Cosmopolitanism and Xenophobia of the Ruling Elites as a Ground for the Rise of Democratic Protest Movements in Ukraine

What could be a result of misbalances in the stakeholder relationship within a state.

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Oppression, repressions, discrimination, inequality, injustice – all what derives from the unjustifiable violence, – are the factors that compel people to joining forces for a collective disobedience, civic protests and resistance. In today’s world of crisis in global economy, and management of both national and international levels, coercive neoliberal restructurizing of both an economy and a society, the elites in the states put less and less attention towards social problem solving, being busy, instead, with saving themselves and increasing their capital by any possible way, as well as trying to find the way out of the situation they have created. This, as can be observed, leads to erosion of democracy even in the most developed countries of the world and, by giving birth to new social movements of any possible level of civil organization starting from local up to the international, brings a new sense to the political activity of civilians and the balance of mutual commitments of the elites and the people.

The goals and purposes that inspire these movements derive from the need to restore the democratic deficit, to struggle for political and socio-economic change, to protect own (civil) rights. The means deployed range from the traditional forms of strikes and open-air demonstrations, up to those used only since recent times, notably social networks and new media.

The demands of these groups of people are hardly given attention by modern political establishment. The cases of state organized repressions or persecutions are not rare, as the state apparatus instead of seeking the ways to solve the accumulated social problems is directed towards physical and economic protection of the existing elites and the world, created by them and their business activity, that is towards decreasing the amount of national
debt, combating the threats to their security, international criminal activity, terrorism, uncontrolled migration.

The authors have deliberately chosen to build the paper upon the ideas, suggested by the founders of Kyiv School of Anthropologic Ideology and further developed by modern scientists researching the issues of human existence in culture.

**Why it needs attention?**

Today’s Ukraine witnesses the latent enhancement of the traditional approaches towards the relationship with stakeholders aiming to protect the administration system from the uncertainty, by means of establishing new and enhancing the existing public control (state security, tax police etc) bodies, making the conciliation procedures more complicated, widening the gap between the public administration bodies and the public itself etc. This relationship, though, could seem to shift from just producing the protective reactions, towards involving all the stakeholders in the activity, as the ordinary elements of the latter. Outsiders often perceive the resemblance of this process to a democratic governance model.

The necessity of these changes has been dictated also by the fact that after the global economic crisis of 2008 the very principles of Ukraine’s state structure started being criticized even by the elites who control the state. The year 2010 had seen the raise of demands to switch to the *crisis budget*, to drop the existing social benefit scheme, to put strict limits on the trade union powers and activities etc, though the budget deficit was (and is) caused not by social spending, but mainly by a decrease in amounts of collected tax being a result of the global economic recession (statistics proves, that the contribution of the State Customs Service of Ukraine to the country’s budget amounts to almost 80 %).

As the economic crisis had caused weakening of all the government institutions, the ties between the Government and business continue to strengthen, financial circles gain more and more control over the government: the central bank and other currency funds have been reorganized so that now they correspond to the goals and desires of big business, and the influence of the people elected trustees keeps diminishing. This illustrates an existing distortion in the relationship between the State (the Government), the people and the elites, a shift towards post-crisis anarchism inspired by both the establishment and the people, which explains the rise of the left-wing ideas and popularity of protectionist measures (Davis, 1999: 6-11).
The level of state secrecy increases allowing the Government to slide further towards personification of power and dictatorship through acquiring more and more power and authority and becoming unreachable for the electorate. The middle class that has grown on a favourable and now being cut down ground of state subsidies and allowances, is under pressure today and will, in its major part, turn proletarian within the next couple of decades. The control that corporative business has got over the State pushes the latter further towards abuse of power, which, as a response, is met with growing public cynicism in relation to the “democratic” rule of the elites (Katkalo, 2006; Sirko, 2003: 21-23).

Only the Border maintains tangible resistance, as its content remains beyond the limits of political formations and their controlling bodies. The Border includes migrants of different kinds as well as the whole black-market economy of Ukraine – the communities that surround criminal or semi-criminal gangs and sometimes become part of those. The families who have lost their previous socio-economic status, who are ‘homeless’ and not perceived by the Government as units of output available for systemic exploitation, clearly illustrate that this abovementioned virtual community can be seen as a stronghold of resistance against the existing capitalist economy. The Government’s attitude towards this stratum consists of conviction that it should be either oppressed and put under strict control or, if possible, discarded (Akulov-Muratov, 2009).

