



AUSTRIAN STUDY CENTRE FOR PEACE  
AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION – ASPR



# 18<sup>th</sup> SUMMER ACADEMY ON OSCE

22 June - 4 July 2014

# NARRATIVE REPORT

At the Austrian Study Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution  
Under The Auspices of the OSCE

ASPR - Stadtschlaining, September 2014



ORGANISED BY  
**Austrian Study Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution (OSCE), Stadtschlaining**

IN CO-OPERATION WITH THE  
**Diplomatic Academy, Vienna**

UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE  
**Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)**

**PROJECT TEAM**

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**SPECIAL THANKS**

for the Support of the Summer Academy on OSCE 2014:

**Permanent Mission of Austria to the OSCE**  
**Permanent Mission of Ireland to the OSCE**  
**Permanent Delegation of Norway to the OSCE**  
**Permanent Mission of Germany to the OSCE**

Author's note: The opinions and views expressed herein are the result of critical, thought-provoking group discussion and should not be credited to any single participant or presenter.

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### **IMPORTANT REMARK BY THE ORGANISERS**

This Report includes information regarding the main subjects covered by the course, provided by lecturers and participants as well as additional information given to the participants before the course in form of a reader and during the course as handouts. It does not only refer to the contributions of resource persons, and time constraints related to the production of the report made it impossible to seek an agreement with them on the information given in the report.

Whereas the ASPR is greatly indebted to all resource persons who helped to facilitate the course and gives their names as references throughout the paper, the editor alone takes the responsibility for the contents of this document.

Please keep that in mind when reading the report – thank you for your understanding!

The ASPR Summer Academy Team

## Introduction

The 18th Summer Academy on the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe took place from 22 June to 4 July 2014 at the Austrian Study Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution in the Peace Castle Schlaining, Stadtschlaining, Austria.

This specific training program which began in 1997 is held under the auspices of the OSCE and is organized in cooperation with the OSCE and the Diplomatic Academy, Vienna.

Since its foundation the aim of the Summer Academy on OSCE is to strengthen the participants' understanding of the organization by improving their knowledge of the history, structures, functions, values, and current activities of the OSCE. The two-week program also gives participants an opportunity to develop their thoughts as to the future of the organization, including ways it could be reformed or altered in order to engage new security challenges.

22 participants from 15 OSCE participating states attended the 18th Summer Academy on OSCE. The group was comprised of diplomats who work with the OSCE in their respective Ministries, staff from OSCE field presences, scholars collaborating with the OSCE, and individuals with experience working for other international organizations.

The speakers invited to the Summer Academy were mainly experts from the OSCE, as well as diplomats and scholars with a deep knowledge of the organization's history, functions, field missions, and strengths and weaknesses. The participants of the Summer Academy were invited to share their personal experience of working in or with the OSCE in the form of brief presentations.

Arie Bloed, currently senior consultant for international organizations such as the OSCE, UN and EU, and since many years Academy Director, was also the programme-moderator. Giving himself several lectures, he provided the participants with inspiring insights into the OSCE and its work, challenging them with critical thoughts, and invited them to think about the Organization in a very interactive way.

Walter Kemp, Director for Europe and Central Asia at the International Peace Institute (IPI) – Office Vienna, was Co-Director. He enriched the Academy with his vast experience in working for the HCNM, the OSCE as well as UNODC which he shared with participants during some of the modules he presented.

Ursula Gamauf-Eberhardt, also Co-Director, is planning and directing various international peace-building programmes aiming at the preparation of international civilian experts for peace-building activities in crisis regions. Within the Peace Castle Schlaining she is responsible for international projects for the OSCE, the EU, and the UN as well as for Austrian peace education programmes.

The 2014 Summer Academy was indeed placed under the concept of peace. Participants from regions or countries which in "real life" do not share good or any relations at all used the secure forum of the Academy to exchange thoughts, discuss problems and therewith lose prejudices and fears that used to be part of their life.

Mr. Evgeny Prein, Summer Academy participant and PhD Student at the Humboldt University Hamburg/Germany, compiled this report. The production deadline for this report did not

allow for review of the draft by the lecturers. Therefore, the responsibility for its contents rests with the Austrian Study Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution.

## **Methodology**

The curriculum of the Summer Academy comprised a combination of high level panel discussions, lectures, working groups, reading sessions, workshops, case studies and on-site observation of formal OSCE proceedings.

Lectures were divided into topics and strictly delimited within the day, often following the pattern of two theoretical lectures in the morning and one workshop in the afternoon. Lectures and workshops provided the basis to acquire an extensive knowledge in the three dimensions of the OSCE as well as in other relevant areas related to the OSCE, such as Freedom of the Media, High Commissioner on National Minorities, Office for Democratic institutions and Human Rights, etc. Long-term missions, structures and relations with IO's and NGO's were also part of the resource.

Theoretical knowledge was then applied within small working groups, mostly during workshops that gave participants the opportunity to elaborate more thoroughly on OSCE related issues and to apply practical skills on negotiations and team-work. Simulation exercises dealing with interaction of multinational teams in conflict transformation situations were employed to highlight the importance and limits of communication skills, and to promote intercultural understanding among the participants.

In order for the participants to be best prepared for the lectures, they were given a comprehensive reader comprising of all relevant material as to familiarize oneself more closely with OSCE's work and OSCE related issues.

An evaluation of the content, structure, methodology, and usefulness of the programme was carried out at the end of the programme. At the conclusion of the Summer Academy, participants engaged in an overall assessment of the programme. Facilitated by ASPR Director Blanka Bellak, they discussed their impressions and offered recommendations for possible improvements.

## **Evaluation**

On the first day the programme organisers distributed an anonymous questionnaire which participants filled in during the two weeks Summer Academy. Participants were asked to assess the individual daily sessions, each of the two weeks, and the overall programme, as well as to provide suggestions for improvement. The organisers made a point of seeking input from the participants by offering thoughtful, provocative remarks and encouraging comments.


At the end of the second week, an oral evaluation session was conducted. Participants discussed their personal course evaluation, assessing the overall course with special regard to organisation and facilities. The ASPR Director Blanka Bellak facilitated the discussion on the evaluation. The fact that she was not present during the Academy's session should enable participants to speak out freely and honestly.

The overall evaluation of the programme derived from the questionnaires can be illustrated in pie charts as follows:

**OVERALL EVALUATION OF THE PROGRAMME**


**Usefulness for my professional development**

Excellent	17
Good	4
Fair	1
Poor	0
No Answer	0




**Usefulness for my personal development**

Excellent	18
Good	3
Fair	1
Poor	0
No Answer	0




**Basic Structure of the programme (composition of the programme in two weekly modules)**

Excellent	15
Good	5
Fair	1
Poor	0
No Answer	1




**Methodology of the programme (mix of lectures, working groups, exercises)**

Excellent	17
Good	4
Fair	1
Poor	0
No Answer	0




**Reader**

Excellent	15
Good	6
Fair	0
Poor	1
No Answer	0




**Facilities - Hotel Burg Schlaining**

Excellent	16
Good	5
Fair	0
Poor	1
No Answer	0




**- Seminar Rooms**

Excellent	15
Good	6
Fair	0
Poor	1
No Answer	0




**- Library**

Excellent	14
Good	5
Fair	0
Poor	1
No Answer	2




**Staff of the ASPR - Ursula Gamauf-Eberhardt  
(helpfulness, efficiency, etc.)**

Excellent	20
Good	1
Fair	1
Poor	0
No Answer	0



**Staff of hotel (helpfulness, efficiency, etc.)**


Excellent	19
Good	3
Fair	0
Poor	0
No Answer	0



**Future Development of the Programme**

**Would you recommend the programme to colleagues?**

Yes	21
No	1
No Answer	0



## SESSION REPORTS

### Monday, 23 June

#### **09:00-12:00 Security and Cooperation in the OSCE Area: Conflicts and New Dividing-Lines. Zarko Puhovski (University of Zagreb / Croatia; Chairman of Croatian Helsinki Committee)**

In his first speech addressed to the OSCE Summer Academy Prof. Zarko Puhovski spoke about the conflicts and new dividing lines in the OSCE area calling the current situation “good old cold war situation”.

The Helsinki Process has 2 main ideas which are clashing each other: (i) *understanding of state sovereignty* without discussing his origin on one hand and (ii) *sabotage of state sovereignty* through the idea of *Human Rights*. The idea of Human Rights is the time bomb, but in the same time only state can protect Human Rights.

We can speak about *3 generations of dividing lines* meaning the concept of borders as wells as their legitimating:

1. *Post-War & Cold-War-Situation* (until 1990): At the time the Helsinki Final Act was signed in 1975, the most pressing concerns of participating nations were borders and the security of the state. Borders had originally been designed to halt advancing armies and were controlled by tanks, but at this time countries wanted to make the existing borders more open to travel and migration. The dividing line walk among the East-West-Confrontation and origin of legitimation of borders was the confrontation between communistic and liberal ideas at that time.
2. *Early post-cold war period*. The new dividing lines went between rich and poor countries (social divide). The control of borders was overtaken by police. Ironically, it is harder to cross borders today than before: "protection against people who could endanger the social fabric".
3. *Current period* started with the East-Enlargement of EU: Less borders inside of EU states, more for those outside. In this term became also very important the question why EU calls themselves “Europe”.

The current crisis in Ukraine became very important topic in the session. Doubtless, the OSCE is effected by the Ukrainian crisis: there is the “back to the Cold War time again” situation. “What happened in Ukraine is the worst what happened in Europe after Cold War” according to the speech of French Minister of Foreign Affairs. In this term was raised the example of Yugoslavian war which cost 1000 time more lives than the Maidan massacre. The isolation of Russia by world community means only Russia’s isolation by NATO-states.

Linked to this example it is important to answer the question of implementation of *generalization* as an intellectual tool: the (moral) rule should be implemented to the all situations in the same way or not implemented anymore (the question of double standards). The methodological question here is how to make this moral rule as a *functional* rule in the politics. The EU was not able to formulate even the political strategy for Ukraine and Russia: there was nobody who could stop Putin who - on a "Western opinion" - has materialistic understanding of politics (e.g. energy supply). There are a lot of discussions about historical roots of conflict, but the real needs of people are forgotten: How to survive the winters in

between? Putin could be seen now as Roosevelt - same type of wisdom of power (Hegemonic power of the US started with the T. Roosevelt era).

The EU is paying now for the 3 biggest failures of the EU-politicians:

1. No strategy in terms of enlargement towards the East: EU has never considered Russia to be a possible partner of EU (member state).
2. No common EU foreign policy as well as functional institutions to formulate it.
3. No strategy to effectively alleviate poverty or towards poor sections of the EU population. As in the 1930s, the poor started to lean towards the far right and nationalistic parties gained influence.

Spinoza theory can't be applied for everyday life ("the enemy of my enemy is my friend") But Spinoza's theory is the current strategy of people in power against Syria, Iraq etc. There are no chances to compare the case of Crimea and Kosovo. If Russia would accept the Kosovo, Russia could have a better position now, but ideology of pan-Slavic brotherhood was on the top of agenda. It could be seen as policy of generalization (governments don't have one single approach per crisis, no consistency). Putin would have been in a dominant position if he had just opted for the policy that he's for according independence to peoples but he's more into a pan-Slavic idea. Perceived as a mistake of Putin is the intervention in Crimea which has stopped discussions about Maidan. Territory was more important than the people.

New dividing lines are not forgotten old ones. (e.g. Serbo-Croatian border). Consequence of military EU interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan led to large number of economic/social refugees. All who is fleeing to Europe are coming from regions destroyed by European allies. Very important became here religious nationalism and Muslims as potential terrorists. New old cold war borders are now in the public opinion because of massive propaganda. Primitive propaganda provokes primitive reactions.

The main topic of the following discussion remains the Ukrainian crisis. The Russian position in Ukraine crisis can be explained through realism in international relations, question of legitimization of institutions (nobody asked in the West about legitimization of hunta) as well as lack of strategy by other parties. EU has no strategy because inside of EU there is no centre of power (no advisers, no think-thanks) as well as EU was not prepared for this scenario. EU is not a political actor. Best solution for Russia in this situation is the "wait and see" strategy.

OSCE- "Organization of seriously confused Europeans". Intelligence leads to discussion which leads to Strategy. Strategy is what the EU lacks. EU feels like being on second place after USA. "Wait and see" is not the best strategy for the EU. Intelligence is a key. Strategy is to be able to plan ahead, not "finding solutions to the problems of yesterday". EU needs to develop strategies based on the situation/scenario they want to see or to have in the future (outcome should be solution/strategy)

**11:00-12:30 Basic Principles of Security and Cooperation: 1975-2014**  
**Arie Bloed (Director of OSCE Summer Academy)**

The lessons started with the presentation about Basic Principles and Functions of the OSCE.

**Short overview of C/OSCE history:**

- ✓ *Cold war origin* (CSCE negotiations began in 1972-1975).
- ✓ *Decision-making* (consensus).
- ✓ *Legal status*. There is no legal status of organization (because of no consensus on it). In sum, OSCE has big functions, little power and no legal status.
- ✓ *Agenda*. The position of Soviet Union was the status-quo on post-war international territories. The West was preoccupied with human rights (free press, democratization) and demilitarization. The East was interested in the economic part and recognition of the post-conflict status quo in Europe. The compromise led to the 3 "baskets" with an interlinkage between them (political-military, economic-environmental dimension, human dimension). In the 70's the environmental issues stood on the agenda, but were not important. Interlinkage come from east and west groups of countries with different interests. Continued game in interlinkage as traditional way of diplomacy.
- ✓ *Helsinki Final Act (HFA) (1975) – "agreement to disagree"*. HFA included from the beginning 3 Dimensions: (1) Political-Military Dimension (e.g. Confidence building measures (CBMs) are binding commitments by sharing information to avoid miscalculations: have to inform other members when doing military exercises.) (2) Economic and environmental Dimension. (3) Human Dimension. Due to HFA, Human Rights were elevated to the level of the most important principles of international law (e.g. principles of protections of human rights). After HFA were a lot of international documents which are not binding. HFA (intergovernmental) is an example of agreeing to disagree; a party can interpret it as he wants normally could cause chaos but it is a basic document which allows the issue to be raised and discussed (better than being left off of the agenda). Negotiations could then happen (on and off the floor); OSCE then becomes a platform for dialogue and negotiation which is its main function today.
- ✓ *OSCE survived deep crisis*. (E.g. Meeting in Belgrade was not successful according documents. Meeting in Madrid 1980 – invasion in Afghanistan and as result every issue was abolished).
- ✓ *OSCE had side-effects* as the establishing of Helsinki Groups. HFA empowered citizens (civic societies). It became a symbol of democracy and the West does not think of the HFA as a betrayal of the countries of Eastern European countries. This effect was not expected. Helsinki Groups became a symbol of democracy.
- ✓ OSCE moved *from confrontation to cooperation*.
- ✓ OSCE developed *from conference to organization*. Some countries even want to create "European United Nations". NATO and Warsaw Pact were not effective in conflict prevention. Direction of the C/OSCE was conflict prevention. This requires permanent bodies, thus began the institutionalization.
- ✓ OSCE moved *from standard-setting to operational activities*.
- ✓ *Corfu (& Astana) Process: 2009-2011*. Start of discussions about future development of organization.
- ✓ *Helsinki +40*.
- ✓ *2014: revival due to Ukraine crisis?*

**OSCE as a “community”.** *Community of values* (standards of far-reaching nature). Theoretically, OSCE member states adhere to the same values and even more than in UN (social market economy, democracy, etc.). OSCE is composed of pluriform parliamentary democracies (the other organization which comes close is the Council of Europe). Rules of OSCE going farther than the rules of UN. Surprisingly, these values were imposed not by western countries, but by Moscow and communist countries.

*Community of responsibility* (invisible peace, principles of non-intervention, responsibility to act in case of problems as well as violations in cooperative way): mechanisms are provided to practice this responsibility to support and to monitor. However, it has been decided (coming from the East) to invoke the principle of non-intervention as it was abused in the 1980s; they consider that internal wars are of an international concern and not under the jurisdiction of the country alone anymore (no right to claim that it's only internal). In theory, this principle does not exist anymore. Raising the issue yes but does not give permission to send troops and invade the country. Principles are sometimes different, than practice.

**15:00-18:30 – Workshop # 1: Communication and Interaction in Multinational Teams.  
Matanat Rahimova (Senior Training Officer, Department of Human Resources (DHR), OSCE Secretariat)**

The main aims of the workshop were to get the abilities for working in the team and working in multicultural environment. The training started with the discussion about definition of the team, team work, roles, leadership etc.

