

AUSTRIAN STUDY CENTER FOR PEACE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION - ASPR,  
STADTSCHLAINING

**REPORT**  
**ON THE**  
**SUMMER ACADEMY ON OSCE**

**June 23 – July 5, 2008**

**ORGANISED BY**

Austrian Study Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution, Stadtschlaining  
The Diplomatic Academy, Vienna

**PROJECT TEAM**

Arie Bloed and Arno Truger: Academy Directors  
Arie Bloed: Moderator  
Ursula Gamauf: Project Co-ordinator  
Claudia Hofer: Secretary

**RAPPORTEUR**

Raphael Tenaud

**PEACE CENTER BURG SCHLAINING, July 2008**

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## INTRODUCTION

The 12<sup>th</sup> Summer Academy on the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe took place from the 23<sup>rd</sup> of June to the 5<sup>th</sup> of July 2008 at the Austrian Study Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution, Peace Centre Burg Schlaining, Stadtschlaining, Austria. The program, which began in 1997, is held under the auspices of the OSCE and organised in cooperation with the OSCE.

The programme is financially supported by the Republic of Austria respectively the Permanent Mission of Austria to the OSCE.

Additionally this year the Permanent Mission of Ireland to the OSCE, the United States Mission to the OSCE, and the Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany to the OSCE supported the Academy's efforts by sponsoring scholarships for participants coming from Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia.

Organisers as well as participants are very grateful for this invaluable support!

The aim of the Summer Academy on the OSCE was to strengthen the participants' understanding of the Organization by improving their sometimes already deep knowledge of the history, structures, functions, values and current activities of the OSCE. The Summer Academy's purpose is to provide diplomats and employees of various ministries with clear overview of the areas they will have to deal with in their relations with the OSCE. The two-week course also gives the participants an opportunity to develop their thoughts as to how the Organization could be ameliorated, be through reform or practices, in order to achieve its objective of comprehensive security in the OSCE region, in a co-operative manner.

Twenty-seven participants from eighteen countries attended the 12<sup>th</sup> Summer Academy on the OSCE. The group comprised of diplomats who work with the OSCE in their respective Ministries of Foreign Affairs or other Ministries, staff from OSCE field presences, academics and individuals with previous experience of working in NGO's.

The speakers invited by the Summer Academy were mainly experts from the OSCE, as well as diplomats and scholars with a deep knowledge of the Organization's evolution, functions, missions and strengths and weaknesses. The participants of the Summer Academy were invited to share their personal experience of working in or with the OSCE in a form of a brief presentation.

Dr. Arie Bloed, the former Executive Director of the Constitutional and Legal Policy Institute in Budapest and currently senior consultant for international organizations such as the OSCE, UN and EU, was the program-moderator. Giving himself several lectures, he provided the participants with inspiring insights into the OSCE and its work, and invited them to think about the Organization in a very interactive way.

The 2008 Summer Academy was twice placed under the concept of peace. Indeed, participants from Azerbaijan and Armenia (the latter coming from the region of Karabakh) managed to overcome the dispute that had arisen on the very first day about the question of Karabakh. Asked to be the so called "Tamada" (person responsible for the toasts) during the Farewell Dinner, a participant from Azerbaijan

invited the other participants to first toast to peace, to that peace that they had found among them during the Summer Academy.

Mr. Raphaël Ténau, Summer Academy participant and graduate of the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna compiled this report. The production deadline for this report did not allow for review of the draft by the lecturers. Therefore, the responsibility for its content rests with the Austrian Study Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution.

## **METHODOLOGY**

The curriculum of the Summer Academy comprised a combination of lectures, working groups, readings, workshops, case studies and on-site observation of formal OSCE proceedings.

Lectures were divided into topics and strictly delimited within the day, often following the pattern of two theoretical lectures in the morning and one workshop in the afternoon. Lectures and workshops provided the basis to acquire an extensive knowledge in the three dimensions of the OSCE as well as in other relevant areas related to the OSCE, such as Freedom of the Media, High Commissioner on National Minorities, Office for Democratic institutions and Human Rights, etc. Long-term missions, structures and relations with IO's and NGO's were also part of the resource.

Theoretical knowledge was then applied within small working groups, mostly during workshops that gave participants the opportunity to elaborate more thoroughly on OSCE related issues and to apply practical skills on negotiations and team-work. Simulation exercises dealing with interaction of multinational teams in conflict transformation situations were employed to highlight the importance and limits of communication skills, and to promote intercultural understanding among the participants.

In order the participants to be best prepare to the lectures, they were given a comprehensive reader comprising of all relevant material as to familiarize oneself more closely with OSCE's work and OSCE related issues.

Each participant wrote a report on one of the sessions of the Summer Academy. These session reports were used to compile this comprehensive report. Evaluation of the content, structure, methodology, and usefulness of the program was carried out at the end of the program. At the conclusion of the Summer Academy, participants engaged in an overall assessment of the program; they discussed their impressions and offered recommendations for possible change.

## EVALUATION


During the first week the program organisers distributed an anonymous questionnaire which participants filled in daily during the two weeks Summer Academy. Participants were asked to assess the individual daily sessions, each of the two weeks, and the overall program, as well as to provide suggestions for improvement. The organisers made a point of seeking input from the participants by offering thoughtful, provocative remarks and encouraging comments.

At the end of the second week, an oral evaluation session was conducted. Participants discussed their personal course evaluation in three working groups – group 1 assessing course week one, group 2 assessing course week, and group 3 assessing the overall course with special regard to organisation and facilities – and then reported back to the plenary. Due to the sick leave of the Summer Academy co-director Arno Truger who usually facilitated the discussion on the evaluation, Arie Bloed was present at the evaluation on the course organisation and facilities, while Ursula Gamauf facilitated the evaluation of the content and structure of the programme. This division of labour should enable participants to speak out freely and honestly.


The overall evaluation of the program derived from the questionnaires can be illustrated in pie charts as follows:

### Overall Evaluation of the Programme


#### Usefulness for my professional development




**Usefulness for my personal development:**




**Basic Structure of the programme:**




**Methodology of the programme:**




### Reader:




### Hotel Burg Schlaining:




### Seminar Rooms:




### Library:



### Staff of the ASPR - Ursula Gamauf:




### Staff of hotel:



## Future Development of the Programme

**Would you recommend the programme to colleagues?**



Participants tended to feel that the Academy had achieved its objective of expanding and deepening knowledge about the OSCE. Participants left the Academy with a better understanding of the purpose and future role of the OSCE, as well as of its various distinct activities, enhancing their knowledge about the OSCE and providing training in working more effectively within the OSCE diplomatic and OSCE-NGO milieus. In this respect, the range of input from speakers, the experience of Professor Arie Bloed, who directed the Academy and enhanced the critical dialogue between resource persons and participants, and the multinational and diverse occupational backgrounds of the participants proved beneficial.

From the written comments and the oral evaluation the following points can be raised:

Overall, the methodology and the content of the program were evaluated very positively. Participants found the focus upon different topics to be positive, though some desired greater attention to one or another specific issue depending on their personal background. Participants stated that in general a proper balance had been reached between providing an overview in a lecture and deepening the knowledge in working groups. A greater practical involvement of participants as recommended in earlier evaluations proved being effective. Participants stated that interactive sessions and exercises helped them improving their communication skills within a multicultural, international setting and provided them with crucial insights and a better understanding of other OSCE participating states. The mix of methods in communicating the content was assessed as effective, interesting, exciting and useful.

Participants felt that particularly the simulation exercises were very well organised and provided an excellent learning opportunity.

Participants considered the excursion to the OSCE Permanent Council in Vienna as very useful, interesting and for some of them even exciting since they had the chance to meet their delegations.

Most participants praised the selection of speakers for the two-week program. The involvement of current and former high-ranking OSCE officials, sharing not only their knowledge but also their specific insights in the OSCE, was considered particularly valuable.

