing institutions, rather than a place where peacekeepers could be dealing with local non-state authorities. Neither UNSC Resolution 1701, nor UNIFIL’s mandate have thus given Hezbollah the status of a distinct actor in the post-conflict order. Any frictions between the peacekeepers and local civilians were to be treated formally by the LAF (or the ISF) as the main representatives of the state and its

4 Personal interview with a former UNIFIL officer, Beirut, 3 December, 2014; Personal interview with a UNIFIL Civil Affairs Officer I, Naqoura, 23 January, 2015; Personal interview with a UNIFIL Civil Affairs Officer II, Naqoura, 6 November, 2015.
5 Personal interview with a UNIFIL Civil Affairs Officer II, Naqoura, 6 November, 2015.
6 Personal interview with the UNIFIL Spokesperson, Tyre, 12 January 2015; Personal interview, a UN DPKO officer, New York, 22 March, 2016; For results of similar type of public research see Small Arms Survey 2010.
7 Personal interview with a UNIFIL MCOU Officer II, Ital-Batt, Beirut, 21 October 2015; Personal interview with a UNIFIL CIMIC officer, MalBatt, Shaama, 1 November 2015.
authority. As such, the autonomous presence of Hezbollah’s armed units, or even its presence as a distinct organization engaged in local security governance, was to be treated as a failure of Lebanese sovereignty. Even though that might not be possible to achieve in practice, such a framework has defined UNIFIL’s mode of engagement with the local order since its deployment.

Hezbollah, or at least its ‘armed wing’ and other non-state armed actors were thus perceived primarily as spoilers, not as potential ‘partners’ for negotiations. The Shiite party has been given, alongside other local non-state armed movements (such as Palestinian and Sunni Islamist armed groups), a vague label of ‘unnamed party to the conflict’ and any kind of disruptions of the ceasefire were to be dealt with only between representatives of Lebanon and Israel. Direct contacts with Hezbollah were ruled out. While the terminology used by UNIFIL to describe Hezbollah has varied, planning documents referred to the Shiite party only by the term ‘armed element present in the area of operation’ (Mattelaer 2013, 103–5). This approach represents a radical shift from pre-2000 UNIFIL whose peacekeeping practices, as well as acceptance in the region, rested on reaching out and liaising with all parties and armed groups in its area of responsibility (Göksel 2007). Also, given the crucial importance of Hezbollah as an authority in the region and for the maintenance of the ceasefire, the mission has had to develop novel ways of outreach to it (see also Newby 2016; Newby 2017).

Encountering Resistance: Conflict management between the formal and informal

Even though the initial tensions with civilian communities have calmed down, UNIFIL’s authority in the area has been occasionally contested. Some villages continued to be hostile or at least uncooperative towards peacekeepers, and UNIFIL has had to find an appropriate balance between posing as a credible peacekeeping force, and not being seen as too assertive to provoke backlash by Hezbollah and local civilians. Nevertheless, the mission frequently deals with diverse incidents, which illustrate its fragile and constantly negotiated position in the local order. These frictions and their handling also point to very local practices and relations, which keep the mission operational and in place. The following paragraphs will briefly focus on two types of overt resistance and its handling: first, incidents involving civilian resistance towards the presence of the mission; and second, small-scale confrontations with suspected members of Hezbollah.

Frictions between peacekeepers and civilian communities represent a predictable outcome of intense patrolling and a high number of rapidly-rotating peacekeepers in a relatively small territory. Stand-offs or other clashes resulting from traffic accidents or photographing of people and buildings in the villages (which is sometimes perceived as spying by locals) are fairly common and usually managed by UNIFIL Civil Affairs Officers with extensive local connections, or, if the tensions are more serious, by Lebanese authorities and officers of Lebanese Armed Forces. These engage directly with the heads of affected communities in order to calm the situation down and avert potentially excessive use of force by peacekeepers.11 As the spokesperson of the mission recalled one of the incidents:

‘Few weeks ago... the Ghanaians were stopped and people confiscated their cameras etc. I think the peacekeepers felt under attack and there was some shooting as a warning. Of course, this created more panic and more tensions. They [peacekeepers] called and then Lebanese army arrived on the spot and the situation was solved by them.’