The new global migration, both within the country and out of its borders, has created an enormous concentrated socium consisting of culturally fragmented and often poor people whose activity cannot be predicted (by the Government’s logic) and whose socio-cultural development is active and consistent. Migration forms communities of people not having been socialized in capitalism and carrying out own economic and political decisions, being gradually directed against the activity of the ruling elites and towards the anarchy. The Government cannot control this stratum by means other than violence. At the same time the Government needs migration as it helps to restrain the salary margins from rising which is good for corporate economy.

This happened before – the anarchism in the low strata was relatively widespread in different parts of Ukraine in the middle of XIX up to the beginning of the XX century, when the national market had been established and people who had never left their native region started to move around freely in search of a job. It was then, when the revolutionary political and economic theories began to be accepted widely in these social groups as their members had realized the necessity to create an alternative to the dreadful, sometimes even killing, living conditions that they have to suffer in the big industrial cities. Slums and shantytowns of
the XIX century had given birth to the socio-revolutionary movements in the XX century Ukraine (Davis, 1999: 6-11).

The same kind of switch in cultural and political relations is happening in today’s Ukraine – the Border expands and becomes less predictable, less manageable for the Government. The latter, by continued imposing of a constantly growing economic burden and raising political pressure, in fact inspires the runaway of people from the areas their forefathers had inhabited for centuries. The number of these runaways is predicted to double within the next 20 years.

This is why Ukraine has to be aware of this threat, especially as the adequate response has not been elaborated yet: Ukraine’s political and economic elites have not yet come to the common conclusion on the approach towards the relationship with the people. Some call for blocking the migration paths, other suggest possible ways of extracting the benefits for business from this source of cheap labour. The common denominator of this issue is that people living on the edge of the state structure have no governmental protection for their rights, and the Government has no clue what to do with them.

Nowadays the people of Ukraine are decentralized and do not have commonly recognized national leaders. It is fragmented and based on the culture of the communities it has derived from. In this situation, anarchism begins to generate its unique development path – through the non-hierarchic, co-operative strategies and organizations that disregard physical borders and respect the specific needs and wishes of the oppressed stakeholder groups. And if the likes of Al-Qaida manage to revise their views and develop work strategies presenting practical alternatives for these new formations, anarchism could become a real threat for Ukraine by being transformed into a mass movement based on the stakeholder relationship between the Border people. Then the gap between the Government and the people coupled with the cosmopolitanism and xenophobia of the ruling elites could create all the necessary prerequisites for various protest movements in Ukraine that, when further disseminated, could easily spill over to the neighbour states.

Introducing and developing the principles of stakeholder relationship is one of main mechanisms of current economic and structural modernization (Freeman, 1984: 51-68) in Ukraine. The national history proves that the modernization of existing Ukrainian model of administrative culture could only be done by evolution. Traditionally the administrative culture in Ukraine, as a blend of principles of administrative command system and norms of bureaucratic behaviour, is based on the principles of 1) authoritarianism – the interests of the State/ the Government/ the boss dominate over the interests of a person; 2) hierarchy –
vertical connections prevail over horizontal; 3) corporativeness – similar to collectivism but aimed not at unity, but at fragmentation into groups according to the friend-enemy principle; 4) personality – preferring unofficial relationship, coloured with personal attitude and affection over formal; 5) indifference – fatal passivity and inclination towards ignoring the risks, which derives from the type of political and religious culture where more trust is given to chance and good luck than to consistent planning of the future (Romanenko, 2005: 50-62).

The implementation of these administrative principles causes distortions in relations between the public administration structures and other stakeholders. But, it is necessary to admit that Ukraine’s administrative culture is a rather integral phenomenon that helped to preserve the efficiency of this public administration mechanism in different periods of history. And the public administration system itself was created under the influence of various factors: traditional Ukrainian mentality and certain specific traits of a Ukrainian; imperial tsarist attitude and soviet military culture; elements of modern Russian administrative command system prevailing in Ukraine because of the cultural-economic background and peculiarities of rural way of life; various religious trends etc. And, as time proved it, this model happened to function with enough efficiency both in a stable and traditional community and in a structural crisis situation when the acceleration of a country towards getting out of it inevitably leads to toughening the intra-state relations: the Government solves the arisen problems by limiting rights of and opportunities for its citizens, which sustains and maintains Xenophobia.