After short introduction and discussion the workshop was continued with the role play “Viking Attack”. The participants were divided into 3 small groups. The participants received cards with related, slightly related or not related information. The rule was to share the information on the cards without opening them to other participants. Each card had certain information about the battle of the Vikings. The task was to determine the date, time and place the Viking attack took place. The point of the game was to find out the communicative balance, so that each participant of the group receives an opportunity to share the information which he has on his card.

After the game took place a briefing, where were shared the views on the role of the (informal) leader (whether there was one), and his management style, the planning (what was the common solving approach, agreement on procedures, adherence to the plan), organization (how the data was organized), communication (how participants listened to each other, how often did the info need to be repeated) and interdependence (how well did team members build on others' ideas). Very often a person, who is supposed to lead, does not have the authority, so other people step in and it becomes chaotic. There is strong need to listen to everyone. Only one group has managed to solve the problem correctly in 40 minutes.

In the second half of the session the work with the OSCE was explained. The OSCE field presences and the OSCE Secretariat and institutions are complex with many players from

different cultures and backgrounds. There is a need for coordination and cooperation between various agencies, organizations, NGOs with varying mandates and purposes. On a mission your every action & behaviour will be observed and judged influencing people's perception of the OSCE.

Very important for the team work are: communication; working together to achieve a certain goal; each individual has a role/expertise to bring in the team; the leader has to guide but the others also have to be able to criticize him/her; listening /communication is key; attention to detail (because this might cause the project to fail).

Some points of working in a multi-cultural environment were also explained: different notions/understanding of time depending on the culture; communication (including body language): neutral expression or more animated; gesticulations (ex. Italians); understanding of hierarchy.

The intercultural mindset means:

- ✓ Respect & appreciation of difference.
- ✓ Conscious awareness if one's own and others' culture
- ✓ What to do to create respectful, productive intercultural relationships

*OSCE Code of Conduct*. Definition of Core Values. Every OSCE is obliged to respect diversity and gender. Definition of culture according to Encyclopaedia Britannica, is "a behaviour peculiar to human beings, together with material objects, used as an integral part of this behaviour. Thus, culture includes language, ideas, beliefs, customs, codes, institutions, tools, techniques, works of art, rituals, and ceremonies, among other elements. The existence and use of culture depends upon an ability possessed by humans alone".

The second practical exercise was to answer following questions about your culture and present to the all participants:

1. Do's & Don't's for public discussion?
2. Do's & Don't's for your guests at your home?
3. What is "now" and "future" in your culture?
4. What do foreigners do that drive you nuts?

Participants from Georgia, Serbia, Ireland and Turkey were selected on random principle to present the culture differences in their countries.

Researchers found out that cultural clashes come in these 9 dimensions: relationships, time, communication, hierarchy, status attainment, space, group dependence, diversity receptivity, change tolerance.

1. **Relationships:** the significance placed on completing a job versus devoting time to building relationships among business associates. There are cultures which prefer to build relationships (Italy) or to focus on procedures (Anglo-Saxons).
2. **Time:** the degree to which a culture believes an individual can focus on one or more tasks, and the evaluation of the importance of personal relationships versus adherence to schedules. Anglo-Saxons say, "Time is money". For southern cultures it is embarrassing to come on time.

3. **Communication:** the way people in a society communicate, including the use of non-verbal gestures. There are emotional people who hug and kiss, and there are more conservative people, so one should be careful with gestures and hands.
4. **Hierarchy:** the way individuals interact with one another within one organizational hierarchy. In some cultures hierarchy begins with the family, with parents and older children. In some cultures it is common to refer to the boss informally with a surname.
5. **Status attainment:** the importance of personal achievement and accomplishment to an individual's overall sense of well-being. It is a question of how people treat the status. Sometimes the fame of parents continues to the children, so people give the same respect to the children as to the parents.
6. **Space:** how individuals use space to define themselves, including spatial distances used when speaking and the amount of space needed for comfort in business and living environments. It means how much space you need for yourself. Everyone maintains social space to work together. The more stranger, the more space is needed. Distance is important, e.g. in the relations between Japanese and Americans. Cultural preferences make a difference.
7. **Group dependence:** the importance of the individual vis-a-vis the group in diverse social and business situations.
8. **Diversity receptivity:** how roles, power and authority are associated with each gender as well as individuals of different races, religions, nationalities, etc.
9. **Change tolerance:** group responses to change, the need for rules and the ability to take risks, also includes perception of how much control individuals have over their destiny. It means, how culture is flexible/ adapting to change, e.g. Warsaw was advanced before World War II, so people stayed comfortable with the fame in the past, nostalgia still existed and they could not change the mentality. There are countries living in the present, who enjoy living today. There are countries, e.g. Germany, living in the future, they would not be pleased to talk about the past. Not every culture is proud of the past.

On behaviour we make only assumptions, we know no values and beliefs. So, we need time to listen and understand. Very often we make judgments on what we see. Diversity is like an iceberg. There are things about us, that are observable, e.g. behaviour. Underlying our behaviour, are deeply held beliefs, values and norms that inform our behaviour. Unless we recognize and understand our beliefs and values, we are apt to quick judgments about the others. Unless we recognize the beliefs and values others hold, we will simply react to their behaviour, making our own assumptions about the reason behind it, instead of interpreting their behaviour within the context of their cultural framework. The intercultural mindset contains the basic understanding and attitude required for effective intercultural communication. Those include: recognizing one's own culture, identify cultural differences, motivation to pursue knowledge about cultural differences and inclination to treat others with respect, distinguish between harmful cultural stereotypes and cultural generalization. It is important not to be ethnocentric, namely not to evaluate other races and/or cultures by criteria specific to its own. In order to develop an intercultural skill set, one needs to emphasize with people from other cultures and to adapt behaviour in conscious and appropriate ways.

There are also several layers of culture: level of awareness; cognitive level; emotional level (intercultural mind-set; cultural complexity; cross-cultural communication & problem solving)

Reasoning model says:

- ✓ Suspend your judgment.
- ✓ Are there any other explanations?
- ✓ Look for values that lie behind what is seen – inquire!
- ✓ There are another explanations!
- ✓ You can draw the right conclusion.

“Seek first to understand, than be understood”!

## **Tuesday, 24 June**

### **09:00-12:00 – The OSCE’s Organization: Basic features**

**Arie Bloed**

The lesson started with the discussion about the question what kind of organisation is OSCE. Typical characteristics for OSCE are:

- ✓ Inclusive membership;
- ✓ Consensus / equality;
- ✓ Non-legal / political organization;
- ✓ Comprehensive security;
- ✓ Co-operative security;

#### **OSCE could be seen as a political process.**

*Politically binding force.* In a view of the political process, it is notable that the OSCE is not a legal organization, but political. All the documents produced are political, not legal, so it is not legally binding. Officially is HFA not legally binding as well, but there are minimal differences between political and legal binding. By violence of politically binding agreements there are no courts of justice, only political ways to solve the problem. In practice 99% of legal issues will be solved by political ways or not solved anymore. Even there is legal dispute; there is very seldom situation when the case is going to legal means. In case of conflict, foreign ministers usually talk to their counterparts to try to discuss and solve the issue. Going to tribunals and arbitration is the exception, even if there is a legal basis. Most countries don't like to go to court because the outcome will not be in their hands anymore; anything can happen, the result can go either way. We go to court if the negotiations are fruitless. The court does not accept a case unless it thinks that diplomatic negotiations have not bear fruit/ meaningful outcome.

*Legal relevance.* HFA is pure 100% international law. International law in the West is more vast and flexible than in the Eastern part of the OSCE which follow a soviet mindset of only considering law written on paper and signed. HFA is politically binding but the main ideas of the 10 principles (1st part of the HFA) are part ius cogens (most binding principle of international law which binds all states) which are legally binding. The main themes are non-

aggression and human rights. So States can base themselves on these pre-existing fundamental laws. OSCE greatly contributes to the development of international law in different areas (e.g. minority rights, terrorism) because the states put forward their agenda. The laws stem from political dialogue and negotiation. Because of political binding there are no ratifications of agreements by national parliaments that make the process more quickly. Legal relevance means that there is law inside and enormous influence on the development on international law. (E.g., OSCE documents related to minorities are legally binding in Germany and Romania).

*OSCE Court of Arbitration and Conciliation (Geneva)*. The Court was created by Stockholm Convention 1992, but some Western countries have refused to ratify the document. They did not ratify because the OSCE is in theory is a political body and not legally binding. Even the name of this court is very contradictory, because the terms “court” and “arbitration” are juridical mechanisms and “conciliation” is not. Not a single case was submitted to this court till now. Besides, there are already too many international courts.

The next group discussion was concerned the question *if the OSCE is a real international organization*. Since the OSCE does not have a founding charter (unlike the UN), it does not have a legal status which comes with other international organization (OSCE is therefore not an IO). As a result, Austria had to confer legal personality to the OSCE in order to sign a legal agreement regarding its presence in Vienna and the law passed by Austrian parliament becomes a basis for the status of diplomats.

**The OSCE as a dynamic process.** Dynamic process with the light institutional structure (budget, staff, location, salaries). Typical for OSCE in this terms are:

- ✓ Annual CiO (as opposed to Council of Europe – every 6 month).
- ✓ Not the “member states”, only “participating states”.
- ✓ OSCE is a non-career organization. A big role plays the secondment (hired and salary is paid by the country) for people in the field, ODIHR, at the Secretariat. Salary in the OSCE is only 2/3 of that of the UN. It is a deliberate action to make the OSCE weak to have light institutional structure. No continuity, less effective people at the end of their career but also it would be easier to get rid of incompetent employees and we always get fresh people with new ideas.
- ✓ Strictly political nature.
- ✓ Various locations for the institutions.
- ✓ Flexibility
- ✓ No military force nor technical equipment = it is a "light security organization".

Another basic concept for OSCE’s functioning is **comprehensive security**. Security is meaning here in broad sense (security in the economic, political and human dimension) as well as Inter-linkage of all dimensions. However, the human, Economic and Environmental, Political & Military issues are discussed only regarding if there is a threat to security. OSCE focuses on the security infrastructures and does not really concern itself with individual complaints; other organizations are dealing with that.

The concept of **Co-operative security** is reflected in key features, such as decision-making, lack of sanctions and enforcement actions and enhancing security through “voluntary

cooperation". "Voluntary security" seems to be a weakness of organization, but in reality it is strengthened (e.g. CSBMs are working pretty well). OSCE can do peace-keeping but without enforcing power. It does not have the authority to tell other parties what to do. The High Commissioner didn't want to receive binding powers for his decisions as that would reduce negotiation and informal discussions between participating states; he'll just be able to impose his decisions. Emphasis is made on "soft" sector in a political-military dimension (Confidence and Security Building Measures, Code of Conduct 1994, conflict prevention, crisis management and peaceful settlement of disputes). In the concept of cooperative security no enforcement mechanisms are foreseen, only peacekeeping. OSCE is more of a conflict-prevention organization because if there is no proper management, there is a war.

**Broad geographical scope of OSCE:** 57 participating states in Eurasia and North America, partners for cooperation. According to §54 of Blue Book of OSCE "all European states, the United States and Canada shall be entitled take part in the CSCE".

### **OSCE institutional structure - "light" is beautiful.**

#### *Political decision-making bodies:*

- ✓ Summits of the heads of participating states and governments every 2 years from 1990-1999 (Paris 1990, Helsinki 1992, Budapest 1994, Lisboa 1996, Istanbul 1999, Astana 2010). There were no summits for 11 years because of war in Serbia and absence of the agenda. It started again in 2010 in Astana.
- ✓ Ministerial Council (include informal ministerial), but only once in Korfu were all ministers present.
- ✓ Economical and environmental Forum.
- ✓ Permanent Council was the central body for decision-making in the 90's. In the reality "Quint" directorium (Group of directors) decides what is going to happen (mainly EU, Russia, USA.). The discussions are taking place in EU formation and EU member states. For first time EU decided to speak with one voice at the OSCE.
- ✓ Forum for Security and Cooperation
- ✓ Informal subsidiary bodies.

#### *OSCE executive structure:*

- ✓ Chairman-in-Office (plus personal representations). Co-chairmanship between CH & Serbia with joint agenda. The Chairman has much more functions (priorities, missions, etc.) and responsibility than its counterpart in other international organization (EU and European Council) since there is no permanent administrative body backing/supporting the Chair and ensures continuity. Leadership of organization is depending on political development inside of the country of CiO.
- ✓ "Troika" (consist form former, present and next Chairman-in-Office).
- ✓ Secretary General and Secretariat. For example, Secretary General in UN has more power, because according to Art. 99 of Charta of UN he can rise attention of Security Council.
- ✓ ODIHR
- ✓ HCNM
- ✓ FoM
- ✓ Council of Economic and Environmental actions
- ✓ Field missions

**Staffing and budget:** OSCE has 540 people in the institutions and 2300 in the field missions (most local deployed). The OSCE is the “cheapest” security organization (2014 around 143 Mio. Euro) with “invisible” budget coming from united budget (UB) and extra budget (XB-mostly donations).

**Related institutions:**

- ✓ Parliamentary Assembly (PA OSCE) is completely separate institution with own agenda (Copenhagen).
- ✓ Court of Conciliation and Arbitration.

**15:00-18:30 – The Security Dimension of the OSCE: Political-military issues (incl. Relations with other Security Organization).**

**Patrick O’Reilly (Deputy Head of Permanent Mission of Ireland to OSCE)**

The political-military issues of OSCE are covering 3 main areas military aspects, non-military aspects, conflicts and conflict cycle, with the idea to provide more transparency, predictability and stability for the cooperation and security.

*The Vienna documents* are the basic documents at the normative level, regulating the exchange of information between the participating states (e.g. quantity of arms), verification regime (e.g. visits of military bases), mechanism of alerting to the other participating states about the military activities (in case of mobilization more than 40.000 ground troops), risk reduction measures, military-to-military contacts.

The exchange of (military) information between the participating states could be extremely important depending on the geographical locations. Vienna documents were developed at the end of 80’s – early 90’s and designed for unexpected invasion, but modern military could make more damages now than 20 years ago. Further there are some new technical and political challenges. From this point of view the up-date of Vienna documents is strongly needed. The ways for the update of Vienna documents as well as arms control were already discussed at the Astana Summit (to increase the number of visits to military bases as well as number of teams, to establish CSPM’s for navy forces). The Vienna documents should be seen in context with other documents (Open sky treaty, Conventional forces in Europe treaty), which are legally binding.

Code of conduct on military-political cooperation includes democratic control on military forces (parliamentarian approve of budget, political neutrality of military), compliance with the human right standards. Very important is the sharing information on productions, export and import of weapons (legal basis provided by Res. 1514 (non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction for the non-state actors) and Res. 2025 of UN (woman in the armed conflict)). Military objective is to protect local population.

Further during the lesson were discussed topics of non-military aspects like cyber crime, border management and fight against crime. In the part concerning the area of conflict and conflict cycles was given short overview of “5+2 talks” and Minsk group as well as peace-keeping operations. The primarily goal of OSCE is to prevent conflicts. Further were

discussed the capacities of OSCE dealing with new conflicts. The conflict cycle were discussed on the example of current crisis in Ukraine (from outcome of Vilnius summit till the deployment of mission). The link between early-warning and early-action is very important for conflict prevention. There was no early action in case of Ukraine.

The following question-answer session dealt with the questions of dual-use products, which is not covered by OSCE as well as with relations with other security organizations.

### **Wednesday, 25 June**

#### **09:00-10:30 – The Security Dimension: Policing Issues.**

**Guy Vinet (Head of Strategic Police Matters Unit (SPMU), Transnational Threats (TNT) Department).**

The morning session started with discussion about a role of police in the current Ukraine crisis as well as some examples of OSCE activities in policing in different countries.

The developing of policing issues was a long process at the OSCE, but the first police-related activities started 1998 (in reality 1999 after the summit in Istanbul). In fact, the OSCE is a flexible and programmatic organization in policing matters.

Policing issues in OSCE today. There are huge differences among the participating states from point of view of police. On one side there are European system, on the other – a large number of totally different systems and approaches. The task of OSCE is to overcome the different systems and to speak about the same issues. Effective policing helps create an environment where sustainable development can flourish. Good policing, which serves the people rather than just the state, is central to preventing conflicts, preserving social stability during crises and supporting post-conflict rehabilitation. Policing could be linked to every task of OSCE (e.g. elections, arms control).