While overt violence against UNIFIL personnel is rare, peacekeepers at times encounter groups of either unarmed civilians, or lightly armed individuals, who prevent them from patrolling in certain locations or performing certain activities. These forms of opposition present a more direct challenge to the project of international oversight. More serious conflicts usually result in stand-offs between peacekeepers and unidentified assailants and are later either managed by the representatives of the LAF intelligence office, or defused by restraint and withdrawal on both sides (e.g. Blanford 2013). While the political dimension of these activities is usually downplayed by UNIFIL (however, see Newby 2017), in 2010, for instance, inhabitants of a few villages protested assertive

8 Personal interview with the UNIFIL Spokesperson, Tyre, 12 January 2015.

9 Personal interview with a former UNIFIL officer, Beirut, 3 December, 2014.

10 Personal interview with a UNIFIL PI Officer, Ind-Batt, Ebel Es-Saqi, 20 January 2015.

11 Personal interview with a UNIFIL Civil Affairs Officer II, Naqoura, 21 January, 2015; Personal interview with a UNIFIL Civil Affairs Officer III, Naqoura, 6 November, 2015.

12 Personal interview with the UNIFIL Spokesperson, Tyre, 12 January 2015.
peacekeeping practices of the French contingent - e.g., searching private properties - by stone-throwing and blockades of its patrols. Similarly to clashes with Spanish peacekeepers in 2007, this small-scale conflict resulted in a moderation of peacekeeping practices (Blanford 2010). In other cases, peacekeepers have been challenged more directly and prevented from taking certain roads by civilian crowds (for a discussion on the political dimension of similar protests see Rivoal 2017, 123 – 125). As one of the Lebanese interlocutors described such incidents:

‘Sometimes they are not doing this [the patrols] the right way, so Hezbollah, for example—they are smart people – they provoke people to stand in the way of their patrol and start throwing stones or something like this... Hezbollah doesn’t do anything. When they suspect, that a UNIFIL patrol is searching for something that is close to a Blue Line, they don’t clash with UNIFIL. That would be seen as Hezbollah fighting the UN. So they just provoke people to do something peaceful. This would be seen as a small problem between UNIFIL and the locals... usually these objections take form of gatherings, or throwing some stones or glass bottles, which is not harmful. It is planned by Hezbollah, it is planned by people. They start calling for the people “come and sit in front of the patrol” and the UNIFIL cannot proceed...’

In these cases, the UNIFIL Civilian Affairs Officers and especially the experienced veterans of the UNIFIL I and their ability to reach out to the heads of local communities (whether those directly identifying with the Shiite party or not) and negotiate a mutually acceptable way out of a stand-off represent a key method of de-escalation. During previous periods of worsened relations between local civilians and the mission, such as when the EU placed Hezbollah on a list of terrorist organizations, diplomats of the major European TCCs were quick to informally reach out to the party and mitigate the potential fallout of such a decision on UNIFIL (Newby 2017, 9–10). Moreover, as a form of protection from more serious incidents, UNIFIL often tries to concentrate its small scale development and outreach activities into the area and thus highlight the benefits of its presence (Chapuis 2012). To sum up, even though UNIFIL does not officially acknowledge local alternative authorities, it necessarily reaches out to them in order to limit potential threats to its mission.

The Limits of Non-Acknowledgement

Even though no single respondent identified Hezbollah as a distinct enemy or even threat to the mission (for a similar observation, see Ruffa 2014), there has been a certain unease over the presence of the Shiite movement in the region and its role. The interviewees did not assert ‘that Hezbollah was everywhere, ruling the southern territory and controlling parts of the LAF’ as in Haddad’s (Haddad 2010, 574) account of the French UNIFIL peacekeepers. The military interlocutors rather spoke of complex and delicate relations with various parts of the local government and society, including Hezbollah. While Hezbollah does not control everything in South Lebanon, it plays an important role in the local social and political sphere. Such an ambiguous (and indeed hybrid) position also enables interactions with peacekeepers. UNIFIL formally interacts only with the representatives of the state, local authorities or civil society at large. However, it inevitably encounters Hezbollah members or sympathizers in many of these positions. A UNIFIL Civil Affairs Officer, who was asked about the mission’s relations with Hezbollah, described these interactions as follows:

‘I work with them as a people. I don’t care who they belong to, although I know... I mean, we deal with the officials. We do not deal with Hezbollah. But if you are a mayor, I deal with you. Hezbollah, or not... In Lebanon, everybody is politicized. You will always find him or her belong to one party, or another, but you will be dealing with them.’