In a period of Russian domination in Ukraine a bureaucrat had always been the main representative of ruling class, and bureaucracy merged with aristocracy forming a rather special social stratum – state service corps that had caste character, though the managing positions were not career-based. Nowadays this scheme is more an anachronism, but it is hard to get rid of, as today’s cosmopolitanism and xenophobia of ruling elites is rooted deeply in the times when our territory was under the Russian Empire and the USSR.

**Cosmopolitanism in Ukraine (historic retrospective)**

In Ukraine’s past cosmopolitanism as an ideology, an idea of world citizenship that puts universal values over the interests of a particular nation or denies the latter at all, was put as opposed to patriotism, which turns into an element of public conscience in the process of state establishing and nation forming. Cosmopolitanism with its universality of values was
criticized being seen as lack of connection to own fatherland and ethnic community: *ubi bene, ubi patria* – the fatherland is where it is good.

Cosmopolitanism was brought to Ukraine from the West through various networks of international contacts of court aristocrats, political elites, book authors and publishers, Huguenot, Franc mason, Jansenist and other significant religious order connections, bankers, Jewish financiers, merchants etc who themselves served as a profound basis of social and cultural cosmopolitanism. Particular expectations were put on the international trade, as it was believed that it is capable of becoming a basis of the universal brotherhood (Willem Freihof, 2003: 31-41).

At the beginning the Russian government was looking at the process with anxiety but could not stop it without bearing loss. That is why the newspapers of the time kept attacking physiocrats, those adherent to liberal trade exchange, bankers and other so called economists naming them *cosmopolites* with a negative meaning of the *enemies of national interests*.

Cosmopolitan ideas in the tsarist Russia were given the guarded look even in its best times, and at the end of the XIX – beginning of the XX century the attitude switched to openly negative (Miller, 2001: 257-263). Xenophobia and patriotism were cultivated at full speed. An example of a Lviv-Kharkiv Pale of Settlement for the Jews of the Empire could be brought to attention in this regard. Or the works of Polish and Russian nationalistic thinkers of the time, such as Witold Zieminsky or Vasiliy Rosanov who drew attention to the ideas of Jewish cosmopolitanism (Rosanov, 1900; Zieminsky, 1890). Thereby we can see that the Eastern European anti-Semitic stereotypes, which were and still are rather widespread in Ukraine, derive from the XIX century processes of modernization and modern nationalism formation.

In the tsarist Russia, the Prince Lev N. Tolstoy – a prominent humanist author – was the brightest and perhaps the only spokesperson for the cosmopolitan concepts of the time (Tolstoy, 1896). In Ukraine, as opposed to the imperial ideology and within the framework of national liberation movement, there was a constellation of so-called “enlightened Ukrainians” (the name suggested by Ivan Franko, prominent Ukrainian author and philosopher), who, taking care of the socialist internationalist ideas, were turning away from *Ukrainity* and towards the socialist universality.

On the other side, the majority of Ukraine’s opposition elites were the followers of the national liberation movement. One of the nationalism inspirers was Stepan Rudnitsky who considered an independent *folk-nation* to be the most important natural unit of humankind, and nationality – a major identification characteristic of a personality (as opposed to the
characteristics of class, religion etc.) He saw no alternative to an independent Ukrainian state, virtually following the concept suggested by Thomas Hobbs. In those times the Ukrainians en masse put their hopes for establishing their own state as an autonomy within the Russian Federation, and the elites of Ukraine’s Western lands were calling for a union with more enlightened Austrian Empire.

It is now widely considered that Ukraine’s statelessness was a result of Poland’s and Russia’s expansionist policy as those kept inciting Ukraine’s elites one against the other, which caused apostasy – in this case abandonment of the people by the intellectual circles. But, the people mostly were uneducated and remained under the strong influence of Russian and Polish cultures, cosmopolitan, socialist or internationalist ideology that, in absence of Ukrainian national ideology, kept catching the minds of youth (Borys Grinchenko, Mykhailo Hrushevsky etc.) Essentially, the intellectuals did not betray the people but were simply estranged; and this, traditionally, still exist in Ukraine.