*Transnational Threats Department* became operational on 1 January 2012 (MC Dec. No. 9/11 on Strengthening Co-ordination and Coherence in the OSCE's Efforts to Address Transnational Threats). This department provides support to the Secretary General, the Chairmanship-in-Office and the participating States on transnational threats (TNT) matters as well as ensures co-ordination and coherence of action across all three OSCE dimensions, among all OSCE executive structures, while respecting their mandates.

The main bodies of transnational threats department are co-ordination cell, strategic police matters unit (SPMU), action against terrorism unit, border security and management unit. In the reality the things are more complicated, because the OSCE is an international organization on one hand, but there are participating states on the other, which could be not happy with the reports and approaches. However, the decision should be done by consensus.

*Strategic police matters unit (SPMU)* were under control of Secretary General, later on it became the part of transnational threats department (TNT). The basic task of SPMU is to

fight the organized crime. Indeed, the transnational organized crime is the biggest threat for the security. Democratic vision of policing means that there is democratic control over police which should serve to the people and to the state.

*Main tasks of SPMU* are to promote co-operation counterfeiting new security challenges, to provide advice for the effective policing, to exchange information about lessons learner and best police practices. Decisions of SPMU are not binding for the police in participating states.

*Field of SPMU services* are police assistance program, organized crime, trafficking of drugs, human trafficking, community policing (tool for the police to understand what is going on in the population), and police training courses.

At the end of lesson were given same concrete examples of police cooperation in the field missions on border security in Skopje as well as on Fight Against Illicit Drug Circulation in Uzbekistan.

#### **11:00-12:30 – Economic and Environmental Dimension of OSCE.**

**Lorenzo Rilasciati (Senior Officer, Head of the Economic and Environmental Forum unit, OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities)**

The presentation about the Economic and Environmental Dimension (EED) which is the second basket of the OSCE started with the short overview of the historical aspects of development of EED (from HFA till now). The EED is very important because it is comprehensive as well as co-operative approach to security. The milestones for the development of EED were Helsinki Final act (1975), Bonn document (1998), mandate of CoEEA (1998) and Maastricht document (2003).

*EED and security interaction:* weak economy and environmental degradation could create threats for security (economical loss, health risks etc.) on one hand, on the other security could also lead to the economical problems.

Further were presented the overview of *structure of EED* which has just executive character as well as its main instruments (Coordinator, Economical Government Unit, Economical and Environmental Unit, Environmental Co-Operation Unit, field missions (EEO-economical and environmental officers)). The discussion was continued about the water which are most difficult issue in OSCE, because the access to the water could be a source for the future conflicts. Unfortunately, EED can't say what to do in the field operation, just supports the activities of participating states.

Latest priority topics of the EED were transportation (2010), security of energy supply (2011), good governance (2012), environmental footprint of energy related activities (2013) as well as environmental challenges (2014).

Main activities of EED are economical activities (from economical prosperity to stability), good governance (e.g. OSCE Good Governance Declaration), transport (e.g. The Handbook of Best Practice of Border Crossing), environmental activities (water resource management,

hazardous waste, climate change and security, ENVSEC, energy security dialogue). Main problem is that the mandate of OSCE in energy security is very weak.

### **15:00-18:30 – Participants Workshop 2: Various OSCE Issues.**

**Dr. Arie Bloed.**

The workshop started with the short feed-back about previous lessons. Afterwards the 3 groups of participants had to make a presentation to one of following questions:

1. Is the legalization of OSCE needed?
2. Decision-making in OSCE: changes needed? Yes/ no/ why/ how?
3. Assess the OSCE involvement in the Ukraine crisis in terms of success and failures. Are new tools needed?

The groups were supposed to write down the findings and appoint a rapporteur.

Group 1 dealt with the issues of necessity of legalization of the OSCE. The participants appointed following weaknesses and strengthens of the Organization without the legal status. Weaknesses: no enforcement mechanism (no sanctions), problems for the small countries in decision-making process. Strengths and achievements: flexibility, rapid decision-making process, quick changes, implementations of the decisions (no ratifications through national parliaments needed). The treats for the Organization without legal status are the instability, loose of control, status of the staff (secondment depends on the state paying). The conclusion of the group I was that that the legalization is needed to avoid the weaknesses and treats for the organization.

The discussion about the first presentation included the questions about need of consensus, legalization process as well as decision-making process through the other type of voting. It is very important to separate in light of legalization (a) the organization as an organization and (b) decision-making process. The legalization of decision-making process will create other type of documents. In terms of legalization of the organization as an organization is the legalization needed. In 1991-93 this question was already on the agenda. The legalization of the documents could undermine every achievement of OSCE. Because the OSCE is a political organization, every country is trying to use it only for the self-interest.

Group 2 delivered the presentation about need of changes in decision-making process. In their opinion the changes here are needed because of extensive period for discussions at the Permanent Council (lack of efficiency, lack of progress), rapid changes in security situation. The suggestions are: time limit for decision-making process, additional power to the Secretary General. The conclusion of the group II was that that here are no cardinal changes needed.

The following discussion on the presentation included the work of Parliamentary Assembly as a good example of diplomacy (there is always a consensus), situation in Kosovo when no international organization want to work there as well as “Consensus-1” (C-1) decision-making process (applied if a country systematically violating the OSCE’s rules and decisions, but was almost never used – only in case of Yugoslavia -, because not to create a precedent),

“Consensus-3” (C-3) (almost adopted in case of Nagorno-Karabakh). In any case there are only one group of states which negotiate on the issue; the other countries will support the decision if there is a consensus in the group of the states direct involved in the issue (e.g. in case of Nagorno-Karabakh were Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkey, Russia, USA and France). Consensus seems to be not functional procedure, but it works in the reality.

Group 3 discussed about the success and failures of OSCE involvement in the current Ukraine crisis. OSCE response to the Ukraine crisis since March 2014: preventive diplomacy contributed positively (visits of representative on Freedom of the Media, High Commissioner on National Minorities); special monitoring mission (decision of PC by 22nd March 2014); military observers; Geneva Agreement (OSCE should monitor the implementation of this agreement); Swiss initiative (road map); contact group (OSCE, Russia, Ukraine); series of round tables; special meetings of FSC/PC. The group pointed out following drawbacks of the Organization in this crisis: lack of the presence to field missions and lack of reports; the delay of monitoring missions, ineffective attempts to bring both sides to the dialogue; escalations of the tensions; increase of the humanitarian crisis. The group made following proposals to increase the effectiveness of OSCE in the crisis situations: OSCE should become more effective facilitator; the organization should be more involved in the dialogue; quick response before escalation; deployment of the monitoring missions without consensus.

The following discussion about the presentation started with the additional information on OSCE activities in Ukraine (human rights assessment missions in the Crimea and East Ukraine), the need of special budget to take the arms from the paramilitary in the East. In any case the mission of OSCE in Ukraine will be prolonged. The mechanisms of OSCE used in the Ukraine: election observation (one of the biggest activities in the history); group of 8; informal joint sessions of PC/FSC; several visits of Secretary General in Ukraine and Russia; ODIHR; HCMN; RFM. The discussion was continued with the issue of military missions: military mission could be deployed without consensus, because of the Vienna document – “unusually military activities”. The “5+2” model (similar to Transdnistria) could be used to resolve the current crisis. There is also the role of vice-man for rapid reaction on the crisis. There is a gap between early-warning and early-action. The early-action doesn’t work because of lack of political will. OSCE is in this terms typical conflict-preventive organization, but the question is if it possible to prevent.

#### **Thursday, 26 June**

**09:00-10:30. The Human Dimension of the OSCE: Standard Setting & Monitoring.**

**Arie Bloed**

The morning lesson started with the question what is the Human Dimension of OSCE. (Definition. Difference with other international organizations. Special focus. Consequences of this focus. Advantages and disadvantages of political nature. Penetrating/intrusive character. Comprehensiveness.)

There is no clear definition of Human Dimension but we know what we are talking about. Human Dimension was already in Helsinki Final Act and is security oriented. In fact, this dimension began in 1989. It includes not just Human Rights and fundamental freedoms but

also rule of law, democracy, protection of national minorities (the aim of minority regime is to prevent conflicts).

*The differences of Human Dimension in the OSCE and Council of Europe* are that the Human Dimension in the OSCE is not only security-focused, but it also a political process (politically binding), where it is legal process in COE legally binding (with courts, ratifications). Political nature of HD in OSCE is more flexible (quickly adaptation of documents – e.g. Copenhagen documents was adopted in 4 weeks). Creation of norms in the OSCE: negotiation --> consensus --> adoption (in the UN: negotiation --> draft --> signature --> ratification --> entry into force). The task of Human Dimension Implementation Meeting is purely monitoring of the implementation of the adopted norms within the OSCE. The only two things are not covered in documents of OSCE: death penalty and LGBT-rights

The most *important areas of HD* are election observation, protection of national minorities, democracy and rule of law, freedom of the press because these issues lead to insecurity and conflict. After the fall of the Soviet Union, minorities began to appear within Newly Independent States (NIC's) and the protection of minorities became a priority. OSCE acts as a catalyst, political guidance; it does not deal with the technical expertise and funding since it is lacking in both money and human resources. We need OSCE because this organization has a different approach, more political and tackles the HD issue in a more systematic way.

Further was a discussion to following questions: Neutrality of norms (Does OSCE have double standards, due partly to different cultures?) Selectivity in implementation? OSCE as 'project farmer' or 'catalyst'? Relevance of gender for OSCE (security)?

*Monitoring the HD of OSCE.* Most special features of monitoring process:

- ✓ *Objective* (election observation and HD), but not always. The monitoring of the OSCE is in the hands of the government to 95%. (No political will to setup in an independent monitoring committee). Independent element is missing.
- ✓ *Fairness* is not always guaranteed.
- ✓ *Impartial.* Anybody can come and speak at the ODIHR in Warsaw (except for NGOs and groups condoning and practicing terrorism (e.g. PKK), but blocking is the issue of the states). NGOs have some influence and they are listened to at the ODIHR. These meetings are open.
- ✓ *Transparency.* The OSCE is generally transparent, except what going on behind the closed doors.

*Monitoring mechanisms and procedures of OSCE are:*

- ✓ HDM (Vienna and Moscow) is not required consensus. Vienna mechanism (1989) is a procedure for the exchanges of information on questions concerning the human dimension. The state is obliged to provide this information. Moscow mechanism (1991) provides the option of sending missions of experts and rapporteurs (one per country – roster of candidates) to assist participating States in the resolution of a particular question or problem relating to the HD. OSCE can send experts under Moscow mechanism to the countries against their will.
- ✓ HDIM (and Review Conferences)
- ✓ ODIHR

- ✓ HCNM (conflict preventive perspective; Recommendations)
- ✓ Missions
- ✓ NGOs
- ✓ Other IGOs

**11:00-12:30. Helsinki +40.**

**Andrea Rauber (Deputy Head of Swiss Delegation /CiO; Chairperson of the Preparatory Committee, General Coordination of the "Helsinki +40" Process).**

The second lesson of the day dealt with two questions: what is Helsinki +40 process and Helsinki +40 roadmap. Helsinki +40 process may be seen as a reform process, as a platform for discussions as well as a vision. This year changed a lot because of Ukraine crisis. The OSCE was unfortunately not really successful in the current Ukraine crisis.

Some core issues of Helsinki +40 roadmap under Swiss chairmanship are:

- ✓ The fostering of the military transparency and how to deal with transnational threats.
- ✓ The fostering of Human Dimension because of lash of East and West in economic issues. EU as such not interested in economic and environmental issues, but some EU-countries have strong interest (because of natural disaster, e.g. Balkans this year). Moreover EU has taboo-topics in the Second Dimension (energy, water).
- ✓ Creation of the spirit of dialogue. Swiss chairmanship started dialogue in 4 regions (conferences in Belgrade, Dushanbe, Tiflis, Vienna). The idea is to organize platforms for civil society. Such kind of conferences were organized for the first time.
- ✓ To increase dialogue with the youth. Youth unemployment is a potential threat for stability.
- ✓ The fostering of field presence. The field operations should be improved (capacity, structure, budget etc). It is very important to keep presence on the ground in some countries. The discussions are going now about the opening of mission in Kazakhstan.

Current challenges for the OSCE are: crisis in the Ukraine will remain on the top of agenda; widening of East-West rift; unresolved protracted conflicts; decreasing of financial resources.

The lesson ended with the question-answer round. The questions were raised about the potential membership of China in the OSCE as well as the borders of OSCE (is there a political basis for cooperation with some countries?); Swiss chairmanship and possible outcomes of Helsinki +40 processes, Russian minorities in Crimea and the question of self-determination.

**14:30-16:30. - Experts Panel on Gender and Security**

**Blanka Bellak, Director, ASPR**

**Leslie Abdela, Senior Partner, Shevolution-Consultancy/UK**

**Ambassador Philip McDonagh, Head of Permanent Mission of Ireland to the OSCE**

The afternoon expert panel was opened by welcome speech of Blanka Bellak. The experts panel was continued with the issue of woman participation and the role of women in civil conflict. The number of civil wars has increased to 50% in the past 10 years and to 90% in the

past 30 years. The human beings are the centre of conflicts. The ambassador continued the topic of women participation with the examples of UN Res. 1425 (action plan of Ireland) with unique aspect of political participation on international level which has following goals till 2015: equality, status of women, rule of law etc.).

Further were given some concrete examples about the situation with women in India (self-employment associations) and Bangkok (women prisoners), women's access to the education in the OSCE countries (Romania). Social inequality leads usually to women's inequality. In case of field operation in Congo there are only 5 women from 200 of the staff. DDR is not working in Congo in terms of gender because of no access to the women's problems (war as a family problem) as well as sexual violence as war tactic. Further was discussed Action Plan on Gender of OSCE (Vienna).

The big discussion was a topic of gender programme for Afghan police. After finishing the programme several years ago the outcome was sexual harassment of female participants back in Afghanistan. One argument was not to create such programme in the future and to put gender issue where it will make effort, the counter-argument was the necessity of such training for the women from crisis regions as a part of SSR as a whole. The discussion about the Afghan police led to the topics as the protection of women from sexual violence, domestic violence, and dealing with the trauma.

### **Friday, 27 June**

#### **09:00-10:30 Introduction, Concepts & General Issues of Long Term missions.**

**Pascal Heyman (Former Deputy Director for Policy Support Service, Conflict Prevention Centre, CPC).**

The OSCE is a field-based organization. There were 17 field operations in 14 countries (2 in not recognized territories – Kosovo and Nagorno-Karabakh). The difference of field operations and other tasks of organization: how to translate the political commitments into field mission? Field mission is a unique mix of political commitments and practical project work. Projects are always political in nature and should support the political commitments. In other words, they do the political but concrete/practical work. Field missions are the "eyes and ears" of organization which are reporting to the delegations of participating states.

Task of the field operations are to assist host States to fulfill their OSCE commitments; to facilitate reforms and political processes; to perform early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management, post-conflict rehabilitation (conflict cycle); to keep the OSCE community informed about developments.

How will be decided about the mission and why is it difficult? The mandate of the mission is:

- ✓ adopted by the Permanent Council by consensus;
- ✓ established in agreement with the Host Country;
- ✓ tailor-made (to the extent possible), very broad (the economic dimension is not included in the mandate) and flexible (but key point is the implementation of mandate);

- ✓ primarily 1 year in duration (e.g. the mandate for the mission in Kosovo should end in December 2007, but many states disagreed with it. The mandate was prorogated monthly with the possibility of closure of mission during the month. In fact, the delegations don't care what is going in the field. The problem is here that it is not long term mission anymore but the benefit is that the mission is going on automatically);
- ✓ encompassing one or more of the OSCE dimensions.

56% of the budget of EUR 142.3 million and 76% of positions are allocated to OSCE field operations. Out of 2,478 positions, 1,893 are in field operations out of which 1,479 are local staff posts. Women make up 46% of the general staff in field operations and 48% of the professional staff. At the OSCE, there are almost 45% professional staff. Percentage of women who are in high ranking level (P5-D) increased from 30% to 35%.

The budget of field missions is cut. The OSCE becomes more institutionalized. States are trying to reduce their costs because of the current financial crisis. There are those who genuinely cut costs due to purely financial reasons but some countries use the same excuse to try to reduce the effectiveness of an institution. Budget becomes a political tool to either undermine or support the activities of an OSCE institution. The delegations decide to which institution they allocate the budget/which organization gets priority. Every increase in budget should be agreed by consensus.

There are several types of field operations. Project Office mandate does not allow to monitor and report on the (political) developments in the country. It only has to implement projects. This is the main difference between the missions. The names of field operations as well as types are not important. Important is only the mandate of the field operation.

