

**REPORT**  
**ON THE**  
**SUMMER ACADEMY ON OSCE**

**June 26 – July 9, 2005**

**ORGANISED BY**

Austrian Study Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution, Stadtschlaining  
The Diplomatic Academy, Vienna

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**PEACE CENTER BURG SCHLAINING, July 2005**

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## *INTRODUCTION*

The 9<sup>th</sup> Summer Academy on the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe was held from 26 June to 9 July, 2004, at the Austrian Study Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution, Peace Centre Burg Schlaining, Stadtschlaining, Austria. The program, which began in 1997, is held under the auspices of the OSCE and is financially supported by the Republic of Austria and the OSCE. The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Netherlands kindly contributed scholarships for some of the participants from Eastern Europe and Central Asia.

The aim of the OSCE Summer Academy was to strengthen the participants' understanding of the OSCE by increasing in-depth knowledge of the history, philosophy, institution, mechanisms, functions, policies and current activities of the organisation. The Academy also intended to contribute to the activities of the OSCE by training diplomats, NGO representatives and scholars who are beginning their engagement with the organisation, in ways of working effectively within the OSCE's institution, in NGOs and other international organisations. The two-week program also sought to explore different ways that the capabilities and potential of the OSCE could be better implemented, thus enhancing its potential for preventive diplomacy, peace-making, peace-keeping, and peace-building.

Sixteen participants from 12 different countries attended the Summer Academy. The participants were diplomats responsible for OSCE matters in their Ministries of Foreign Affairs, members of OSCE missions and academics, as well as individuals with experience in NGOs.

The Summer Academy speakers were diplomats with extensive experience of the OSCE, as well as experts and scholars with intimate knowledge of OSCE history, organisation, functions, and missions. They came from OSCE and participating states' Ministries of Foreign Affairs, as well as from NGOs, research and policy institutes. In addition, participants were invited to prepare a short personal lecture on their work and/or field experience.

Dr. Arie Bloed, the former Executive Director of the Constitutional and Legal Policy Institute in Budapest and presently senior consultant for organisations such as OSCE, EU and UN, moderated the program, made presentations, offered input, and facilitated discussion.

Ms. Nikolina Staleska, Summer Academy participant and student of the Diplomatic Academy, Vienna compiled this report, including daily summaries written by participants. The production deadline for this report did not allow for review of the draft by all the lecturers. Hence the responsibility for its contents rests with the Austrian Study Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution.

## *METHODOLOGY*

The curriculum of the Summer Academy comprised a combination of lectures, working groups, readings, workshops, case studies and on-site observation of formal OSCE proceedings.

Lectures were divided into different sections. The moderator established a framework for the work of the Academy with the historical and political development of the OSCE, as well as on OSCE structures and institution. This provided the basis for examination of security concepts, peacekeeping, the economic and ecological dimension of the OSCE's mandate, and the organisation's human rights work. This thorough background provided the participants with the background to investigate case studies involving long-term missions, regional aspects of OSCE functioning, relations with NGOs and IGOs, and challenges and opportunities facing the OSCE in the years ahead.

Working group activities reinforced information transmitted through lectures and issues raised in discussion. Simulation exercises dealing with interaction of multinational teams in conflict transformation situations were employed to highlight the importance and limits of communication skills, and to promote intercultural understanding among the participants. A comprehensive reader of OSCE documents and secondary literature on the OSCE was distributed at the beginning of the course for participants to prepare for topics raised during the Summer Academy.


Each participant wrote a report on one of the sessions of the Summer Academy. These session reports were used to compile this comprehensive report. Evaluation of the content, structure, methodology, and usefulness of the program was carried out at the end of the program. At the conclusion of the Summer Academy, participants engaged in an overall assessment of the program; they discussed their impressions and offered recommendations for possible change.

## EVALUATION


The program organisers distributed an anonymous questionnaire at the beginning of the first week, which participants filled in during the course of the sessions. Participants were asked to assess the individual daily sessions, each of the two weeks, and the overall program, as well as to provide suggestions for improvement. The organisers made a point of seeking input from the participants by offering thoughtful, provocative remarks and encouraging comments. At the end of the second week, participants formed three working groups to evaluate the overall program, and to make observations and recommendations. Each working group presented their findings in turn, and discussed them with other Summer Academy participants.

The overall evaluation of the program derived from the questionnaires can be illustrated in pie charts as follows:


### Overall Evaluation of the Programme




### Usefulness for my professional development




### Usefulness for my personal development




Basic Structure of the Programme



Methodology of the Programme




Reader




Hotel Burg Schlaining




Seminar Rooms



Library




Staff of the ASPR – Ursula Gamauf



Staff of hotel

Future Development of the Programme



Would you recommend the programme to colleagues?

Overall the participants found the Summer Academy on OSCE 2005 to be a very positive learning experience. They found the Academy to be very useful professionally as well as personally. They agreed that the Academy had achieved its objective of expanding and deepening knowledge about the OSCE. Participants left the Academy with a better understanding of the purpose and future role of the OSCE, as well as of its various activities, and some training in how to work more effectively within the OSCE diplomatic and OSCE-NGO milieus. This was achieved with the range of input from speakers, and the experience of Prof. Arie Bloed, who directed the Academy and enhanced the critical dialogue between resource persons and participants. Also beneficial was the multinational and diverse occupational backgrounds of the participants. However, more participants from “Western” OSCE Participating States would have been welcomed.

Highlights from the written and oral evaluation:

Overall, the methodology and the content of the program were evaluated very positively. Participants found the focus on different topics to be positive, though some preferred greater attention to specific issues. The participants concluded that a proper balance had been reached between providing an overview with lectures and applying the knowledge in working groups. Participants felt that the simulation exercise was very well organised and provided an excellent learning opportunity. Participants considered the excursion to the OSCE Permanent Council in Vienna very useful and the visit of the OSCE Secretariat interesting.

Most participants praised the selection of speakers for the two-week program. The involvement of current and former high-ranking OSCE officials was considered particularly valuable. Participants also appreciated the presence and availability of Arie Bloed throughout the two weeks. And that they were able to continue discussions with the faculty and guests outside the seminar room. This greatly enhanced the overall learning experience.

Participants were satisfied with the reader and additional reading materials. However, they thought that some lecturers could have provided hand-outs and used audio visuals to enhance their lectures. Some participants wanted more video material and copies of the OSCE Handbook.

Participants felt warmly welcomed and appreciated the friendly professionalism, helpfulness and efficiency of the staff of Hotel Burg Schlaining and the ASPR.

## *SESSION REPORTS*

### Post Cold War Realities

Lecturer: Zarko Puhovski

Date: Monday, June 27, 2005, 11.00 – 12.30 hrs

'The story of the cold war is the story of a frozen conflict' - was the introductory note by Prof. Zarko Puhovski

The collapse of the Soviet Union was a "prepared breakdown" – but still unexpected and the beginning of the new era. Before the 90s, there was no space for Europeans to be confused. It was a clear cut: left or right, east or west. After 1989, the case was quite the opposite, it was the time of great confusion.

Prof. Puhovski described the post Cold War reality at four levels:

**Social:** Globalisation – there is nothing but market-economy in the world now. A few exceptions include an accepted socio-economic model, individual models with some more social and some more market guided, but nobody disputes the global dissemination of the market-economy.

Before '89 – '90 former socialist communist countries had no experience with unemployment. However, within the past 15 years, the fact that there are now 50 million new unemployed people in the world came as quite a shock.

It was up to the state to provide security at the price of some freedoms. After getting the freedom but facing high unemployment, people are now ready to give up the freedom in order to gain more security (e.g. economic security).

**Politics:** Although nationalist parties won the first elections in all the new states (except Serbia), reformed, post-communist parties as a rule won the second elections (except for Croatia).

Ideologically it was very simple to jump from communist ideology to nationalist ideology as some basic principles are the same for both: collectivism, combat ideology, class struggles, paternalistic state. All these aspects are now combined as the so-called ethnical nationalism, so the more or less smooth move from communist ideology to nationalist ideology was made possible by presenting itself as an anti-communist "way out" of the old order.

Post Cold War Europe was facing a new rise of nationalism in Western Europe as wars in Eastern Europe resulted in immigration influx into Western Europe. This caused a backlash of 'indigenous population' becoming more right-wing, racist, and nationalist. The east imported the utopia of the western ideology and life and in return exported the reality of nationalism to the West.

An immediate consequence of the breakdown was a change of the European borders. Fortress Europe remains but instead of protection against tanks, it guards against the flow of immigrants from the new states, especially after the Bosnian war.

In talking about post Cold War Europe Prof Puhovski raised a few questions: What is Europe? What are the criteria for becoming the member of the European Union? Geostrategy? Values? Is Moscow Europe? Does the fact that Cyprus is the member of the EU send a certain message for

other countries? Does EU apply double standards? The Commission is basically a government of the EU but the Parliament does not control it. Since there is no legislative control-power over the executive, can we say that there is deficit of democracy? Today nobody knows how far Europe extends. This is the situation when one cannot step back. Rethinking and slowing down are the best instruments while marching to the uncertain destination. EU has shown to be unfit to act especially at its periphery when the conflicts in the Balkans started. Frozen Conflicts still exist today and people don't seem to have learned from experience.

In terms of social security, general security, economic prosperity, , there are still “Two Europes” – one East of Vienna and the other West of Vienna.

OSCE is the only organization where every country can discuss wide-ranging security problems, even though the plans may not always be the greatest, the members at least try to find a solution.

**Ideology.** People in Western Europe have claimed that the time for ideology is past but with the importation of political realities from the East, political ideologies are now re-emerging. Western politicians now often use examples from the East to justify their ideological policies, especially to “project” problems they may have internally onto outsiders

**Legal / Political.** There were 19 post-communist countries, with very firm ideas about sovereignty against Moscow, but not against Brussels. First came a rebirth of 19<sup>th</sup> century sovereignty as a struggle against Russia, and then they tried to forget all about sovereignty and snuggled up to western Europe.

The European Union appears to apply double-standards in its membership requirements. For instance, Bosnia cannot accede divided as it is, yet they accept a divided Cyprus. Europe's criteria for EU accession employs double standard to justify geo-political goals. It still calls these geo-political considerations “criteria of values”. This sends out the wrong message.

Today there is a cultural and economic globalization and now, political globalization is also needed.

Currently the US is the superpower, the world's police, but it is also the judiciary, the legislative and executive all in one – a sheriff without judge, parliament, and democracy.

In his concluding remarks, Prof. Puhovski pointed out that the New European countries are used to “following orders” because they have a culture of dependency or listening and subsuming their opinion to those in power. This used to be Russia during the Cold War days, and today, it is Washington or Brussels. An example of this was seen during the Iraq Crisis when almost all of the 19 New European members followed Washington's lead, whereas Western Europe was more varied in its responses.

At the end of the lecture some long term prognosis were made, including the potential of China's dominant role in the near future, and the redistribution of the power in the world.

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## Workshop 1: Communication and Interaction in Multinational Teams

Lecturer: Dietmar Larcher


Date: Monday, June 27, 2005, 15.00 – 16.30 hrs

The goals of the workshop were: becoming aware of one's own cultural bias; developing discussion skills for controversial issues in multicultural teams; learning about the political dimension of cultural conflicts; discussing rough and ready rules for communication and interaction in multicultural teams.

The lecture began with few self-identification exercises where the participants formed groups on the basis of whether they belonged to Big Family/Small Family; Big city/Small town; and geographic origins.

Mr. Larcher introduced the Culture-Interview Games where teams of two asked and answered each other's questions: What do you think culture is?; What do you like about your culture/What would you keep?; What would you like to change about your culture?; What do you admire about culture?; Can you imagine marrying a person from a different culture?

Four models of multicultural societies were discussed:




### 1. Cain and Abel Model

A model based on destruction where one is more powerful, one less powerful. Everything that doesn't belong to the ruling culture is destroyed or driven away.

It all started with Caine and Abel in the Bible. Caine was a farmer who had settled down and owned land. Abel, his brother, lived in a nomadic way. Caine represents the progressive, modern, territorialized way of life, whereas Abel represents the older, nomadic way of life. Cain kills Abel out of wrath.

Examples of this model included: Revolutionary France, Nazi Germany, Stalin's Russia, Serbia's actions in Bosnia, Rwanda, Armenian Genocide, European Roma, Homosexuals, as well as interpersonal relationships displayed in domestic violence, intergeneration clashes in culture.




### 2. The "Melting-Pot"/Assimilation Model

The "melting pot" model is a soft version of the first model as physical change is replaced by linguistic and cultural transformation. This model is based on the assumption that a multicultural society can only function if it becomes mono-cultural. So acceptance is achieved through assimilation and destruction of other cultures, and without destruction of the agents of the other culture. It works through fear of the dominant culture as opposed to assimilation of aspects through admiration of another culture.

Political Theorist: S. Huntington who wrote "Clash of Civilisations", promotes the idea of imposition of the Anglo-Saxon model on the world through American imperialism. He provides very little empirical evidence for this view.


3. Ethno pluralism – Multicultural model



In this model the organization of the society allows all linguistic and ethnic groups full cultural autonomy. The ethnic groups live side by side, in close proximity, on an equal basis but without many links. Communities stay relatively isolated with neutral institutions providing meeting spaces for inter-communal dialogue and cooperation. The problem that arises here is that localisation of ethnicity can increase in-group bias and increase the density of ethnic differentiation. This can also create problems of identification and family integrity in inter-ethnic marriages.

Examples given were USA, former Yugoslavia.

4. Intercultural Model



Here all ethnicities in the society overlap to a great extent because of flexibility of institutions in terms of language, religious practice, etc. Apart from the multi-cultural, multi-linguistic, people are also allowed to withdraw into the private space of their own culture. Examples given were Singapore, South African Republic.

A majority culture is always likely to assimilate the minority culture, whether it wants to or not, simply because of its larger numbers and the ratio of interaction (e.g. minority culture meeting more of the majority culture will likely get diluted; majority culture mainly interacting with its own majority culture is not likely to be challenged/diluted)

Instead of using a “Common Language” in a multi-lingual society, this model allows the languages to flow freely, whether across national boundaries or not. This may result in a process of gradual and natural assimilation, change and understanding. However, this is unlikely to work as long as nation-states exist, as they seek political justification through differentiation of culture, history and territory.

After the lecture, three rounds of role playing were organized with every participant being given a chance to play a certain role. In the first role play participants were not given roles but only a topic for discussion. Others were assigned to observe specific individuals involved in the fishbowl discussion. At the end the participants’ views and the views of the ‘observers’ were discussed. Two more rounds of role play took place, with participants assigned particular roles as leader, peacemaker, clown, etc.

At the end of the lecture, Mr. Larcher showed a segment of the film “East is East”. It was presented as a portrait of a mixed race Pakistani-English family encountering inter-cultural difficulties of communication and understanding.

## Historical and Political Developments of the C/OSCE

Lecturer: Arie Bloed

Date: Tuesday, June 28, 2005, 9.00 – 10.30 hrs

This session traced the historical origins of OSCE. The situation today indicates a trend back to the beginning when the organization was created to connect East and West.

CSCE was created in response to the need to regulate relations between east and west, to civilize the situation that existed in the 1970s, live together nonviolently, and streamline mutual relations so that none of the sides would feel threatened.

The CSCE started as a debate club of diplomats to agree on 'rules of the game' on how to develop economic relations that would lead to reducing political and military tensions. The CSCE had a wide membership and all states participated as "sovereign and independent states and in conditions of full equality". That organization has since grown into a large operation with comprehensive representation of the region.

But how did it come to existence? In answering this question Mr. Bloed presented the interests of the founders of the conference: USSR and the West.

The interests of the USSR were mostly economic and political. Recognition of the status quo, guarantee of non-intervention in domestic affairs, and good trade deals were all very important dimensions for the USSR since they could not move forward without international assistance.

The West, however, was not interested in affirming the new borders and giving economic assistance. It was, in fact, interested in expanding the human dimension because it had a more comprehensive view of security. Human rights violations in one part of the geographic area of Europe would create instability in other parts. The Europeans used the CSCE to extract disarmament assurances.

The non-allied states like Yugoslavia, Sweden, Switzerland, had different interests. They were bridge builders, willing to support, and interested in human rights issues.

With two completely different, at times even opposing agendas, it was an achievement that there was a unified agreement following dialogue. It took a long time to extract concessions from the USSR on disarmament, and human rights. And the inclusion of the USA and Canada in the CSCE was unanimously approved.

After several years of preparation the decision on membership included all European states, United States and Canada. The USSR had to accept a treaty on East Berlin.

The Soviets initially wanted to have a treaty but when they realized what they would that involved, they opted for a political process. Thus was created a process-format which was only politically binding, but was based on the principle of consensus-based deliberation.