Ukrainians have their own, quite unique and self-sufficient borderland culture and psychology. For centuries nobody of the newcomers could establish their own state on Ukrainian lands. This enabled Ukrainians, as is proved by the period of existing under the Russian power, to self-organize on a level of a governing body. Lev Gumilev and Yuri Boroday considered that in relation to Ukraine appeared a mass psychological syndrome being expressed as a need to process and remake its nature and culture by all possible means (Boroday, 1981: 82-85; Gumilev, 2007: 331-333) That had vandalism and destruction as its results. Even the Russian autocracy had not managed to assimilate Ukrainians, who are ethnically close to the Russians themselves. After Ukraine’s territory was conquered by the Russian Empire, a chimeric ethnicity of so-called little Russians emerged. And after that there were the Soviet people of Ukraine who sponged the ideas of a communist utopia.

Both Nationalism and Cosmopolitanism were out of question in a country as was Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic being a part of the USSR, even though the father of both the 1917 Russian revolution and the USSR, Vladimir Lenin, was developing the ideas of cosmopolitanism and abolishment of nations and states (Sergeyev, 2003: 14-16). Moreover, in the 1920s the term of proletarian internationalism was officially considered to be equal to socialist cosmopolitism.

The first accusations in cringing to the West started to appear back in 1936. Though the war times saw the relative openness and benevolence not only towards the Western culture, but also towards the socio-political system i.e. democracy as it was seen as a way of living and culture of the allies. Moreover, the war had inspired hopes for liberalization in political
and cultural spheres – the Soviet people who went abroad and saw the European way of living with their own eyes became much less perceptive of the propaganda about “horrors of capitalism”. That is why, with the II World War ending and the cold war beginning, the USSR leaders deployed much stricter measures for keeping all the people up to the correct ideology and the regime. The Soviet ideologists had to focus not much on explanation of the socialist claims on the world domination (which meant propagating socialist cosmopolitanism), but instead on denunciation of the same claims presented by the ideological enemy. The Russian national patriotism coupled with great-power chauvinism strongly needed an antipode – an enemy, whose face became the American imperialists (outside) and the cringers to the West together with the cosmopolitans of no kin (within the USSR).

On 24 May 1945 a toast of Josef Stalin at the Kremlin reception launched the campaign. The instructions were given to widely propagate the Russian traditions as those of the elder brother – the most eminent of all the USSR nations. In general, the leadership managed to strictly control the campaign within the framework of the Soviet patriotism class meaning and according to the set course. In 1947 Stalin initiated the Politburo Resolution on the courts of honour in the USSR Ministries, which existed for two years and issued around 50 sentences.

The fight against cosmopolitanism was an ideology campaign held in the USSR in 1948–1953 and directed against a particular stratum of Soviet intellectuals who were seen as the bearers of the skeptical and pro-Western trends. One of the campaign elements was blaming the Soviet Jews as the cosmopolitans of no kin who are hostile to the patriotic feelings of the Soviet people. The Jews were also dismissed from their jobs and positions, sometimes put under arrest. There was a struggle for the Russian and the Soviet priorities in science and innovation, certain scientific schools were criticized, persons suspected to be a cosmopolitan or a cringer to the West were subjected to administrative measures. Later cosmopolitan gained a particularly ominous tint becoming a synonym to the traitor of the Fatherhood, a counter-revolutionary or an enemy of the nation.

There is a common belief that it was an anti-Semitic campaign (Fast, 1990). But the particular role of the Jewish can be explained by their attitude towards establishing the State of Israel and its policy. The truth is that the national issue here was not the major as there was an objective background. The Jews as a historically formed European diaspora had been for a long time occupying rather strong positions in the intellectual sphere. After the 1917 October revolution they were represented in Soviet intelligentsia and state security structures much
more densely than was the percentage of the Soviet nation they constituted. And they took an active part in political and ideology confrontations on both sides of the barricades (Zhebrak, 1945: 357-358; Dubinin, 1947: 109-112).