Field operations answer to the CiO, Administrative Office in Vienna (SG), Delegations (Participating States including the host county). Project Office write reports on their project implementation. The "master" is different depending on the topic/issue. The FO handles its own project. The delegations can influence their work through the budget. Activities are also undertaken in participating states even without a field presence. Field operation is a complex working environment ("organized chaos"). Nobody is independent in the field mission. There is only autonomy with regards to the mandate.

### **11:00-12:30 Long-term missions: lessons learned.**

**Pascal Heyman**

In the second part of lesson on long-term mission were given the overview about the lesson learned from the past field operations.

#### **Challenges and Constraints of the long-term missions.**

*Political challenges to the Field Operations (FO).* Field operation got a negative sense: if the field mission will be deployed that means is something wrong going on in the country. In essence, it is good for the host country to have a field mission because they are receiving aid from other countries. But political stigma factor for the hosting country is to have a FO can be an indicator that the country has serious problems inside. Why doesn't OSCE have a field

mission in Northern Ireland? What is difference between Northern Ireland and Moldova? The focus area of OSCE was the East from Vienna because of the transformation process related to the Eastern-Western block confrontation. The focus regions are the stages of this confrontation of the Cold War. There was and is no political will to put field missions west of Vienna because various issues there may be addressed by other institutions (EU, Council of Europe). In essence: the end of the Cold War gave a good reason for the OSCE to exist.

Second challenge is that delegations of some countries can limit the power and mandate of the field operation. Reporting has been increasingly a problem. Reports should be only about verified facts. Even if written objectively, a report can still provoke debates and the country could put the other country in the defensive.

Third political problem is how to measure the implementation of FO's mandate. One way is to measure how the mission has done its business; the other way is how the host country implemented the recommendations. It's difficult to measure whether or not a FO has fulfilled most of its mandate. The answer is more political rather than scientific.

*Structural challenges to the Field Operations.* Cross-borders problems: the field missions are not sufficient to tackle transnational issues, because a priori the FO's mandate is focused on one country. In some issues like transnational threats are the territories of many countries involved. It is also not easy to develop regional cooperation through the mission – the implementation of concept is very hard (e.g. Georgia).

There is competition factor with the other organizations (e.g. EU) that are also coming to the field. OSCE can't be a service provider (e.g. to prepare the country for EU-membership).

Internally, the OSCE has a chaotic structure. Most people in the field are seconded contracted and paid by the participating states or not paid at all.

### **A Number of Lessons Learned.**

*Host country.* First at all, the project should be agreed with the host country what is not always easy. Thus, the dialogue with host country is strongly needed. Especially problematic is the appointment of Head of mission (announcement of vacancy --> candidates are proposed by the governments --> candidates are chosen by the CiO).

Imposing a candidate on the host government is not a good idea. If the host government is against the appointed head of mission, it can deny the person's entry to the government, there will not much cooperation, i.e. there will be consultations but difficulty reach agreements. The country will not want to work with the head of mission and thus, the OSCE will not have an effective representative in that country. Thus, the deployment is very difficult: regional, national and gender balance should be respected plus the wish of host country. *Civil society.* OSCE keeps good relations with relevant NGOs and CSOs. *Political objectives vs. project work.*

**Future approaches:**

- ✓ mandate implementation and exit-strategy (e.g. Georgia 2008; successful exit-strategy in Croatia);
- ✓ strengthen of field operations;
- ✓ regional approaches;
- ✓ future models for co-operations in the field (e.g. Innovative project model in Mongolia: have a core local team but have international experts which provide their expertise during short periods of time. Advantages: fewer burdens on the budget but still ensuring continuity. Moreover, it is also more flexible and "lighter" than a full-fledged project office).

Question & Answer round concerned the issues of missions in Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh and their results. The conclusion of discussion was that the OSCE will become completely other organization without the field missions which could be disappear.

**17:00-18:30 – Transnational threats (TNT).****Alexey Lyzhenkov (Coordinator of Activities to Address TNT / OSCE TNT Department).**

The aim of afternoon lesson was to give a brief and quite general introduction into activities of the OSCE with regard to Transnational Threats. The lessons started with a brainstorming to understand what Transnational Threats are, how the OSCE is addressing TNTs as well as where the OSCE stands regarding TNTs compared to other organizations which are dealing with this matter.

TNT has been created to streamline all the institutions. Various Actors within the OSCE are working with these issues: *OSCE Secretariat*: (TNT Department; Forum for Security Co-operation Support Section (within CPC); Office of the Co-ordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings (also Special Representative); Office of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities (e.g. Energy Security which can also be a TNT); *OSCE Institutions* (such as the ODIHR Anti-Terrorism Co-ordinator); *OSCE field operations* (e.g. more than 100 police officers seconded).

TNT has 4 pillars: Consolidated Framework for the Fight against Terrorism, Convention on narcotics and drugs, Transnational Organized Crime, Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs – were successfully resolved).

The transnational threats are: terrorism; organized crime, including illegal trafficking  
Corruption and money-laundering: WMD proliferation; Cyber/ICT threats.

*Cybercrime.* Cybercrime has been on the rise for years. The counterfeiting of cybercrime is the most difficult task nowadays. Use of computer systems and the Internet as weapons for cyber-attacks is also a growing concern. The OSCE is primarily concerned with the interaction of States in cyberspace. In 2013 the CSBMs for cybercrimes were adopted by the 57 States which the basic aim to avoid the conflicts in digital world which could lead to the conflicts in real world (e.g. DDOS attacks). Interventions are not in the virtual world but in the real world. The exchange of information, consultations, creation of cooperation

between national bodies and establishment of focal points are strongly needed. TNT task force divided into an implementation group and a CSBM-development group.

*Terrorism.* Interestingly enough, the term terrorism has no legally binding, criminal law definition. Common definitions of terrorism refer only to those violent acts which are intended to create fear, are perpetrated for a religious, political or, ideological goal; and deliberately target or disregard the safety of civilians. In 1999 the delegation of Russian Federation put the problem of definition of terrorism on the agenda of UN which is still under discussion because 192(3) states have different approaches. The Consolidated Framework for the Fight Against Terrorism does not provide a definition neither. In the OSCE is no need to have definition of terrorism. The participating states are focusing on practical tools.

Priorities on counterfeiting of terrorism:

- ✓ Legal framework on terrorism. There are 19 universal instruments against terrorism. OSCE works in support of 19 UN Conventions, from which only 13 adopted by in the UN and 15 by OSCE
- ✓ Counterfeiting of extremism and radicalization which are leading to terrorism. In relation with cybercrime, TNT aims to limit the terrorist propaganda and prevent recruitment of people via the Internet.
- ✓ Preventing of financing terrorism. (E.g. The terrorist attack in Madrid 2003 cost only around 50.000 euro according to the press).
- ✓ Promoting dialogue and cooperation in counterfeiting of terrorism in private-public-partnership (PPP).
- ✓ Strengthen of national capacities for implementation UN Res. 1440 (Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction).
- ✓ Security of travel documents. (The trigger was 9/11 - biometric passports, etc.). The Action Against Terrorism Unit is working on exchanging experience and promoting good practices with regard to travel document security
- ✓ Promoting and protection of Human Rights in counterfeiting of terrorism. Counterfeiting of terrorism should be under the rule of law.

*Drugs.* The legal framework for the counterfeiting the illicit narcotics and drugs are 3 conventions of UN. Narcotic and drugs on the OSCE agenda: trying to limit it because it represents a threat to public health, economy, and security (in case of sensitive, technological infrastructures especially in producing of chemical precursors which can be used for production of drugs). Also organized crime use OSCE borders to easily transport drugs (ex. Afghanistan produced 80-93% of opium which will be transported inside of the OSCE). Once something enters the OSCE region, it is easier to transport it to probably the US, Canada. This calls for stronger border management and needs for transnational cooperation. It is harder to regulate the drug problem and in particular the drug transportation problem because each country is different with their own rules.

Due to the time limit it was not possible to discuss in details the other transnational threats. In the following question & answer round were discussed the issue of legalization of drugs.

## Saturday, 28 June

### **09:00-18:30 Workshop # 3 Mediation, Negotiation and Diplomacy.**

**Wilbur Perlot (Training and Research Fellow, Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael).**

The workshop started with the introduction and the experience of participants in negotiations. Diplomacy is always linked to negotiations. As a mediator one should have to have more knowledge about what the other parties want. Negotiations are strongly needed during a crisis. Crisis provokes a lot of stress. With the pressure is the stress as well as emotions arising. Managing emotions is important. Don't let personal attacks go unaddressed.

Negotiation is a process, and a mediator must include everything related to the negotiation. The elements involved in mediation include

- ✓ Multiparty elements;
- ✓ Culture (examples of meaning “yes”, “no” and “may be” in different cultures);
- ✓ History;
- ✓ Identity issues;
- ✓ Power (structural power (ex. big countries), situational power (depends on the actual negotiation situation));
- ✓ Conflicting / diverging interests (a common topic of conversation which has nothing to do with the crisis or is not a cause of conflict);
- ✓ Information (Relevant information is needed: if you think you know too much, you often don't want to negotiate anymore. We often react to the prior knowledge we have).
- ✓ Emotions (e.g. Children know very well how to use emotions and body language. Body language and nonverbal communication also gives the negotiator an edge in the process. Taking physical surroundings, such as seating arrangements, into consideration can also enhance the negotiation process.);
- ✓ Trust (“shadow of the future” - If somebody is having long-term relations and one tends to lie and cheat - it means off for negotiations);
- ✓ Constituency;
- ✓ Perception (“Diffused reciprocity”: we give something and we get something on other time (not directly). A country which does not have a lot of stake can support those which do and then get something back some other time. Coalition creation: try to convince the neutrals first (those who don't have a lot of at stake, then the opponents)).
- ✓ Empathy;
- ✓ Mutual understanding (E.g. “Constructive ambiguity”: loved by diplomats, but downside is that outcomes tend to be difficultly to implement);
- ✓ Issue linkage (“Egotiation”);
- ✓ Relationship.

Some important tips for a negotiator:

- ✓ You need to have a window of opportunity.
- ✓ Avoid saying “Calm down” (Ex. a chairman ignores a participant, she screams. The chairman should address her to pacify her (the chairman should not directly apologize right away but he should say something similar to an apology without saying it; don't tell

them to calm down either because they have a problem with you and by doing that you are distancing yourself. The chairman should not give the floor right away because it will set a precedent. It is better to take a break and regroup).

- ✓ Negotiation is not about being right but getting what you want.
- ✓ Don't negotiate or negotiate within the limits you have imposed. (Suggested reading: Blink by Gladwell).
- ✓ Avoid a lot of messages in one speech. (Give a summary of what you just said to make the main arguments of your speech clearer to everyone).
- ✓ Avoid making jokes that could be misinterpreted.

The introduction was followed by an exercise "Crocodile river". The participants were divided in four groups and had to rank the characters in the following story from 1 (the "best" character) to 5 (the "worst"):

"Once there was a woman named Abigail who was in love with a man named Greg. Greg lived on the opposite side of a crocodile infested river. Abigail wanted to cross the river to be with Greg, but the bridge had been washed away. She approached Sinbad a riverboat captain to take her across. He said he would be glad to assist if Abigail went to bed with him before the trip. Unfortunately, the bridge had been washed away. She promptly refused and went to a friend named Ivan to explain her plight. Ivan did not want to be involved at all in the situation. Abigail felt her only alternative was to accept Sinbad's terms. After she had been to bed with him, Sinbad fulfilled his promise to Abigail and delivered her across the river to Greg. When she told Greg about her amorous adventure, he cast her aside with disdain. Heartsore she turned to Slug with her story. Slug feeling compassion for Abigail, found Greg and beat him up brutally. Abigail was overjoyed at the sight of Greg getting what she thought he deserved and as the sun sets we hear Abigail laughing at Greg".

Afterwards each group presented their rank order and finally one of participants from each group had to negotiate with the others about the reaching of the common ranking of characters. The final consensus was reached after the negotiations and couple rounds of breaks for the discussions about the positions inside of the small group: (1) Greg; (2) Slug; (3) Ivan; (4) Sinbad; (5) Abigaile.

During the debriefing of exercise were discussed the questions about the decision making process within the groups, negotiation between the represents of groups, the role of possible mediator, the reaching of common ranking. This case study is best used to demonstrate cooperation, collaboration, discussion, prioritizing, and consensus building. It is also a great way to discover less then desirable traits used to try and persuade people to change their minds.

Lesson learned after this exercise:

- ✓ For the negotiations are very important mediator, rules and procedures, place (should be neutral), time (speaking time should be equally), argumentations and proposals, possibility of package-deal.
- ✓ Not important how time do you have – the decision will be taken at last 5 minutes!
- ✓ Avoid saying "NO"!
- ✓ It is better to be unhappy during the negotiations than afterwards back home.

After the lunch break the participants dealt with the next exercise “Diplomatic Transport”. Participants were divided into group of two.

The instructions for the Party 1 (P1) were the following: P1 was requested by the ambassador to sell the embassy's van. Budget cuts are hitting the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Stockholm. As a consequence all diplomatic posts have to cut down their expenses on transportation by 50%. The ambassador tells to sell the small van that is being used for group transport. The van has been used to drive around Development Cooperation experts from Sweden, and now a bus must be hired to replace the van. The ambassador wants to get a price as high as possible, otherwise he will have to cut down on other transport costs, e.g. he has to sell his own car and buy a more modest one. The van is a five years old Volkswagen, kept rather well. A new one of this class nowadays costs about 25.000 euro. An Ethiopian dealer is ready to pay euro 11.000, for it in order to sell the van as a kind of taxi for groups. The price proposed is acceptable. However, a higher price would please the ambassador. The colleagues from the British and Belgian embassies are interested in buying the car. P2 was the colleague from the Belgian Embassy, who was requested to buy a second-hand car for his chef in order to keep costs as low as possible (not more than 14.000 Euro). The bidding was about the price. The participants supposed to write down the first bid and the final prize and compare them in the plenum.

During the debriefing of exercise were discussed the questions about the BATNA (Best Alternative to Negotiated Agreement) and the ZOPA (Zone of Possible Agreement). Making extreme offers is risky because if the seller goes too high, he or she has to make very big jumps to get back to the contract zone. If the buyer starts too high, he or she has no room to move. Anchoring (i.e. the initial bids) determines room to manoeuvre. If you call the other side's bluff, they are in trouble.

Lesson learned after this exercise:

- ✓ The negotiations about the price depend on the culture. (E.g. In Egypt the tourists are paying on the market 7 times more than normal price, in China even 10 times more).
- ✓ Zone of Possible Agreement could be improved by package-deal (In the case of exercise – additional insurance or warranty for the car).
- ✓ The seller is usually in the best condition than the buyer.
- ✓ Integrative solutions (win-win solutions). 50%-50% solutions are not always the best. Some cultures don't accept the “win-win”.

The next exercise was a negotiation simulation, this time creating an operation agreement between the EUROPOL Mission and the government of Afghanistan. Participants divided into pairs, and used worksheets to make concessions. Each concession had a point value such that Afghanistan lost points for each concession it made, and gained points for each concession the EUROPOL made (and vice versa for the EUROPOL). It was possible for both Afghanistan and the EUROPOL to achieve a positive score. Following the negotiations participants met in plenary and recorded their results on the board. Scores differed, since even negotiations based on interest can be influenced by other factors.

The nash equilibrium is the outcome whereby everyone scores the same. Although it is not necessarily the best outcome, it is often one that is satisfying because parties may perceive it as most fair. The optimal outcome is called pareto, which is truly the highest possible value that can be created. It results from cooperation, which is a step above compromise.

At the end of the day the participants took part at a negotiation session over the agreement on Algeria, representing five parties, namely Spain, France, Germany, United Kingdom and Sweden. The aim was to provide an insight into the complexity of the decision-making process, the divergent positions and interests of all parties involved and the practice of multi-lateral negotiations.

The participants were divided into small groups, which included the representants of all five parties. Every country got a list with the table where the six negotiations issues on Algeria are listed (evacuation of EU citizens, support for the Algerian government, development cooperation programmes for Algeria, mediation on conflict, arms embargo and other sanctions, humanitarian aid) and had different values for every party. The points behind each possible outcome on issue represented the value of this outcome for the country that participant represented. For each outcome that the participants were agreed upon, they wrote the corresponding value in the column "points earned". At the end of negotiations the participants added up the total score. The job was is to negotiate in such way, that the country earns as many value points as possible. However, a final outcome lowers than zero points are unacceptable and should be vetoed.