Participants also welcomed that the Director made himself readily available throughout the two weeks, and that some resource persons were able to continue discussion with them outside the seminar room. This greatly enhanced the overall learning experience.

Basically, participants were satisfied with the reader and additional reading materials. Following earlier recommendations the amount of articles was reduced, concentrating only on the most important ones, which made it possible for participants to read most of the recommended articles.

Participants felt warmly welcomed and appreciated the friendly professionalism, helpfulness and efficiency of the staff of Hotel Burg Schlaining and the ASPR.

## **SESSION REPORTS**

### **Summer Academy on OSCE Opening Ceremony**

**By**

**OSCE Secretary General Ambassador Marc PERRIN DE BRICHAMBAUT**

Dr. Bloed opened the 2008 Summer Academy on OSCE and thanked the Secretary General for making us the honour of his presence in Schlaining.

After evoking the alternative name for the OSCE, namely Organization for Seriously Confused Europeans, Dr. Bloed pointed out that 56 Participating States, each of which with a broad agenda limited the OSCE's margin of maneuver.

Nevertheless, the OSCE has proven its "raison d'être" and is successful in its main task of preventing conflicts. Interestingly enough, this success is maybe a problem for the Organization, since there is no news if there is no conflict.

Having been given the floor, Ambassador de Brichambaut thanked Dr. Bloed as well as the participants, elaborating on what the Summer Academy on OSCE was going to represent for us, namely a mirror at which it is not always comfortable to look, and an opportunity of gaining a real insight into the OSCE's work.

The OSCE is providing security, Secretary General continued. It is not a military alliance such as NATO. It is not only a club but also a common project based on core values that reflect the mood of the 1970's. In spite of its demanding task, the OSCE has not done so badly so far, in comparison to other organizations.

Newly elected President Medvedev had recently kind words towards the OSCE, which differs from Putin's repeated criticisms. There are apparently no more opposition to the organization, even though the need for negotiations or even a Summit may seem relevant.

At the Madrid Summit, the OSCE shifted eastwards to Central Asia, granted Kazakhstan the Chairmanship for 2010 and advocating more security for Afghanistan. The organization also acknowledged new arising challenges such as police training or officials support.

Secretary General touched then upon Kosovo, mentioning the OSCE mission there. 850 people have been working to improve dialogue and daily life. Three criteria have yet changed in the area (Secretary General did not debate on whether Kosovo is a country or not): the Constitution entered into force on June 15<sup>th</sup>, a new political majority has been arising in Belgrade, a debate has taken place on the future of the international presence, whereby Russia and Serbia stuck to the UNSCR 1244 whereas the European Union and the US advocated a transfer of competencies from UNMIK to EULEX. The draft proposal states that UNMIK remains while EULEX receives more competencies.

Secretary General expressed his worries about the situation there, which resembles always more to a frozen conflict with three different parallel institutions (Pristina, Belgrade, Mitrovica).

The Abkhazian issue is also a serious crisis, with the Chairman-in-Office is worried with. Even though President Saakashvili has been asked to restrain, the presence of both armies close to each other is a danger for the peace in the region.

The OSCE is helping transitions to democracy through continuous dialogue, of which election observation is only a part.

Many obstacles have recently arisen, such as the challenging by Russia of the election observation methods that has led to internal conflicts within the OSCE itself. The OSCE is not a usual organization. It has no charter, and it uses consensus for its decisions. Any Participating States could kill the organization in three months, but the fact that nobody does so means that the OSCE has still a "raison d'être". Nevertheless, the question of an OSCE reform has come up over the past few years.

The OSCE niche is to provide perspective, to create a momentum in order all regional and international stakeholders to convene and discuss in cross-dimensional way. This system may also have some relevance for regions outside the OSCE.

Secretary General then asked for questions from the participants.

About South-Ossetia, Ambassador de Brichambaut acknowledged that the situation was a very complex puzzle, which remains split despite all efforts.

Secretary General also precised that, as a part of UNMIK, the OSCE presence in Kosovo was under UNSCR 1244 and thus had not recognized the independence.

The OSCE reform is not much on the agenda yet. Paradoxically enough, even though the autonomy of the Secretary General is limited, the other offices of the Secretariat (ODIHR, FoM, HCNM, OCEEA) are very autonomous and can act according to their conscious. Reform issues remain election observation (raised by Russia) and legal status (advocated by both Russia and the European Union).

One big variable is currently the next US President, for whose election the OSCE is now waiting in order to work even more efficiently. McCain's idea of a League of Democracies goes against the OSCE vision of a "gray zone" where there are no good countries and bad countries.

To conclude, Dr. Bloed finally thanked Secretary General for being so frank and direct.

Tuesday, June 24, 9:00 – 10:30 a.m.

## **Security and Cooperation in the OSCE Area: Conflicts and New Dividing-Lines**

By Zarko PUHOVSKI

Mr. Arie Bloed introduced Mr. Puhovski to participants and briefly outlined his professional background.

This session has been introduced by Professor Zarko Puhovski to the participants of summer academy OSCE -2008. Zarko Puhovski is a Professor at the University of Zagreb and Chairperson of the Croatian Helsinki Committee for Human Rights.

Professor Puhovski began his lecture by recalling the historical background. Before 1989, the dividing lines in Europe were simple, and surprisingly enough, the struggle between East and West was characterized by a high level of trust that rendered both sides quite satisfied of the situation. The re-creation of 19 new states in the late 1990's posed the necessity to reorganize borders differently. European borders were no longer to stop Soviet tanks, but to hinder the migration of poor people from central and Eastern Europe, a sort of "fortress Europe" against the "beggars of the East". This was of course accompanied by a lot of suspicion towards those Eastern regions, supposedly inhabited also by Moslem terrorists.

The European Union has indeed created new dividing lines, while calling itself Europe, which does not correspond to the reality.

In fact, if we see to history the perception of the borders of Europe changed; it was only about three hundred and fifty years back that due to the expansion of the Ottoman Empire, the European borders were considered to be near Vienna. So, there is a strong element to define Europe in geographical and historical terms, dating back to the mid-17th century.

Then the Westphalia Peace marked the end of the 30 Years War and the beginning of the European Nation States in our modern understanding with the accepted notion of sovereignty that the controlling power of a State is entitled to define the religion of its population. According to Prof Puhovski there was thus a link made to the notion that Europe presents a unity within accepted cultural and linguistic differences.

Nowadays, not even a think-tank consisting of brilliant specialists is able to determine whether Moscow and St-Petersburg belong to Europe or not. It is probably there that an Organization such as the OSCE has a place, a role to play.

Professor Puhovski then spoke for a long time about the European Union.

The first 12 articles of the European Union Treaties state non-discrimination principles. However, the article 13 states that all 12 previous articles are not applicable for non European Union Member States, which an obvious "carte blanche" for discriminating those countries.

The European Union is a "community of values". However, the Lisbon Treaty already omits many of those values such as essential aspects of Human Rights. The European Union has been an answer to Hitler's idea to unify Europe. If those values disappear, then the very core of the Union is endangered.

The European Union also shows the highest concentration of power that is not under parliamentary control, which provokes many criticisms as for the so-called "democratic deficit" of the Union. The European Union suffers indeed of two problems: an internal lack of democratic legitimization, and an external lack of community of values.

Some countries were not ready, which the European Union granted membership, obviously for geostrategic purposes (e.g. Rumania, Bulgaria). The reason for that is the will to create two holes: a pink one, Switzerland, and a black one, the Balkans. This logic of encircling entire regions dates back to the radical geostrategic change occurred after 9/11.

That geostrategic change also entails further consequences, such as a reduction in the defense of Human Rights, which reminds of Brejnev's famous sentence: "You cannot discuss values, now that our security is in danger."

Perceptions have changed. In the 1970's and 1980's, Yugoslav citizens could travel in Europe without great difficulties. Now, people from this region are considered either beggars or terrorists.