The Jews constituted 1.3% in the USSR after-war population. At the same time in 1946 they constituted 48% of the Sovinformburo (compared to the 40% of the Russians), around 40% of heads of research laboratories and sectors of the USSR Academy of Science (starting from the 25% in the science-technical divisions, 33% in chemistry, up to 54% in law and economic divisions). Among the Marxism-Leninism lecturers they formed 26%, and among the staff of the Institute of History under the USSR Academy of Science – 36%. A similar proportion (around 30%) was also among the literature authors – both among members of the Soviet Writers Union and members of its Ukrainian subdivision.

The statistics of 1952 shows different picture: the number of Jews on the managing positions in the ministries and other central authorities dropped from the nearly 13% (of total of 4,000 in 1945) to 4% (of the total of 4,900); among the executives in enterprises or big-scale building plots went from 11.2% down to 4.6% (of 4,200); among the industrial enterprises executives – from 12.3% down to 4.6 (of 2,000). A decrease, though of a less significant scale, had also taken place among the chiefs of construction bureaus and scientific research institutes, managers in central printed media, universities, party schools, various economic organizations of different scale, secretaries of the regional Communist Party subdivisions and Central Committees of the Communist Party in the republics.

In these circumstances any kind of pressure of any strength touched mainly upon the Jewish nationals. On top of that, the US – a country where the Jewish had significant influence both in politics and in economy – became a potential enemy, and Israel, straight after having been established, declared itself a US ally. This is why the Soviet Jews, who had broad connections with their American and Israeli relatives and were since the end of the war oriented at developing economic and cultural ties with the bourgeois Western states, were treated as dubious citizens of the USSR and potential traitors. The majority of accusations in cosmopolitanism ended with a dismissal and going through the Court of Honour, the cases of jailing were rare. Some sources state that up till 1953 arrested were 217 novelists, 108 actors, 87 painters, 19 musicians (Ehrenburg, 1990: 103). According to a common Stalinist practice some of them later were rehabilitated and some of the most active punishers were dismissed from their posts and kept off the campaign, some even were subjected to a death penalty. Nevertheless, the policy reached its goals and was then abandoned. Since 1953 in the Great Soviet Encyclopedia cosmopolitanism was explained as a backside of bourgeois nationalism,
meaning a reactionary ideology for establishment of the global government and global
citizenship, justifying the conquering policy of the imperialists and constituting the
background of a trait.

This is why to explain the anti-cosmopolitan campaign in the USSR by Stalin’s anti-
Semitic attitudes is inappropriate. As the campaigns of 1930s, it was connected both with the
political struggle on the international arena and with latent social and national political
processes, with the elites replacement in the Soviet society. The regime attempted to put
under control some of the national impulses, which were allowed during the war times for the
propaganda purposes. This activities were only elements of a range of measures undertaken
after the war to further consolidate a victorious communist regime. Moreover, after the war a
latent Jewish nationalism in personnel management had been observed (Simonov, 1989: 129).
Some argue that the fight against cosmopolitanism was a reaction to the Jewish aspirations to
become a leading force in the country (Lobanov, 2003). Within dissident circles the anti-
cosmopolitanism campaign was explained by Stalin’s setback from the major Communist
dogmas of cosmopolitanism and antinationalism and his drift towards the patriotic positions
(Chalidze, 1981: 46, 49).

Another result of Stalin’s anti-cosmopolitan policy was a pull-down of an iron curtain
and another purge (though there were no repressions this time), which had its negative impact
on the progress both in science and in culture. Possibilities of scientific development in
economics and philosophy, as well as in some other spheres were significantly limited;
development in natural sciences was put under strict ideology control, which threw the USSR,
and the Ukrainian SSR as a part of it, back in quite a few spheres; cybernetics was declared
reactionary. Although there was a good side of it as the practical need had forced the Stalinist
regime to value and protect the highly qualified experts that were quite rare in the USSR:
hardly anyone of the academics or well-qualified experts was subjected to concentration camp
or death (those two were the most common sentences in 1920s-1930s). Even exile was a rare
case applied only under extraordinary circumstances. The absence of purges in the sphere of
physics is explained by a running nuclear project.