As the quote illustrates, UNIFIL’s Political and Civil Affairs Officers interact with certain representatives of the movement formally if peacekeepers need to negotiate its entrance to certain villages or other places, as the Hezbollah-aligned mayors or other officials are part of the state which UNIFIL is tasked...
to strengthen in the southern regions. Paradoxically, they are at the same time members of the group whose presence the peacekeepers are tasked to limit and transform. Naturally, this leads to many awkward situations, such as when UNIFIL officers sit in municipality meetings under Hezbollah banners which praise the military prowess of the Shiite movement; when they stop patrols in order not to interfere with funerals of Hezbollah’s fighters killed in Syria 19, when they accidentally salute a coffin of a Hezbollah commander and by doing so cause an international controversy (Abrams 2008), or when they are present at Ashura commemorations in the Hezbollah-aligned village where Hezbollah’s members pose as armed protectors of the Shiite community. 20 The UNIFIL’s simultaneous tacit acknowledgement of the peculiarities of the local politics and its official non-acknowledgement represent the paradox of its position, as well as a delicate and pragmatic compromise, which keeps the mission in place and reconciles the international limits of dealing with non-state armed groups and local practices.

In this respect, the close reliance on the LAF for handling more serious incidents and management of the local order represents the essence of this compromise. Even though the LAF embodies the state in the region, its actual position is more complicated. While far from being ‘dominated’ by Hezbollah, some branches of the LAF are described as being able of reaching out to it if needed (Meunier 2016; Picard 2012, 90). 21 The cooperation between Hezbollah and the LAF in other Lebanese regions, a high number of officers trained in the spirit of cooperation between the Army and the Resistance, and the dedication of the LAF to avoidance of conflict between the confessional groups all point to the blurred distinction between ‘the state’ and ‘the non-state’ and simultaneity of both in the Lebanese context (Calculli 2014; Hazbun 2016). Like local mayors, the LAF represent the state, which has the supreme authority within the area and thus represents a natural partner for UNIFIL. However, it is also an actor which is deeply embroiled in the peculiarities of Lebanese politics and able to reach out to non-state and local political authorities if it is needed to preserve stability (Newby 2016).

In sum, while the mission officially does not acknowledge the presence of other authorities than the Lebanese state, this does not mean that it does not, in its daily practice, encounter representatives of these non-acknowledged actors and authorities. Similarly, while the mission officially relies on ‘official channels’ for settling local conflicts and frictions, these channels only work because they are at the same time connected to those parts of the local order which the mission officially does not recognize.

Managing Relations, Improving Governmental Oversight: Local development

If a peacekeeping mission wants to control a local space without using violence, it needs the consent of (most of) those who are affected by its presence. While some friction can be mitigated through less formal means, a long-term presence of peacekeepers needs to be supported by the local population. In order to do so, the mission has to find a way to align itself with the civilian population and gain its acceptance. For UNIFIL, this means a strong emphasis on communication and community outreach, which is manifested by the wide range of activities UNIFIL performs in order to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of local communities and highlight the benefits of their presence in the region. These activities might take the form of investments in local development projects or frequent visits of UNIFIL officers in villages, querying about the needs of local communities, or participation in social events where UNIFIL manifests its close allegiance to some local customs and traditions (Chapuis 2012). 22 The level of small-scale development cooperation facilitated or realized by the mission has been comparatively high, and UNIFIL was even highlighted in official UN publications as an example of the effective use of so-called Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) - small and short-term projects, which are funded by UNIFIL and carried out by local partners, primarily municipalities or NGOs (UN DPKO 2012, 201). While UNIFIL has allocated about 500,000 USD exclusively for QIPs, Western countries have raised additional funds to support projects of their own contingents in the country. In total, UNIFIL invests about 5,000,000 USD yearly in local development projects (Kassem 2016, 466; Meier 2016, 189–190).