The CSCE formally opened in Helsinki on 3 July 1973. Foreign Ministers from 35 European States (with the exception of Albania) plus the USA and Canada adopted the Blue Book and stated the views of their Governments on security and cooperation in Europe, and the further work of the Conference. The "Helsinki process" was launched.

The second stage in Geneva from 18 September 1973 to 21 July 1975 engaged experts from the 35 participating States engaged in what amounted to the first multilateral East-West negotiation process. The end result was the CSCE Final Act or **Helsinki Final Act** signed in Helsinki by 35 Heads of State or Government in 1975. The participating States agreed to continue the multilateral process by exchanging views on the implementation of the provisions of the Act and the tasks defined by the Conference, deepening of their mutual relations, the improvement of security and the process of co-operation.

At that time the Helsinki Final Act (HFA) was heavily criticized, it was said to be “outright betrayal of the people in the east.” However nobody anticipated what this process would stimulate. The HFA included a number of human rights clauses (specifically on travel, inter-national marriage, public information). The HFA required that the entire document be published in all the member countries, which the USSR did. After the full text of the HFA was published, a lot of people read it in their newspapers and started demanding their rights. It stimulated civil society movements, as citizens in Czechoslovakia and Poland called on their governments to keep their promises.

**The three-year 1980 Madrid Summit** ended with a document on terrorism, relevant to the time when Spain suffered terrorist acts by ETA. The next meeting scheduled in Vienna occurred during turbulent political times when Gorbachov started Perestroika, and Glasnost. The west was very suspicious. There was almost total breakdown of the talks in 1981, after the Russian crackdown on internal opposition, establishment of near-martial law, and closing of borders.

The CSCE had played a role in stimulating a number of developments in USSR that undermined the power of the central authority of the Soviet Regime, and which probably played a role in the fall of the Eastern bloc.

After the Vienna Summit (4 November 1986 – 19 January 1989) there was a big change because the Cold War was over.

Initial high spirits about peace, prosperity and security soon gave way to realistic threat and development assessments. There was a recognition for the need of CSCE. Thus it became institutionalized.

The two powerful security organizations (NATO and the Warsaw Pact) could still fight a destructive war and there were no mechanisms to prevent these conflicts. Discussions centered on a complete reform identified the need to develop a large Collective Security Organization that would replace NATO and the Warsaw Pact. They decided they needed to address conflict prevention well before inter-ethnic conflicts erupted in former Yugoslav, the civil war in Transdnistria, Abkhazia, Nagorno Karabakh. Thus, the CSCE was transformed into an active conflict prevention organization with its new operational role in 1989 after the collapse of communism eastern Europe.

**Bonn and Copenhagen 1990:** The East wanted to go further than the West was willing to accept in agreeing to a global system of the rule of law, human rights, and a market economy as the only integrated system that can ensure economic sustainability for its citizens. While the Bonn Document dealt with Economical and Environmental dimension, the Copenhagen Document, nicknamed a ‘Constitution of Europe’ was the first-ever document that contains the rights of national minorities and was drafted in just four weeks.

**The Paris Charter for a new Europe (1990)** announced the end of cold war, establishment of community values, institutionalization of CSCE through political consultations, and founding institutions. The disintegration of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union presented potentially destabilizing new risks and challenges to European security.

**1991: With the collapse of the Soviet Union** into its 15 constituent parts, all of which now wanted to join the CSCE, the geographic limits were challenged as Central Asia was not initially seen as being either “in Europe”, nor “of vital interest”. However, the countries were accepted because they had already been subjected to the HFA as the USSR and they also potential “hotspots”.

**1991-1992:** CSCE found a new direction, new identity, even as it started to compete with the Council of Europe, which wanted the CSCE to give up its human dimension and NATO, which wanted it to give up its military dimension. This created the confusion that continues today as there are overlapping agendas.

**1994: CSCE became OSCE.** The decision was made in Budapest where for the first time, a decision was taken to launch Peace Keeping Operations. Nagorno Karabakh was selected as the first site but there was still no budget and no mechanisms.

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**Today OSCE** is facing a reform debate. The Russian Federation has lost its interest in the organization, and it is championing the interests of the eastern countries. Some countries like Belarus and Kazakhstan agree with the Russian Federation.

OSCE Summits are supposed to take place every 2 years. The fact that there has been no summit since 1999 is an indicator that there is a problem.

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## Basic Principles and Functions of the OSCE

Lecturer: Arie Bloed

Date: Tuesday, June 28, 2005, 11.00 – 12.30 hrs

OSCE is in many ways different from other organizations. It is a family of 55 participating states like a 'community' of political organizations. It is a community of values and of responsibilities, reflected in both its functions and its powers.

**Community of values** is a feature typical of the OSCE. It has created standards in all aspects of life, an impressive set of standards that is laid down in documents with far-reaching effects.

The 1973 Blue Book set procedural rules the process of consensus based decision making. It remains the only document on procedures that are not legally binding but provide political standards.

OSCE goes much deeper than the UN even though it is not a classical intergovernmental organization. It goes further because the commitments made are done by voluntary consensus. Thus the OSCE is different from all other organizations except for the Council of Europe.

OSCE is not only a community of values, it is also a **community of responsibilities**.

As such, it makes consensual decisions work. A member country can not stay indifferent to events in other countries. It is a mutual responsibility where members not only have the right but also the duty to intervene.

The non-intervention principle does not exist. It was laid down in summits since 1990 that no area of internal affairs of a member state is excluded from intervention by the participating states. Unlike the UN in 1990 when they were not able to intervene in Iraq because of the non-intervention principle.

Based on the desire for regional stability and peace, OSCE as a community of responsibilities can't just ignore events in other countries but has to assist in overcoming the problems.

However, the assistance should be a co-operative effort. Countries should, with mutual consent, assist each other in non-confrontational ways. Generally there is a big difference between the organizational procedures as described in the book and the reality of application. Much of the written procedures are good for application in the 1990s.

The reality today is a shift in the opposite direction, for example the Russian government does not want OSCE to intervene in Chechnya, and will not allow a mission to be established there.

This is a violation of the book. By silently accepting this position of Russia, the basic principle of the OSCE on co-operative security is undermined.

OSCE is still an organization based on voluntary co-operation and not enforcement, therefore it has no sanctions. In principle no decisions are made against the will of states and no enforcements of any kind.

At present reform debates that resulted in the creation of the Panel of Eminent Persons, are now focused on their report with recommendations for reform.

Besides, Russia is currently dissatisfied with OSCE's activities in Election Monitoring and Human Rights, but is still interested in the other OSCE activities.

Prof. Bloed concluded that despite the present situation OSCE still is a community of values and responsibilities. He also elaborated on the various functions of the OSCE. The OSCE is traditionally a standard setting organization, as well as supervisor of the implementation of commitments Furthermore the OSCE has a stabilizing function with its mechanism for conflict

prevention and conflict management, to de-escalate tension using political, and not military means. In order to ensure implementation of OSCE agreements especially security the OSCE assists in various ways including peacekeeping missions. OSCE is either given the mandate or it works with other organizations to establish missions under the flag of the OSCE. In addition it also has a co-ordination function. It serves as an umbrella to co-ordinate other international organizations. Another function is that of a catalyst especially in economical and environmental issues where there are other organizations with greater capacity and expertise.

Prof. Bloed also discussed the criticism that OSCE sometimes acts with double standards. The eastern members have a perception that the western states demand from them much more than they themselves provide in their systems for their citizens. It has also been criticized for being abused by the bigger 'more important states', such as the US. Also on the universal validity of the OSCE norms and principles, the imbalance of focus has always been more 'east of Vienna'.

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## Workshop 2: Conflict Transformation

Lecturer: Ursula Gamauf

Date: Tuesday, June 28, 2005, 15.00 – 16.30 hrs continued to 17.00 – 18.30 hrs

The session was divided into *theoretical* and *practical* parts, starting with some theory on conflict transformation.

Before conflict can be transformed it is necessary to first identify the conflict. There are many different definitions of the term “**conflict**“. It can be described as a clash of interests, defense of values, force, violence etc. But there should be a distinction between conflict and violence as the first can be both negative and positive (positive conflict occurs with a chance, or a competition., It is not always violent), but violence is always negative.

Conflict has its phases of development. Firstly there is an incompatibility of goals, which results in polarization and deepening of gap between the conflicting parties. This situation may result in acts of violence and further escalate into conflict. There are **3** main types of violence, which are interdependent: *direct, cultural and structural*.

The term “**peace**” implies a situation of stability, respect and agreeable way of co-existence. Conflict transformation is aimed at the transformation of violence to peace. It is one of the main paradigms of establishing the peace. the two other paradigms are *peace through the balance of powers* and *peace through law*.

**Conflict transformation** has *traditional* and *non-traditional* methods. The first includes mediation and facilitation, capacity strengthening, empowerment, shuttle diplomacy, back-channel negotiations, court-based mediation. Non-traditional ways are the practical cooperation project, use of the media, arts and culture, sports and policy forums.

One of the key issues in the conflict transformation is the analysis of the conflict. Analysis requires the listing of the actors of the conflict, defining the main contradictions, anchoring the actors to their goals and, finally, defining the relations between them (good relations, no relations and tense relations).

The process of conflict transformation has **3** phases:

- *understanding the goals of all conflicting parties;*
- *understanding subconscious behavior and attitudes;*
- *exploring new behavior and attitudes.*

Conflict transformation is a long-term process, made possible through inclusiveness, sensitivity, empathy, respect of human rights and basic needs.

In applying the theoretical knowledge the workshop broke into three groups, with each selecting a current conflict for analysis. Conflicts of Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh and Chechnya were analyzed and possible ways of resolution were presented by the participants. The aim however, was not to find a solution to a conflict but to use the instruments presented in the earlier session on conflict transformation.

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## The OSCE's Organization: Basic Features

Lecturer: Arie Bloed

Date: Wednesday, June 29, 2005, 09.00 – 10.30 hrs

This session covered the process that led CSCE to OSCE with its Cold War origins, how it went from standard – setting to operational activities, from diplomatic conference to security organization, and from confrontation to co-operation.

### **Some Basic Features**

OSCE is based on political process, not a treaty. Thus there are no legal rules a constant bone of contention for lawyers even though there are positive and negative consequences.

Its non-legal status has caused some problems regarding the relevance of the organization and sometimes also its employees. Country to country treaties have addressed the lack of legal protection for employees. On the positive side, without treaties, it only requires membership consensus to go into conflict zones that would not be accessible to others.

Currently, many member countries want to make OSCE a legal, treaty-based organization. Some others like the US does not want this legalization, because it would mean less flexibility, and more bureaucracy.

However, the argument remains that, with the increasing numbers, scope and danger of missions organized by OSCE, there is an increasing need for a minimum level of legal protection for staff.

All the OSCE's decisions are political documents that are legally non-binding, but are politically binding. While one can argue that a politically binding document has a greater international authority than a legal document, generally, legal documents carry an enforcement mechanism with them, whereas political documents do not.

Many OSCE documents not only reflect international (or at least European) law, but they provide the foundation for the legal process in certain areas. The example given was the Copenhagen process that produced the document on the protection of national minorities. This was included in the Framework Agreement put forward by the Council of Europe. It has now become international law.

This was the first-ever document on minority rights protection and it was drafted in 4 weeks.

Besides that, a whole network of bilateral treaties has been established (e.g. between Romania and Germany) that give legal force to the OSCE documents – and there are also a number of treaties that directly adopt the wording of OSCE documents.

Prof. Bloed then highlighted the advantages and disadvantages of OSCE being only a political organization.

Its flexibility is a great asset. Also, it is a process of consensus of official representatives of governments. Unlike international treaty-based organizations, it does not require ratification by elected officials of governments. One clear advantage is its ability to act quickly, once consensus is reached it can act.

Legalization could undermine the agreements achieved so far and it may set off a re-negotiating process on all documents and agreements that member states had already found common ground on. Besides throwing doubt on decisions already made, it is likely that new agreements would be on a lower level of protection or cooperation, or maybe never ever reached.. This would destroy all the achievements and concessions that have been made with countries over the years.

Prof. Bloed pursued the view that the best solution would be to find a middle-way by giving the organization a legal structure (e.g. the offices, the personnel, etc.), but without attempting to

legalize the decision-making process and the documents and agreements that have been reached so far.

Its lean institutional structure is also a particular feature of the organisation. It has a small number of staff with various offices located in different cities. It is a deliberate policy to disperse activities.

Another basic feature of the OSCE is its comprehensive and cooperative approach to security and a very broad agenda. The underlying philosophy is that the OSCE should not only deal with the crises but the root causes. One problem is when the OSCE stretches its agenda to include aspects that go beyond its core security issues. He also pointed out that the OSCE weakness of not being able to impose norms or standards on states without their cooperation can actually be its strength as it encourages states to cooperate.

The consensus-based decision-making is most fundamental feature of OSCE. It can also be inflexible, but there are ways for members to make reservations or observation statements without affecting the binding status of an agreement. Since consensus can be easily abused a 'consensus minus one' mechanism was created primarily to deal with states that systematically and seriously violate human rights with its effects spilling outside the country concerned. It was applied only once to suspend Yugoslavia from the OSCE in 1992.

Another problem with political, not legally binding document that cannot be enforced in any country is the increasing isolation of the country as well. The self-interest of countries also prevents them from agreeing use the 'consensus minus one' principle again, because of the fear it could be used against them one day.

There is also the 'consensus minus two' principle. This is a process applied to two countries that have a stability-causing dispute. However, it has never been used.

Prof. Bloed also discussed the OSCE's broad geographical scope which he called pan-European, Eurasian. It has a partnership for cooperation framework, which allows for non-members, to cooperate with the OSCE. He pointed out that the criteria for membership in this framework is quite vague including states like Thailand although it does not border any OSCE country. The system for becoming a partner for co-operation is very simple. The country sends a letter to the office of the Secretary General and if there is a consensus, it is accepted as a partner.

Though many people want to change OSCE there is no political will to do so. Each item on the agenda has its 'fans' and if a decision is reached, the others accept it.

One recommendation in the report of the Panel of Eminent Persons regarding candidates for Secretary General is that countries that have candidates should have no right to vote or to block decisions on the election.

On the involvement of NGOs, Prof. Bloed explained that they had a huge authority in the Helsinki process with its human rights issues. Civil Society is a big part of the work of the OSCE. The process for participation of NGOs is vague but it is clear that groups practicing terrorism can be excluded. That is how Turkey managed to exclude some Kurdish organizations.

## The OSCE's Organization: Institutional Structures and Budget

Lecturer: Arie Bloed

Date: Wednesday, June 29, 2005, 11.00 – 12.30 hrs

This lecture reviewed the institutional and operational structure of the OSCE.

All members are represented by country-delegates. There are no independent expert panels, like the UN.

The Summit of Heads of States or Governments is the highest level of the political decision-making body. It was established by the Helsinki Final Act and supposed to meet every two-years to set priorities and provide directions at the highest political level. However, it is no longer convening every second year. The fact that there has been no summit since 1999 indicates a crisis in the OSCE

The Ministerial Council is the most important decision-making body. However, it is not attended by most of the foreign ministers, many sending their deputies. Most of the discussions are sent back to the Permanent Council, because decisions are usually not reached here.

Even though some strategies are agreed on, they become more and more general. They give the OSCE large areas of responsibility, but they do not address the funding and resource issues. They do not include very specific intermediate or short-term objectives toward these wider goals. As well, there has been no consensus in the last few years on Final Documents because the Russians and their political allies have often been blocking all decisions and agreements.

The Senior Council is made up of political directors of the participating states' foreign ministries and it prepares the work and implement the decisions of the Ministerial Council. Since 1997 it has only met as the Economic Forum. It used to be a very important body in the Cold War years, but has become more obsolete as it only discusses economic issues these days.

The Permanent Council is the key decision-making body of the OSCE. It meets on a weekly basis. It was strengthened after the Cold War thereby the Senior Council somewhat redundant. It has been criticized for developing into a dreary formal forum where big clusters of states make the decisions. The EU for example confirms its issues in preparatory meetings as the important issues are generally discussed and negotiated behind closed doors.

In discussing the operational structure Prof. Bloed emphasized that the Chairman-in-Office (CiO) is the official leader. However, since the office always rotates, the organization ends up catering to the whims of the country holding the chairmanship position. Besides, there is no institutional memory, as the teams change completely and they probably have a different agenda from the CiO before.

There is the Troika, composed of the previous, incumbent and next CiO, to provide the continuity and to give the decision-making some political clout. However, more often than not, the troika is composed of countries that do not have major political influence in Europe.