But there are also dividing lines within the very European Union, what one calls a multicultural society. The number of non-European Union citizens within European Union countries has been increasing over the past couple of years. Values have been stated by the Council of Europe on national minorities, which certain countries such as France or Germany have not yet ratified, arguing that there are no minorities on their soil, which is obviously a discrepancy between the internal and the external approach of the European Union on Human Rights. The problem is that a double standard is no standard at all.

The so-called "new Europe" (i.e. new Member States) still thinks like it used to do during the Soviet time, namely that they are too small to participate in the whole EU thinking about values.

Indeed, old patterns still seem to influence current politics. Nevertheless, new elements also now come into this framework, which the European Union still avoids to address. The notion of European Union territory is now raised by China, since the extension of the European Union is occurring eastwards. The notion of the relations of the European Union with the rest of the world is also preoccupying, for the lack of global strategy is obvious.

Those new visible and invisible dividing lines render thinking of new strategies unavoidable and necessary.

Tuesday, June 24, 11:00 – 12:30 a.m.

## **Basic Principles of Security and Co-operation**

By Arie BLOED

Reminder: CSCE: 1973-1994/95.  
OSCE: from 1994/95 on.

Starting from the very beginning of the CSCE idea, one has to examine the reason why both the Warsaw Pact and the Western countries were interested in this conference.

The Communist States' interest first lied in the legitimization of the status quo in Europe, and especially the recognition of the new borders resulting from the Second World War. This had been a priority of the Soviet countries since the 1950's.

Secondly, these countries were also in desperate need of an economic collaboration with the West.

The Western interests were different. The "free flow of information, people and ideas" was the central issue the West was pushing for, for the reason that, despite the 1966 UN Covenants on Human Rights, the Soviet Bloc was in the 1970's steadily arguing that Human Rights related issues were internal matters, which had then led to a paralysis of International Organizations such as the UN.

The second concern was the disarmament, rendered necessary by the tremendous stockpiles that had resulted from the arms race between the two blocs.

Those different interests were articulating around a common contingent interest, namely that both blocs were bound to live in the same place: Europe.

The two Soviet interests became respectively the 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> basket of the CSCE (later known as "Dimensions of the OSCE"), and the first western interest became the 3<sup>rd</sup> basket, since the disarmament issue had been put aside during the negotiations, being discussed mainly within another forum.

The OSCE is a unique animal, with a large membership. The US and Canadian participation resulted from their 'vital interest' in Europe, reflected in the number of soldiers both countries had then on the European soil. The decisions are taken by consensus, which assures that no country can ever be the victim of a decision adopted against it. Despite Brejnev's wish to confer the Conference a legal status, the decisions remain solely politically binding, which also poses a certain problem of interpretation as to know what the OSCE actually is. Furthermore, the consensus rule has been a constant subject of criticism, some countries arguing that it is incapable of tackling conflicts.

Is the OSCE based on common values? Yes, even though the interests are very divergent. Nevertheless, democracy, rule of law, the three dimensions, the media, the minorities, etc, are principles shared by all 56 Participating States, which is attested by numerous documents expressing the attachments of the latter to those values.

The current problem the OSCE seems to be currently facing is that a number of values are being forgotten, which has led for instance to the reappearance of the non-interference principle.

Nevertheless the level of achievement in the OSCE as a 'community of values' still goes beyond the Council of Europe's.

The OSCE is also a community of responsibility. Indeed, each Participating State is, on paper, responsible to assist each other in case of problems in implementing OSCE's standards. However, one must not forget that the other Participating States are also responsible for helping a country implement measures.

Consequently, the non-interference principle is no longer applicable in the Organization, in accordance with that principle of common responsibility.

If necessary, the Prague Mechanism (i.e. consensus minus one) can be used to put pressure on a country that does not comply with its commitments. It was used only once, in 1992.

Powerful countries are eager to forget those benchmarks to increase their margin of manoeuvre, sometimes at the expense of the organization. However, the fact that the OSCE is a "soft organization" does not mean that it is not effective.

Functions of the OSCE:

- 1) Core functions
  - To set up standards
  - To organize implementation.
  
- 2) Stabilization
  - Conflict prevention
  - Crisis management
  - Security
  - Democratization
  - Etc...
  
- 3) Assistance
  - All missions actually carry out projects which allows the organization to tackle problems on the spot, saving money and time.
  
- 4) Legitimization
  - The OSCE has a mandate to set up Peace Keeping Operations.
  - But it always delegates other settings (Commonwealth of Independent States, NATO, UN), by legitimizing them.
  
- 5) Catalyzing
  - OSCE has a small budget.
  - Therefore, it "sells" projects to other organizations such as IMF, World Bank, EU.
  - This is a smart way of having influence.

Example: in the Water Management issue in Central Asia, technical NGO's asked the Organization to provide guidance (Conference in Vienna, 2000).

Tuesday, June 24, 3:00 – 4:30 p.m.

**Workshop: Communication and interaction in multinational teams**

By Galya DIMITROVA-ZDRYVKOVA

*"One cannot not communicate" Paul Watzlawick*

At the beginning of the training session Ms Dimitrova requested the participants to voice their expectations about the session. The group expressed that they anticipated hearing observations of different people representing different cultures, to learn new ideas and approaches, to work cooperatively in a multinational team, to get in touch with people doing the same or a similar job in other countries, to observe the similarities and diversities, to learn the skills and the experience of the teachers, etc. The lecturer noted that the session was going to be about the topics of communication and interaction in multinational teams and multicultural environment. The notion of 'communication' was defined as comprising 'verbal' and 'non verbal' elements that include time, dress, stance, distance, gestures, eyes, voice, etc. Only a small percentage of our everyday communication is verbal (7%), about 38% is paralinguistic (tone of the voice, intonation, way of speaking, etc.) and the major part is non verbal thus body language.

Communication between two persons can be described as a sequence of constructing the message, matching the message to the receiver, preparing the receiver, sending the message, receiving the message by the other party, interpreting the message by the other party, and confirming if the message has been understood.

After this brief introduction, the trainer offered the participants a practical exercise called 'Viking Attack'. The participants were divided into five working groups, and the game instructions, a story about a Viking attack, were distributed, whereby every one in the group had only part of the story. The groups' task was to find out the details of the attack and so they needed to communicate to each other through sharing the additional information that they had got from the cards with the condition that none of the group members might show their cards to the others.

After announcing the results, the trainer asked the groups to make their remarks about the game, to comment on what was helpful and what was not, etc.

The general assessment of the workshop was good. Some groups had difficulties to find a leader, and one has to note some cases of isolation of one or several members.

The participants came to the conclusions that equal participation allows the team to work efficiently, but that the leader is also important at some stages. Finally, the communication is obviously an essential factor.

A second practical exercise started by grouping the participants into couples. Each part had to tell the other how they understand the notion 'culture'. Then the participants were requested to shortly present what they had heard from their colleagues about their culture.

The notion culture comprised of a variety of issues such as political systems, economy, historical background, way of life, achievements, basic cultural trends, customs, traditions, language, dialects, family values, religion, arts, handicrafts, sightseeing, folk music and dances, national musical instruments, food and national cuisine, drinks, favourite animals, popular sports, national holidays, national

costumes, natural resources, feasts, toast makers and even the spirit of holiday making. Many participants noted the diversities and similarities of different cultures. At the end, the trainer summarized the essence of the exercise, focusing on the fact that culture is about the way of life of a people (values, beliefs and behaviours) passed on from one generation to another'. She also defined the characteristics of culture as follows: culture is learnt, forms our self-identity, combines the visible and invisible, is dynamic, and accessible to outsiders. Afterwards, the trainer defined culture in different dimensions, such as 'collectivism and individualism', 'neutral and affective', 'masculine and feminine' and finally 'past-oriented, present-oriented and future-oriented'.

Wednesday, June 25, 9:00 – 10:30 a.m.