The QIPs, alongside other forms of development assistance and

---

19 Personal interview with two UNIFIL PI Officers, ItalBatt and FrenchBatt, Shaama, 1 November 2015.
20 Personal interview with a local journalist covering south Lebanon, Qlaaiah, 3 November 2015.
21 Personal interview with a US journalist covering South Lebanon, Beirut, 25 November 2014; Personal interview with a Lebanese security analyst, an international think tank, Beirut, 11 December, 2014.
22 Personal interview with a UNIFIL PI Officer, SpanBatt, Ebel Es-Saqi, 25 October 2015; Personal interview with two UNIFIL PI Officers, ItalBatt and FrenchBatt, Shaama, 1 November 2015.
increased outreach, have had a crucial impact on the level of the mission’s acceptance in the region and have been frequently highlighted by both UNIFIL and Lebanese interviewees as an important form of UNIFIL’s contribution to the wellbeing of local community. However, many of the interviewed UNIFIL officers have described them also as an opportunity to open ‘a window’ to the community, to gain its trust and disseminate information on the mission. As one of the UNIFIL Civil Affairs Officers stated:

‘...South Lebanon is very small geographical area. Sixty-four by forty kilometres. We have more than ten thousand troops with heavy equipment, so for sure when they move around in their patrol they will damage an olive tree here, they hit a wall there, so this will disturb the community. So, I mean, we, with these projects, we can maintain the good relation between our troops and communities. And not only that, we will further let the local population understand our mandate...’

The projects differ substantially, since they are designed by the battalion. Among those mentioned most often were the construction or renovation of community centres and the agricultural infrastructure, construction of roads or electrical and water infrastructure, sewage and waste management, or low-cost organization of first-aid, yoga, or language courses (Chapuis 2012; Newby 2016; Sapienza 2012). As the quote suggests, these outreach activities are valued beyond their basic utility to show a ‘good face’ of the mission and enhance its acceptance.

All the outreach activities are pursued with the ‘recognized’ local representatives and represent one of the main forms of interacting with local society. The majority of development projects are clearly marked and often inaugurated with a small ceremony, including the presence of local (official) authorities and communities and serve as an opportunity to highlight particular values and norms represented by UNIFIL (Kassem 2016, 467–72). As such, the projects help to construct and enact internationally recognized forms of Lebanese sovereignty and governmental apparatus as well as the positive image of UNIFIL in the region.

Furthermore, in order to ‘bring the state back to the South’ and ensure the oversight of the central authorities over the region, UNIFIL concentrates on the LAF and other national security agencies and engages in security system development and reform projects. UNFIL pursues also number of other low-profile statebuilding projects. In cooperation with the UN country team the mission’s civil affairs officials also facilitated visits of the high-profile Lebanese politicians in the region to increase Lebanese ownership over the area and forge links between the national government and local communities.

**Conclusion**

The aim of this paper was to explore the local dimension of peacekeeping practices and highlight three areas of local activities, which make the continuation of particular peacekeeping missions possible. The paper thus described the adaptation of peacekeeping practices to local conditions and noted various types of learning about navigating the local social space, as well as the role of local experience and connections in managing conflicts and frictions. Finally, it examined the ways in which UNIFIL interacts with local communities and pointed out the use of development projects to enhance acceptance of the peacekeepers and link them with the local population and local authorities. Additionally, the paper also discussed the (non)interactions of the mission with Hezbollah as the dominant alternative authority in the region. As the Shiite movement transcends the state/non-state divide, UNIFIL necessarily interacts with some of its representatives either directly or indirectly and uses various brokers, such as local mayors or Lebanese military intelligence officers, to interact with its ‘military wing’ if needed. However, following the international insistence on Lebanese sovereignty (and opposed to the peacekeeping practice of its predecessor - UNIFIL I), it refuses to acknowledge the Shiite movement as a distinct authority. This official non-recognition, but tacit acceptance of a local order in which Hezbollah plays an important role presents, on the one hand, a paradox; but on the other, a condition which keeps the mission in operation and its peace settlement programme in place.

---

23 Personal interview with a UNIFIL Civil Affairs Officer I, Beirut, 24 December, 2014
24 Personal interview with a UNIFIL PI Officer I, IndBatt, Ehel Es-Saqi, 21 January 2015; Personal interview with a MCOU Officer and PI Officers, UNIFIL Fin-IrishBatt, At Tiri, 4 November 2015
25 Personal interview with a MCOU Officer and PI Officers, UNIFIL Fin-IrishBatt, At Tiri, 4 November 2015
26 Fieldnotes, October, November 2015.
27 Personal interview with a UNSCOL Officer, Beirut, 30 October 2015; Personal interview with a UNIFIL Civil Affairs Officer I, Beirut, 24 December, 2014.
Bibliography