The Secretary General's task within the OSCE is different from that at NATO or the UN. It is more that of a "Chief Administrator," with no decision-making power. The position is politically not very strong. The SG's main task is to support the CiO but the current debates on the reform

of the OSCE as well as recommendations in the report of the Panel of Eminent Persons propose strengthening the role of the Secretary General.

The Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) is an independent institution, based in Warsaw. Its main functions for ensuring Human Dimension Commitments are concerned with free and fair elections including observation.

The High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) serves as a conflict prevention body, created 1992 after the events in former Yugoslavia. It is based in The Hague and has a successful record of de-escalating conflicts.

The Representative on the Freedom of the Media promotes the freedom of the media and works against political misuse of the media. It is a Human Dimension instrument that provides early warning on violation of the freedom of expression.

Past discussions within the OSCE debate whether the OSCE should establish a Security Council similar to that of the UN. So far there is no agreement on this point, as it would impair the OSCE's equality and political cooperation concept.

In conclusion, Prof. Bloed gave an overview of the OSCE budget. It has a compulsory scale with the 'invisible' budget being what states pay to their staff seconded OSCE. A special scale for large OSCE missions and projects is negotiated annually. The OSCE budget for 2004 was 168.6 million euro with approximately 80% of the budget spent for the field missions, only 20 % is spent on the institution.

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## Introduction, Concept and General Issues of Long-Term Missions

Lecturer: Hans-Georg Wieck

Date: Wednesday, June 29, 2005, 15.00 – 16.30 hrs

Ambassador Wieck discussed OSCE's Long-term missions and their specific tasks such as Conflict Prevention, Dispute Settlement or Post Conflict rehabilitation. More recently, general tasks included support of the transformation process of state and civil society structures in accordance with OSCE Commitments.

Together with Special Representatives of the CiO on current issues and with the special Offices on general issues such as Human Rights (ODIHR), Minorities, Media and Economics, the Field Missions are the major tools of the OSCE to achieve their objectives in the territories of OSCE area.

While military security commitments of governments result in international treaties such as CFE and ACFE or the Open Sky Treaty, the commitments under the Copenhagen Document and the Charter of Paris of the year 1990 are of a political, not of a legal nature.

Also, OSCE documents are not established as part of international law, because there is no treaty, no signatures and ratification documents.

This is a liability with limited advantage.

In the beginning missions were established to prevent the outbreak of conflict in the tense situation of Yugoslavia or ethnic control over a newly independent state. Milosevic closed the mission and the country's seat was suspended on the Permanent Council of the OSCE for quite some time.

In general, a specific conflict situation or post conflict situation leads to the establishment of the mission after a Permanent Council Resolution and an agreement worked out by the OSCE Secretary General with the potential host country and interested governments. The process includes detailing the mandate, the duration of the mission, the status and the number of seconded personal and sometimes also of local collaborators, the initial budget and indications of the projects and priority programs.

Ambassador Wieck gave examples of the various types of missions. Conflict prevention:

- dismantling of the former Soviet Sakruna Radar Station in Latvia (accomplished in 2000 and replaced by the Baranovichi Radar station in Belarus)
- Macedonia (civil war factions of Albanians and Macedonians)
- Kosovo Verification Mission (1999 with 2 500 men)

Conflict Management with settlement of Dispute

- Latvia and Estonia with dispute over integration of Russian minorities into the national societies. This was terminated in 2003 with membership in EC.
- Belarus where conflict between the government and the 13<sup>th</sup> Supreme Soviet over the suspension of the democratic constitution of 1994. The mission worked from 1997-2001. The Istanbul Summit Declaration of November 1999 emphasized in very clearly the major role of the mission in the democratisation process of Belarus. With Lukashenko's resistance the AMG was replaced in January 2003 by the OSCE Office in Minsk with an amended mandate...

- Chechnya had an OSCE Assistance Group from 1995 to 2002 to mediate without a recognised partner, and stationed in Chechnya humanitarian assistance offices.
- Ossetia and Abkhazia – Georgia
- Minsk Group on Nagorna Karabach
- Moldova (Transniestr)
- Albania after internal collapse

Post Conflict Rehabilitation and support for transformation process of state and civil society structures

– after the Dayton agreement 1995, in Croatia, Kosovo, Belgrade (Serbia and Montenegro) and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In the Balkans as a result of the EU based Stability Pact and larger EU role, there is a gradual down-sizing of the OSCE missions.

The ambassador referred to the three baskets of the OSCE, the military-political, economic-environmental, and human dimension basket as the framework for long-term missions. The Human dimension basket provides for a general support for the transformation process of the state and civil society structures within the scope of the OSCE. This basket includes Human Rights, Democracy, elections, rule of law, gender items, drug traffic women trafficking, gender issues. Missions in this area include Ukraine (after first mission for assistance for settlement of Crimea disputes in 1999), Central Asia (five offices), Southern Caucasus (Baku and Yerevan – with Tbilisi/Georgia already established earlier because of issues of conflict prevention, but now operating as a general office).

Basic Framework Conditions of long term missions are duration of mandate and OSCE Budget and these are determined by consensus. Then projects are presented for voluntary contributions from Participating countries or European Institutions.

Issues of Civil Society is the most disputed area of activities for the OSCE missions because of the sensitive nature of large sectors of civil society. These projects are determined after consultation with government or in co-operation or on the basis of agreement regarding the compliance of the host country with its OSCE commitments (Copenhagen, Paris 1990; Istanbul 1999).

Co-operation takes place more or less effectively especially when there is a strong interest of the country in question in a future NATO and EU-membership. There are issues of coordination with international institutions, such as the EU, OSCE, United Nations, NATO and also with regard to activities of non-governmental organizations.

In general Moscow and successor states of the Soviet Union with more or less authoritarian regimes seek to reduce the role of international institutions in the development of their democratic state and civil society structures. They complain that the West applies “Double Standards” on issues of compliance or non-compliance with OSCE democracy standards. Moscow seeks the withdrawal from Paris- and Istanbul Commitments.

Civil Society can be reached by OSCE missions in general only through the government. Therefore the initiation of active engagements of international or national NGOs is important. That means working directly with civil society in order to enable the structures of civil society to effectively challenge the autocratic state structures through networked domestic election

observation and support for election campaigns and public associations such as youth, student, women organisations as well as independent media, and independent lawyers.

The intergovernmental nature of the key institution of OSCE – the Permanent Council of Participating Countries – and the rule of unanimity of its decisions has another negative consequence. The institution cannot overrule non-democratic positions of autocratic state structures. OSCE loses credibility among the suppressed, intimidated peoples, the independent media, human rights organisations and democratic parties that struggle for their rights under the conditions of authoritarian regimes.

The issues may be dealt with in the bi-weekly mission reports , but this is not visible in day to day work. It may be in press statement and in assessment reports of international election observation teams.

Ambassador Wieck talked about new trends for Field Missions when the Dutch OSCE chairman initiated in 2003 a number of review groups, including one for the field missions under a Canadian Chair.

OSCE issues need to be looked at in regional clusters – South East Europe, East Europe, South Caucasus, Central Asia. This would allow a review of field mission activities in all three OSCE baskets. Activities should be spread out more evenly in substance and in all geographical regions- not only in Eastern Europe.

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## Long-Term Missions: Lessons Learned

Lecturer: Hans-Georg Wieck

Date: Wednesday, June 29, 2005, 17.00 – 18.30 hrs

The afternoon session addressed the issues of lessons learned from the field missions, as well as the possible direction that these could take. Mr. Wieck challenged the audience to a very interesting discussion, and the participants with relevant experience in the field shared their ideas and perceptions.

Development of civil society structures for genuine democratic development has been neglected with disregard of Copenhagen and Paris Agreements (1990) and Summit Declaration of Istanbul (1999).

There has not been a summit in years; decline of political commitment with security and stability taking precedence over human rights and civil society based on democracy and human rights, as seen in Belarus and Chechnya.

There is a re-emergence of models for non democratic states and civil society structures in East Europe, all seeking legitimacy by way of co-operation with OSCE on non-sensitive issues.

There is a loss of confidence among civil society in OSCE.

Civil Society has engaged NED (US based National Endowment for Democracy) and some political foundations from several countries. Will EU also engage in this field? EU is still hesitant!

OSCE Field Missions has had varying degree of awareness of civil societies in East Europe.

How can OSCE reach Civil Society? The central issues of an independent judiciary, fair and free elections; parliamentary control of governments; non-intimidation of opposition, domestic election observation and submission of complaints to the courts; support for victims of suppression, such as media, and individual citizens are all included.

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## Assessment of the OSCE from a National Point of View

Lecturer: Andrey Rudenko

Date: Thursday, June 30, 2005, 09.00 – 10.00 hrs

Mr. Rudenko briefed the group on the view that the Russian Federation has towards the OSCE. He said that the OSCE is at crossroads at the moment. The organization was established 30 years ago, and like other organization like the EU, NATO it is adapting itself to the new situation.

The complexity of OSCE's Participating States is another reason why it is sometimes difficult to reach consensus. However, transformation is difficult, as some things have remained the same as when it was just a conference.

Despite the fact that ideological and military dividing lines in the beginning have now disappeared, new social and economical lines have appeared.

In his view the focus that the OSCE is having mainly on human rights is not correct. The deployment and mandate of missions are mainly in the former Soviet space, currently 11 out of 17 missions. The concept of the missions has changed as well. They are playing much more self imposing roles on the host government and not just assisting. These things require changes.

However, first and foremost the political priority should be determined. In the view of the Russian Federation, Mr. Rudenko said the OSCE should focus on issues that are of interest to all of the participating states and not just a few. These issues would include a bigger role in terrorism, trafficking of human beings, arms, drugs, etc.

Mr. Rudenko pointed out two major changes necessary for the OSCE. Firstly the OSCE status is still an arrangement under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. It does not have statute, legal personality, which would allow it to enter into treaties with other organizations; and OSCE staff do not have diplomatic immunity.

These would allow small states to pursue their interests.

Secondly, there should be changes in the secretariat; and missions with new concept. Here he emphasized that Election Observation Missions are very important area where a lot of problems have been detected. Standards are not pursued in the same way in every state – in one they are criticized, in another the same laws are supported.

The negotiations starting in mid September will show the depths to which the reforms will go..

It was important this year that the Panel of Eminent Persons worked on improving the efficiency of the work of the OSCE and issued a report. This report is not a view of the Participating States but of individual experts. The group was lucky to be present at the session of the Permanent Council when this report was officially handed over to the PC.

Mr. Rudenko also pointed that they pay a lot of attention to this issue since without reform the OSCE has an extremely problematic future.

When asked what he thought about the report of the Panel of Eminent Persons and whether there is a future for the OSCE, Mr. Rudenko answered that despite the dilemma in the organization, the Russian Federation sees it can be flexible.

Nevertheless, he emphasized two points. Firstly the focus should be equitable to all baskets and not only one. Secondly the way assistance is currently provided is by imposition on the host countries. This approach of the work of the OSCE in the transition countries should be changed. It should only be on invitation of a country and not imposed by a group of states.

Summing up, Mr. Rudenko once more reiterated two major issues of concern of the Russian Federation: all baskets to be treated equally and with proper attention; and the nature of assistance should be more co-operative and comprehensive.

At the end of the session Mr. Rudenko answered a question on which particular problems the Russian Federation will put on the table when the negotiations start. He said that not only problems but proposals will be submitted after careful analysis of the report of the Panel of Eminent Persons on three major issues: political priorities, structural issues. How the organization deals with the new transformation, and the field operations will be crucial since they do not believe that the present way is the best.

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### Visit to the Permanent Council

Date: June 29, 2005

The group observed a regular session of the Permanent Council and fortunately it was a session when the report of the Panel of Eminent Persons was officially presented by the Panel to the honorable delegations in the Permanent Council.

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### Assessment of the OSCE from a National Point of View

Lecturer: Katherine Brucker

Date: Thursday, June 30, 2005, 15.00 – 15.45 hrs

Ms. Brucker started her presentation by explaining that the US still finds OSCE useful, specifically referring to the Helsinki Process where all Heads of State or Governments signed the Helsinki Final Act. It adds to the OSCE commitments even though sometimes there is lack of implementation, it is still there on paper. It provides the basis for gentle or forceful persuasion for states to implement what they have committed to.

In her view US likes the OSCE because it is flexible and acceptable unlike some other organizations, also if necessary it can act quickly.

OSCE has done some interesting things like the Election Observation Mission to Afghanistan. This mission drew on something that OSCE has with its election expertise. Afghanistan as partner for co-operation asked for assistance and it turned to be very successful. For the first time OSCE did something of worldwide interest.

OSCE is the only organization that has flexibility and fluidity. It approaches things from three perspectives and through its three baskets include cross dimensional activities.

An example of the OSCE's cross dimensional activities was the connection of environment and security that came out from the Portugal Chairmanship. When hot spots were identified, they developed a program that worked with Armenia and Azerbaijan. These kinds of programs bring

people together to discuss on a technical level and tensions between countries can be defused when working on this level. Another example is how the Oslo Accords actually blossomed out of talks on water issues.

Talking about the present 'crisis' of the OSCE Ms. Brucker said it was refreshing to see, even though at times there are heated debates, that reforms are being discussed. There are still some states that want to join and align with the OSCE, which shows that they see that the OSCE can be useful.

From a narrow national perspective OSCE is another strong voice for freedom of the media, democratization, human rights. It is always useful to have a lot of entities promoting the same things, especially through field presence pushing for human rights, democratization, etc. That is where they see the increased value. As an intermediary, which is not a single country but an organization with common commitments.

Under the Dutch chairmanship the focus on trafficking was of interest because it is something that every country is affected either by being a source, transit or receiving state. Raising the awareness that unwillingly people might be contributing to human trafficking is an important issue.

Since 9/11 OSCE has been well positioned to advance its agenda. Two years ago the Security Council issued a resolution on the improvement of issuance of passports; the added value of the OSCE here is that it was the same agreement with all 55 Participating States.

At the end Ms. Brucker explained the reasons why they are against legalization of the OSCE, by saying that it is flexible. Once legalized, she said it will be difficult to push things through as quickly. Besides, there are not many compelling reasons why it should be legalized. One of the reasons often mentioned for the legalization is legal suits against the organization, for example to provide protection of staff.

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## Assessment of the OSCE from a National Point of View

Lecturer: Karel Vosskühler

Date: Thursday, June 30, 2005, 15.45 – 16.30 hrs

Mr. Vosskühler based his discussion on current developments and the report of the Panel of Eminent Persons.

His view is that the OSCE is not in crisis at all. It is only doing what it is supposed to do and what countries decided to do when they adopted the Charter of Paris in 1990 where promoting political pluralism was the main objective. Up to this point no state had questioned it as all agreed to promoting democratization, rule of law, human rights and also economic pluralism. Nobody says that these objectives are not valid.

He also mentioned that the Vienna Ministerial failed to adopt political declaration, since then the issue of Chechnya was on the table. The Istanbul Ministerial in 1999 agreed that Russian

Federation will withdraw its forces from Moldova and Georgia, however they failed to meet the deadline and the first crisis with the Russian Federation occurred in 2000.

Now Russia complains about imbalance with focus mostly on human rights activities and lack of balance in geography with focus only in the east.

He then talked about the Dutch presidency when they tried to deal with this issue. However 9/11 happened and it helped the ministerial in Bucharest when everybody could agree and did agree on a political declaration. Then Russian Federation and USA sat down and found a way to deal with terrorism together.

The OSCE attempted to find a solution for the Transdniestrian conflict, then the Rose revolution happened in Georgia, so by the end of 2003 a good number of documents were adopted. Nevertheless, at Maastricht there was no political declaration.

At the end Mr. Vosskühler once again emphasized that what OSCE is facing now is not a crisis but rather modest work in getting more specialized work of missions.

The effectiveness of this organization is more seen in what it is doing on the ground i.e. what missions are doing.

According to his view we are facing a painful question on the future of the CIS countries. The fact stands that many authoritarian states have abused 9/11. This raises the question of how serious and committed states are in the process of liberalization. Mr. Vosskühler sees a regressive process.

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## Visit to the OSCE Secretariat

Lecturer: Fabrizio Scarpa

Thursday, 17.00-18.00

The group was welcomed by the External Co-operation Officer – Fabrizio Scarpa. He gave a brief introduction on the structure of the Secretariat as well as overview of his activities as an External Co-operation Officer.

The Structure of the Secretariat was explained and a diagram was shown to the participants. Starting with overview of the units in the Office of the Secretary General like: Legal service, Press and Public Information, Gender, and Security; as well as some substantial units that were developed in the last few years like Anti Trafficking, Anti Terrorism and Strategic Police Matters Unit.

The Secretariat is structured in 4 main departments: Human Resources, Management and Finance, Conflict Prevention Center (CPC), and the Office of the Economic and Environmental Coordinator.