## The OSCE's Organization: Basic Features

By Arie BLOED

The principle of co-operative security, a comprehensive understanding of security, and a strong emphasis on dialogue are key characteristics of the OSCE. Since the Helsinki Final Act was adopted in 1975, the participating states have found a common normative ground in the CSCE, which was renamed OSCE in 1994. Co-operative security is the underlying principle of the OSCE. It starts from the assumption that security is indivisible, and that the co-operation of all parties is required to guarantee security, peace, and stability. This understanding has led the OSCE participating states to adopt a comprehensive approach to security, which is illustrated by the OSCE's:

- Geographical scope;
- Broad understanding of security, which strikes an equal balance between human, economic, and military aspects of security;
- Involvement in all phases of the conflict cycle (early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management, post-conflict peace-building);
- Operation as a regional Organization under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.

Nevertheless, the question of what is the OSCE's niche has not been fully answered yet.

Mr Bloed started with a question to the participants, namely what does "Security and Co-operation" mean. Is this security before co-operation, security after co-operation or security through co-operation? Officially, the CSCE/OSCE is dealing with both as a mutual process, but certain countries such as the Soviet block wanted then to first achieve security and only then to enhance co-operation.

The participants were then invited to name the differences between the CSCE and its successor the OSCE.

### CSCE

Spontaneous

No Secretary General

General

**"On** Security and Co-operation"  
talk

### OSCE

Organised meetings

Permanent Secretariat and Secretary

**"For** Security and Co-operation"  
act (example: discarding *mélange* stocks)

According to Dr. Bloed's presentation, OSCE's basic features are the following:

- Comprehensive security
- Larger membership
- Political process
- Forum for negotiations
- Light structure
- No non-interference principle. In that respect, the OSCE is very different from the UN.

- Intrastate dimension (OSCE often goes deep into one Participating State's internal affairs, also because it is not hindered too much by the non-interference principle).
- In principle OSCE accepts all NGO's without official invitation or governmental invitation.

Since its inception, the OSCE has achieved a high level of legitimacy in its core business of norm setting. By adopting the Paris Charter in 1990, the OSCE participating states have paved the way for the recognition of democracy as the only legitimate principle of governance within the OSCE area. With this, these states have directly linked the quality of interstate order to their ability to organise internal sovereignty along liberal democratic lines. Although this consensus has opened the door for constructive intervention within the system of each state (by political means) and outside the territory of any given state, the OSCE cannot enforce actions against the will of a participating state.

The concept of comprehensive security encompasses all three dimensions of the OSCE. Poverty, drought and other issues are indeed also security related issues that must be tackled before a conflict occurs.

But the Organization seems to deviate from its core business, while it is dealing with issues not really related to security.

The OSCE is the largest regional Organization, including more or less all countries of the northern hemisphere. The Organization is also an interesting organization in view of the large number of States it has. Also, the relatively broad access of NGO's to the OSCE (though mainly confined to the human dimension) has a considerable impact on the organization and has made it a more transparent and accessible forum for all.

The OSCE is an organization *sui generis*, namely that it has every aspect of an organization but the legal status, and many people criticize it for this aspect alone. No decision can be enforced in Court however both politically binding and legally binding decisions are essentially the same thing in that all participating States are obliged to comply and violation is not acceptable. One view is that it is rare for a dispute to be taken to Court and, in fact, they are often solved by political means. Therefore, in summary, political and legal binding force is the same but it is the enforcement mechanism that differs.

This is why the wording of OSCE decisions always reads "will" and not "shall".

Legally binding documents often take many years to draft and adopt whereas political decisions are adopted immediately after agreement. Furthermore, when a decision is politically and not legally binding the participating States are more willing to go further in their discussion as they fear less the possible repercussions.

Dr. Bloed explained the dynamic process of the OSCE in that it has a light institutional structure, is of strictly political nature, has a flexible approach to security aspects and constitutes a "light" security organization. He then went on to conceptualize the terms 'comprehensive security' and 'cooperative security' in the OSCE. Comprehensive security is used to describe how security within the OSCE region is seen in broad terms with the inter-linkage of all three dimensions. Cooperative security is reflected in the key features such as decision-making, the lack of sanctions and enforcement action and the fact that all OSCE States are acting on the basis of 'voluntary cooperation'.

The equality of all States is also a major factor for the OSCE. It is manifested through the consensus principle for all decisions (the most contested rule for the PA). However, although this principle is of major importance for the workings of the organization there are derogations through the 'consensus minus one' principle and 'consensus minus two' for the peaceful settlement of disputes ('directed conciliation'). The equality of all participating States is also evident through the fact that reservations and interpretative statements are allowed (however, without affecting the binding force of the OSCE commitments) and in the fact that there are currently six official working languages. The consensus principle is in itself at the same time the strength and the weakness of the OSCE. Strength because agreed decisions are more easily implemented by states who committed to them, and weakness because any state can block the process, although most of the time the number of Participating States interested in one particular matter is rather limited.

Wednesday, June 25, 11:00 a.m. – 12:30 p.m.

## **The OSCE's Organizations: institutional structures and budget**

By Arie BLOED

OSCE is a purely political organization, without a basic treaty. The OSCE is further characterized as a dynamic process with a light institutional structure and offices in different countries. All states within the OSCE are formally equal and this is reflected in the decision-making process.

Mr. Bloed proceeded to outline the main political decision-making bodies, as well as operational structures and institutions of the OSCE. He told groups that there is a decreasing political interest on the side of the participating states in the high-level meetings. Also, he explained the main function of all OSCE bodies. The most important political body is Summit. Summits are periodic meetings of Heads of State or Government of OSCE participating States that set priorities at the highest political level. During periods between summits, decision-making and governing power lies with the Ministerial Council, whose members are the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the OSCE Participating States. The Permanent Council convenes weekly in Vienna to discuss current developments in the OSCE area and to make appropriate decisions. The Forum for Security Co-operation meets weekly in Vienna to discuss and make decisions regarding military aspects of security in the OSCE area, in particular confidence- and security-building measures.

After defining the main functions of the OSCE political bodies and the main bodies during the decision-making process, Mr Bloed defined the functions and the role of the operational body and institutions. During his lecture, he underlined the Parliamentary Assembly of the OSCE and the Chairman-in-Office. The Parliamentary Assembly is the parliamentary dimension of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe whose task is to facilitate inter-parliamentary dialogue. The Chairmanship rotates annually, and the post of the Chairman-in-Office is held by the foreign minister of the participating State which holds the Chairmanship. His responsibilities include co-ordination of the work of OSCE institutions, representing the Organization and supervising activities related to conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation. The Chairman-in-Office is assisted by the previous and incoming Chairman-in-Office; the three of them together constitute the Troika. After this he continued to talk about the other operational bodies, such as Secretary General and Secretariat, OSCE missions, ODIHR, High Commissioner on National Minorities, High Level Planning Group, Representative for Freedom of Media.

The Chairman-in-Office is an internally recognized body, which is democratically chosen. The drawbacks are however that the OSCE is dependent on the internal developments in the country of the Chairman-in-Office and in the chair itself. Furthermore, Mr Bloed mentioned, the too various agendas induces a lack of institutional memory that blurs the political message of the Organization.

During the whole session, we discussed about all above mentioned bodies and their role in the decision-making process.

Wednesday, June 25, 3:00 – 6:30 p.m.

## **Workshop 2: Negotiation and Diplomacy**

By Paul MEERTS

Dr. Meerts began his lecture by providing the participants with a very inspiring preamble to negotiation.

The main problem within a negotiation is the ripeness: when is a negotiation ripe for outcomes? Whereas negotiations used to be the outcome of a war, negotiation is nowadays preferred to warfare, because wars have left too many traumas and scars. Parties thus prefer to first negotiate. Traumas are very vicious sentiments that come back again during negotiation, and whose danger one must not underestimate. Even if sometimes negotiations are used by one or several parties to buy time, they usually aim at finding an agreeable outcome.