The outcome of the negotiations was very interesting. Indeed, there should be an agreement that scored more points for the whole EU and not only for every party. Because of different extremely different values in every issue for Sweden and France it was very important that Sweden became accommodative and in this case France will become cooperative. Surprisingly, the best possible agreement was reached by one of group, what is very seldom during this exercise.

Lessons learned from the last case study:

- ✓ Look at the bigger picture, we can concede some things which will eventually be beneficial for everyone. In this case, France has a lot more at stake and the other should have assisted this country not undermine it for our own interests.
- ✓ It is very important to assist our counterparts.
- ✓ In negotiations, we forget the consequences of our decisions. Diplomats tend to defend their national interests and not about the people who are dying on the ground.

### **Monday, 30 June**

**09:00-10:30 Minority Rights and Minority Issues Within the OSCE.**

**Arie Bloed (Director of OSCE Summer Academy).**

Why are minority rights so important in OSCE? Minority rights are the tool to prevent conflicts. They are the predominant issue for the security. Minority rights and issues are extremely complicated issues, with links to all three dimensions of OSCE activity. It is unique instrument in OSCE, no organization has it. The High Commissioner on Minorities is a truly

unique office; its mandate includes conflict prevention and gives it the ability to intervene even without a state invitation.

Why special group of rights or why are Human Rights in general not sufficient? 1948 was the universal declaration of human right adopted, but there were no issue of minority rights. The UN Charter does not provide a single sentence about minority rights. The key issue of Human Right is non-discrimination.

The short introduction was followed by discussion about the minority and majority rights. The minority rights are very sensitive topic because of Hitler who started with the protection of Germans and there were general human rights. But soon it became clear that the alone HR are not enough (minorities used to live in poverty etc.). 1966 the United Nations General Assembly adopted the International Covenant on Civil and Minority Rights (ICCPR). First time after the World War II, we have an article about the minority rights. There is no definition of minority. Some countries say, they don't have a minority.

What is the main aim of the international regime of minority rights? (Assimilation, separation, integration). Integration is an inclusion of minorities into the society, but at the same time their identity should be secured. On one side there are the rights, but at the same time there should be responsibilities towards the society. It is delicate balance, but there is no obligation in international law. Next step was the adoption of the 1990 Copenhagen Document. The document outlines and formally recognizes a number of new human rights and fundamental freedoms, such as minority rights, respect the right of persons belonging to national minorities to effective participation in public affairs, including participation in the affairs relating to the protection and promotion of the identity of such minorities. Character of minority rights can be described as a balance of rights and duties (e.g. §§ 34). In legal framework of Council of Europe is clearly written down, that the assimilation is forbidden.

In sum, the character of minority rights:

- ✓ Balance of rights and duties;
- ✓ Vagueness (e.g. §§34 and 35(b) of Copenhagen Document). The application is different from country to country. No rules in international law;
- ✓ More principles than "rights";
- ✓ In OSCE: mainly political nature.

Main international documents on minority rights are:

- ✓ Copenhagen Document OSCE 1990;
- ✓ Geneva Report OSCE 1991;
- ✓ UNGA Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities (1992);
- ✓ Article 27 of ICCPR (only one legally binding document on minority rights): "In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language."
- ✓ CoE Framework Convention on the Rights of National Minorities 1995.

Basic features of minority rights are:

- ✓ Categories (identity rights, political participation, special measures). To protect minority is also in interest of majority to maintain security.
- ✓ Definition. There is no clear definition. "I don't know how to define them, but I know them if I see them".
- ✓ Citizenship. Citizenship is not important for the High Commissioner (in OSCE).
- ✓ Collective or individual nature.
- ✓ Self-identification (§32 Copenhagen Document).
- ✓ Self-determination (internal/external). Very important questions are here: What is the subject of self-determination? Who has a right for self-determination? Principles of self-determination: Internal means that the people and nations have the right for self-determination, not national minorities. External means that the people can create own state or join to the other state. If the minority is systematically discriminated than this minority could have right on self-determination. In the most cases there is only internal self-determination within the existing borders.
- ✓ National minorities – people – indigenous people.
- ✓ Territorial integrity.
- ✓ Non-discrimination (e.g. language, access to resources).

The following question-answer round dealt with the Ukraine crisis and the right on the self-determination in Crimea, Putin's view on kin-state: what we saw in the Ukraine is not in the line with the international law, Helsinki Final Act etc.

**11:00-12:30 High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM).  
Walter Kemp (Co-Director of OSCE Summer Academy).**

The lecture was focused on the High Commissioner on National Minorities and started with its pre-history. This instrument was created in 1992 when the tensions in minority's issues started in former Yugoslavia and the USSR (Georgia, Transnistria, some tensions in the Baltic). Instead of the period of peace there was a period of rising tensions and conflicts:

"Violent inter-ethnic conflicts of the past decade, indeed the last century, have demonstrated the danger of extreme nationalism. National minorities have frequently suffered in these conflicts. The lessons of the past have underlined the necessity of respect for the rights of persons belonging to national minorities freely to express, preserve and develop their cultural, linguistic or religious identity free of any attempts at assimilation. While maintaining their identity, a minority should be integrated in harmony with others within a State as part of society at large. This is fundamental to international peace, security and prosperity." (Statement of Rolf Ekéus, OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, 2001).

The OSCE was not created to solve this kind of problems as well as there were no institutions in the EU or Council of Europe. The participating states decided to create a High Commissioner on National Minorities. The office opened in 1993. Why the Commissioner on and for minorities? The Commissioner is dealing with issues of minorities and majorities and he is not an ombudsman for minorities.

His mandate is to prevent the conflicts (more security dimension and not the human dimension). It is an instrument of early warning and early action. Early warning happened only twice till now. The Commissioner works in a way so that people do not know that he is there. It is up to Commissioner where and when to decide and to act. From this point of view he is more independent. Profile of High Commissioner: he is selected from the number of eminent international persons with long-standing relevant experience. His mandate is very proactive: High Commissioner reports only after leaving the country with the aim to avoid tensions (confidence). High Commissioner is not dealing with the minorities involved in organized acts of terrorism as well as with individual belongings to national minorities.

Early warning consists from the collecting and receiving information regarding the national minorities' issues (with the high securitization inside of the office), visiting of participating states as well as promoting dialogue, confidence and co-operation between participating states.

What does the High Commissioner do concretely? He brake down with abstract issues of minorities and is dealing with very special and specific issues (languages, schools etc.). Special projects are needed in some cases. Very important question is how to integrate minority into the society against their wish. The protection of minorities by the the kin-state is the concept from 19<sup>th</sup> century and very dangerous. There is no obligation to protect minorities by the kin-state, but by the state where the minority lives.

The following discussion were continued with the issue of protection of Russian speaking population in Ukraine from different points of view as well as about of problem of occupation of Crimea.

#### **15:00-18:30 Workshop # 4. Practical exercise – Regional Aspects of the OSCE work.**

**Arie Bloed**

**Walter Kemp**

During the workshop participant gave a short presentation about the work of OSCE in their countries.

#### ***„Mongolia-OSCE Co-operation“***

Guamaral ALTANGEREL (Mongolia)

We believe that many if not all of the goals, whether security or stability, fighting against common transnational threats, sustainable development, promoting human rights, etc. can be attained better through multilateral cooperation. We see that the OSCE, the most advanced security community today in Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian area is an appropriate forum for that. Mongolia believes that evolving security uncertainties and non-traditional security issues can and should be addressed in all its dimensions namely: politico-military, economic, environmental and human security.

OSCE as a unique platform for political dialogue and facilitation of regional cooperation. The Trans-Atlantic co-operation of the OSCE has expanded to include the broader Eurasian region. Maintaining security in this region is very important today for ensuring that the world continues to be a peaceful and secure place. Within the OSCE, we would like to

contribute to the dialogue between the East and the West, becoming a link between Asia and Europe.

The participation in the OSCE is giving us opportunity to strengthen our multi-pillar foreign policy, develop cooperation with the OSCE participating States on security-related issues, share information and experiences, maintain regular dialogue and contribute to the collective efforts to fulfill the OSCE's noble objectives and principles.

Mongolia sees the OSCE as a valuable and unique platform for political dialogue and facilitation of regional cooperation. We are very much interested to learn from the experiences of European countries. Thus, at present, we are undertaking a series of measures to introduce European standards in different sectors and fields.

The OSCE also opens new channels of cooperation with our "third neighbors" such as the European Union and its member states. The relations between Mongolia and EU have been broadening and developing in recent years. For example, we have signed the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with the EU last year and Mongolia hopes for swift conclusion of the ratification of this agreement by member states within this year. Once ratified, the PCA will open many new opportunities for cooperation not only with EU, but also with its member states.

Mongolia is pursuing a dynamic relation and cooperation with the OSCE across all three dimensions in jointly promoting the vision of a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian community. We are determined to broaden and strengthen its cooperation with the OSCE and its institutions, and seeking further opportunities to expand it.

As the youngest member of the organization Mongolia fully supports and welcomes the roadmap on the Helsinki +40 process in the run-up to the Organization's 40th anniversary in 2015, Mongolia was chosen to be the coordinator for the Asian and Mediterranean Partner countries and other international organizations to support Helsinki +40 process.

*International conferences:*

- ✓ OSCE and Mongolia Joint Conference on "Strengthening the Co-operative Security between the OSCE and the Asian Partners for Co-operation" (Ulaanbaatar, June 2007). The main objective of the conference was discussion with our foreign colleagues - researchers from abroad on features of Mongolian geopolitical situation which is between Central and North East Asia and possible real contribution of Mongolia into stabilizing the world and regional securities.
- ✓ In cooperation with the European Security Studies George Marshall Center organized an international conference on "Present and Future Security Environment in North-East and Central Asia: Ulaanbaatar as a New Helsinki?" (April, 2009). The conference which was discussing Mongolian neutral foreign policy and position, and to give better understanding if and possibilities and conditions of being Mongolia as a regional cooperation center, has have an objective to study threats to the North East Asian regional security, discussion of European experience of setting up a dialogue mechanism and the North East Asian dialogue mechanism formation, and finally, to define a role and position of Mongolia in this dialogue mechanism formation.
- ✓ OSCE and Mongolia Joint Conference on Strengthening the Cooperative Security between OSCE and the Asian Partners of Cooperation in Ulaanbaatar (May 2011). Side event OSCE-Mongolia Conference on "Afghanistan capacity building: strengthening the diplomatic service". The objective of this side event proposed by Mongolia, with the support of the 2011 OSCE Lithuanian Chairmanship and of the Kazakh Chairmanship of

the Asian Contact Group was to exchange views and discuss the optimal ways of training mid-level diplomats from Afghanistan in Mongolia.

One of the first things Mongolia did as a newly-minted participating State was to invite ODIHR to observe its presidential elections last June. Mongolia was reported to be an exemplary host to the Election Observation Mission, providing with a clear example of how to give ODIHR observers full and transparent access to the entire election process. More than that, in the final election observation report, Mongolia demonstrated how a country with a relatively recent past of authoritarian rule can conduct credible and inclusive elections that provided a meaningful opportunity for political participation for its citizens. There are many participating States that have much to learn from Mongolia's example in this regard. Of course, the Final Report highlighted several areas for Mongolia to focus on improving in order to fully meet its OSCE election-related commitments.

The OSCE leaders emphasized that the last year's Presidential election of Mongolia attracted a great attention of many countries, and said the OSCE focused attention on a voting process. Mr Lenarcic highlighted that this election was very competitive, ensuring people's right to vote.

Since 2006 the Mongolian delegation attends the OSCE Ministerial Council on a regular basis. Since 2011 border, and customer officers are regularly attending the OSCE Border Management Staff College in Dushanbe.

*Trainings, seminars & study visits:*

- ✓ Co-organized with OSCE a two-week training-seminar on "Strengthening a diplomacy of Afghanistan" (April, 2012). The aim is to give lectures to the trainees on Mongolian history, international relations, strategic studies, environmental and energy securities, geopolitics, terrorism, international law and international and regional issues.
- ✓ Center for OSCE Research of the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg in cooperation with the Institute for Strategic Studies of Mongolia organized a one-week training for civil servants, researchers and NGO's representatives (September 2013). The training focused on main activities of the OSCE, as well as on possibilities for enhancing the position, participation and contribution of Mongolia
- ✓ "Terrorists' Access to Explosive Substances" OSCE-Mongolia roundtable discussion (November 2013). TNT department ATU in cooperation with the Mongolian national counter-terrorism coordination unit organized a roundtable on the control of explosive chemical precursors of legal use by industry and agriculture.
- ✓ MFA of Mongolia in cooperation with the OSCE Centre in Bishkek organized a study visit on population registration for the Kyrgyzstan Government officials (24-28 June, 2014). A study visit of 15 representatives from Kyrgyzstan's Parliament, the Central Election Commission, the State Registration Service, the President's Office, the Foreign Ministry and other key state agencies to familiarize participants with the population registration system and use of biometric data in Mongolia. The study visit was organized as part of the Centre's activities in supporting electoral reform in Kyrgyzstan.

Mongolia is ready to work together in all three dimensions of the OSCE and in jointly promoting the vision of a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian community. Mongolia is willing to seek further opportunities to expand cooperation with the OSCE and its member countries. It is in this context, the Government has requested to host an OSCE field presence in the country. The CiO sent a representative to lead a small delegation of OSCE officials to Mongolia to study the need for, and feasibility of, establishing a field presence there. That visit produced

a report that recommended establishing a small presence in Ulaanbaatar in order to assist Mongolia to fully implement its OSCE commitments.

This will undoubtedly help strengthen the democratic institutions that we have established in our country since 1990s. Specifically, we are interested in developing joint projects / programmes in areas such as anti-corruption, police training, border management and control.

Major events are Chairmanship of the Forum for Security and Cooperation (FSC) in the first trimester of 2015; Mongolia will host the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly Fall session in 2015.

### ***“OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine”***

Kira SPYRYDONOVA (Ukraine) and Iuliia SERBINA (Ukraine)

Deployment. March 3, 2014 – invitation to the OSCE by the Permanent Representation of Ukraine to International Organizations in Vienna – proposal of the establishment of an international mission of observers, including from the OSCE, to establish facts on the ground in Ukraine, and specifically in the Crimean peninsula. March 21, 2014 – PC Decision # 1117. March 22, 2014 – arrival of the first monitors to Ukraine (drawn from the existing staff in OSCE field operations and the Secretariat using the rapid response mechanism of ‘first responders’). March 25, 2014 - first four Monitoring Teams deployed to the south and east of Ukraine.

The aim of the SMM is to contribute, throughout the country and in co-operation with the concerned OSCE executive structures and relevant actors of the international community (such as the UN and the CoE), to reducing tensions and fostering peace, stability and security; and to monitoring and supporting the implementation of all OSCE principles and commitments.

Tasks of the SMM are to

- ✓ Gather information and report on the security situation in the area of operation;
- ✓ Establish and report facts in response to specific incidents and reports of incidents, including those concerning alleged violations of fundamental OSCE principles and commitments;
- ✓ Monitor and support respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the rights of persons belonging to national minorities;
- ✓ In order to fulfill its tasks, to establish contact with local, regional and national authorities, civil society, ethnic and religious groups, and members of the local population;
- ✓ Facilitate the dialogue on the ground in order to reduce tensions and promote normalization of the situation;
- ✓ Report on any restrictions of the monitoring mission’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate;
- ✓ Co-ordinate with and support the work of the OSCE executive structures, including the HCNM, ODIHR and RoFM, in full respect of their mandates, as well as co-operate with the UN, the CoE and other actors of the international community;
- ✓ According to the Geneva statement – play a leading role in assisting Ukrainian authorities and local communities in the immediate implementation of de-escalation measures.

Period of deployment is 6 months (till September 22, 2014) and can be renewed for further six month periods by decision of the Permanent Council if requested by Ukraine

Personnel: Initially – 100 civilian monitors operating as necessary 24/7 in teams. Plans to expand SMM by a total of up to 400 additional monitors. As of June 18, 2014 – 324 international monitors.