It is important to mention that the Conflict Prevention Center was established even before the Secretariat, however once the Secretariat was established it came under it. Within the CPC there is a Mission Programme Section that works between the political direction of the Chairmanship and the Field Missions themselves.

Another issue that was emphasized was the Inter-institutional relationship. Until the 90s there was limited need for systematic co-ordination among international organizations. However, particularly since the Balkan crisis it became clear that the work in the field was overlapping. This was emphasized at the Istanbul Summit when the Declaration for Co-operative Security was announced, and basic feature of it is that co-ordination is needed. Therefore, one of the key partners of the OSCE are now UN, NATO and the EU.

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## The Security Dimension of the OSCE: Political-Military Issues

Lecturer: Mark Werth

Date: Friday, July 1, 2005, 09.00 – 10.30 hrs

Mark Werth provided a brief historical view of OSCE's role in the political-military dimension in answer to his question of whether OSCE has made a difference in this arena. Pointing out that the 1975 Helsinki Act was groundbreaking as the first one to cover political and military affairs, he went on to describe the Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBM). For the first time, these measures covered all of Europe, was of military significance, was politically binding and verifiable.

The initial goal of openness and transparency has been evolving as a process since then. The 1990 Vienna document Werth described as 'breakthrough,' was a politically binding commitment anchored in international law. It expanded to include the beginning of arms reductions in the region.

The 1990 Vienna document has helped to create a database of information on the military capabilities of each member country, supported by an annual 'obligatory self-assessment.' Werth chairs the communications network that serves as an exchange for military information of each member country.

Much of the discussion during this session centred on the implementation of the regional CSBMs, specifically the request by a member country to inspect the military capability of another. Despite the questions raised about the limitations in inspecting military capability particularly of foreign military bases in a country, the overall assessment is that implementation of CSBM has helped. It has helped to reduce tension with high, though somewhat uneven participation; increased transparency; reduced tension; increased confidence of other states' intentions and decreased the threat of interstate conflict.

Two areas, the Code of Conduct and Small Arms Like Weapons (SALW) cover the issue of terrorism for OSCE. The Handbook of Best Practices was referred to as having relevant case studies for national policy making and procedures. As well, Werth reported on the assessment and arms reduction in Belarus 2004-5, Tajikistan 2004-5, and Kazakhstan 2005. Missions in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Skopje, Serbia/Montenegro, Georgia and Moldova were described. Arms control was described as being part of the interlocking framework providing support to the Forum for Security Cooperation.

The session concluded with a tabulated answer to the question whether the political military dimension is still important to OSCE. Naturally, the list of factors that support the political military dimension far outnumber the factors that do not – 7 to 3!

## The Security Dimension of the OSCE: Policing Issues

Lecturer: Andrew Carpenter

Date: Friday, July 1, 2005, 11.00 – 12.30 hrs

Mr. Carpenter made a presentation on why and how the OSCE is involved in police issues. He elaborated on where the OSCE undertakes policing activities and discussed the successes and problems of those missions.

The OSCE is involved in policing mainly because it is an important factor in conflict rehabilitation. The reasons why the OSCE does policing are several. Firstly, there is a clear and present threat that needs to be addressed and not ignored. Secondly, without law enforcement there is no comprehensive security and lastly, there will be no rule of law if there is no law enforcement. He also stressed that policing can be seen as an important step in between preventing conflict and building democracy.

Section 44 of the Istanbul Charter for European Security' signed in November 1999 laid the basis for OSCE Police-related Initiatives. It was here when the OSCE politically discovered policing as it set out 'to enhance the OSCE's role in civilian police related-activities as integral part of the organization's efforts in, conflict prevention, crisis management, post-conflict rehabilitation'.

The OSCE is involved in four different Policing Missions and has deployed police officers in Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro, Kosovo, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Firstly, Mr. Carpenter elaborated on the mission in Croatia where the OSCE has been working since 1998.,OSCE began with policing in Croatia before it was politically decided, because during the war, the police officers were used as military.

The role of the OSCE police assistance is to help in the recruiting and restructuring of police. It aims to hinder trans-national crime, encourage community policing and improve donor coordination. This was the case in Bosnian and Herzegovina after the Dayton Agreement in 1995. The first task for the OSCE taking over from the UN was to change them from camouflage to police uniforms, give them police arms, as well as to deal with transnational crime. Then community policing – police service that protects the right of the individuals, citizens rather than protecting the interests of the state. The donor Coordination was crucial in post war BiH since it becomes a police problem if it is not done properly.

Secondly, he talked about the Kosovo Police Academy, established in 1999,with 5,700 graduates and courses for the cadets within 20 weeks intense training at the academy followed by 15 weeks in the field.

Thirdly he presented the OSCE policing mission in Serbia and Montenegro established in January 2001. Here the OSCE is engaged in training and deployment of multi-ethnic police officers in Southern Serbia with 27 international police instructors. So far 400 police officers have been trained and deployed. 60 per cent of these officers are of Albanian ethnicity. This mission is to assist in conflict preventions measures in South Serbia, in order to ease ethnic tensions and provide a representative professional police force for the region. Moreover it will provide the necessary assistance to modernize the police service in both Serbia and Montenegro in accordance with international and democratic principles. It will also facilitate the integration of policing in Serbia Montenegro with the international policing community and coordinate international assistance and expertise.

The Police Academy in Republic of Macedonia, was established in September 2001, with its aims to provide police training and assistance with a redeployment programme. 1,200 cadets were to be trained. 100 Field Training Officers have been trained.

In 2002 the Strategic Police Matters Unit was established within the office of the Secretary General in the Secretariat in Vienna. Its mission statement is to:

- Assist and advise the OSCE Secretary General and other departments within OSCE police activities.
- Provide assessment, training and onsite police expertise in the development and rehabilitation of police agencies which request assistance.
- Identify, recruit and maintain a consultant staff of police experts to facilitate the objectives of the Strategic Police Matters Unit.
- Establish and provide the benefits of an institutional memory collected during the course of the OSCE missions, projects and programmes.
- Support the OSCE in its mission of building democratic institutions, protecting human rights and combating transnational crime.

It all starts with a preliminary visit to where the mission will be operating in order to enable the host country to communicate what they believe are their needs and what should be achieved. This is followed by a an assessment of the situation in the area before an assistance programme is developed.

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## Reading Session and Working Groups

Lecturer: Arie Bloed

Date: Friday, July 1, 2005, 15.00 – 16.30 hrs continued to 17.00 – 18.30 hrs

The group was split into three subgroups with each debating different questions provided on the PEP report.

Group I: The PEP stresses that the OSCE must focus on areas where it has added value (§ 8). Which are those areas and which areas could be reduced / eliminated?

The group decided to first define the term “added value” as an area where the OSCE can bring an advantage through superior expertise compared to other institutions.

The group tried to answer this question using the three baskets of the OSCE, admitting that they did not know much about the Economical and Environmental basket.

In the political and security basket the group decided that policing has added value but views were split on whether the OSCE should do it and have it increased. On the CSBMs one view was that they should be transferred to organizations where CSBMs can have legal enforcement; the other view was that it is the basic issue the OSCE started with and it should be kept.

All agreed that the consensus based decision making should be kept and implemented in all areas since it gives voice to everyone.

In the Human dimension there was not much discussion but the whole group agreed that Democratization, Freedom of the Media, RoL, HR, Minorities and Election monitoring should be strengthened or at least remain.

In the Economical and Environmental basket the groups admitted less knowledge but concluded that it should play a catalyst role as much can be done better by other organizations.

The group also discussed the role of the Field Missions, and decided that they are very important therefore, they should be strengthened. They should be long term, thematic, roving – expertise gathered in one area to be used in other areas missions.

The team concluded that OSCE should focus only on areas that they were familiar with, and the OSCE should not overstretch and should focus on few areas but with more depth and longer term.

Group II: How could political leadership/management in OSCE be strengthened?

What are present strengths and weaknesses? (PEP chapter 3)

The group discussed the roles of the CiO and the Secretary General. The CiO, in their view is at a high level of political dialog in order to achieve the tasks and the agenda of the OSCE. He is part of the troika to provide continuity to the one year rotation of the position that is a weakness. One year is insufficient for any state to realize what is going and how to address the issues. Another difficulty of the position is getting a state to take the chairmanship. It was decided that a good proposal would be to make sure that at least one of the states of the Troika is a big and important one.

As for the Secretary General, there is a lack of information about him. The group decided that he has to have stronger network of communication, from Field Operations and media, and beyond and not just with the host countries of missions .

The group thought it would be better if both the CiO and the Secretary General had clearly defined and better known tasks and responsibilities. The team thinks that the functions overlap and that there should be distinct operations, and not necessarily a hierarchy.

Group III: What are benefits and drawbacks of consensus principle?  
Are there reasons to change it? Why (not)? How? (PEP chapter 3.2)

The group considered this a difficult and controversial question. On benefits, the team agreed on the positive aspects of inclusiveness, transparency, equality of vote, equality in decision making; common responsibility as benefits..

Discussing the drawbacks the team managed to define only two: one when a vote is used to block decisions needed in time of crisis; and two, that a vote can be used to protect national self-interests rather than on addressing the issue at hand . An example given was the Moscow declaration of the CIS.

On changes, the group agreed the consensus principle should remain but recommended that consensus -1 or -2 should be used in specific cases in times of Crisis Management and Conflict Prevention.

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The second workshop on the topic of police issues was organized with new groups and new questions.

Group I: Which minimum criteria have to be developed for effective police related assistance?

The group had a difficult discussion and did not agree on all points. Therefore it decided to give a list of all criteria that need to be considered. A country receiving assistance should have political will for change; having peace in the host country is crucial; lack of stability or threat to stability by local and regional tensions in the past must be taken into account; lack of public confidence in the police; insufficient education and training because of limited budget and expertise; high rate of criminal activity and inability of the police to deal with it; limited operational capacity to react in a timely way, often because of poor technical equipment; corruption; gaps in legislation which impede the efficiency; and border insecurity i.e. trafficking, logistics.

Group II: Which policing areas should preferably be addressed by OSCE? (Address the added value aspect and the central mandate.

This group came up with a number of things which would not require too much funding by applying an intra-institutional approach. These include advising on methods to strengthen institutional capacity; cross dimensional or connectivity measures, for example international police workshops; border monitoring; and providing non lethal tools.

Group III: Police in many states is confronted with a lack of public confidence, corruption, paramilitary structures and abuse by political leadership. How could OSCE assist in addressing such problems? (Roadmap)

The first issue presented by this group was to work on public confidence: education and information campaign, through communication, and initiating community dialog, in areas where

the public is afraid to talk with the police. A possible option was to have community members contributing to the security of their community by organizing Neighborhood Watch where the community observes and reports to the authorities.

On corruption, the group suggested that the media be used to increase transparency and monitor corruption, for example monthly press briefings in Tajikistan where every minister must hold a press conference on monthly basis. This experience came from Turkey.

Education is also important as generally high level officials are former USSR with old views. Besides assisting the participating states in establishing legal framework, and providing expert assistance, general education was considered crucial.

To address paramilitary structures, the group talked about starting a process to disarm the military using some incentives; and to integrate paramilitary through dialog using a programme that would help them understand the change they have to do.

Abuse by political leaders especially one elected as a political leader is hard to handle as they can get away with a lot. Using a media campaign, especially outside the country with the international community should have lasting impact and sustainability, as well as accessibility by the local population. Using international organization to expose political abuse of power is currently being done in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.

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## Reading Session and Working Groups

Lecturer: Arie Bloed

Date: Saturday, July 2, 2005, 09.00 – 10.30 hrs continued to 11.00 – 12.30 hrs

This session was dedicated to a short simulation game of negotiations between two parties. The two parties were OSCE delegation including: Secretary General, CiO, US, UK, and EU ambassadors and three senior advisers; and the Croatian Delegation including the Croatian President, Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Croatian Ambassador to the OSCE and four senior advisers.

Separate instructions and materials were given to each delegation with a copy of the mandate of the OSCE Mission to Croatia. The session was split into two parts.

The first part was dedicated to getting familiar with the mandate and the tasks that each of the delegations had while working in different rooms.

In the second part the two groups came together in a plenary session to negotiate the future, if there was to be one, of the OSCE Mission to Croatia. The Croatian delegation insisted on closure of the Mission and the OSCE delegation was there to negotiate prolongation of the mandate if necessary with certain concessions.

The session ended without any substantial results in the negotiations. However the participants found it an invaluable experience, as well as an opportunity to experience how difficult negotiations can be and how strong negotiation skills are needed for such tasks.

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## The Human Dimension of the OSCE: Standard Setting and Monitoring

Lecturer: Arie Bloed

Date: Monday, July 4, 2005, 09.00 – 10.30 hrs

Prof. Bloed began the lecture by discussing recent developments in Brussels in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe because of a report on human rights. Russian Federation was trying to get rid of words on human rights, especially in legislation adopted last June. A critical report on this legislation was issued but the Russian Federation managed to have the name Putin erased.

In contrast to this, the OSCE official reports can not be issued as long as consensus is not reached. However, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly makes decisions by a majority vote and every year they issue reports. Here Prof. Bloed showed the difference between the parliamentary assemblies of the OSCE and the CoE.

An example of Turkmenistan was then discussed. OSCE wanted to send a mission to observe the state of political prisoners but Immanuel de Coal was not allowed in the country. He then made a highly critical report. As an individual expert appointed by the OSCE, he continued to work even after consensus was not reached and Turkmenistan did not give him visa.

In the Human Dimension, the Moscow mechanism allows a limited number of states to act on the behalf of the OSCE. This was when a few countries decided to establish the 'mission of repertoires'. The CiO also has the power to appoint personal representatives, without consultations with any members, nor with a consensus. The Personal representative reports to the CiO and to the Permanent Council.

The monitoring procedures include the Vienna Mechanism from 1989 and the Moscow Mechanism from 1991. The former allows for participating states to express concern of Human Dimension violations in other countries by inviting the country in question to respond within 48 hours. The latter has a complicated set of rules to establish a mission of rapporteurs or experts following the formal expression of concern. The implementation of this mechanism has allowed a number of countries to raise the problems in other countries.

Prof. Bloed answered some crucial questions that he posed: What is the definition of the Human Dimension? What is it? Where can you find a definition? There is no definition because it includes many fields. It is in applying the activities of this dimension that OSCE has managed to convey a common understanding on what it means.

It can be found in the Helsinki Final Act, the Copenhagen Document, Charter of Paris, and Helsinki document.

OSCE commitments in the field of Human Dimension are not clear and concise. Since 1970 the Participating States have been working on the same issues. However, in order to find what exactly certain commitment is, one has to check quite a few documents, and still what one may find is that they are formulated vaguely, and they may contradict each other and overlap.

Paragraph 34 of the Copenhagen document was quoted as a typical example of weakly formulated provisions in the OSCE.

In the area of minorities the CoE is also vague.

On various issues in the CoE there are legally binding documents but in the OSCE it is vague, . This is another reason why it has been criticized and that it should first work on codification and secondly be given legally binding force. But legalization can not be done since it will mean to

open re-negotiations. The OSCE universality principle, at least now is clearly applicable equally and in every country. If OSCE is legalized it will have to go the parliament for ratification; and need parliament approval.

Prof. Bloed pointed that if there is political will, agreement can be reached. An example is the short period of four weeks in which the Copenhagen Document was adopted. This document called the Constitution of Europe, is the first international document that has ever been drafted in such a detail on national minorities. It entered into force immediately with all states. If it had been a legal document this would not have been possible.

An important aspect of standards is the political process of how documents have been drafted is political. How it deeply penetrates the way each member country functions is also important. In the OSCE parliamentary democracy and social market are promoted. The OSCE process can interfere deeply in what is considered to be internal affairs of the country in areas that are not traditionally covered by international law. So the non – intervention principle does not exist in the OSCE.

Comparing the human dimension of the OSCE with CoE, Prof. Bloed said even though the area covered is nearly same, there are major differences.

The OSCE is political, CoE is legal or quasi legal. CoE has a Court, so too the OSCE but it has not dealt with any cases. OSCE has no individual complaint procedures, no legal or political basis. But they do exist in the CoE. A question here rises why these procedures were never adopted in the OSCE. In the 90s, institutionalization started, in 1990 ODIHR was established, and individual complaint procedure was not considered, then in 1992 there was the HCNM, with no consideration for this issue. OSCE covers all countries under the CoE.

Comprehensive security is another non defined concept although it is understood to include military political and economical issues. All the areas that OSCE is dealing with are from the perspective of security In promoting security stability as an overall agenda, OSCE deals with more structural issues. In not dealing with human rights cases, OSCE recognizes there is no legal or political basis to do so. People address the OSCE field offices and centers but they can not help them.