A good negotiator knows perfectly their dossier, the overlapping bargaining zones, and they are capable of making compromises. Without trade-offs, no negotiations. Even though ambiguity is essential, a core principle of negotiations is trust. Prof Meerts then used the following image: if negotiations are water, an Organization is a glass. The glass must be there, strong enough to contain the water.

\*

Participants were then invited to take part to a simulation game. Each group comprised of five individuals, each of which had to defend the point of view of a party involved in the Kosovo question (situation before the independence). Each party was given a personal sheet mentioning various outcomes. When the parties would have agreed on an outcome, the individual would earn or lose a certain amount of points. All groups had the same outcomes, but the points were of course very different depending on whom each participant was playing. Participants were not allowed to change the wordings, but could give their own interpretation to an outcome.

The strategy comprised of using trade-offs and of finding win-win situations, which do not mean that everyone win the same but that everyone wins more than they had invested in the negotiation. Therefore, a party had to agree on the decision if their points amounted a total superior to zero.

The negotiations worked more or less smoothly and were an inspiring experience for most of the participants. The latter then concluded that not everything is negotiable. However, they were also convinced that without negotiation, there is no outcome either. They acknowledged that negotiate demands a capacity to set up a hierarchy of one's priorities and to think many steps ahead. It became finally clear that successful negotiators focus first on consensual points, in order to only after consider delicate issues.

Thursday, June 26, 10:00 a.m. – 13:00 p.m.

### **Visit to the OSCE Permanent Council**

On June 26, 2008 within the framework of the OSCE Summer Academy – 2008 its participants visited the OSCE Permanent Council in Hofburg where they enjoyed a deeper insight in the OSCE activity and took part in 718<sup>th</sup> plenary meeting of the OSCE Permanent Council.

Before the meeting's start, Deputy Director for Conference Services, Department of Management and Finance of the OSCE Hans-Michael Plut acquainted the participants with the OSCE activity, staff of the Permanent Council, order and rules of conducting the regular meetings of the OSCE PC, as well as answered on numerous questions of the participants.

The agenda of the 718<sup>th</sup> meeting of the OSCE Permanent Council comprised of the report by the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities Knut Vollebaek, review of current issues, report on the activities of the Chairman-in-Office, report of the Secretary General and any other business.

In his speech, OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities Knut Vollebaek told about his recent visits to different countries and shared with the gathered the conditions of national minorities living there. For example, minorities in Kosovo, Macedonia, Croatia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Georgia, Latvia, Russian Federation, Romania, Ukraine and other countries.

After the OSCE High Commissioner's on National Minorities speech, on the given issue came forward ambassadors of different countries in the OSCE, exchanged opinions took the floor with different proposals to cooperate and assist the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities in its future work.

At the next point of the agenda statements on freedom of assembly in Armenia and on racism were made, followed by the usual any other business.

Friday, June 27, 9:00 – 10:30 a.m.

## **The Security Dimension of the OSCE: Political – Military Issues**

By Mark WERTH

*Handouts of presentation provided and copy of FSC. DEC/5/02, 20 March 2002  
Decision no 5/02 “Road map of the FSC Implementation of the Bucharest Plan of  
Action for Combating Terrorism”.*

Mark Werth began his lecture by saying that the PolMil was what the OSCE had to offer to its Participating States. This is an essential dimension that is usually not even noticed, as long as it is working. However, when the co-operation is no longer efficient, it becomes immediately noticeable.

At the beginning the most important documents, which regulate political – military issues were highlighted:

- 3 baskets of Helsinki Final Act 1975 and
- Vienna Document 1999.

Institutions at OSCE dealing with above mentioned issues:

- Forum For Security Cooperation (rotates 3 times a year, now – Estonia and next – Finland) and
- Conflict Prevention Centre.

Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBM) are used for decreasing the tensions and increasing the confidence among the Participating States. These measures are militarily significant and politically binding. The whole process, characterised by openness and transparency, is entirely verifiable.

In this regards, the Vienna Document of 1999 was a groundbreaking event that has since then shaped the OSCE’s “acquis”.

Each country’s participation in the CSBM is voluntary, and FSC countries have the opportunity to discuss, through CSBM, military threats and situations. The results of the CSBM are positive: the transparency of military activities has visibly increased, as well as the confidence in others’ intentions, which has contributed to decrease the tensions and the threat of military interstate conflicts, even though the latter is no longer the most crucial aspect of today’s security, in this time of terrorism and organised crime. The CSBM is characterised by a high level of implementation, which is an additional sign of its success.

Besides of CSBM there are 3 the most important additional measures:

- Code of Conduct on Politico – Military Aspects of Security (1994)
- Document on Small Arms Light Weapons (2000)
- Document on Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition (2003).

Several OSCE missions are based on these agreements, for instance in Ukraine, Tajikistan or Montenegro, where the OSCE has had to deal with the huge problem of tonnes of highly toxic rocket fuel called “Mélange”.

Friday, June 27, 11:00 a.m. – 12:30 p.m.

## **The OSCE' Relations with other Security Organizations**

By Christo POLENDAKOV

Main reason for co-operation with other international actors in the field is the impossibility to act alone due to limited resources. Background for co-operation is the recognition of security challenges demanding united response. The platform for co-operation with other organizations and institutions is provided by the Istanbul Summit 1999 document.

Interactions with partners and natural partners are value-based co-operation, shared or overlapping membership, similar mechanisms and movement of employees, common geographies, joint support and implementation. IO's help each other, the OSCE often sparking the co-operation and inviting other organizations to participate in the process. Strength of the co-operation is among others the tremendous exchange of information, allowing the compiling of a lot of significant resources. Furthermore, contacts at different levels are very usual, sometimes even on a daily basis. Finally, one must not underestimate co-operation outside the system, for instance within or between the missions, for it fosters new ideas to incubate and to be eventually forwarded up to a decisional level.

Areas of co-operation are conflict prevention, crisis management, frozen conflict management, supporting political negotiations, post-conflict rehabilitation and development.

### **Co-operation with UN**

OSCE is a regional arrangement according to the Chapter VIII of the UN Treaty. Co-operation with the UN is maintained by annual staff meeting of Secretariats. Regular contacts are with specialised agencies, programs and committees of the UN. Interestingly enough, OSCE and UN offices are located in a same building.

OSCE is involved in the UN high-level meetings and thematic debates of the UN Security Council, in the multiparty meeting with UN, Council of Europe, European Union, IOM and International Committee of Red Cross, as well as in tripartite meetings with UN and Council of Europe since 1993. OSCE missions may be institutional pillars of UN missions, for instance the OSCE Mission in Kosovo.

### **Co-operation with the European Union**

The European Commission (EC) is one of the major partners in project funding and implementation in all three dimensions across the entire OSCE Region.

European Union (EU) is represented in the OSCE political bodies by the delegation of the country holding the Presidency of the Council of the EU as well as by the EC. Political contacts include regular meeting of Troikas. At the working level, staff meetings between the OSCE Secretariat, the EC and the General Secretariat of the Council of the EU take place annually since 2003. OSCE field presences co-operate closely with the EU on issues related to their mandates.

### **Co-operation with Council of Europe**

OSCE shares similar goals with Council of Europe in promoting stability on the basis of democracy, the rule of law and respect for Human Rights in Europe. High-level “3+3” meetings between Secretaries General, Chairmen-in-Office and Parliamentary Assembly Presidents are held annually, whose process brings outcome that could not be reached by any other mechanism. The OSCE and Council of Europe Secretaries General regularly exchange visits to each other’s main decision-making bodies.

### **Co-operation with NATO**

It has developed from an essentially political dialogue to an operational interaction as a partner organization, including such issues as terrorism, border management and security, disarmament, small arms and light weapons, CSBM as well as regional issues. Meetings of respective Secretaries General are taking place. Since 1998 regular working level meetings between staffs representatives of the two organizations are taking place.