OSCE SMMU activity: Odessa regional aspect. The OSCE SMM in Odessa, has a general mandate to monitor, assess and report on all relevant developments taking place on the ground; to help facilitate dialogue for trust building as precondition for de-escalation of tensions and ultimate reconciliation. In Odessa, the SMM team more specifically works on facilitating dialogue following the 2 May violence with its many fatalities. Odessa team consists of 30 OSCE monitors, with broad international experience in diplomacy, human rights, civil society, gender, political, security and operational-related issues

OSCE SMMU and Odessa Regional Branch of the National Institute for Strategic Studies: perspectives for co-operation:

- ✓ Support to the Odessa Mediation Group and representatives of the regional expert community (including Odessa Regional Branch of the National Institute for Strategic Studies in the elaboration of recommendations on trust-building process in Odessa, by supporting a number of roundtables on the situation in Odessa region, including the rights of national and other minorities in this regard.
- ✓ Establishment of the Council for Religious Dialogue at Odessa Regional Head, and the
- ✓ Establishment of an Anti-crisis information centre for dialogue processes in Odessa region.

### ***„OSCE office in Yerevan“***

Nare MIRZOYAN (Armenia)

OSCE office in Yerevan opened on 9 February 2000 based on the Memorandum of Understanding between the OSCE and Government of Armenia. The office has 7 international staff members and 47 local staff. The Office supports a Programme Implementation Presence (PiP) in Syunik. 2013 budget was 2,791,400 EUR.

Office mandate is to promote the implementation of OSCE principles and commitments within the OSCE framework, in all OSCE dimensions, including the human, political, economic and environmental aspects of security and stability. The Office does not deal with the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The Office does not monitor elections.

Politico-Military Programme:

- ✓ Supporting Police Reform (Introduction of community policing; New police education system; Training on public order management). Community Policing started in 2003. Due to Office efforts, the charter on community policing was adopted nation-wide and accordingly the model of community policing was introduced. There are 300 community police officers, who regularly meet with community representatives in order to solve security issues together. RA has a Police Reform Programme for 2013-14. The main areas of assistance is evaluation of police reform package. Three focus areas: 1) Community Policing / Police and Public partnership; 2) Police educational reform – police education system is in line with international standards; 3) Public order management. Awareness raising is mostly focused all Armenian provinces (not Yerevan-centric); so there are numerous awareness raising campaigns that include the establishment of citizen advisory group and expose the local population (children and media specifically). In Yerevan, projects include: “Safety School Project” as well as public discussions on issues such as domestic violence.

✓ Democratic control over the armed forces (Co-operation with the MOD; Cyber security).

Economic-Environmental Programme:

✓ “Regulatory Guillotine” project (Providing capacity for the implementation of Regulatory reform. Regulatory Impact Assessment. Regulatory simplification).

✓ Supporting SME development. (Unemployment rate is officially 18%. Providing Support the SME Support/Inspection Reform Council which is chaired by the PM. Supporting Civil society development and research on relevant issues).

✓ Economic development of rural areas (Office in Syunik)

✓ Aarhus Convention implementation. Network of Aarhus Centres. (Access to environmental Information, environmental justice and public participation. Currently supports 15 Aarhus Centres to raise awareness on environmental rights and provide expertise to the government and civil society. The ACs looking to create a foundation for sustainability. Recently opened Sustainable Development Center at Yerevan State University adopts international standard of effective use of nature resources and the legislation. Capacity building of environmental journalists).

✓ Environment and Security Initiative (Nubarashen)

Good Governance:

✓ Support to elections (EU 1.7 mln project completed). Electoral Code reform, promoting local election observation, technical support to CEC and Police, trainings for media, recinct electoral commission members).

✓ Improving state administration at various levels.

✓ Fight against corruption (NGO capacity building).

Human Rights:

✓ Support to the Ombudsman’s Office (6 regional Offices).

✓ Judicial reforms (Criminal Procedure Code reform, fair justice)

✓ Penitentiary Reforms (introducing Probation Service, monitoring of prisons and detention centres).

✓ Minority rights.

✓ Public awareness and Education.

Democratization:

✓ Freedom of the Media and Information ( Legal reform, training of journalists, defamation and insult).

✓ Gender equality (Women resource centres in Syunik).

✓ Youth/Education (Model OSCE).

✓ Migration management and Anti-trafficking (Inter-agency working group on anti-trafficking, improving migration policies).

***“The OSCE Centre in Ashgabat. Bridging the differences, building the trust”.***

Jemal MEREDOVA (Turkmenistan), Dovlet CHOTBAYEV (Turkmenistan) and Mahym SAPAROVA (Turkmenistan).

The Centre in Ashgabat commenced its activities January 1999. The Centre assists the host country in implementing OSCE principles and commitments as well as in promoting the host country’s co-operation with the OSCE in all spheres; facilitates contacts between Turkmenistan and OSCE authorities and institutions; establishes and maintains contacts with local authorities, universities and other institutions of higher education, research institutions

and non-governmental organizations; assists in arranging visits of OSCE delegations as well as facilitates the participation of Turkmen representatives in OSCE events abroad.

In the centre works team of six seconded professionals from OSCE participating States as well as 17 national staff members employed as local professionals, dimension/officer assistants, or in administrative support functions.

Political-Military Dimension:

- ✓ Airport security. Programme name: "Conflict Prevention, Confidence and Security Building" Thematic Category: Combatting terrorism, emergency response, strengthening aviation and airport security. March 2013 Specialized practical training on "Emergency Response Operational Skills" (Ashgabat, Mary airport, Turkmenbashi international airport). July 2014 - study visit to Munich International Airport in Germany for six Turkmenistan airport security and law enforcement officials.
- ✓ Strengthening Border Guard Capacities in Turkmenistan (ExB). Programme name: "Conflict Prevention and Confidence and Security Building". Thematic Category: Border Security and Management

Economic and environmental Dimension.

- ✓ Good governance activities: Anti Money Laundering, Combating Financing of Terrorism, Combating Corruption.
- ✓ Energy diplomacy. Thematic Category: Energy Security. Series of the energy diplomacy workshops; International Energy Security and Sustainability Conferences.

Human Dimension:

- ✓ Support to the penitentiary system. Thematic Category: Rule of law / Penitentiary systems / Rights of prisoners.
- ✓ Support to the penitentiary system.

Priority areas of the OSCE Centre in Ashgabat are: promoting energy security, strengthening border management, enhancing the safety of stocks of small arms and light weapons, supporting legal reforms, assisting in water resources management, raising awareness about the international human rights standards, maritime and aviation security, advancing the penitentiary system, modernizing media legislation.

### ***"Switzerland in the OSCE"***

Mila Marie LOMARDA (Switzerland)

The presentation talks about Switzerland's role in the OSCE, from being one of its founding members to holding the Chairmanship for the second time in 2014, and its contributions to the Organization's peace building and conflict prevention efforts throughout the years.

### ***"OSCE's Community Security Initiative Project (CSI) in Kyrgyzstan"***

Nazira TOROBAEVA (Kyrgyzstan)

The Community Security Initiative (CSI) was launched at the beginning of 2011 (after tragic 2010 ethnic clashes) and being implemented by the OSCE and Ministry of Interior of the Kyrgyz Republic. The main objective of the CSI is to build confidence between police and communities including through the promotion of multi-ethnic policing and to increase the respect for protection of human rights by the police.

At all areas of operation OSCE's international police consultants together with local staff are supporting local police in community, multi-ethnic policing and protection of and respect for

human rights through regular trainings, support of police-community joint activities' implementation, various police-community discussion forums.

Since the beginning of the project, OSCE has donated over a dozen of mobile police receptions-minivans with basic equipment needed for a mobile police reception. Mobile police receptions were introduced to local police as an instrument to re-establish and increase police visibility/accessibility and increase police-community interaction. Police and local crime prevention centers' members accompanied by CSI staff regularly go for mobile police reception trips to neighbourhoods.

The project collaborates with a large number of national authorities in Kyrgyzstan. The CSI Project is contributing to wider national police reform programme envisaged by the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic.

### ***“Ireland’s engagement with the OSCE”***

Ciara GILVARRY (Ireland).

Ciara presented on Ireland’s engagement with the OSCE, examining Ireland’s Chairmanship-in-Office in 2012 and the continued engagement since. This presentation provided an overview of the highlights of the Chairmanship-in-Office in Dublin (including conferences on Lesson Sharing from Northern Ireland, Internet Governance and Good Governance). Discussion also looked at the practical considerations of holding the Chairmanship-in-Office. The presentation also looked at Ireland’s engagement with the Helsinki +40 process and with the current work of the OSCE in Ukraine.

### ***“The OSCE in Bosnia and Herzegovina”***

Milovan PEULIĆ (Bosnia and Herzegovina)

*Shortly about History.* First democratic multi-party elections in the Socialist Republic of BiH were held on 18 November 1990. In a session on 14 and 15 October 1991, the Parliament of Socialist Republic of BiH approved the "Memorandum on Sovereignty" as had already been done by Slovenia and Croatia. The Memorandum was adopted despite opposition from 83 Serb deputies. On 24 October 1991, the Serb deputies formed the Assembly of the Serb People in Bosnia and Herzegovina to be the highest representative and legislative body of the Serb population. On 9 January 1992, the assembly proclaimed the Republic of the Serb People of Bosnia and Herzegovina, declaring it part of Yugoslavia. On 28 February 1992 the assembly adopted the Constitution of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Parliament of BiH without its Serb deputies, held a referendum on the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina on 29 February and 1 March 1992, but most Serbs boycotted it since the assembly had previously (9–10 November 1991) held a plebiscite in the Serb regions, 96% having opted for membership of the Yugoslav federation formed only by Serbia and Montenegro. On 6 March the Bosnian parliament promulgated the results of the referendum, proclaiming the republic's independence from Yugoslavia. The republic's independence was recognized by the European Community on 6 April 1992 (the war started) and by the United States on 7 April. On the same day the Serbs' assembly in session in Banja Luka declared a severance of governmental ties with Bosnia and Herzegovina. The name Republika Srpska was adopted on 12 August 1992

*The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (GFAP),* negotiated in Dayton on 21 November 1995 and signed in Paris on 14 December 1995 to end nearly four

years of conflict. On the BiH level we have Presidency, and Council of Ministries-not government. At the beginning of 1996- it consisted of 6 ministries and now it has 10 ministries. More than 50 state agencies created as result of reforms in many different sectors. The Republic of Srpska is a parliamentary Republic with limited international subjectivity. It has a Government with 16 ministries, where 8 of them have to be Serbs, 5 Bosniaks, and 3 Croats. Some of its interest the Republic of Srpska (as Entity) realizes through joint government institutions on the level of Bosnia and Herzegovina as internationally recognized state. The largest town in BiH is Sarajevo as an capital with more than 600.000 inhabitants, and in Republic of Srpska this is Banja Luka with more that 200 000 inhabitants and represents administrative, economic, university and cultural centre of the Republic of Srpska.

*The scope of the OSCE Mission in BiH.* The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (GFAP), negotiated in Dayton on 21 November 1995 and signed in Paris on 14 December 1995 to end nearly four years of conflict, shapes the work of the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina. This agreement specifies the OSCE as one of the agencies responsible for helping to secure lasting peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), implying the role of the Mission in helping to rehabilitate the country after the conflict and contributing to the building of a stable, secure, and democratic state. The scope of the Mission's work is presented through its seven thematic programs:

- ✓ *Community Engagement.* The OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina works with citizens across the country to increase their level and quality of participation in local community and municipal affairs. The OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina works with communities across the country to encourage their sustained engagement with local authorities and to build genuinely inclusive democracy at the local level.
- ✓ *Parliamentary Support.* OSCE Mission to BiH works with all parliaments in BiH to develop their legislative capacity, transparency, efficiency, strengthen technical and professional expertise, improve accountability to citizens and oversight of the executive: BiH Parliamentary Assembly (BiH PA), and the three lower level parliaments: the Republika Srpska National Assembly (RSNA), the Parliament of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (PFBiH), and the Brčko District Assembly of BiH (BDA).
- ✓ *Education.* Education reform is widely regarded as critical to the long-term stability of Bosnia and Herzegovina. (1) Promoting good governance within the education sector and inclusive, accessible, and accountable schools throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina the Mission's projects have supported history textbook reform and modernization and increased respect for diversity by teaching about national minorities in the mainstream curricula. (2) Addressing the roots of discrimination and separation in education as a consequence of former conflict is essential for promoting sustainable peace. (3) Prevention of Violence in Schools
- ✓ *Human Rights.* The OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina assists government authorities in fulfilling the economic and social rights of BiH citizens in a progressive and sustainable manner. Mission encourage government institutions to pay close attention to those persons or groups who are particularly vulnerable as a result of widespread discrimination.
- ✓ *Rule of Law.* The Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina sets out that BiH shall be a democratic state adhering to the rule of law (Domestic War Crimes Prosecutions; Fighting Human Trafficking; Strengthening the Justice Sector; Combating Gender-Based Violence; Combating Hate Crimes)

- ✓ *Governance.* The OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina encourages municipalities to form partnerships and regional networks to address issues of common concern, consolidate and improve good governance standards that have been achieved, and develop new approaches to current and future challenges in local governance. Currently, over two-thirds of BiH's 143 local government units are involved in 22 networks focused on topics such as: strengthening ethical standards in the community, human resource management, leadership, strategy and planning.
- ✓ *Security Cooperation.* The OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) continues to play a vital role in strengthening the country's ability to establish a sustainable, stable security and defence environment. Specifically, the Mission works to assist BiH in overcoming the military division of the country, developing State-level defence structures, and fully implementing OSCE and other international politico-military commitments. The OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security sets the foundation for BiH's defence and security commitments. Under the Code of Conduct, the country is obliged to provide for and maintain democratic control of the: Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina (AFBiH), the intelligence services, and police.

### ***"OSCE Office in Tajikistan"***

Shakhnoza USMANOVA (Tajikistan) and Amri SHERZAMONOV (Tajikistan)

Politico-Military Dimension:

- ✓ Political Dialogue and Conflict Prevention;
- ✓ Border Management and Security;
- ✓ Police Assistance and Counter Terrorism;
- ✓ Mine Action;
- ✓ Common Approaches to Threats and Challenges to Security.

*Economical and Environmental Dimension:*

- ✓ Economic Affairs;
- ✓ Cross-Border Trade;
- ✓ Environmental Affairs;
- ✓ Water Management and Energy Security;
- ✓ Good Governance.

*OSCE Border Management Staff College (BMSC)* is the first international centre for specialist training for senior border officials facilitates implementation of the OSCE Border Security and Management Concept.

*Human Dimension:*

- ✓ Human Rights Education;
- ✓ Legal Judicial Reform;
- ✓ Democratization;
- ✓ Gender Equality and Anti-Trafficking;
- ✓ Media Development.

Human dimension of security takes strategic actions to support international human rights commitments; strengthens state capacity to serve its constituency; strengthens an individual's capacity to claim his/her rights. Objectives for 2014 are to assist the host country in promoting justice; to raise awareness and education levels of government institutions, civil society, students and the public on human rights principles and commitments; to support Tajikistan in conducting elections in line with OSCE commitments and in expanding

citizen participation in public and political life; to promote pluralistic, free, independent and competitive media; to support Tajikistan in promoting gender equality and ensuring protection from domestic violence and from trafficking in human beings.

Human dimension programmes in Tajikistan:

- ✓ Rule of law (capacity-building of those involved in the legal, judicial, criminal justice and penitentiary systems; prevention of torture and ill-treatment).
- ✓ Human rights awareness (support to implementation of State Program on Human Rights Education; promoting dialogue between representatives of government and civil society on key issues in human rights).
- ✓ Media development (freedom of expression and access to information; digital switchover; regulatory frameworks; professional standards, media self-regulation).
- ✓ Electoral reform and democratic processes (implementation of ODIHR recommendations; capacity-building in cooperation with CCER; expand participation of youth in public and political life).
- ✓ Combating trafficking in human beings (support in identifying and protecting victims through capacity building and the development of a National Referral Mechanism, focus on rural areas; support to implementation of National Action Plan).
- ✓ Gender awareness and equality (cooperation with Ministry of Interior: working group and training on domestic violence; expand participation of women in public and political life; support for crisis services).

## **Tuesday, 01 July - Vienna Excursion / OSCE Conference Centre**

**09:30-10:30 Words of Welcome.**

**Ambassador Lamberto Zannier (Secretary General of OSCE).**

Firstly the Ambassador gave the idea how the agenda of OSCE looks like. Indeed, the OSCE is the best platform for the dialogue. The agenda of OSCE became extremely broad 3 years ago because the organization has accumulated functions from different historical points as well as collected a lot of tools from all dimensions and basic principles in 80's. In the 90s the OSCE moved to the other places – from conflicts to the election observation. The number of mechanisms increased as well. It was a long time when the agenda of OSCE became very broad. Additionally, the OSCE got the field missions. Thus, the OSCE became the broadest functions than other international organizations.