The comprehensive security approach determines the agenda, election monitoring for example.

Finally Prof. Bloed described the difference between OSCE and CoE in working on monitoring. Monitoring in the CoE is based on whether a country has ratified certain documents or not. . And it is legal whereas in the OSCE it is more political and strictly intergovernmental. The OSCE main instruments of monitoring are: Representative on the Freedom of the Media, ODIHR, and HCNM. Free media is considered vital for parliamentary democracy as well as for the stability in the country; the HCNM is a conflict prevention instrument; and ODIHR prepares reports based on what is observed in countries ;

## Combating Trafficking

Lecturer: Ms. Michele Clark

Date: Monday, July 4, 2005, 11.00 – 12.30

Ms. Clark provided a short introduction on her background before she launched the session by asking the participants for their perception of what human trafficking is.

After the different comments from the participants with no clear delineation between human trafficking and human smuggling, she asked the participants: to distinguish between the two..

One difference, she pointed out is that smuggling is with consent of the smuggled person and trafficking is without. Smuggling is a contractual arrangement between two individuals with the smuggler only interested in finishing the job and getting the profits. Because the relationship is not a continuous one, many smuggling cases end up in horror stories. There is no incentive to care for smuggled individuals whereas in trafficking the profit does not start until the individual is in the destination starts working to pay back..

Another difference is that in smuggling, they know they are doing something illegal while in trafficking the trafficked persons do not know that they are doing something illegal because they start off legally maybe with a tourist visa. Most important difference is that smuggling is a crime against the state while trafficking of human beings is crime against individual and the individual is a victim of a severe crime and not necessarily a criminal. Also, for a person to be trafficked there is no need to have crossed a border.

The best way to define human trafficking is in 3 components as laid down in the Palermo Protocol and accepted by the OSCE.

Acts of trafficking, according to the protocol, are recruitment, transport, etc and none of them are by themselves illegal. What makes them illegal is the purpose for which they are conducted. When threat, use of force, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power, describe how the vulnerable become exploited, it becomes a crime.

Example was given from Latin America where the public health clinics is where victims are recruited and paid for by the local syndicates. These people share their personal information with health staff who in turn sell the information so that the victims are recruited This is clear cut exploitation of the vulnerable.

It was also emphasized that trafficking is not just about sex, not a prostitution issue but rather exploitation. Many countries define it just as sex. For example Cyprus and Netherlands define it as just commercial sexual exploitation. Even though this is one of the forms it takes it is not the only form but these countries need to change their legislation to include the other forms (the Dutch are already in a process of changing it and Cyprus is starting to do it).

The issue of labor trafficking has not been defined and not dealt in the OSCE but in the fall, the OSCE office on trafficking will organize a conference, to study all aspects of the issue of trafficking.

Ms. Clark then shared three different cases of real life trafficking and discussion centered on what one can learn from the 'real life scenarios' in policy terms. Also the following questions were discussed: How do you prevent trafficking? What is the responsibility of the country of destination? How do you convince a trafficked person to raise the issue and be able to convict the offender?

Ms. Clark also raised other issues in the context of OSCE, and how it addresses these issues in terms of policy.

The first organization to become involved was OSCE's anti trafficking initiative, which was launched by the ODIHR.

In July 2003 PC adopted a decision to accept the OSCE action plan in combating trafficking of human beings. To formally accept the form of trafficking, the definition they had used was the common UN definition.

They handled it in few ways. The action plan is cross dimensional. The Coordinator for Economical and Environmental Affairs addresses the issues of economical empowerment, particularly on how to deal with countries of demand and what the economical responsibility of the country of destination is.

The Police Strategic Unit provides police training to special anti trafficking units in different countries.

The HR aspect the of the HD basket, which is handled through ODIHR, leave the implementation of all these through the field missions.

As the process became very complicated, the Anti Trafficking Assistance Unit was created. One of its main functions is to be a strategic guide to the other structures in the OSCE. The office was created as a special representative to keep the trafficking at a high governmental level and to have an action plan.

With its comprehensive approach, the action plan deals with ideas of prevention using public awareness, public education in countries of origin and destination; another way is to work for good economic opportunities so victims would not have to leave their countries. 23% of Ukraine's and 25% of Moldova's populations work abroad. These countries depend on the income generated so there is no incentive to create possibilities for employment at home since they would loose these remittances from abroad.

Protection and assistance to victims of trafficking with shelter, and employment services could involve getting residence permits in the countries of destination.

In regards of the participation of the civil society, NGOs and different religious institutions, it is all laid out in the action plan, particularly the regulations required.

At the end before answering questions Ms. Clark pointed to few crucial and difficult questions: a) determining the victims of trafficking and how to find them (many of them don't want to be part of any investigations, shelters built by international donors stay empty; and there are much more anecdotal evidence than there are facts) and b) once they have been trafficked will they be allowed to stay there, issues of residence permits, how to proceed after the case is closed, provision to assist in reintegration, what about children, and is there accurate information on civil society.

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## Minority Issues within the OSCE

Lecturer: Arie Bloed

Date: Monday, July 4, 2005, 15.00 – 16.30 hrs

Prof. Bloed started by asking and answering the question: Why are minority rights considered to be so important?

All countries in the world have minorities and they are important because it is a **security issue**, there is a need to protect the vital interest of the majority. And from the legal point of view, this group deserves its human rights to be protected from the regime.

Prof. Bloed also pointed that other organizations, the United Nations for instance, do not have any provisions on minority rights in its Charter. The explanation for this lies in the period before the World War II. Germany justified its occupation of Czechoslovakia on the basis of protection of its minority there. This resulted in a reaction where nobody wanted to have minority rights included and the reference to the self-determination principle in the UN charter. This also caused a long break in the development of the minority rights after the World War II.

The pre war situation indicated that the minority rights can be misused so it became a very sensitive issue. With a growing awareness that human rights do not completely protect minority rights, the issue started to develop.

There is a perception that minority rights are accepted because it is imposed on the state but gradually the state wants to get rid of it. The real need for minority right is not to protect the minority but to protect the **vital interest of the majority**.

Prof. Bloed pointed out the major difference between human and minority rights, namely human rights as the rights of an individual and minority rights as rights of a group. He mentioned that most of the minorities are the poorest group in the society. There was growing conviction that something had to be done for these groups to bring them to the same level as the others. Therefore, human rights was not enough anymore. Kosovo was given as an example for what happens with severe violation of minority rights.

Prof. Bloed explained the aim of minority rights was to **integrate** the minority groups into the society or the state system. Not by separation or isolation but by integration. He also mentioned the responsibilities of an individual, or a group, to the state including respect for the state in which they live. Hence confidence building measures play a crucial role in integrating the minorities and avoiding separation or isolation. Examples of the complexity in dealing with minorities included Roma and Kurds, since they do not have 'mother state', and the Muslims in the Netherlands since they are not a national minority.

The character of the minority rights was also discussed. Firstly it is a complex set of standards that is very careful balance between rights and responsibilities. Paragraph 34 of the Copenhagen Document was quoted: that knowing the state language is a responsibility as it serves to help the minority by providing equal access and opportunity to join government or public institution.

Another characteristic of the minority rights is that they are very vaguely formulated in documents, as described in . Article 35 of the Copenhagen Document and article 14 of the Framework Convention of the Council of Europe. These are more guiding principles hence the Framework Convention provides a framework within which the state is left to define the details within its national legislation, as it only gives guidance on direction.

The main international documents relating to minority rights were listed and briefly discussed.

\* Copenhagen Document in 1990, which was a major milestone, a main effort on which to be built.

\* Geneva Report of 1991 when the political climate changed and the attempt to go further failed. One of the good things that came out of it was that minority rights were no longer considered to be only domestic affairs.

\* UNGA Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities (1992) including article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), and the Council of Europe Framework Convention on the Rights of National Minorities.

\* Art. 27 of the ICCPR is the only legal basis for minority rights all over the world yet it is also very vague.

Discussing the basic features of minority rights Prof. Bloed started with the 3 categories: 1. identity rights – right to use one's language, to study on one's land; 2. participation rights – right of national minorities to participate in political life, to be represented in government, and also political participation rights mean to be properly consulted, This category is best defined in Art. 35 of the Copenhagen Doc. As 'will respect'; and 3. promotion rights or special measures (Art 4 p. 2 Framework Convention).

In defining a national minority Latvia was given as an example where citizens of Latvia were defined as a group with different features. However, states have never been able to find consensus on the definition. Instead they have an understanding that it refers to a numerical minority that have language, culture, etc distinct from the nationals of that country and have long historical connection with the territory of that country and that they wish to be identified as a minority.

On the question of citizenship the Human Rights Committee has the view that citizenship is not required. However, countries like Latvia, Estonia and Germany hold the view that one has to be a citizen in the country of residence in order to be a national minority.

OSCE refers to national minorities, the UN General Assembly to national or ethnic, religious, and linguistic minorities. The basic right of people is for self-determination which in international law means the right to establish an independent state but only in colonial circumstances, or by mutual consent like Czechoslovakia. However minorities do not have this right and there is no answer to this question in international law.

The self-determination principle has two perspectives, external and internal. External self-determination is in colonial terms when no rights are respected at all the people have a right to ask for independent state. Internal self-determination means having a local self-government, with autonomy, which is seen as a first step towards secession A federation could be very good way of handling minorities, for example, in Canada, Quebec has an English speaking majority and French speaking minority and it is asymmetric federation.

In conclusion, Prof Bloed pointed out that minority rights are usually taken to be individual rather than collective rights since the group approach never got consensus. So it is a political understanding that one can enjoy minority rights as an individual.

## The Work of the High Commissioner on National Minorities

Lecturer: Arie Bloed

Date: Monday, July 4, 2005, 17.00 – 18.30 hrs

In 1992 the Netherlands took the initiative to establish an office for the High Commissioner for National Minorities (HCNM). It sprang from the context of the war in Yugoslavia in 1991. There was a lot of debates and fears with regard to the HCNM. England, Turkey and Spain were afraid that the HCNM with its extensive mandate would arouse national minorities (NMs), rather than reduce tensions. This has resulted in the exclusion of groups practicing “terrorism”, the exclusion of individual claims and the concern of the own country.

HCNM’s mandate is not a NMs protecting, but a security conflict prevention mandate: *“The HC will provide “early warning” and “early action” at the earliest possible stage in regard to tensions involving NM issues which <...> have the potential to develop into a conflict <...>.”* (Helsinki Document 1992, §3, p. 716) However, there are many definition problems with the mandate regarding the notions “early warning”, “tension”, “conflict”, etc. What is clear then? The main task of the HCNM is stabilization and de-escalation of ethnic tensions. He is accountable to the chairman in office and does not require the permission of the country to visit it. HCNM is organized with huge intrusive character.

However, he only has very limited powers for instance, he can issue an early warning for the Permanent Council, which would simultaneously end the mandate (except when requested again by the Permanent Council). In addition, when the task is to reduce tensions, issuing early warnings can have the exactly opposite effect. An early warning was invoked only once with Macedonia during the Kosovo War.

Prof. Bloed provided some examples of HCNM work: 1) education law regarding Hungarian minorities in Romania; 2) tensions in Albania between the Greek minorities and the majority; 3) status of Russian minorities and barriers in getting citizenship in Estonia; 4) negotiations between Ukrainian and Crimean delegations in the Netherlands on the constitution of Crimea.

HCNM works through diplomatic means of negotiation, mediation, conference diplomacy, meetings, seminars, and implementing projects. Parties are willing to work with the HCNM since he has no political power. A new instrument with recommendations was developed by the former HCNM Max van der Stuhl. .

HCNM continues to travel regularly East of Vienna. Ane there is a HCNM policy problem with missions not having an exit strategy. It is obvious that tensions between the Western majorities and new minorities have been increasing, while tolerance is decreasing (e. g. Muslims in the Netherlands). These tendencies would mean changing the HCNM’s mandate to include non-national minorities as well. So far Western countries are not included in the HCNM agenda.

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## The Human Dimension of the OSCE: Media

Lecturer: Roland Bless

Date: Tuesday, July 5, 2005, 09.00 – 10.30 hrs

Mr. Roland Bless is one of three senior advisers to the Representative on Freedom of Mass Media, seconded by the Government of Switzerland. He had very rich experience related to public relations and mass media. Previously, he worked as a spokesman for the Swiss Government in Bern, a spokesman of the OMIK, a correspondent in Vietnam, etc.

The Office of the Freedom of the Media was established in 1997 by the PC decision. He briefly went through the mandate by each article. For example, he noted that although participating States agreed on the existence of the OSCE watchdog to oversee media issues, it took more than two decades to create an office with that responsibility in the OSCE.

The representative on Freedom of the Media is selected by PC consensus and reports directly to PC. So far, two Representatives on Freedom of the Media have been chosen – Mr. Freimut Duve of Germany, who has served two consecutive terms, and presently a Hungarian outspoken dissident academician, Mikloś Haraszti. The standard reporting scheme is a quarterly regular report.

There are different schemes and forms that the RFM can use to intervene to address improper treatment of freedom of the mass media. In the case of Italy, where eight major TV outlets belong and/or affiliated to the Prime-Minister, the RFM has researched and prepared the findings of the report that show that two relevant laws passed in 2004 to resolve problems have not been fully implemented. This intervention was a response to recurring accusations of an overemphasis in countries to east of Vienna. Another example of RFM intervention is a statement on the conviction of one US correspondent for contempt of court.

Mr. Bless discussed the operational activities of the Office of the RFM which includes providing technical and financial assistance to the participating countries to improve and streamline national legislation on media in line with international standards and practice. One example is the advocacy campaign for transfer of libel and insult legislation from criminal law to civil law. Freedom of the internet journalism is also part of the work of the RFM.

In closing, Mr. Bless reiterated the importance and usefulness of activities of the Office of the RFM to help ensure freedom of mass media in the participating states. The office of the RFM is well aware of existing problems in the participating states and works hard to resolve those in power of its mandate.

## Gender Mainstreaming of OSCE

Lecturer: Kristina Milosavljevic

Date: Tuesday, July 5, 2005, 11.00 – 12.30 hrs

Ms. Kristina Milosavljevic briefly outlined her background, as a diplomat and a member of the Mission of Serbia and Montenegro to the OSCE.

OSCE developed and adopted an Action Plan on Gender Equality which was endorsed by Ministerial Meeting in 2004. Resolution 2025 is a basic document. OSCE has a GM focal point assigned to the ODIHR.

Gender mainstreaming covers the assessing of impact of men and women on policies, strategies and decisions and achieving a balance of participation and representation of women in decision-making. The objective of gender mainstreaming is to bring more women to decision-making and management level position. However, currently there is no single woman Head of Mission and none were included in the Panel of Eminent People. Women are well represented in the OSCE institutions but not at top management positions.

Ms. Milosavljevic noted that empirical observations show that conflicts are more likely in countries with low participation of women in political life. In this regard, OSCE was very successful in capacity building of local female NGOs in Bosnia and Herzegovina. There are now characterized by high inclusiveness of women in state governance. In the traditional patriarchal society of Kosovo, a quota system was established for women that 33% of the registered candidates must be women in parliamentary elections. This was successfully introduced to overcome low representation of women in political life.

All participating states are involved in implementation of gender equality at national levels within the framework of the OSCE Gender Action Plan. OSCE provides assistance to improve national legislation, which would provide more opportunities to women and eliminate all forms of discrimination against women.

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## Election Monitoring

Lecturer: Hrair Balian

Date: Tuesday, July 5, 2005, 15.00 – 16.30 hrs

Mr. Balian started by pointing out that the ODIHR mandate is based on the June 1990 Copenhagen document. He explained that the election observation encompasses elections as well as “electoral events,” such as local elections, referenda, etc.

ODIHR is not meant to go around pointing fingers at people, but rather to provide assistance. After all, OSCE is an organization that is based on cooperation rather than imposition

The lecture covered four different clusters: the political significance of the election observation activities, general trends, the ODIHR’s observation process and the technical assistance.

On the political significance of Election Observation (EO), he said that elections are a test of the accountability and credibility of governments. There is more at stake than simply the popularity of a party or leader as the economic and political development on a country depends on the election of a certain leader or party/parties.

An electoral event often brings to the surface the hidden tensions within a state or society. In developed democracies, civil society can often channel these tensions through the political process but in developing democracies with a weak civil society; an election may actually be a trigger for instability and crisis. If confidence in the electoral process is destroyed in such a situation, it may even more lead to open conflicts

The purpose of EOs is to prevent and deter more blatant forms of electoral fraud., increase the sense of confidence the population holds towards the elections, provide institutional backing to increase the level of credibility of the electoral process, and to provide a diagnostic and analytical process, which can result in proposals for change and improvement of any given electoral process.