The USSR campaign against the cosmopolitan ideology gained particular political
acuteness after various projects of uniting the nations and the states, both in regional and
global scale, appeared in the West. Western mass media kept stating that the global
government is inevitable and should be strived for even if the catastrophic Third World War is
the only possible way to that. In England Bertrand Russell suggested that “the horror of the
World being split into two rival camps” could only end by setting up the Global Government
under the aegis of the United States of America and exclusively through the use of force. Albert Einstein stated that only a wise World Government could impose obstacles to the unreasonable activity of the Soviets. The *World Constitution* (also known as the *Chicago plan*) had been drafted. The USSR perceived all this as establishing a united front ready to act against the USSR and the *new socialist-democratic* countries, ready to trigger a war (Stalin, 1946).

In Ukraine as a republic, where the density of the Jewish was the highest, the campaign against the cosmopolitans of no kin was held at its cruelest. Here it was accompanied by accusations of being sympathetic and pro-sionist, or belonging to the *Jewish bourgeois nationalism*. Ostracized were not only the living authors and scientists, but also the long gone ones; not only recently published works, but also the 1920s publications; not only the Soviet authors, but also the foreign ones. The unveiled *cosmopolitans* were immediately dismissed from their jobs, sometimes exiled to the country’s remote regions or put under trial for their, presumably anti-Soviet, activity. Ukrainian party elite strived for that the people could accept this purge as a liberation of the Soviet culture, science and art from the *anti-patriotic influence* of Jews, in the first place. The term *a cosmopolitan* became a synonym of *a Jew* and odious as much.

Stalin’s glorious victory that ended the war strengthened the support Ukrainians, as their land suffered the most during and from the war, had for his personal authority and charisma. Perceiving themselves as the victors they strived for a better life, more prosperous and free. The freethinking and the national identity started being revealed, in the first place by the intellectuals, as the war undermined the cog-in-the-machine ideology. Revealing the national self-consciousness, critical approach to the social life events, drifting aside from the imposed propagandist stereotypes often were qualified as Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism, cosmopolitanism or the anti-Soviet activity, which threatened their bearers with moral and/ or physical destruction.

This ideological background put to support the Stalin’s regime had particularly negative impact on Ukraine. In 1950 Stalin suggested that Russian, Byelorussian and Ukrainian nations all derive from one and the same *Old Russian nation*. The process of step-by-step decrease of the number of Ukrainian schools had been triggered. In 1948 – 1954 the number of Ukrainian schools dropped from 26.000 to 25.000 and for the Russian schools in Ukraine – grew 1,5 times (from 2.720 to 4.051). The 1953 saw 1,4 million pupils in Ukrainian schools and 3,9 million – in Russian or mixed. Other national schools (Polish, Hungarian, Romanian etc.) were getting closed down or reorganized into Russian.
A start signal for an anti-cosmopolitan attack was the editor’s article On an Antipatriotic Group of Theatre Critics published in Pravda newspaper in 1949. In Ukraine the article caused labeling the local literature and theatre critics as the cosmopolitans of no kin.

By this the Zhdanovschyna (a campaign for raising the Soviet patriotism, named after its leader, official theoretic and organizer Andrey Zhdanov) started in Ukraine. For strengthening the leadership of Ukrainian party organization Lazar Kaganovitsch was posted to Kyiv (Nikita Khruschev was transferred to a less powerful post of the Head of the Government) (Khruschev, 1997: 512). Kaganovitsch started a fight against the so-called bourgeois nationalism in Ukraine. That was him who de facto prepared the case against Ukraine’s most prominent intellectuals of the time – among the planned victims were Andriy Malyshko, Petro Panch, Maksim Rylsky, Volodymyr Sosiura, Oleksandr Dovzhenko. But the Kaganovitsch initiative was unacceptable and he was recalled back to Moscow.

The campaign against cosmopolitanism in the USSR played an important role in the process of evolution of the ruling Communist Party from being the world revolution party to being the state interest protection party. That process, dictated mainly by the circumstances of an international kind, was not finished after the war and became one of the major causes of the USSR collapse in 1991 when the very representative of Ukrainian Communist Party apparatus Leonid Kravchuk suggested granting sovereignty to the Soviet republics.