Global challenges began from the 9/11. The OSCE moved from the regional aspects to the global issues (terrorism, trafficking, organized crime) what could be seen as a progress because the OSCE starts to look outside. The OSCE has expanded as well. A lot of countries asked how to become the member of the OSCE. What is the space covered by the OSCE? Russia started the process of development of tools for the co-operation with other countries (NATO, Eurasian Union).

Process of cooperation in Eurasian space. Ukraine was a chair in the OSCE last year and was for the close cooperation with EU as well as Russia. EU and Russia didn't manage to create common space and remain competitive what creates problems in Ukraine now. This process affects not only Ukraine. Georgia has the push-back (separating lines between regions) as

well. The dynamic of the process lies in the co-operation. The OSCE is a right place to accelerate this dynamic. In this term the strong sign came from the summit in Astana to create the common Euro-Atlantic space.

What is the difference between Crimea and Kosovo? The EU integration was the driving force in the last case. It is missing in the case of Ukraine. Within the OSCE EU found the place for itself. The OSCE managed to be cooperative in this issue.

The job in Ukraine is very difficult. It was the agreement about cease fire, but it was not respected by all sides. Nevertheless the OSCE shows in Ukraine that the organization has a very useful tool-box. Media war is going on. The media are taking different sides in the West and East on Ukraine. It is dramatic situation when the journalist killed. The ODIHR tried to monitor the situation with the Human Rights as well as to provide election observation there. But it is very difficult to create bridges between the East and West Ukraine in this situation. The process of reform of constitution in the Ukraine should be started as soon as possible.

The OSCE plans to discuss future role of the organization such a creation of common Euro-Atlantic spaces, reforms, balance of internal organization, procedures with the aim to create more informal forms of dialogue and cooperation, arms control tools etc.

The following questions were raised in the discussion round: the visit of Secretary General to the refugee camp in Rostov, the Helsinki +40 process, the preventive measures of the OSCE for withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, the role of legal binding documents, the tasks of OSCE in terms of Islamophobia as well as possibility of extension of the OSCE till Thailand.

The visit to refugee camp in Rostov was a good opportunity to prepare the visit to Dnepropetrovsk afterwards as well as to see what is going on in the East-West Ukraine. The Secretary General came back with very seriously concerns because he heard strong language like it was in the Balkans. Something has broken in the relationship there. The new separation lines were created in the region. But the dividing lines are more political nature than ethnical in the Ukraine. The new Ukrainian president was called only as a fascist in the East-West. Round talks are strongly needed for the dialogue.

The agenda of Helsinki +40 process is very complicated. The reform of procedure is needed because for example has only 5 minutes for the speech. It is not too easy to explain the position of the state in several questions. There is also big polarisation in the issue of filed operations. Participating states have created the institutions, but their support is more important. There are several problems in this issue: the missions themselves started to get the problems in the host countries, it should be more cooperative work with host countries. The crisis in Ukraine slowed down the process of Helsinki +40. The organization was very fast internally in the Ukrainian crisis; only the host country was late.

The OSCE try to cooperate in the issue of Afghanistan, but it is very difficult task. Concerning the Thailand we have to remember that the OSCE is regional organization. This country doesn't fit in the region. But it could be possible to become assisting country. The issue of Islamophobia is very important as well. The OSCE discussed it in cooperation with Organization of Islamic Cooperation.

### **10:30-11:00 Communication in the OSCE**

**Cathie Burton (Head of Communication and Media Relations Section).**

The meeting started with the short explanation of communications ways in the OSCE (Communication fashion). Crisis changes the way how the people are thinking. The OSCE is indeed a crisis organization: main tasks are how to stop, to prevent and to mediate the crisis. Very powerful things are that the 57 different countries can decide to go one direction. The OSCE is working at very single level. It is very important to keep the communication.

### **11:50-12:00 Election Observation - ODIHR**

**Tatyana Bogussevich (Senior Election Adviser Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR)).**

The presentation started with the short overview of Election Department and its activities. ODIHR has several areas of expertise and there is always room for the improvement.

“Mechanics of election observation”. Short overview of ODIHR’s history:

- ✓ 1990 - Office for Free Elections – Warsaw;
- ✓ 1992 - renamed ODIHR;
- ✓ 2012 – approx 150 staff representing over 30 OSCE states;
- ✓ 2012 Budget: approx. 15,6 mln EUR with 6mln to Elections.

ODIHR Election Department:

- ✓ Professional Staff – 11;
- ✓ General Service Staff – 5;
- ✓ Some 1,200 international experts in the database;
- ✓ Since 1996, 200 + observations;
- ✓ 2011: 17 observations;
- ✓ 2012: 13 observations;
- ✓ 2013: 9 observations so far.

Why is important to observe the elections:

- ✓ To assess compliance with the OSCE commitments (not to certify or validate results);
- ✓ To enhance the integrity of the process;
- ✓ To deter possible fraud and intimidation;
- ✓ To recommend ways in which the electoral process can be improved;
- ✓ Process oriented – only interested in results to the degree that they are reported honestly and accurately.

Decision-making: Where to Observe?

- ✓ Budget voted by the OSCE PC;
- ✓ Decision of the ODIHR Director;
- ✓ “Rolling Calendar” of elections published on the ODIHR website;
- ✓ Invitation by participating state;
- ✓ National elections, occasionally local elections and referenda;
- ✓ Main focus - developing democracies;
- ✓ Increasing attempts to follow elections in countries with established democracies;

- ✓ Minimum conditions for effective election observation.

Mandate and tasks of the election observations missions is to help participating States “ensure full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, to abide by the rule of law, to promote principles of democracy and ... to build, strengthen and protect democratic institutions as well as promote tolerance throughout society.” Copenhagen Document (1990) established basic criteria for genuine democratic elections. (The elections should be universal, equal, fair, secret, free, transparent and accountable). Rome Ministerial Council (1993) enhanced the role of ODIHR in comprehensive election monitoring. Budapest Summit (1994) - Long-term observation mandate. Lisbon Summit (1996) – Electoral fraud could endanger stability. Istanbul Summit (1999) – Commitment to follow-up on recommendations.

Main Issues of focus of election observations missions are: legislative framework, election administration, registration of political parties and candidates, voter registration, election campaign and role of media.

The tasks of Needs Assessment Missions (NAM) are to make a preliminary assessment of:

- ✓ Existence of minimum conditions for effective, credible and professional election observation (invitation, ability to decide, deploy, issue statements, access, all stages, accreditation);
- ✓ Political pluralism in the electoral process;
- ✓ Respect for fundamental freedoms;
- ✓ Public confidence in the electoral process;
- ✓ Transparency in the electoral process;
- ✓ Pluralistic media environment;
- ✓ Follow-up of previous ODIHR recommendations;
- ✓ Added value of a possible ODIHR election observation activity.

Types of observation missions:

- ✓ No Mission.
- ✓ Election Expert Team (EET) (2-10 experts, usually to support OSCE field Mission).
- ✓ Election Assessment Mission (EAM) (Team of experts; no Long Term Observers (LTOs) / Short Term Observers (STOs)).
- ✓ Limited Election Observation Mission (LEOM) (Core team + LTOs). Usually will be deployed if everything seems to be good in the country but something is going on (violence of Minority Rights, new voting technologies etc.).
- ✓ Election Observation Mission (EOM/IEOM) (Core team + LTOs + STOs).

Recruitment of Experts and Observers:

- ✓ Core team analysts and experts recruited by ODIHR;
- ✓ Open and competitive recruitment process;
- ✓ Election Expert database;
- ✓ LTOs & STOs seconded by OSCE participating states; ODIHR does not intervene in the recruitment process.

Code of conduct:

- ✓ Ensures conduct consistent with an observer role;
- ✓ Impartiality and non-interference;
- ✓ Observe = observe + report;
- ✓ Observe ≠ instruct, assist, interfere;
- ✓ Binding on all observers;
- ✓ Serious infraction will lead to withdrawal of accreditation.

Challenges for the elections observation are: new areas to be covered by observation; capturing/assessing events occurring prior to arrival of observers; declining numbers of seconded observers; focus on count and tabulation; implementation of recommendations; dialogue between elections.

### **12:00-13:00 Panel Discussion on the European Security Community: Are we getting closer or farther away?**

**Ambassador Thomas Greminger (Swiss).**

**Ambassador Daniel Baer (USA)**

**Ambassador Vuk Zujic (Serbia)**

**Counselor Vasily Tsyanov (Russia)**

The panel discussion started with the exchange of views on the topic.

Mr. Tsyanov has opened the panel. Crisis helps to understand what interests are really common. The current Ukrainian crisis didn't create something new. We are trying to consolidate the common space. The main task is to be realistic and to produce less ideology. 2014-15 are the key years for the future of OSCE. The OSCE plays a very important role in security. We have still the opportunity for dialogue to achieve common solution. Helsinki +40 process will play very important role in this process. What we have to bring together – we have to come in balance with reality. Main goal is not to create new dividing lines. We have a lot of common interests as well as common threats. The end stage of Helsinki +40 process is to create reformed new organization with the balance between 3 dimensions and strong legal status.

Mr. Baer continued with his point of view. We are agreeing that we are going closer (e.g. draft of Russian vision about Euro-Atlantic organization). Further he spoke about Russian violence of the state territories. Inside of Russia there are also a lot of attacks on LGBT, freedom of media, migrants etc. About the future – we have to talk about gaps. We are going to the old bargain: one group of states will have interests in the state borders; the other group will have their interests in open societies.

What steps could do Swiss to bring Helsinki process forward, and not to Helsinki-40? Mr. Greminger started his speech with the current crisis in the Ukraine as well. Dividing lines are getting stronger and stronger. The annexation of Crimea is the violation of basic principles of the organization and European security. The shift in the European security is that some states are especially concerned about the defence of territory. That could bring us back to the cold war. The OSCE manages to use tools for the de-escalation. It has two main points: we have to reconfirm the basic principles and we have to capitalize the using tools as well as to give more opportunities to the organization.

Mr. Zugic ended the panel discussion with his statement. Chairing the OSCE means not only to chair the meetings as well as to try to identify the common opinion on the solution. The model of Joint Chairmanship shows more administrative tasks but during the crisis and problems also more opportunities. The concept of Trojka as well as Joint Chairmanship could be a great opportunity for the conflict resolution in Ukraine. We have to be realistic. Helsinki +40 could be a trigger for the process of improvement of the organization.

In the final answer-question round the discussion concentrated on the question if the crisis is really an opportunity for the organization; which norms were violated in Crimea and how to resolve the crisis in the Ukraine.

All in all the discussion was assessed as interesting and informative coming together - and the presence of four high level diplomats from national delegations was appreciated by participants and organisers.

### **13:00-13:30 Freedom of Media.**

**Mike Stone (Senior adviser to the representative on Freedom of Media (FoM)).**

It was given only very short overview about this are due to the limited time.

The challenges for the freedom of media are violence against the media and journalists in the participating states, legal restrictions on free speech, overregulation in the internet, government secrecy law (right to access the information), safety of journalists (physical violence, impunity, psychological pressure, imprisonment, attack on the media property, arbitrary police action). All this is leading to the censorship as well as to self-censorship.

At the end was discussed the situation with the freedom of media in Ukraine, Russia and Crimea.

### **Wednesday, 02 July**

#### **09:30-10:30 Workshop # 5: Crisis Management in the OSCE – Simulation of an OSCE event.**

**Arie Bloed**

**Walter Kemp**

The whole day the participants were involved in the simulation of an OSCE event dealing with the crisis management. The group received the description of a certain situation.

Actors involved in the simulation: Chairmanship (Serbia), Secretary General, HCNM, RFoM, Russian Federation, USA, Ireland (Chair of EU), Pagodia, Narodia, Svetlov, Norway, Switzerland, Kyrgyzstan, Turkey.

The participants were divided in pairs to represent every actors involved into the crisis situation. The session was opened by speeches of the Chairman and Secretary General as well as following reports of representatives of FoM and HCNM.

Afterwards the CiO opened the floor for the discussions. Every party got a limited time for the explanations of their positions as well as proposals for crisis resolution. After the exchange of views the CiO offered the break for extra discussions. Ireland proposed to send the monitoring mission. During the break the CiO met the conflict parties separately. The conflicting parties accepted the deployment of special representative to the crisis area to use the OSCE tools.

The following discussion after the break was about the deployment of the field mission as well as its mandate. The positions of conflicting parties as well as participating states were explained.

After the discussion was the long break proposed to create working groups as well as to prepare the text of resolution. The text was prepared by Norway, Swiss and Turkey. Afterwards the text of resolution was discussed and the amendments to it were done by the delegations. After long discussion the text of resolution was adopted by consensus.

At the end of the session the debriefing on the simulation game took place. Some lessons learned on this day:

- ✓ The Chairman should be neutral. The CiO and his representative have not so much functional role like in other organizations.
- ✓ The outcome of discussions should be much broader. If there are no discussions, it will be lead to the vacuum in the Permanent Council. From this point of view the CiO needs broad sense of context.
- ✓ The discussions are affected by many issues.

The simulation and the scenario were very close to the real situation. The delegations of the participating states are deeply involved in the issues like this, so it is very hard to find the common position. But there are different venues to influence the other positions and to achieve the consensus. All in all the simulation was a worthwhile experience.

### **Thursday, 03 July**

#### **09:00-11:00 Making (better) Use of OSCE (interactive Q&A session) Ambassador Brendan Ward (Ireland).**

The Q&A session started with the gender issue. First of all the role of women in the issue of peace and security was discussed. This role is very important. UN resolution 1425 is about women in the conflicts and conflict resolution. Most countries have an action plan on the resolution 1425. The OSCE is not the UN (there is no arms, no peace enforcement etc.) but the main tasks of the OSCE are conflict prevention, dealing with the frozen conflicts as well as with ongoing conflicts. The experience from the war in Yugoslavia showed the importance of the woman's role in the conflicts. There were a lot of female officers in the field. After the war should be created the additional channels for communication (re-establishing of contacts, networks etc. what was destroyed in the war). The woman could bring additional value for the conflict resolution as well as for the post-conflict reintegration.

Further the participants shared their experience and thoughts about the issue of women in conflict. Very important topics were the broken families in conflicts and IDPs, role of women in different cultures and the security of women, experience of Ireland in the peace-keeping operations (Irish national action plan). 2/3 of resolved conflicts escalate after 10 years.

The discussion round were ended with the issue of legal status of the OSCE, budget of the organization, as well as future of the OSCE. Not legal status of the OSCE allows the flexibility of organization.

**11:00-12:30 Wrap-up speech. The future role of the OSCE.  
Ambassador Brendan Ward (Ireland).**

The round started with the reflections on the OSCE. "The OSCE is like hotel "California"- you can check in when you want, but difficult to leave". The OSCE is very different and modest organization. The Helsinki Final Act is the strong achievement of the CSCE. It was the acceptance of status quo in Europe as well as domination of USSR in Europe. The HFA was at the same time the basis for development of freedom in the Eastern Europe. The CSCE became the OSCE after the cold war. In early 90s the other documents expanded the OSCE. The organization is a unified factor for the Euro-Atlantic region. Why has the OSCE the importance after cold war? The consensus is the weakness and strength of the organization in the same time. There is a lot of trust in organization among the participating states. When the USSR felt down Russian leaders had time to implement the HFA. Some parts of HFA have an aspiration that we never implemented (freedom of movement) but the basic elements of HFA were implemented in most of the OSCE area.

The field presence is the most important for the OSCE. The institutions have small offices, low budget, but they achieve great goals. When we look back in 1975 and now there are still countries which have unresolved conflicts that could create huge problems for the security.

It is very important to re-build the trust as a basis for the further co-operation. It is not easy to do, but it is essential. The OSCE Summer Academy is a very good opportunity to get an impression how the other people feel and think. This initiative could be expanded to build the trust.

**14:00-15:00 Feed-back session.  
Blanka Bellak.**

During the feed-back round were discussed the organization of the Summer Academy, importance of the lessons and technical aspects. The Summer Academy got very positive feed-back.