On general trends, Mr. Balian referred to specific geographic areas:. Countries of Central Europe and the Balkans still have some specific election issues especially concerning the representation of national minorities. Belarus and Moldova still need continued monitoring, as credible elections are still a long way off; Russia still needs assistance with observation with many of the more remote areas; the Balkans, despite having undergone fundamental improvements in the election process, still remains very fragile, especially with regards to minority issues.

On other trends, technical and institutional progress has been made almost everywhere in the former eastern socialist countries but there is still need for work on freedom of expression, fairness of elections, as opposition parties are still viewed as enemies.

With some countries doing better or worse than others, opposition parties and the media also still have a lot to learn about settling their differences peacefully; electoral laws and the legislative frameworks still need to be improved. An effective legislature is not always the main problem as often the electoral process lacks a great deal of transparency, with no discernible relation between local, regional and national electoral processes

In explaining the ODIHR EO process Mr. Balian pointed out that ODIHR independently chooses which elections to observe and how to observe it, without any interference on how it does its report. ODIHR sets an annual agenda of about 15-20 elections a year and requests a budget from the OSCE accordingly.

The basis for choosing which elections to monitor include findings and conclusion from previous elections in that country; recent political developments in a country since the last election; as well as views of political actors within or outside the country immediately prior to the election.

ODIHR has over the years developed a very sophisticated methodology, developed in the “Blue Book” including pre-election team to survey and assess the need and size of the monitoring, the election monitoring team, then the long-term observers and finally the short-term observers. .  
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Observers do not have to inform the state where they plan to be before and during the elections. Monitoring continues into the counting process, whether parliamentarians are allowed to take their seats, and how the elected officials function.

ODIHR is generally satisfied with the implementation of the minimum standards that all the OSCE states have agreed upon, such as universal, fair, non-discriminatory elections, accountability, transparency.

Technical assistance from ODIHR includes improving election laws, training observers and police forces, organising roundtable discussions between the political parties.

Mr. Balian also discussed points how ODIHR can be improved with examples of evaluation of the media in the electoral process currently too simplistic; evaluation of campaign funding; electronic voting and tabulation of results The use of cell phones with electronic voting may make it easier for some to vote but there problems of accuracy and accountability .

He also pointed that recent criticisms are not justified, because previous criticisms by the ODIHR have not been heeded by the political leaders in Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, and Ukraine.

On coordination between ODIHR and OSCE he explained that even though ODIHR is part of OSCE it still has certain autonomy in implementation of its mandate.

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## Economic and Environmental Dimension of the OSCE

Lecturer: Kilian Strauss

Date: Tuesday, July 5, 2005, 17.00 – 18.30 hrs

Mr. Strauss emphasized the need for an Economic and Environmental dimension by stating that its absence can constitute a serious threat to security, and that they are prerequisites for the development of the human dimension.

These areas are also where countries are often more willing to cooperate than on the Human or Security dimensions.

Recognition of the EE basket has increased over the years, particularly with the various milestones.

-1975 Helsinki Final Act, when it was mentioned but not taken seriously;

-1990 the Bonn Conference on European Economic cooperation when participating states brought it back to the agenda in the light of newly independent states developing new economies.

-1992 The First Annual Economic Forum-the most important event.

-2003 Adoption of the Strategy Document for the Economic and Environmental Dimension at the Maastricht Ministerial Council. Revision of commitments of participating states since 1990.

EE issues are handled by the Economic and Environmental Sub committees, the Office of coordination of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities (OSCEEA), which is a part of the Secretariat, and the 20 Economic Environmental Officers spread over the OSCE field offices mainly in Central Asia, the Caucasus and the Balkans. The mandate and the main tasks of the OSCEEA are :

- Identifying economic and environmental (EE) threats to security

- Alerting participating states to EE risk of conflict

- Raising awareness about the threats to security

- Organizing the annual Economic Forum and pre Economic Forum seminars.

- Developing and implementing concrete activities and projects.

- Enhancing cooperation with relevant international organizations, NGOs and the private sector.

He highlighted the range of EE threats that compromise security, including:

- Poverty, unemployment, economic gaps between rich and poor may cause tension.

- Environmental degradation may cause desertification of arable land, groundwater pollution, and scarcity of resources, all potential issues of conflict.

- Emigration may cause a brain drain, which hampers the development of society and economy. Illegal immigration may cause the host state politically and socially, which may in turn cause tension between groups.

- Bad governance where there is no clear separation between public and private sectors, the arbitrary application of rules and laws, excessive rules and regulations and non-transparent decision-making may cause unrest in a country.

Mr. Strauss then elaborated on how the OSCEEA deals with these problems. It takes a comprehensive and cross-sectoral approach to security, through networking and cooperation with political leaders, NGOs and international organizations and by using local knowledge and expertise from the 17 field missions. The main activities include a range of economic projects targeting trafficking, terrorism . On the Environmental side there is the Environment and Security Initiative (EnvSec), which comprises monitoring and assessment activities of

environmentally vulnerable areas, regional seminars for capacity building, institutional, policy development and implementation. In the Environment and Security field, OSCE, UNDP and UNEP collaborate.

Mr. Strauss concluded his lecture by expanding on the Economic Forum and its past themes. He also discussed the added value for OSCE in the of economic and environmental dimensions.

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Case Study on the OSCE involvement in a certain area  
Workshop 3: Simulation Exercise following the Case Study  
Lecturer: Arie Bloed  
Date: Wednesday, July 6, 2005, 09.00 – 18. 30 hrs

This workshop was preceded by a briefing on the case study. The ‘frozen conflict’ of Moldova-Transdniestria has, in the past four years involved negotiations with ‘five sides’ including OSCE, the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Moldova and Transdniestria. Moldova has suspended its participation in the negotiations over the strong influence of the Russian Federation and has demanded the inclusion of the US and the EU in the talks.

The aim of the simulation game was to get the parties back to the negotiation table for multilateral negotiations and possibly get the parties involved to reach a consensus on a draft outline for the future status of Moldova with the inclusion of Transdniestria.

Before the simulation game started, the participant from Moldova, gave an overview of the history of Moldova and a background to the conflict .

Then Prof. Bloed explained the rules of the game. There should be a first round of meetings possibly a second round where multilateral negotiations would take place. Press releases, requests to meet and answers to requests were to be channeled through a post office. All parties were represented by two persons in the five-sided forum: the OSCE, the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Moldova and TMR; and there was a neutral observer and a journalist.

The groups were placed in separate rooms and were given specific instructions to follow .

Background reading materials had been distributed two days before the simulation to help the participants prepare. These included

a few press releases; speech by Ambassador William Hill, HoM OSCE Moldova; paper on frozen conflicts; The Kozak Memorandum by the Russian Federation; The Joint Declaration by Moldova and TMR on setting up a federal state; International Crisis Group’s Europe Reports on Moldova from August 2003 and June

2004; and The Ukrainian Plan for Settling the Transdniestrian Conflict.

The first round of talks was devoted to reading the instructions and figuring out which groups needed to meet. The OSCE and Russia were the major actors in arranging meetings where they could hear the diverse opinions and prepare them for the meeting at the OSCE Headquarters at the end of round two. Ukraine functioned as a mediator between Russia and the OSCE, with the main goal to prevent the Moldovan language from becoming the only state language. The Moldovans were concerned with the establishment of border controls along the TMR border in cooperation with the Ukrainian border police. The Ukrainians were concerned that this cooperation would be on Ukrainian territory and feared the cost to Ukraine for such an operation. The TMR authorities were adamant not to agree to an asymmetric federal state structure. The Russian Federation was successful in getting the TMR authorities to back their Kozak proposals insisting was similar to the OSCE document but with more details.

The afternoon continued with bilateral meetings, negotiations were stirred up and sometimes stimulated by press releases and leaks to the journalist, who succeeded in providing update of the situation throughout the day; together with statements by NGOs and news agencies.

The OSCE did not meet with the Russian Federation prior to the OSCE Headquarter meeting. Therefore, it was not assured support for the OSCE document to be discussed at the five-party

meeting. After the OSCE managed to persuade Moldova to return to the negotiating table all parties responded agreed to OSCE's invitation for a plenary except for the Russian Federation and TMR. Prior to this, the EU delegation had agreed to only observer status at the multilateral negotiations., However OSCE offered the US full participant's status in the plenary without consulting the Russian Federation. The Russian Federation and TMR refused to attend the plenary until the issue of the US participation was resolved.

Therefore, the first issue discussed and agreed upon at the plenary was that the participation of the US as observers only. After the Russian Federation and the TMR delegations joined the talks, the

Russian Federation supported the TMR delegation's proposal to adopt the Kozak memorandum rather than the Ukrainian Plan. They refused to discuss the OSCE proposal and instead suggested that OSCE should submit documents in advance rather than presenting them for discussion. They proposed that the OSCE work out a new document that would be a compromise between the Kozak memorandum and the Ukrainian Plan. This was partially supported by the Moldovan delegation

After the long day of negotiations, time had run out and the second round was left with the Moldova-TMR conflict remaining a 'frozen conflict'.

The purpose of the simulation was to illustrate the difficulties and sensitivities of negotiations.

It also showed how the OSCE not only struggles to find common ground with co-negotiators and the conflict parties, but also how its efforts can be undermined by the declarations of other international actors like the EU. The class greatly appreciated the simulation game, found it extremely valuable for practicing negotiations and agreed it was a very useful activity to help build an understanding of the work of the OSCE.

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## OSCE Activities in Central Asia

Lecturer: Sabine Machl

Date: Thursday, July 7, 2005, 09.00 – 10.30 hrs

Ms. Machl started with some background information on the OSCE activities in Central Asia. OSCE has been in Central Asia from early 1990s with its first OSCE mission opened in Tajikistan in 1993. Then the OSCE didn't play an strong role in the region. However, OSCE's interest in the region gradually increased and currently 7 percent of the overall OSCE budget is allocated to Central Asia. The growing budget indicates that delegations of various countries are ready to contribute as much as possible. The Chairman-in-Office of OSCE usually appoints personal representatives, with overall responsibility for the region concerned.

Following the first field mission in Tajikistan in 1993, an OSCE centre was set up in Uzbekistan in 1995, and three more centres in other Central Asian countries in 1999. All of these missions have a similar mandate focusing on economic and environmental issues.

### *OSCE Centre in Tajikistan*

The largest field mission with overall staff of 80-100 persons and 5 field offices countrywide.

Activities:

- political and security dimension and, particularly, de-mining programmes
- human dimension (education projects)

### *OSCE Centre in Uzbekistan (Tashkent)*

Activities:

- prison programme aimed at training of prison guards. Since the developments in Andijan in May 2005, there are obstacles to implementing the programme
- programme of rocket fuel destruction
- training of border guards on the Uzbek-Afghan border

*(Note: OSCE and, in particular, the CiO were quick to react to the developments in Andijan and the issue of displaced persons).*

### *OSCE Centre in Turkmenistan (Ashgabat)*

Staff: 5 international and 5 local

Activities:

- training of border guards
- countrywide seminars on OSCE
- economic projects (development of small enterprises)

*(Note: In April 2005, CiO's message during his visit to Ashgabat was that Turkmenistan was not to be isolated. As a positive response, a few representatives people were sent to Washington to attend the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly).*

### *OSCE Centre in Kazakhstan (Almaty)*

Activities:

- economic and environmental issues

*(Note: Kazakhstan plans to assume the CiO position. However, progress is expected in areas such as media and political parties and the country is under strong scrutiny. The adopted law on extremism is very broad since it does not include a concrete definition of extremism).*

#### *OSCE Centre in Kyrgyzstan*

International staff: 10 in Bishkek and 3 in Osh

Activities:

*(Note: the Centre has the widest scope of activities throughout the region)*

- police assistance programme (an experiment as it is the first in OSCE's engagement)
- OSCE Academy with a MA programme in political science
- election preparation (including parliamentary elections in February 2005)
- human dimension (lawyer assistance)

*Concluding remarks:*

Central Asian countries would not be happy if OSCE decides to leave the region. Meanwhile, these countries have become more assertive requiring more engagement from OSCE and it is a positive development. On the other hand, OSCE finds it increasingly difficult to adequately respond to this challenge.

Discussions on Central Asia raised the issue that personal representatives of CiO not be rotated every year. Previous and current Chairmen-in Office could agree on one person as a special representative for a few years. This allows time to establish trust and fulfil the task of listening to partner countries. One criticism is that *the current special representative is seen by most Central Asian countries as too strongly linked with Kyrgyzstan's peaceful revolution.*

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Regional Aspects of the OSCE's Work: contributions from participants  
Chaired by Wilhelm Höynck (co-chairs Airi Bloed and Sabine Machl)  
Date: Thursday, July 7, 2005, 11.00 – 12.30 continued to 15.00 – 16.30 hrs

### **Turkmenistan**

Participants from Turkmenistan started their presentation by assuring everyone that contrary to rumors, Turkmenistan is a nice place and people are not dragged from the street and put into prison.

The OSCE center was opened in 1999 after the 1998 decision of the PC. The mandate is broad, and this has actually helped them in their work. Everything is done with the consent of the host government and through regular notes. This is time consuming but without it the mission cannot function. Last year the center proposed to hold regional seminars mainly because it was vital to the government's interest in promoting tourism. Work on approval of this event started a year before and with no response, it was finally held in Almaty. It is a pity that it was not approved and held in Turkmenistan as well.

On the issue of OSCE projects, even though the projects are very good, what OSCE does overlaps with other organizations. The Coordinator of OSCE Economical activities said projects and activities are recent developments. The personal experience of the presenter was that it was more efficient with activities and it was more effective than with the projects. In her view the center is now a source of funds for other organizations rather than collaborating with projects.

On micro credit projects, she said it is successful because at least people know about OSCE. In the past people were afraid to go to the center thinking it dangerous. Now it has changed since the public is aware that OSCE has good intentions.

Other than Economical and Environmental dimension, there are activities in the political and military dimension activities, as well as HD.

### **Uzbekistan**

The participant from Uzbekistan had no experience with the OSCE but had worked with the Open Society Institute Assistance Foundation's (OSIAF) office in Tashkent until it was closed by the government. She chose to raise some sensitive local issues.

Firstly she talked about the May 13th imprisonment of 33 businessmen, who were freed by the Andijans. This later turned into a citizens' revolt against the government in the Fragana valley.

The On building democracy with the government and civil society, OSCE has done its best but it has not helped.

The presenter was critical about the comprehensive approach of the OSCE, suggesting that early warning could be improved to prevent a crisis. She was not familiar with the OSCE programme, but felt that even though training of prison guards is good and needed, it still does not change the political climate.

OSCE's ability to intervene in political affairs in the country was also criticized because of limitations to conducting independent and fair investigations. At the moment, this is not possible in Uzbekistan. The Refugee office is insufficient and ineffective. It is important to have international presence in the court, and to monitor trials, as well as raising a dialog on extremism.

### **Kyrgyzstan**

The participant from Kyrgyzstan talked about the OSCE's role in prevention of a political crisis on March 24, 2005.

The 24<sup>th</sup> March 2005 has become the day of the people's uprising (or Tulip revolution) when ordinary people took power back in their hands. The regime of the first President of independent Kyrgyzstan, who ruled for 15 consecutive years, fell in a few hours, a victim of his family and inner circle.

The outcome of parliamentary elections in Feb 2005 led to nation-wide protests against falsification of results, misuse of state administrative resources, blackmailing, intimidation, and vote-buying practices. The most prominent opposition figure, R.Otunbayeva, an interim Foreign Minister, was not registered by the Central Election Commission because of some flimsy grounds. Those, like K.Bakiyev, the acting President, and A. Madumarov, an interim Vice-prime minister, were allowed to participate, but turned out to be losers, especially in the south where they were expected to win. So, the battleground of the opposition representatives became the southern towns of Osh and Djalalabat where massive supporters of the opposition staged peaceful antigovernment rallies demanding recount of ballots and dismissal of the election results in disputed constituencies. The then-President Akayev through the CEC was not willing to compromise and instead, accused opposition leaders of trying to destabilize situation. In protest, the supporters of the opposition took over offices of the provincial state administrations in the first week of March and put forward an ultimatum for the resignation of the then-President Akayev and abolishment of parliamentary election results, and appointment of pre-term presidential and parliamentary elections.

Mr. Akayev ordered use of force to expel the protesters from the occupied buildings. The special forces of the MIA stormed buildings in Osh and Djalalabat on the eve of the 20<sup>th</sup> March and successfully gained control of the premises. The attack on unarmed population, including old men and women, only triggered the anger of the people. On March 21<sup>st</sup> a few thousands of people led by opposition leaders literally wiped out a group of the militia guarding the buildings. The militia did not resist at all because they had lost faith in the regime after the deaths of six protesters in a bloody shooting at a peaceful demonstration in Aksy in 2002.. So, the 21<sup>th</sup> March became the day when the Mr. Akayev had effectively lost control over the three southern provinces which eventually resulted in the failure of his regime on 24<sup>th</sup> March.