**Cosmopolitanism and Xenophobia today**

Current state of things in the sphere of cosmopolitanism, xenophobia and marginalism, as interconnected and complementary phenomena of an average Ukrainian’s cultural existence, corresponds with the historic tradition (Zagriychuk, 2010). In 1991 the Communist Party top acquired the power (Leonid Kravchuk, Ukraine’s first President, was a Ukrainian Communist Party leader) together with the so-called red directors – soviet top managers with whom the power and the accumulated capital was shared (Ukraine’s second President Leonid Kuchma). Then, after a struggle and redistribution of the cash flows, approached the criminals, which were at first put off by the orange revolution being a result of people’s tiredness from the decades of disorder and lack of regulation. But the appointees of the people did not match the expectations and were themselves swallowed by the organized crime. A positive point here is that the criminals were better aware of the people’s situation and could use some of the support they had from the Eastern regions Ukrainians through their traditional identification as the often guiltlessly suffering opposition. Now these illusions are vanishing.
All the elites that flew by were and keep being estranged from ideas and aspirations of the people of Ukraine. Within the elite surrounding, cosmopolitanism is a major dominant in the world outlook and is strongly propagated for acceptation and following – the official attitude towards raising the number of Ukrainian troops in world’s hotspots and further expanding this international activity is a striking example. This is very likely to incite the people, especially the labour migrants coming back to the homeland, towards expressing xenophobia and nationalism that could sooner or later spill over into the open and forceful confrontations not only between various economic and political elites, but also between the historically formed socio-ethnic groups of people, which could lead to a split of the country according to the socio-cultural characteristics. The situation with the Crimean Tatars, which now is one of the major hot spots of ethnic conflicts in Ukraine, can serve as an example here.

This process takes place because the public administration levers are being pushed not by politicians as representatives of the nation or the big capital lobbyists, but personally by actual capital owners or oligarchs – the first generation of Ukraine’s “elite” who made their “first million” through criminal activity. Having gained access to power they see Ukraine and its system of state authorities as a big business-project that also includes a bonus for selling out parts of national sovereignty. This infringes upon the principles of intrastate social and economic stakeholdercy. Ukraine’s current plutocratic state mechanism allows national oligarchs, the nouveau-riches, to perceive their position in the state a priori through a prism of increasing both the amount of their capital and the level of its security in order to secure their dominance both in the state and among the international economic elites. As they don’t have any national, approved by autochthonous society, cultural or historical roots, they cover their activity by demagogy, which deeply annoys people. Shielding themselves by their own prototype of being “culturally European”, fantastically lucky and intellectually superior, which altogether constitutes the image of “a real man”, today’s “national elite” of Ukraine shows, at best, neglect towards Ukraine’s people.

And the nation’s response is the same: dissatisfaction with the state authority (the Government) in principle grows exponentially through mass impoverishment; uncontrolled by the state, the search for possible methods of the regime change has been provoked and is being directed. Automatically, through the dispersion and latent approval of extremist ideas en masse, the xenophobic and anarchy ideas catch more and more minds. And the “national elites” support this, aiming to use it in their struggle for political and economic dominance in Ukraine.
The virtual, at least three-part, split of Ukraine with the following accession of the territories to other states and creation of a conventionally democratic satellite puppet-state in the heart of Europe could be the results of such a hasty activity of the criminal clans and families in power, especially coupled with their ungrounded self-assurance that they would manage to keep the situation under control. This would change the balance of powers not only in Europe, but in the whole world as well. This implies the necessity to develop national methods of democratic and non-violent regime change, which nowadays could be seen as one of the top-priority political problems not solely for Ukraine.

**Conclusion**

Ukrainian cosmopolitanism as a philosophy of the people by neglecting the national not only consists of national but also is its extension. And this extension can be ambivalent depending on the people's own ranking of the national culture in a cultural and civilization development of the humankind. This is why cosmopolitanism is a highest development grade of a national idea of a nation, whose interests go beyond its physical borders. On the other side a cosmopolitan policy in a culture is a way of denationalizing of the conquered nations by decomposition of their ethno-cultural integrity.

Today's crisis in modern Ukrainian culture is a specific step of its development, which in the essence is stratification of collective forms of identification of the Ukrainians characterized by disagreement among its elements. A national crisis ground is in the breakaway of the ideal product of national existence from its sensual-existential essence. But this cultural differentiation contains a trend to integration and synthesis of its compounds in a new organic integrity. And this means that not only the source of the crisis lies in the ethno-national, but also the solution.
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