OSCE serves as a forum for co-operation with regional and sub-regional organizations and initiative in OSCE area (1999 Charter for European Security, 2003 Maastricht Treaty). For example, OSCE Secretary General convened a meeting in September 2002 with regional and sub-regional organizations/initiatives on preventing and combating terrorism.

OSCE develops contacts and co-operation with Central European Initiative (CEI); Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO); Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS); GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova); Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC); Southeast European Co-operative Initiative (SECI); South East European Co-operation Process (SEECP); Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe.

### **New opportunities:**

- Joint efforts on border security and management systems in Central Asia and Afghanistan
- Kazakh Chairmanship in 2010 - connecting bridge with regional organizations, such as SCO, CICA and Commonwealth of Independent States

### **Partners for Co-operation and regional Organizations outside the OSCE area**

- All interaction is carried out through informal group meeting with the framework of the PC, joint conferences, seminars/workshops, possible participation of Partners in EOMs, and the seconding of staff to a number of OSCE field missions.
- 1975 Helsinki Final Act-inclusion of the chapter on Mediterranean (based on the linkages between security in Europe and the Mediterranean). The Mediterranean Partners for Co-operation include Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia.
- Asian Partners: Japan became a Partner in 1992, Korea in 1994, Thailand in 2000, Afghanistan in 2003 and Mongolia in 2004.

Based on 2001 Bucharest Plan of Action for Combating Terrorism and 2003 Maastricht Strategy, the OSCE is broadening contacts with Shanghai Cooperation

Organization (SCO), the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the Arab League and the African Union, the Organization of American States (OAS), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and with the ASEAN regional forum.

Friday, June 27, 15:00 – 16:30 p.m.

**Workshop: Various OSCE Issues**

By Arie BLOED

The lecture on various OSCE issues covered the topical issues concerning OSCE legal status, political leadership and decision-making. The lecturer divided class into 3 groups aimed at finding answers on the following questions:

- What are the possible benefits and drawbacks of giving legal status to the OSCE?
- In which way political leadership in the organization can be strengthened (role of Chairman-in-the Office and Secretariat)?
- Which options do you see to make the decision-making process in the OSCE more flexible while maintaining OSCE's co-operative character?

**First Group:**

The first group considers that giving legal personality to the OSCE will help OSCE to become a full-scale regional organization, allow to avoid administrative problems, give legally-binding force to the OSCE decisions, and grant privileges and immunities to the OSCE and its officials. On the other hand, recognition of the OSCE legal capacity may lead to losing its flexibility, its intervention into internal affairs, and its influence on consensus principle.

Since the OSCE is already based on plenty of legal documents, giving the organization legal personality may seem perfectly logical.

Finally, a legal personality would allow other frameworks to move forward, following the example of the Council of Europe, which relies on the Framework on Human Rights that is nothing else than the OSCE commitments legalized, so to say.

However it is to consider, Dr. Bloed added, that OSCE's efficiency lies in its very politically binding force.

**Second Group:**

The second group suggested that in order to strengthen the political leadership of the organization, the problems related to Chairman-in-Office should be tackled, such as the rotation on yearly basis that hinders the OSCE to develop a long run institutional memory. Furthermore, the Chair-Participating State often tries to push for its own national interest within the OSCE framework. The group thought that improving the Chairman-in-Office could be achieved through switching roles of the Secretary General and Chairman-in-Office. As a result, the Secretary General would become a real decision making body, and thus the Secretariat would become the backbone of the OSCE. It was also proposed to institutionalize the Quintet.

The Summits seemed really important to the second group, who proposed to convene one Summit every other year, as it is stated in the book. To ensure that this process works smoothly and is not avoided, the Secretary General should have the duty to call for a summit on a regular basis.

**Third Group:**

The third group proposed ways that can make OSCE decisions more flexible. Among them are changing from consensus principle to 2/3 majority voting procedure, to 2/3 majority voting procedure plus key international players, or to a system where consensus principle has to be observed concerning important political and security issues and where 2/3 majority voting procedure is applied for all other issues.

Dr. Bloed indicated that these were very sensitive issues. He added that it could be the moment to reconsider consensus minus one.

Saturday, June 28, 9:00 – 10:30 a.m.

## **Introduction, Concept and General issues of Long –Term Missions**

By Sean MCGREEVY

At present OSCE has 18 Field Operations (18 Main Offices and 51 Field Operations), based in South-Eastern Europe, Eastern Europe, Caucasus and Central Asian regions, under the responsibility of the CPC (Conflict Prevention Center). Field Operations account for 2714 staff out of total OSCE 3247 staff and for EUR 108 million out total budget of EUR 164 million, and conduct the bulk of the Organizations operational work.

Political basis for the Field Operations was started to be laid during the 1990 Paris and 1992 Helsinki Summits, going hand in hand with the process of CSCE transformation from a purely forum for political dialogue into a mechanism for proactive support for the implementation of commitments.

The first deployments of missions were in Skopje (trying to avoid spill-over from Bosnia), Georgia and Moldova in 1992.

Field Operations are aimed at assisting host states in:

- Fulfilment of their OSCE commitments;
- Strengthening dialogue and interaction between state and civil society,
- Increasing effectiveness of early warning of conflicts and early intervention.

Field Operations are rather autonomous, they report directly to the Chairman-in-Office, have a freedom to implement activities they see fit to fulfil their mandate and do not need explicit host state approval for all activities.

Field Operations are country specific and have their specific mandates. They report solely to the Chairman-in-Office or the Participating States, and are usually fairly autonomous. They are all run by the Ambassadorial-level heads, have international and national staff.

Field Operations can be subdivided in 3 types:

- Conflict Resolution focused Missions (Georgia, Moldova) are facilitating a settlement to frozen conflicts; undertake initiatives to enhance trust and co-operation between sides and monitor cease-fires. They also carry out economic rehabilitation programs.
- Post-conflict/crisis Field Operations (Bosnia, Croatia, Kosovo, Skopje, Albania, Tajikistan) emphasizing on rebuilding confidence and security between former hostile groups in post-conflict environment, reforming state institutions to ensure its equitable, effective and neutral functioning, reports on political development and security issues.

- Security enhancement Field Operations – a new type of OSCE Field Operations that were established in late 1990's (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Serbia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan) are not responding to an elaborate security threat. SEFO are aimed at addressing underlying fundamental threats to security in the context of comprehensive security in the fields of human rights, State institutions, Rule of Law, good governance, and crisis management. They have broad, all encompassing mandates for working in all dimensions and support transition countries in fulfilment of their OSCE commitments.

Saturday, June 28, 11.00 a.m. -12.30 p.m.

## **Long-Term Missions: Lessons Learned**

By Douglas DAVIDSON

After briefly introducing his career background, Ambassador started with describing the basis of the OSCE web site what is the OSCE and in particular what it does in field operations. He then touched upon the times, after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union, when an idea was introduced to send missions, which in his view were supposed to be only brief interventions and not long-term activities. The first missions were of monitoring nature, involving broad categories of early warning, conflict prevention and crisis management. The next wave of missions was of a post-conflict rehabilitation character, which included the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo.

The mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina was established on 8<sup>th</sup> December 1995 and is considered to be the first large OSCE mission. From 1996 on, several hundreds of people from a number of countries were sent to carry out its main task – implementation of the peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (based on the Dayton Peace Agreement). In Ambassador Davidson's view, all missions bear certain similarities. Almost all of them are at bottom instruments to assist their host countries and governments in making the transition from what was generally a socialist or communist past to what one may call a market-democracy present. Ambassador Davidson further qualified OSCE missions' work as "nation-building" and quoted Condoleeza Rice and the Rand Corporation on this issue. He also quoted a paper prepared by Valery Perry on Bosnia and Herzegovina, which described democratization as a process of transition where democracy is the aim and brings about all the necessary components of what is qualified today as "democracy".