OSCE Intervened before 24<sup>th</sup> March. When CiO and Secretary General visited Bishkek and met Mr. Akayev, opposition leaders, ambassadors and heads of international agencies. Although they had confidential talks, it can only be assumed that they tried to convince Mr. Akayev to make some concessions to ease political tensions but this was refused .

The Personal Representative of the CiO arrived in Bishkek on the 20<sup>th</sup> March to mediate a political dialogue between the ex-President Akayev and the united opposition. He was supposed to meet Mr. Akayev on the afternoon of 24<sup>th</sup> March but instead witnessed his overthrow from power. It was already too late to do anything.

In short, missions of the CiO, SG and Personal Representative of the CiO failed to enforce conflict prevention mechanism of the OSCE.

The second participant from Kyrgyzstan provided a brief description of about the Police Open Day, which took place on the 4<sup>th</sup> of June in Bishkek. It was widely announced in the media. The presenter said it was well organized and well attended despite the earlier events in the spring when people had lost trust and police were demoralized. OSCE assisted in organizing this event where the Minister of Internal affairs attended, with most of the police units, demonstration of equipment, and even a special unit demonstrating how they dealt with terrorist attacks. This first event by the police for was very successful. The OSCE staff and local counterparts were pleased

and expressed hope to continue this since the police had never organized public relations activities..

### **Tajikistan**

The two participants from Tajikistan had a joint presentation of the OSCE Center in Dushanbe, which was established in 1993 by a decision of the PC. A Head of the Center and 1 international started work in February 1994. In 2002 the mandate was changed from OSCE Mission to Tajikistan to a Center because the civil war ended.

The work of the field offices was presented, with reference to the regions covered; staffing at HQ, highlighting main activities. The presentation ended with some very nice photos from Tajikistan elections, everyday life, and OSCE work in the field.

### **Georgia:**

The participants from Georgia discussed the OSCE mission to Georgia which is the second oldest mission established in 1992 because of the conflict in South Ossetia. The mission covers all three baskets. The mandate includes the status of South Ossetia, the consolidation of democracy in the whole of Georgia, the monitoring of borders, and the monitoring of Russian forces in the region.

It has some problems, but it is a good example of cooperation between a host country and the OSCE.

Then the South Ossetian Conflict was presented:

- Started in late 1991
- June 1992, a ceasefire agreement was reached and a tri-partite peace-keeping force and a joint control committee was established
- Georgia regarded this as inefficient and invited the OSCE to engage in the process of conflict settlement and force-monitoring
- OSCE is often criticized by Russian and South Ossetian of being biased and inefficient
- OSCE's role in the settlement is very limited, as Russia still has most influence in the area

The border-monitoring by OSCE was established in 2000 after a PC consensus to monitor the Chechen segment of the Russian-Georgian border for refugees into Georgia and cross-border violence. This ended late 2000 due to Russia's persistent intransigence and lack of agreement. Border monitoring has since shifted its emphasis to the training of Georgian border guards. EU has sent three experts to strengthen their special representative to the south Caucasus. The OSCE Mission to Georgia has a big human dimension mandate, (torture, political expression, police training, etc.) but it is not as well received in this area as the border-monitoring.

### **Moldova**

The participant from Moldova said the OSCE Mission to Moldova was established in February 1993 and it has a branch in Transnistria. It has a very big and very flexible mandate, which has made positive impacts so far:

- Hilashko case:
  - Court-proceedings started against the Romanian opposition to the Transnistrian conflict
  - Leaders imprisoned for several years without charge
  - Some have been freed through negotiations, but the mission continues to work on freeing the rest
- Support for democratization process:

- Election monitoring
- Education problems (Romanian schools in Transnistria)
- Education workshops and programmes (e.g. for police)

### **Lithuania:**

The participant from Lithuania said Lithuania joined OSCE in 1991 within a regional 'Baltic' frame. Baltic neighbors Latvia and Estonia have established centers to deal with the national minorities. In Lithuania this was never the case because it has a much smaller Russian population. Also, Lithuanian citizenship is only applicable to those living there pre-1940s and everybody else has to apply individually and pass a citizenship test.

There was little change in the OSCE policy after Lithuania joined the EU and NATO, although operation has shifted to these institutions.

Belarus is also of a great concern to the country and it continues to push for democratization.

Lithuania seeks the CiO position in 2010

### **Armenia:**

The participant from Armenia presented a general position of the country, the problem of Nagorno Karabakh and the OSCE Office in Yerevan.

The aspirations of Armenia for integration into European structures began right after the collapse of the USSR.

OSCE in Armenia has a very broad mandate, especially concerning the third basket

The problem of Nagorno Karabakh starts back in history when it was given to Azerbaijan.

OSCE helped achieve a ceasefire in 1994 and currently, Nagorno Karabakh enjoys a high degree of institutional autonomy, but is not recognized by the international community. The OSCE office was set up in 1992 to negotiate a ceasefire.

### **Republic of Macedonia**

The participant from Macedonia gave a brief overview of the OSCE Spillover Monitor Mission to Skopje. It is the longest standing OSCE Field Mission, established in 1992.

The presenter explained that the name of the mission came from its original mandate to monitor the border of the host country with Serbia, and other areas which may suffer from spillover of the conflict in Yugoslavia.

In 1998 the mission was enhanced because of the Kosovo Crisis, in order to prevent possible spillover effects.

In 2001, in post conflict Macedonia, the mission was enhanced again from its previous staff strength of 8 to 210 including confidence building monitors instead of the border monitors, police advisors, police trainers, as well as international staff for administrative and support issues.

The mission currently has three main areas of activity monitoring, police training and development. Here the role of the OSCE in the implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement was described, as well as some basic details of the agreement were given.

The mission has established several different units like Confidence Building Unit (CBU), Police Development Unit (PDU), Rule of Law Unit (RoL), Media Development Unit (MDU), and other smaller units. Some activities of the CBU in the area of education and MDU were described.

Lastly the presenter personalized her experience of the Missions efforts to promote national staff by providing variety of trainings within the mission, outside of the mission and support for career building.

**Romania:**

The participant pointed out that there were not much activities of the OSCE in Romania. Romania is rated between 3 and 5 on the Freedom House scale, which means it is not a priority for OSCE.

However the HCNM had done some work in Romania like drafting legislation for minorities because of a Hungarian minority of about 6.6%; and promoting multi-culturalism in the University.

ODIHR has mostly done election monitoring, with 42 observers in 2000 reporting generally free and fair elections, but indicating some room for improvement regarding participation of minorities and others. The 18 observers in 2004 again provided a satisfactory report.

Lastly the presenter said that Romania became a NATO member in 2001 and hopes to become EU member in 2007.

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## Future Role of the OSCE within the European Security and Co-operation Architecture

Lecturer: Wilhelm Höynck

Date: Thursday, July 07, 2005, 17.00 – 18.30 hrs

Ambassador Höynck started his discussion by saying that OSCE should be viewed as part of the European architecture. Throughout the lecture Mr. Höynck referred to Europe as defined by OSCE as stretching from Vladivostok to Vancouver.

The lecture went on to cover three areas : European security organizations other than the OSCE; the role and position of the OSCE in this structure; and the future of OSCE?

Ambassador Höynck said that the post cold war period is over in Europe. The fact that the day of the lecture was when terrorist bombs shook London has nothing to do with cold war. However, the key aspect is globalization. With terrorism, trade, crime, and the environment, the key challenge in “Europe” is to find the answers to two questions: “What kind of world are we moving to? and “What will be Europe’s place and responsibilities?”

One important fact is that no country in OSCE can safeguard its interests alone and that includes big powers like the Russian Federation or even the only global power, USA. The first parameter is regional co-operation. This is extremely difficult because of differences, capabilities, perceptions, and concepts of how Europe should look like with referring to all the differences. So diversity is a key element to organize and structure in this regional organization.

Ambassador Höynck pointed out that the physical boundaries created from Vladivostok to Vancouver is a very unique and positive one. All other regions of the world would be very happy to have such a structure. The question is whether this structure is good enough.

In reviewing non OSCE security organizations, the EU was discussed. As of May 2004 EU has 25 MSs, and by 2007 there will be two more. This means that almost half of the OSCE PSs are EU MSs. Referring to the proceedings of the PC meeting attended by the group earlier, it was noted that MSs of the EU and those that want to be members speak with one voice. For OSCE perspective this means it is a consultative and co-operative view, with the group speaking as a block. This affirms the remarks of the head of the Russian Delegation to the OSCE in interview that OSCE has lost its individual state nature. The extension of the EU currently being discussed would put an end to the East West division. It may create another one, thought not a very likely scenario. The lecturer felt that the Russian Federation has an interest to avoid developments that could separate it from Europe.

The extension of the EU is not only on its membership but also its capacities . In 2003 the EU police mission took over from the UN mission. In December last year the SFOR tasks were again taken over by the EU under the Chapter VII of the UN Charter and EU’s mission is now called ITEA. Even beyond BiH with respect to the other organizations there, the EU is set to play a vital role in the security.

EU has a very few OSCE style field operations. One could be EU’s mission in Georgia which is small in size and 2 years old, but this could change with the EU neighbor policy. There are now 8-10 Special representatives and this will probably increase. Border Monitoring in Georgia was not extended because Russia didn’t want it, so it was taken over by the EU. When the OSCE is

hindered the EU will take on the task. NATO was extended to 7 more members and today there are 26 MSs with more to come as expressed at its summit in Istanbul “Our seven new members will not be the last” Even beyond the expansion of membership NATO is extending also its bilateral agreements. One with the Russian Federation is based on NATO Russian Council for Co-operation and has as its goal to build lasting peace in the Euro Atlantic zone. There is another with Ukraine and there is the Partnership for Peace. The question arises whether NATO will one day have the same membership as the OSCE. NATO’s out of area missions are of great strategic importance, in particular two cases should be mentioned: Afghanistan and Sudan.

The Council of Europe (CoE) is very active and important in the European framework. Since two years ago US and Canada have had observer status, and the Secretary General of the CoE visited Central Asia two years ago. CoE had a summit in May in Poland where they developed an action plan that places value on security and European elements. The Human Rights Court is a unique one but it is overloaded because of increasing numbers of individual complaints. In regards to the CIS, CSTO it is still difficult to make the judgment of the future of these organizations. In the CIS Russia had great difficulties to operationalise it. CSTO had a summit where various issues were covered including discussion about WTO membership.

In reviewing the role and position of the OSCE, the expansion and the capacity of the organization raises questions regarding the relevance of the OSCE? A comparative strength of the OSCE is its comprehensive concept of security, now accepted as part of the OSCE area even by the UN. What really distinguishes OSCE from the others is also its comprehensive mandate and its comprehensive membership. As others expand, OSCE has America to the east and Central Asian countries on the other side. The Central Asian countries are not members of the CoE, but partners in the PfP which is a loose arrangement. The OSCE is the only organization that has relatively well developed election standards. UN has but not specific standards, and surprisingly not even the CoE. These standards are not contested, perhaps OSCE should just focus on election monitoring. One issue that has been forgotten in recent years is the Confidence Building Measures in the military field. It is not crucial but it can help make a change through avoiding the misunderstandings that lead to confrontation. The work of ODIHR, HCNM, and the Representative on Freedom of the Media, are very useful and can be applied in a manner that the other organizations would find difficult. As well, the OSCE experience in Conflict prevention plays a role and provides hope with the developments the countries are facing. There are clearly two levels where problems exist, political and organizational as related to structure and management. This two fold problem is addressed in the PEP report. The more difficult problems are in the political area. The lecturer feels there is a real need for a new OSCE consensus. Generally speaking the accusation of the OSCE applying double standards is not true but rather that the countries are different.

Ambassador Höynck pointed that for the present, and the future OSCE can be of crucial importance in the field of security. Further he discussed the structural challenges of the OSCE, mentioning § 26 of the PEP report referring to OSCE not being an international organization.

The second aspect is increased focus. In reviewing the broad spectrum of the OSCE one asks whether all that is manageable? The lack of focus makes it difficult to sell the OSCE to the public. Related to the issue of focus is the issue of coherence as noted in §29 which is not optimal and beneficial. A structural challenge described in §30 refers to having meaningful political dialog. The problem here is whether there is readiness in the OSCE for such a dialogue.

And finally the issue of the division of labor of the CiO and the Secretary General. An organization like the OSCE cannot be run as its changes the highest authority every year. Thus the power of the Secretary General has to be increased.

Is OSCE still necessary? Keeping Europe whole and free is still something that is at least a potential task and the problems are not yet solved. The differences of prosperity in the OSCE area are so wide that that it could at some point jeopardize security. Life expectancy – figures comparing Austria and Russia used to be about the same in the past but now, Austrians live 11 years longer than the Russians.

Some other elements like crisis prevention remain issues. Efforts have been made in addressing minority issues but these can be easily challenged. Crisis prevention is not only relevant in the Central Asia but in Central Europe but other countries as well.

In conclusion, Ambassador Höynck again emphasized that despite his critical view, he still believes that OSCE is now and in future part of network of European North Atlantic and other organizations. But there needs to be a dynamic development of the OSCE within the framework of the overall development. The OSCE must be careful not to continue to live on its achievements of the past. It played a role in the ending of the cold war but that is history now. OSCE should focus on issues where it is relevant.

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## Mock Ministerial (simulation)

Lecturer: Wilhelm Höynck

Date: Friday, July 8, 2005

The Mock Ministerial was introduced by Ambassador Höynck the day prior to the simulation. The aim was to simulate a ministerial meeting of the OSCE. In the light of the present debates of reforms, it was decided that the ministerial meeting will deal with OSCE reform using the report of the Panel of Eminent Persons. The task of the meeting is to identify areas where consensus might be possible. The participants as 'ministers' were given the PEP report a few days before. Flexibility was given to focus not only on areas of interest but on areas which the 'ministers' do not favor. The participants were to act as Ministers of Foreign Affairs of their respective countries, either taking the position of their countries or presenting personal views. Ambassador Höynck would chair the Mock Ministerial, participants signed up in the 'speakers list', and were given the maximum of five minutes to present their views.

The Mock Ministerial, taking place a day after the terrorist attacks in London, was influenced by this event. Ambassador Höynck as a Chairman opened the Ministerial by saying that sometimes we are divided because we are guided by differences. And sometimes we are united. He referred to the attacks in London as something that we are all exposed to. We should, he said concentrate on what unite us and put aside what divides us. We inherited the OSCE from the east - west confrontation, we have used it in the 90s and now OSCE urgently needs to reform. In the last meeting in Sofia a decision was made to enhance the OSCE capacity to answer to the challenges in the 21<sup>st</sup> century and thus PEP was established. Then he ended his introduction by expressing his belief that the discussions will raise key elements of reform.

### **Kirgystan**

The 'minister' firstly expressed condolences to the British nation on the occasion of the actions yesterday in London and condemned the actions. He also expressed condolences for the loss of the Russian representative in the PEP.

The Kyrgyz Republic was, in general, pleased with the PEP Report's recommendations on strengthening the effectiveness of the OSCE, and agreed that many issues were undermining the efficiency and effectiveness of the OSCE. Criticism was expressed that the PEP did not take into account some suggestions of the Kyrgyz Republic in the area of HD. However, the 'minister' commended, with some reservations, all the recommendations related to transforming OSCE into efficient and effective Organization and stands ready to cooperate in this connection.

### **Germany**

The 'minister' from the Federal Republic of Germany brought two specific strengths listed in the report to the attention of the audience. First of all, OSCE's role in combating terrorism, and secondly, the OSCE's vast reservoir of experience in addressing National Minority issues. Both these are concerns, which, especially in the light of the attacks in London, something Europe can no longer afford to address individually. Germany would like to see greater involvement of the High Commissioner for National Minorities as well as the OSCE's advantage of a cross-dimensional configuration employed in the combating and resolution of these complex and heavily inter-related issues.

**Armenia** recorded its condolences to the people of GB, adding that this act of violence once more proves the need for a security organization. The 'minister' criticized the

comprehensiveness of the OSCE, and the need to review and strengthen its development. It is time to actively co-operate with other organizations, be they are international, regional, sub-regional, as OSCE has developed irreplaceable mechanisms especially in the field of HD.