App. 1 Programme

DATE & TIME	SESSION	SPEAKER	METHOD
<b>Sunday, 22 June</b>			
16.00 - 17:00	<b>Arrival &amp; Check-In of Participants Coffee-Break served in the Seminar Centre/Castle</b>		
17.00 – 18.30	<b>Introduction of Participants and Team &amp; Introduction to the Programme</b>	<b>ARIE BLOED</b> Director of the Summer Academy on OSCE  <b>WALTER KEMP</b> Co-Director of the Summer Academy on OSCE  <b>URSULA E. GAMAUF-EBERHARDT</b> Co-Director of the Summer Academy on OSCE/ ASPR	<b>Interactive Introduction Session</b>
18:50	<b>Group photo in the courtyard of the castle</b>		
19:00 – 19:45	<b>Official Opening Ceremony</b>	<b>AMBASSADOR PHILIP MCDONAGH</b> Head of Permanent Mission of Ireland to the OSCE  <b>BLANKA BELLAK, Director, ASPR</b> <b>ARIE BLOED &amp; WALTER KEMP</b>	<b>Ceremony in the Knights Hall</b>

<b>20:00</b>	<b>Welcome Cocktail &amp; Welcome Dinner</b>		
<b>Monday, 23 June</b>			
<b>09:00 – 10:30</b>	<b>Security and Cooperation in the OSCE Area: Conflicts and New Dividing-Lines</b>	<b>ZARKO PUHOVSKI University Professor, Zagreb / Croatia</b>	<b>Lecture Q&amp;A</b>
<b>11:00 – 12:30</b>	<b>Basic Principles of Security and Cooperation: 1975-2014</b>	<b>ARIE BLOED</b>	<b>Presentation Q&amp;A</b>
<b>15:00 – 16:30</b>	<b>Workshop 1: Communication and Interaction in Multinational Teams</b>	<b>MATANAT RAHIMOVA Senior Training Officer, Department of Human Resources (DHR), OSCE Secretariat</b>	<b>Interactive Workshop Presentation Group Work Q&amp;A</b>
<b>17:00 – 18:30</b>	<b>Continued</b>		
<b>Tuesday, 24 June</b>			
<b>09:00 – 10:30</b>	<b>The OSCE's Organisation: Basic features</b>	<b>ARIE BLOED</b>	<b>Presentation Q&amp;A</b>
<b>11:00 – 12:30</b>	<b>The OSCE's organisation: Institutional Structures and Budget</b>	<b>ARIE BLOED</b>	<b>Presentation Q&amp;A</b>

<b>14:15</b>	<b>Visit to the Institute's Library &amp; Introduction</b>	<b>LISA FANDL</b> <b>Head Librarian, ASPR Peace Library</b>	<b>Introduction</b>
<b>15:00 – 16:30</b>	<b>The Security Dimension of the OSCE: Political-Military Issues (incl. Relations with other Security Organizations)</b>	<b>PATRICK O'REILLY</b> <b>Deputy Head of Permanent Mission of Ireland to the OSCE</b>	<b>Lecture</b> <b>Q&amp;A</b>
<b>17:00 – 18:30</b>	<b>Continued</b>		
<b>Wednesday, 25 June</b>			
<b>09:00 – 10:30</b>	<b>The Security Dimensions: Policing Issues</b>	<b>GUY VINET</b> <b>Head of Strategic Police Matters Unit (SPMU), Transnational Threats (TNT) Department</b>	<b>Presentation</b> <b>Q&amp;A</b>
<b>11:00 – 12:30</b>	<b>Economic and Environmental Dimension of the OSCE</b>	<b>LORENZO RILASCIATI</b> <b>Senior Officer, Head of the Economic and Environmental, Forum Unit, OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities</b>	<b>Presentation</b> <b>Q&amp;A</b>

<b>15:00 – 16:30</b>	<b>Participants Workshop 2: Various OSCE Issues</b>	<b>ARIE BLOED</b>	<b>Presentations by Participants Q&amp;A Comments by Director</b>
<b>17:00 – 18:30</b>	<b>continued</b>		
<b>19:00</b>	<b>Social Event at a Winery (Heuriger Mittl)</b>		
<b>Thursday, 26 June</b>			
<b>09:00 – 10:30</b>	<b>The Human Dimension of the OSCE: Standard Setting &amp; Monitoring</b>	<b>ARIE BLOED</b>	<b>Presentation Q&amp;A</b>
<b>11:00 – 12:30</b>	<b>Helsinki +40</b>	<b>ANDREA RAUBER</b> Deputy Head of Swiss Delegation/ CiO; Chairperson of the Preparatory Committee, General Coordination of the "Helsinki +40" Process et al.	<b>Presentation Q&amp;A</b>
<b>15:00 – 17:00</b>	<b>Experts Panel on Gender and Security</b>	<b>BLANKA BELLAK, ASPR</b>  <b>LESLIE ABDELA, Senior Partner, Shevolution- Consultancy/UK</b>  <b>AMBASSADOR PHILIP MCDONAGH</b> Head of Permanent Mission of Ireland to the OSCE	<b>Statements Discussion</b>

<b>Friday, 27 June</b>			
<b>09:00 – 10:30</b>	<b>Introduction, Concepts and General Issues of Long Term Missions</b>	<b>PASCAL HEYMAN</b> Former Deputy Director for Policy Support Service, Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC)	<b>Presentation</b> <b>Q&amp;A</b> <b>Discussion</b>
<b>11:00 – 12:30</b>	<b>Long Term Missions: Lessons Learned</b>	<b>PASCAL HEYMAN</b>	<b>Presentation</b> <b>Q&amp;A</b> <b>Discussion</b>
<b>15:00 – 16:30</b>	<b>Self Study Time</b>		
<b>17:00 – 18:30</b>	<b>Transnational Threats</b>	<b>ALEXEY LYZHENKOV</b> Coordinator of Activities to Address TNT / OSCE TNT Department	<b>Presentation</b> <b>Q&amp;A</b>
<b>Saturday, 28 June</b>			
<b>09:00 – 12:30</b> <b>(incl. breaks)</b>	<b>Workshop 3: Mediation, Negotiation and Diplomacy</b>	<b>WILBUR PERLOT</b> Training and Research Fellow, Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael	<b>Interactive Workshop:</b> <b>Presentation, Q&amp;A</b> <b>Role Plays</b> <b>Simulation</b> <b>Discussion</b>
<b>14:00 – 18:30</b> <b>(incl. breaks)</b>	<b>Continued</b>		

**Sunday, 29 June**

**DAY OFF!**

**Monday, 30 June**

<b>09:00 – 10:30</b>	<b>Minority Rights and Minority Issues Within the OSCE</b>	<b>ARIE BLOED</b>	<b>Presentation Q&amp;A Discussion</b>
<b>11:00 – 12:30</b>	<b>High Commissioner for National Minorities (HCNM)</b>	<b>WALTER KEMP</b>	<b>Presentation Q&amp;A Discussion</b>
<b>13:30</b>	<b>Guided Tour through the European Peace Museum at Schlaining Castle</b>	<b>LASZLO W. FARKAS Academic Director, European Peace University (EPU)</b>	<b>Castle Tour</b>
<b>15:00 – 16:30</b>	<b>Workshop 4: Practical Exercise - Regional Aspects of the OSCE Work</b>	<b>ARIE BLOED WALTER KEMP</b>	<b>Presentations by Participants Q&amp;A Discussion</b>
<b>17:00 – 18:30</b>	<b>Continued</b>		<b>Comments by Directors</b>

**Tuesday, 1 July**  
**VIENNA EXCURSION / OSCE Conference Centre / Hofburg**

<b>7:00</b>	<b>Departure to Vienna</b>		
<b>9:00</b>	<b>Introduction to the Hofburg Conference Centre OSCE</b>	<b>CATHIE BURTON</b> Head of Communication and Media Relations Section	
<b>9:30</b>	<b>Words of Welcome</b>	<b>AMBASSADOR LAMBERTO ZANNIER</b> SECRETARY GENERAL of the OSCE	
<b>10:15 - 11:45</b>	<b>Election Observation – ODIHR</b>	<b>TATYANA BOGUSSECIHV</b> Senior Election Adviser Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR)	<b>Presentation Q&amp;A</b>
<b>12:00 – 13:00</b>	<b>Panel Discussion on the European Security Community: Are we getting closer or farther away?</b>	<b>AMBASSADOR THOMAS GREMINGER / CIO, CH</b> <b>COUNSELLOR VASILY TSYGANOV / RF</b> <b>AMBASSADOR DANIEL BAER / US</b> <b>AMBASSADOR VUK ZUGIC / SERBIA</b> Moderator: <b>WALTER KEMP</b>	<b>Presentations by Participants Q&amp;A Discussion Comments by Directors</b>
<b>13:00 – 13:30</b>	<b>Freedom of Media</b>	<b>MIKE STONE</b> Senior Adviser to the Representative on Freedom of the Media (FoM)	<b>Presentation Q&amp;A</b>

<b>13:30-16:45</b>	<b>Time to meet National Delegations (optional) Free Time in Vienna</b>		
<b>17:00</b>	<b>Departure from Vienna Dinner at a Heurigen</b>		
<b>Wednesday, 2 July</b>			
<b>9:00 – 12:30</b>	<b>Workshop 5: Crisis Management in the OSCE - Simulation of an OSCE Event</b>	<b>ARIE BLOED WALTER KEMP</b>	<b>Simulation</b>
<b>14:00 – 18:30</b>	<b>Continued</b>		
<b>Thursday, 3 July</b>			
<b>9:00 – 11:00</b>	<b>Making (better) Use of OSCE (interactive Q&amp;A session) / Mock Ministerial</b>	<b>AMBASSADOR BRENDAN WARD Ireland</b>	<b>Simulation</b>
<b>9:00 – 12:30</b>	<b>The Future Role of the OSCE</b>	<b>AMBASSADOR BRENDAN WARD</b>	<b>Wrap up speech</b>
<b>14:00 – 15:00</b>	<b>Feed-back Session</b>	<b>BLANKA BELLAK</b>	<b>Group Feedback</b>

19:00	Closing Ceremony	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>AMBASSADOR CHRISTIAN STROHAL</b>  Head of Permanent Mission of Austria to the OSCE</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>ARIE BLOED</b>  <b>BLANKA BELLAK</b>  <b>URSULA GAMAUF-EBERHARDT</b></p>	
20:00	<b>Cocktail &amp; Farewell-Dinner in Hotel Burg Schlaining</b>		
<b>Friday, 4 July</b>			
9:00	<b>Departure of Participants</b>		

## App. 2 List of Participants

Nr	Mr/ Ms	NAME	citizen	Present Position
1	Ms.	Nare MIRZOYAN	Armenia	OSCE Office in Yerevan, Head of Office Programme, Press and Public Relations Department - Intern
2	Ms.	Sviatlana SAVIK	Belarus	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Belarus, OSCE and CoE Unit, European Cooperation Department - Third Secretary
3	Mr.	Milovan PEULIĆ	BiH	Republic of Srpska Government-Ministry of Industry, Energy and Mining, Bosnia and Herzegovina - Head of European Integration
4	Ms.	Nino FARIZOVA	Georgia	The Revenue Service of the Ministry of Finance of Georgia - Chief Specialist of International Relations at the International Relations Department
5	Ms.	Mariam CHIKHLADZE	Georgia	The Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy South Caucasus Representation, Georgia - Gender Program Officer
6	Ms.	Ciara GILVARRY	Ireland	Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Ireland - Desk Officer: Conflict Resolution, OSCE, Council of Europe and UN Coordination
7	Ms.	Nazira TOROBAEVA	Kyrgyzstan	OSCE Community Security Initiative (CSI), Kyrgyzstan - Program Assistant
8	Ms.	Marina METELSCAIA	Moldova	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration of the Republic of Moldova - Third Secretary, General Directorate for Multilateral Cooperation, International Security Division
9	Ms.	Guamaral ALTANGEREL	Mongolia	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Mongolia, Department of International Organizations - Counsellor
10	Mr.	Evgeny PREIN	Russia	PhD student at Humboldt University of Berlin, Germany
11	Mr.	Dmitry DRYUCHIN	Russia	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, OSCE Desk, Department for European Cooperation - Attaché
12	Mr.	Marko BRKIC	Serbia	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia - First Secretary, Department for International Legal Affairs
13	Ms.	Jasmina PETROVIC	Serbia	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia - Counsellor, Department for Human Rights
14	Ms.	Mila Marie LOMARDA	Switzerland/ Philippines	Les Architectes Associés, Geneva, Switzerland - Secretary
15	Ms.	Shakhnoza USMANOVA	Tajikistan	OSCE Office in Tajikistan - Senior Assistant to the deputy Head of Mission

<b>Nr</b>	<b>Mr/ Ms</b>	<b>NAME</b>	<b>citizen</b>	<b>Present Position</b>
16	Mr.	Amri SHERZAMONOV	Tajikistan	OSCE Office in Tajikistan - Program Assistant on Anti-Trafficking Issues, Gender and Anti-Trafficking Unit, Human Dimension Department
17	Mr.	Erdinç ÜNAL	Turkey	Embassy of the Republic of Turkey in Kabul, Afghanistan - Second Secretary
18	Ms.	Jemal MEREDOVA	Turkmenistan	OSCE Centre in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan - Personal Assistant, Office of Head of Centre
19	Mr.	Dovlet CHOTBAYEV	Turkmenistan	Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkmenistan - Desk Officer, International Organizations Department
20	Ms.	Mahym SAPAROVA	Turkmenistan	Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkmenistan
21	Ms.	Kira SPYRYDONOVA	Ukraine	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine - Member of the OSCE Unit, Directorate General for International Organizations
22	Ms.	Iuliia SERBINA	Ukraine	National Institute for Strategic Studies, Odessa Regional Branch, Ukraine - Senior Researcher

### App. 3 List of Speakers

Mr/Ms	NAME	Present Position
Mr.	Arie BLOED	International Consultant, Lecturer and Trainer Director of the Summer Academy on OSCE
Mr.	Walter KEMP	IPI - International Peace Institute (Office Vienna) - Director for Europe and Central Asia Co-Director of the Summer Academy on OSCE
Ms.	Ursula GAMAUF- EBERHARDT	Austrian Study Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution (ASPR) Co-Director of the Summer Academy on OSCE
Ms.	Blanka BELLAK	Austrian Study Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution (ASPR) Director
Mr.	Philip MCDONAGH	Permanent Mission of Ireland to the OSCE Head of Mission, Ambassador
Mr.	Zarko PUHOVSKI	University of Zagreb Professor
Ms.	Matanat RAHIMOVA	OSCE Secretariat - Department of Human Resources Senior Training Officer
Ms.	Lisa FANDL	ASPR - Peace Library Head Librarian
Mr.	Patrick O'REILLY	Permanent Mission of Ireland to the OSCE Deputy Head of Delegation
Mr.	Guy VINET	Strategic Police Matters Unit (SPMU), Transnational Threats (TNT) Department of the OSCE Head of SPMU
Mr.	Lorenzo RILASCIATI	Office of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities (OCEEA) Senior Economic and Environmental Officer, Head of the Economic and Environmental Forum Unit
Ms.	Andrea RAUBER	Permanent Mission of Switzerland to the OSCE, Deputy Head of Swiss Delegation/ CiO; Chairperson of the Preparatory Committee, General Coordination of the "Helsinki +40" Process et al.
Ms.	Lesley ABDELA	Shevolution-Consultancy/UK Senior Partner
Mr.	Pascal HEYMAN	Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC) of the OSCE former Deputy Director for Policy Support Unit
Mr.	Alexey LYZHENKOV	Transnational Threats (TNT) Department of the OSCE Coordinator of Activities to Address TNT

<b>Mr/Ms</b>	<b>NAME</b>	<b>Present Position</b>
Mr.	Wilbur PERLOT	Clingendael Academy Senior Training and Research Fellow, International and European Negotiations
Ms.	Cathy BURTON	Conference Service / Hofburg Head of Communication and Media Relations Section
Mr.	Lamberto ZANNIER	Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Secretariat Secretary General, Ambassador
Ms.	Tatyana BOGUSSEVICH	OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) Senior Election Adviser
Mr.	Thomas GREMINGER	Swiss Delegation to the OSCE / CiO Head of Delegation, Ambassador
Mr.	Daniel BAER	United States Mission to the OSCE Head of Delegation, Ambassador
Mr.	Vuk ZUGIC	Permanent Mission of the Republic of Serbia to the OSCE Head of Delegation, Ambassador
Mr.	Vasily TSYGANOV	Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the OSCE Counsellor
Mr.	Mike STONE	Senior Advisor to the Special Representative on Freedom of the Media
Mr.	Brendan WARD	Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Ireland Director for Conflict Resolution and UN Coordination, Ambassador
Mr.	Christian STROHAL	Permanent Mission of Austria to the OSCE Head of Delegation, Ambassador
Mr.	Laszlo W. FARKAS	European Peace University (EPU) - Private University Stadtschlaining, Austria - Academic Director