Coming back to the OSCE web site Ambassador Davidson identified the work of missions as putting the political will of the Participating States into practice, which in recent years is questionable. He further pointed out to the following several trends which would cause demising of field operations:

- 1) Some Participating States do not like to be criticized;
- 2) Prevailing desire to shift more resources far to the east of Vienna and away from the southeast (to Central Asia, etc.). This resulted in reducing OSCE budget by 40 million Euro as a result of downsizing Balkans' missions;
- 3) Suspicion on hidden desire in the Secretariat to make field missions like development agencies based on new administrative reforms introduced in 2003, which Ambassador Davidson disagreed with. In his view, a decade ago, Heads of Missions were much freer to determine the work of their operations that they are today (thanks to the current bureaucracy) and the OSCE at that time was more nimble than other organizations. He further made comparison in personnel and financial structure between OSCE and the Hague Tribunal and the UN benefits and classification system, not in favour of the first one.

In conclusion Ambassador Davidson noted that missions over time have gone from being monitoring operations to being nation-building and democratization exercises. He also added that declining levels of interest in western capitals for the organization and the special interest for some areas have prompted attempts to reduce big missions and to build up the little ones, while the countries with little missions do not

want to see them growing bigger. The new regulations introduced by the Secretariat aims to make missions more responsive to the political will of Participating States, but de facto making them less flexible, which is a problem since it would not be possible to provide a quick response to the broken crisis as it was in 1998. He brought an example of Macedonia, when the OSCE failed to provide police experts due to strict recruitment procedures. At the end of his presentation Ambassador Davidson expressed his concerns about the future of the OSCE in general and the missions in particular, based on the trends mentioned above quoting General Douglas MacArthur "Old soldiers never die. They just fade away".

Saturday, June 28, 3:00 – 4:30 p.m.

## **Gender Issues in the OSCE**

By Linda Kartawich

### **What is gender?**

Gender is different from sex. Gender issues relate to Human Rights, whereas sex is only a biological difference. Hence, gender equality does not mean that men and women are not different, but correspond to achieving equal opportunity between them.

Studies have shown that when no woman is involved in a project, when gender issues are not considered, the project usually fails. There is currently a strong focusing of the Finnish Chairman-in-Office and most probably from the next-year Greek Chairmanship as well, to address this issue.

### **History**

2001 saw the first Action Plan in gender related issues. Unfortunately, it was too weak because gender issues were placed under the Third Dimension of the OSCE. The new Action Plan acknowledged the need to address those issue in a cross dimensional way.

### **Action Plan**

As mentioned, this Action Plan encompasses all activities and programs in all three dimensions. However, even though it tries to involve all Participating States, the Action Plan remains focused on the host country at stake.

The Plan entails a training component, as to build capacity and knowledge within the staff itself. The management aspect is also present, has the recruitment process has been strengthened since 2008 in order to recruit more female senior positions.

### **Approach**

So called gender mainstreaming is now used as a process of assessing implications for women and men of any planned action in any area at all levels, as to include gender issues in areas where it is unusual. Various groups having various needs, they must all be taken into account.

Gender issues are essential in addressing human security as a whole, since women's needs shed a light on issues that male decision-makers might ignore or consider minor, such as protection against rape.

The OSCE is furthermore part of a broader framework, such as the 1979 UN Convention for Elimination of Discrimination against women (CEDAW), ratified by all Participating States but the USA, or the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, which draws attention on how war affects women differently than men.

Monday, June 30, 9:00 – 10:30 a.m.

## **Economic and Environmental Dimension of the OSCE**

By Kilian STRAUSS

The presentation started with a short introduction of the speaker's biography by the respective moderator of this session, which was followed by a briefly presentation of each participants of the Summer Academy.

At first the session started with the presentation of the Helsinki Final Act: Basket II, in which is prescribed the co-operation in the field of economics, science and technology and the environment, as the 2<sup>nd</sup> human dimension in the OSCE area.

The discussion concentrated on the economic and environmental problems, which includes the issues of corruption, money laundering and financing of terrorism, the cross-borders, rivers, pollution (mentioned here the environmental problem with the Aral Sea), mélange, etc.

At present OSCE has 19 Field Presences (20 Economic and Environmental Officers and assistants) and 18 OCEEA staff, based in South-Eastern Europe, Black Sea, Caucasus and Central Asia regions.

The presentation has then focused on the key activities of the OSCE Economic and Environmental Dimension, which are: Anti-Corruption activities, Anti-Trafficking Programme (ATP), Combating Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism and AML/CFT .

The OSCE Anti-Corruption activities include four kind of activities, such as the co-operation with other Organizations like: UNODC, OECD (ACN), NGO's etc, promotions of international instruments, fostering of international co-operation and capacity and institution building.

The OCEEA Anti-Trafficking Programme (ATP) aims on the promotion of the Code of Conduct for the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation in Travel and Tourism (includes provisions on protection of trafficked persons both as victims and as witnesses), which includes the promotion of self-regulation in the private sector, economic and environmental of vulnerable groups and the awareness raising in countries of destination.

The co-operation has now gone so far, that people can be sued in Europe, even though they have committed a crime abroad.

Moreover, since orphans are particularly exposed to human trafficking, the OSCE works at providing them life-skills, working skills and even internships in certain companies, in order them to be more integrated.

Activities aimed at Combating Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism are the close co-operation with the UNODC's Global Programme Against Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism (GPML), the Council of Europe, NATO, World Bank and other international partners. The OCEEA and GPML have developed joint national workshops on combating money laundering and financing of terrorism and have organised a series of regional events the past years. In these activities a great contribution is given by the Finance Intelligence Unit (FIU), Moneyval, and EAG. The AML/CFT activities aimed at capacity building, legislative development, and international co-operation.

The presentation was followed up by some examples as to how can be explained the problems in geographic terms, related to economic and environmental issues. The problems of South Eastern Europe to Central Asia about the political transition and environmental risks were also been touched upon in this session, as well as the water management in Central Asia, and the radioactive, chemical and biological hazards.

Dr. Strauss finally mentioned the ENVSEC (Environment and Security Initiative), which is a partnership of six Organizations – the OSCE, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the UNDP, UNECE, and the Regional Environmental Centre for Central and Eastern Europe (REC). NATO has also associated itself to the Initiative.

The ENVSEC aims at providing a framework for co-operation on environmental issues across borders and promoting peace and stability through environmental co-operation and sustainable development. The Initiative's operational tools are vulnerability assessments and monitoring, capacity building and institutional development.

The ENVSEC regularly provides a report about the main threats that are being posed in the today's world. It encourages the Participating States to work together across borders, providing them with very comprehensive maps. That work is even more important that the resolution of environmental problems lies in the increasing awareness of the population to those issues.

As evidence of how issues in the environmental dimension can be crucial, one may refer to the elimination of rocket fuel stockpiles (mélange). Mélange is a highly toxic and volatile rocket fuel component left in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The project Rocket Fuel Component consists of recycling the mélange in close co-operation with NATO.

Monday, June 30, 11:00 a.m. – 12:30 p.m.

## **The Human Dimension of the OSCE: Standard Setting & Monitoring**

By Arie BLOED

**Human Dimension** has always been one of the important aspects in OSCE. It is very broad an area that includes full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, rule of law, democracy, freedom of media, question of minorities rights, etc.

**Significance of the human dimension** is a very controversial topic among OSCE participating states. Somehow, it seems that history is repeating. Some participating states were, and still are more in favour of the HD than in the other two baskets: politico-military, economic and environmental, even though according to the OSCE handbook all three dimensions are interlinked with same importance, and equality.

### **What does make OSCE different organization than other international organization dealing with HD?**

First we can say that OSCE is reinforcing the countries to fulfil the obligations taken from various declarations in many other organizations. The main mechanism is monitoring missions. Moreover, the OSCE is a political organization focused on security issues. Even when we are talking for example of free elections in regard of democracy, we are having in mind security, which remains the principal aim of the Organization.