## **US**

The ‘minister’ also started the presentation by condemning the terrorist attacks in London and expressing condolences. After expressing the appreciation to the PEP for its report the ‘minister’ focused on Chapter 3 of the report, namely describing the needed structural changes as relevant and urgent. This is something that the US has repeatedly called for. However, the US does not agree with the art. 29, since it is this lack of legal status that allows OSCE to be flexible. OSCE have achieved in months or weeks what others could not do in years. Emphasizing that the lack of legal status contributes to flexibility and a strength of the OSCE, the ‘minister’ welcomed improvements, but hoped that the legal structure of the OSCE will remain as flexible as it is.

## **Republic of Macedonia**

Firstly, the ‘minister’ said that they were appalled by the atrocious act of violence that had struck London. This act was considered not only a blow to Great Britain but to all democratic and civilization values, to which Republic of Macedonia is lastingly attached to.

Secondly, the ‘minister’ elaborated on the present threats to our civilizations like terrorism. In regards to c comments on the PEP report, the ‘minister’ shared that their experts were preparing a written document to be presented at a later stage.

## **Tajikistan**

Firstly condolences were expressed to Great Britain. After greeting the release of the report of the PEP for the common purpose, the ‘minister’ focused on Chapter 3 on the structure of the organization. Particularly strengthening of the position of the Secretary General was supported, because the belief is that the Secretary General should be a public face of the organization and not just administrative one.

## **Lithuania**

The ‘minister’ pointed out that a comprehensive approach to security remains a clear advantage of the OSCE; besides recommending development of the Political Military basket. Terrorism is spreading with globalization and recent developments remind us that the world is threatened and it should be specialized and ready for new security challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. It was also stressed that OSCE has a clear and strong role to play in disarmament and arms control through the CSBMs.

## **Moldova**

The ‘minister’ expressed condolences to the British Government; and in light of these terrorist attacks pointed to the importance of science and technology that was once on the OSCE agenda but is now excluded. This area should be reconsidered since terrorists can break through everything.

## **Tajikistan**

The second participant from Tajikistan focused on the Field Missions. Pointing to their importance the ‘minister’ shared that 80% of the OSCE budget goes to Field Missions which clearly indicate their importance. Therefore, the minister supported the remarks on the enhancement of the Field Missions in the PEP report.

### **Turkmenistan**

After expressing condolences to the British nation, the ‘minister’ stressed that we should move on and not fall under terrorism. In regards to the PEP report the ‘minister’ suggested reform of the Economic Forum in order to use it as a tool to strengthen the organization.

### **Kyrgistan**

The second participant from Kyrgyzstan joined in the condolences to the people of UK and prime Minister Blair. The ‘minister’ said that the OSCE remains the only framework connecting Central Asian countries to Europe. OSCE must keep in mind the problems that these countries face and assist in overcoming them. Stressing that the cross border cooperation is no longer in existence, and border management regimes are much, the minister fully supported enhancement of regional cooperation that was put forward by former Secretary General and later Special Representative to Central Asia Ambassador Höynck.

### **Romania**

The first participant from Romania pointed that this was a report that offers important guidelines for the future of the organization, currently leading one in the field of election monitoring, freedom of the media, and national minorities. Emphasizing the necessity of prioritizing, the ‘minister’ said that the focus should be on monitoring of the implementation of these standards already developed.

### **Georgia**

The first ‘minister’ said that OSCE should either reform or remain a club of 55 inefficient states. The needs for OSCE are once more proven by the act that happened yesterday in London, and he used the opportunity to express condolences. He also expressed support for the chapter on enhancement of the field missions with the hope that all the OSCE PSs will duly view the recommendations of the PEP in order to promote more efficiency and cooperation.

The Second ‘minister’ pointed to the terror that happened in London as an indicator of the need for change and to be able to prevent or respond to such acts. She also suggested that a thorough change is needed in order to avoid the overlapping of the activities of different areas in the OSCE.

### **Uzbekistan**

The ‘minister’ of this country expressed condolences to the British people. She then focused on issues from the point of view of civil society. She said that trust will not be established between the states if issues are not tackled and if there is no sufficient dialog between east and west. Further elaboration is needed on sustainable text policies and how to help small and medium enterprises. OSCE work should be at the top of policy making level rather than at the bottom on projects. The PEP report provides good frames for transformation.

Ambassador Höynck concluded the session by saying that it will be very interesting and important to see which areas the PSs will want to develop. There will be a report in which the PSs will write their suggestions and hopefully these suggestions will find consensus. He ended the session by saying that it is clear that there is still enormous work to be done on things to be changed. And there need to be consensus in the Permanent Council on these reforms.

## APPENDIX 1

### PROGRAMME

*FIRST WEEK : June 26<sup>th</sup> – July 9<sup>th</sup>*

#### **Sunday, June 26<sup>th</sup>**

- 17.00-18.30                      Arrival of Participants
- 19.00                              **Official Opening Ceremony** (Knight's Hall)  
ARNO TRUGER  
Director, ASPR, Stadtschlaining  
ARIE BLOED  
Director, Summer Academy on OSCE  
**Welcome Dinner** (Hotel Burg Schlaining)

#### **Monday, June 27<sup>th</sup>**

- 9.00-10.30                      **Introduction of the Participants and Team** (Room 5)  
ARNO TRUGER  
**Introduction of the Programme**  
ARIE BLOED
- 11.00-12.30                      **Post Cold War Realities in Europe**  
ZARKO PUHOVSKI  
Professor at the University of Zagreb and Chairperson of the  
Croatian Helsinki Committee for Human Rights
- 15.00-16.30                      **Workshop 1:**  
**Communication and Interaction in Multinational  
Teams**  
DIETMAR LARCHER  
Senior Professor of Intercultural Education, University of  
Klagenfurt/Austria; Visiting professor at Shahid Beheshti  
University in Teheran; Università degli Studi di Trento (It);  
University of Hangzhou, CH; University College of Cork (IR).  
Expert for Teacher-in-Service-Training for Intercultural and  
Multilingual Education with experience in long term projects in  
Croatia, Bosnia, Montenegro, Italy, Nicaragua, Guatemala,  
Madagascar...
- 17.00-18.30                      **continued**

#### **Tuesday, June 28<sup>th</sup>**

- 09.00-10.30                      **Historical and Political Development of the OSCE**  
ARIE BLOED

11.00-12.30	<b>Basic Principles of Security and Co-operation</b> ARIE BLOED
14.00	<b>Visit to the Institute's Library</b>
15.00-16.30	<b>Workshop 2:</b> <b>Conflict Transformation</b> URSULA GAMAUF Project Co-ordinator for EU and OSCE related Projects/ASPR
17.00-18.30	<b>continued</b>
19.00	<b>Social Event</b>

### **Wednesday, June 29<sup>th</sup>**

09.00-10.30	<b>The OSCE's Organisation: Basic Features</b> ARIE BLOED
11.00-12.30	<b>The OSCE's Organisation: Institutional Structures and Budget</b> ARIE BLOED
14.00	<b>Group photo in the courtyard of the castle</b>
15.00 -16.30	<b>Introduction, Concept and General Issues of Long-Term Missions</b> HANS-GEORG WIECK Ambassador, Germany
17.00 -18.30	<b>Long-Term Missions: Lessons Learned</b> HANS-GEORG WIECK

### **Thursday, June 30<sup>th</sup>**

9.30 – 9.55	<b>Assessment of OSCE from national point of view</b> ANDREY RUDENKO Senior Counsellor, Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the OSCE
	<b>Welcome and Introduction to the Permanent Council</b> HANS MICHAEL PLUT Deputy Director for Conference Services
10.00-13.00	<b>Visit to the OSCE Permanent Council</b>
13.30	Lunch
15.00-15.45	<b>Assessment of OSCE national point of view</b> KATHERINE BRUCKER Deputy Political Counsellor, United States Mission to the OSCE
15.45-16.30	<b>Assessment of OSCE national point of view</b> KAREL VOSSKÜHLER Deputy Head of the Permanent Representation of the Netherlands to the OSCE
	Mission to the OSCE
17.00-18.30	<b>Visit to the OSCE Secretariat – Introduction</b>

FABRIZIO SCARPA  
External Co-operation Officer, OSCE Secretariat  
**Permanent Council**  
HANS MICHAEL PLUT  
**Dinner in Vienna**

19.00

### **Friday, July 1<sup>st</sup>**

- 09.00-10.30 **The Security Dimension of the OSCE: Political-Military Issues**  
MARK WERTH  
Senior Communications Network Officer, Conflict Prevention  
Centre
- 11.00-12.30 **The Security Dimension: Policing Issues**  
ANDREW CARPENTER  
Political Affairs Officer, Strategic Police Matters Unit, OSCE  
Secretariat
- 15.00-16.30 **Reading Session and working groups**  
ARIE BLOED
- 17.00-18.30 **continued**

### **Saturday, July 2<sup>nd</sup>**

- 9.00-10.30 **Reading Session and Working Groups**  
ARIE BLOED
- 11.00-12.30 **continued**
- Afternoon **Free**

**Sunday, July 3<sup>rd</sup> Free**

<i>SECOND WEEK : July 7<sup>th</sup> – July 11<sup>th</sup></i>
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### **Monday, July 4<sup>th</sup>**

- 09.00-10.30 **The Human Dimension of the OSCE: Standard Setting & Monitoring**  
ARIE BLOED
- 11.00-12.30 **Combating Trafficking**  
MICHELE CLARK  
Head of the Anti-Trafficking Assistance Unit
- 15.00-16.30 **Minority Issues within the OSCE**  
ARIE BLOED
- 17.00-18.30 **The Work of the High Commissioner on National Minorities**  
ARIE BLOED

## **Tuesday, July 5<sup>th</sup>**

- 09.00-10.30                    **The Human Dimension of the OSCE: Media**  
ROLAND BLESS  
Senior Adviser of the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media
- 11.00-12.30                   **Gender Mainstreaming of OSCE**  
KRISTINA MILOSAVLJEVIC  
Mission of Serbia and Montenegro
- 15.00-16.30                   **Election Monitoring**  
HRAIR BALIAN  
Director of Special Programs, Geneva Centre for Security Policy
- 17.00-18.30                   **Economic and Environmental Dimension of the OSCE**  
KILIAN STRAUSS  
Senior Programme Officer; Office of the Coordinator for Economic and Environmental Activities of OSCE
- 19.00                            **Social Event**

## **Wednesday, July 6<sup>th</sup>**

- 09.00-10.30                   **Case Study on OSCE involvement in a certain area**  
ARIE BLOED, URSULA GAMAUF
- 11.00-12.30                   **Workshop 3:**  
**Simulation Exercise following in the Case study**  
ARIE BLOED
- 15.00-16.30                   **continued**
- 17.00-18.30                   **continued**

## **Thursday, July 7<sup>th</sup>**

- 09.00-10.30                   **OSCE Activities in Central Asia**  
SABINE MACHL  
Senior Mission Programme Officer, Central Asia
- 11.00-12.30                   **Regional Aspects of OSCE Work: Contributions from PARTICIPANTS**
- 15.00-16.30                   **continued**
- 17.00-18.30                   **Future Role of the OSCE within the European Security and Co-operation Architecture**  
WILHELM HÖYNCK  
former Secretary General of the OSCE (1993-1996) and former Ambassador to the United Nations in Geneva

## **Friday, July 8<sup>th</sup>**

- 09.00-10.30                   **Mock Ministerial (simulation)**  
WILHELM HÖYNCK
- 11.00-12.30                   **continued**

15.00-16.30

**Evaluation**

18.00

**Closing Ceremony** (Knights Hall)

ALICE ACKERMANN

Mission Programme Officer; Conflict Prevention Centre;

OSCE Secretariat

19.00

**Farewell Dinner** (Hotel Burg Schlaining)

**Saturday, July 9<sup>th</sup>**

09.00

Departure to Vienna

## APPENDIX 2

### LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

Nr.	Mr/ Ms	NAME	CITIZEN	PRESENT POSITION
1.	Ms.	ABDULLAEVA Nigina	Tajikistan/Russia	Assistant to the Head of the OSCE Centre in Dushanbe
2.	Mr.	ABDURAKHMONOV Farhod	Tajikistan	Senior Field Assistant, Kulyab Field Office of OSCE Centre in Dushanbe
3.	Ms.	CARAMAN Gabriela	Moldova	Leading Specialist in the Trade policy and WTO Division, Ministry of Economy and Commerce of the Republic of Moldova
4.	Mr.	GEGESHIDZE Nikoloz	Georgia	Attaché, Assistant to the First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Georgia
5.	Mr.	KABAYEV Kuban	Kyrgyzstan	Project Assistant, Economic and Environmental Dimension, OSCE Centre in Bishkek
6.	Mr.	KELLER Niklas	Germany	Research Assistant, European Security and Defence Policy in the Eastern Mediterranean, UN University, Tokyo
7.	Ms.	LIEW Halcyon	USA	Communications Consultant, Good Schools Initiative, Marygrove College
8.	Ms.	MIHAI Alexandra Iulia	Romania	MA student
9.	Ms.	MORKUNAITE Egle	Lithuania	Attaché of NATO Division, Security Policy Department, MFA
10.	Ms.	MRELAHVILI Ekaterine	Georgia	Ambassador's Assistant and Administrative Affairs, Embassy of Georgia to the Republic of Turkey
11.	Ms.	NAZAROVA Läle	Turkmenistan	Economic & Environmental Assistant, OSCE Centre in Ashgabat
12.	Ms.	SANDULESCU Smaranda	Romania	European Integration Advisor, The Ministry of European Integration
13.	Ms.	SIMONYAN Hasmik	Armenia	Attaché, European Department, Council of Europe Division, MFA of the Republic of Armenia
14.	Ms.	STALESKA Nikolina	Macedonia	Student, Diplomatic Academy of Vienna
15.	Ms.	TOKTALIEVA Nazira	Kyrgyzstan	Project Management Office Interpreter/Translator, European Union/UN Development Programme - Border Management and Drug Action in Central Asia Programme
16.	Ms.	TURSUNOVA Zulfiya	Uzbekistan	EPU Student

### APPENDIX 3

#### LIST OF LECTURERS

Mr/Ms	NAME	INSTITUTE	FUNCTION
Ms.	ACKERMANN Alice	Conflict Prevention Centre OSCE Secretariat	Mission Programme Officer
Mr.	BALIAN Hrair	Geneva Centre for Security Policy	Director of Special Programs
Mr.	BLESS Roland	OSCE The Representative on Freedom of the Media	Senior Adviser of the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media
Mr.	BLOED Arie		Director, Summer Academy on OSCE
Ms.	BRUCKER Katherine	United States Mission to the OSCE	Deputy Political Counsellor
Mr.	CARPENTER Andrew	OSCE Secretariat	Political Affairs Officer, Strategic Police Matters Unit
Ms.	CLARK Michele	OSCE Secretariat Anti-Trafficking Assistance Unit	Head of Anti-Trafficking Assistance Unit
Ms.	GAMAUF Ursula	ASPR Austrian Study Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution	Project Co-ordinator for EU and OSCE related Projects
Mr.	HÖYNCK Wilhelm		former Secretary General of the OSCE (1993-1996) and former Ambassador to the United Nations in Geneva
Mr.	LARCHER Dietmar		Senior Professor of Intercultural Education, University of Klagenfurt/Austria; Visiting professor at Shahid Beheshti University in Teheran; Università degli Studi di Trento (It); University of Hangzhou, CH; University College of Cork (IR). Expert for Teacher- in-Service-Training for Intercultural and Multilingual Education with experience in long term projects in Croatia, Bosnia, Montenegro, Italy, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Madagascar...
Ms.	MACHL Sabine	OSCE Secretariat, CPC	Senior Mission Programme Officer, Central Asia
Ms.	MILOSAVJEVIC Kristina	Mission of Serbia and Montenegro to the OSCE	First Secretary
Mr.	PLUT Hans-Michael	OSCE - Congress Centre	Deputy Director for Conference Services

Mr.	PUHOVSKI Zarko	University of Zagreb	Professor at the University of Zagreb and Chairperson of the Croatian Helsinki Committee for Human Rights
Mr.	RUDENKO Andrey	Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the OSCE	Senior Counsellor
Mr.	SCARPA Fabrizio	OSCE Secretariat	External Co-operation Officer
Mr.	STRAUSS Kilian	Office of the OSCE Co- Ordinator of Economic and Environmental Activities (OCEEA)	Senior Programme Officer
Mr.	TRUGER Arno	ASPR Austrian Study Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution	Director
Mr.	VOSSKÜHLER Karel	Permanent Representation of the Netherlands to the OSCE	Deputy Permanent Representative, Head of Political Section
Mr.	WERTH Mark	OSCE Secretariat, CPC	Senior Communications Network Officer
Mr.	WIEK Hans-Georg		Executive Officer, OSCE Strategic Police Matters Unit Ambassador, former Head of OSCE Advisory and Monitoring Group in Belarus