Every issue can be put in a HD basket, and if is not treated properly, can lead to a conflict. Minority issues are evidence as to how tensions can easily transform to conflict. That is why OSCE established High Commissioner on National Minorities to prevent the possibility of escalation of tensions.

There was a certain lobby within the Council of Europe to abolish the OSCE Third Dimension, with the argument that duplicates the Council of Europe's work. Actually, if one looks carefully at each Organization's aims, one sees that the Council of Europe is dealing also with individual cases, whereas the OSCE only pay attention to broader violations involving security issues.

Finally, and opposite to the Council of Europe, the OSCE enjoys a certain implementation force, whose main evidence is the annual HD implementation meeting in Warsaw, open to everybody including NGO's, which have a high participation. Even though these meetings are not legally binding either, they do help calming tensions down while problems are discussed and thus do not freeze.

### **Democracy and Rule of Law**

The work of the OSCE is not undisputed, and some argue that the organization creates a risk of conflict escalation in autocratic countries, even accusing it to trigger so-called "colored revolutions" in countries such as Georgia or Ukraine.

**Monitoring**

The OSCE includes several monitoring bodies, such as HDIM, ODIHR, FoM, HCNM, the missions and the Parliamentary Assembly. Nevertheless, each Participating States may ask Vienna or another body to explain its work (Vienna Mechanism). These bodies may also allow small groups of countries or a single country to set up a mission (Moscow Mechanism).

Monday, June 30, 15:00 – 16:30 pm.

## **Election Observation**

By Nicolas KACZOROWSKI

The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human rights (ODIHR) was created in 1990 in Warsaw, and is the main OSCE institution for the human dimension. It is dealing with observation of the elections, gender and minority issues, and aims at assisting governments in fulfilling their commitments on the Human Dimension. The key element of the ODIHR human dimension mandate is the promotion of democratic elections. ODIHR is acting following the Copenhagen document (1990), which established basic criteria's for a genuine democratic election and according these document OSCE participants committed to invite observers for the monitoring national elections in their countries. In this way ODIHR became the principal international election observation institution in the region, whose task encompasses the whole election process (before, during and after the election itself) and providing a relevant framework to ensure that they work according to the OSCE standards.

There exist four phases of the observation: gathering information; analysis of information; drawing of conclusions; formulation of recommendations, which make election monitoring differ from the sole election supervision. The main idea of the ODIHR missions remains to assist the state in the election through the observations. To achieve this aim at best, ODIHR applies some main principles for observation tasks, namely systematic, comprehensive and accurate collection of information; impartial and professional analysis of information; well-grounded conclusions; constructive recommendation; non-interference and non-obstruction.

The code of conduct is particularly strict. Observers have to be professional, and may not belong to any party involved in the election. Roles are also clearly defined, for instance in Kosovo, where the European Union observed election because the local election staff had been trained by the OSCE. Observers must also go by two, in order the one form they fill in at the end to be a balanced assessment.

Election observation have clear the benefit to building confidence in the voters' mind, showing them that the state is no longer or less corrupted, and that it is therefore worth it again to cast one's vote.

Nevertheless, Election Observation Missions have also drawbacks. First, they contribute to divert attention from more important issues concerning a government's compliance with their OSCE commitments. The ODIHR observation mission is also accused to becoming a political tool (trigger of "coloured revolutions", entrance to the EU or NATO) and is being criticized by some OSCE members for using double standards in their work.

The Astana Summit 2004 touched upon on a reform proposing to reduce the focusing on monitoring.

The core controversial question remains whether election observation is only a technical or also a political activity.

Nevertheless, ODIHR observation of the elections is a lower price to pay than the consequences of false elections.

Monday, June 30, 5:00 – 7:00 p.m.

### **Panel Discussion**

#### **“Assessment of OSCE from an EU and national point of view“**

By Didier GONZALEZ, Alexey POLISHCHUK and Samuel C. LAEUCHLI

The panel discussion was led by the guest speakers Mr. Didier Gonzalez, Deputy Head of Delegation, Permanent Representation of France to the OSCE; Mr. Alexey Polishchuk, Counsellor, Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the OSCE; and Mr. Samuel Laeuchli, Political Counsellor, Mission of the USA to the OSCE. The discussion topic was *main challenges and areas of interests of the participating states within the OSCE*.

#### **Vision of the USA**

The US representative gave a brief and simple overview of the what, the why and the how of the US vision on OSCE.

##### What?

The US wants to extend the western culture from Vancouver to Vladivostok, to reach everywhere the same level of constitutional maturity and the same level of prosperity. Despite the difference within the West, there is a lot in common, that the OSCE should contribute to extend.

##### Why?

First, the US has national interests in that matter, since the world would be more stable. As the US is called to intervene whenever there is instability, a stable world would make Washington save money and lives. Moreover, stability and common values offer tremendous opportunities to trade.

Secondly, the US advocates that process, “because it is the right thing”. There is no reason that Hungary benefits from something that Ukraine does not have for instance.

##### How?

OSCE should work in all rounds, creating a framework to achieve its goals. The US is supportive of structures that lead to those goals, such as Field Operations. Sole dialogue is not interesting, each country has to share the will to benefit from the OSCE. Election monitoring is relevant because it brings countries into that EU/US likeminded culture.

#### **Vision of France, on behalf of the EU**

France views integrated EU in the OSCE that is an international organization with one common ground where EU usually has one position.

There is a complementary relation between the EU and the OSCE with an integrated concept on all three dimensions. This concept is still workable and it does not exist in other international organizations.

Other than that, the OSCE is the only place where the Russian Federation, the USA and the EU participate in dialogue together.

### **Vision of the Russian Federation**

Russia wants the OSCE to correspond to each letter of the acronym.

- O: OSCE is still not an organization. It thus needs legal personality.
- S & C: Russia views the OSCE as an instrument to reinforce security and co-operation among Participating State on an equal basis.
- E: This might be confusing, since Europe does not go from Vancouver to Vladivostok. However, this is not a problem for Russia.

In terms of added values, the Russian Federation views the OSCE as a rare place where the EU, the USA and the Russian Federation meet together. Additionally, the OSCE serves as a place where conventions and agreements of other international organizations are implemented.

The main areas of the Russian Federation's interests are:

- In terms of political-military security: to ensure that the Participating States will not increase their security at the expenses of others; also to fight against terrorism and to fight against drugs.
- In terms of economic dimension: the Russian Federation believes that the OSCE is not a donor organization. Even though the OSCE has a modest budget, it can accumulate funds through extra budgetary contributions from the Participating States and to implement serious projects.
- In terms of human dimension: to protect Russian citizens outside the Russian territory; the Russian Federation is also concerned with anti-trafficking issues since Russian Federation is a country of origin, country of transit and country of destination at the same time.

As the Russian Federation believes, OSCE has become marginalized in many areas; however it is still useful, inter alia as facilitator for the work of other IO's.

The participants were then invited to ask questions to the panellists.

### **Legal personality**

*US:* The US is supportive, but Russia obviously does not want to negotiate.

*RF:* Russia decided to reactivate the dialogue on that issue, and has been advocating for years to adopt a charter. Russia does not block, the OSCE only lacks a consensus.

*EU:* The EU supports the charter with the condition that existing commitments will not be discussed again.

### **National Minorities**

*RF:* HCNM should put pressure on non-complying Participating States. The work of the HCNM could be more confidential, although it is working quite well. Russia acknowledges the results of ODIHR, but criticizes the lack of transparency.

### **NATO-OSCE relations**

*US:* US deplores that most NATO Member States and Russia oversee the difference between NATO and the OSCE. The entire focus on NATO has now changed, namely it is no longer aimed at Russia.

## **Russia and Georgia**

*RF:* The representative denied any will to grant citizenship on a massive scale. Passports are given case by case. Nevertheless, giving citizenship to people that do not have one remains one of Russia's main goals.

## **Consensus minus 1, consensus minus 2**

*EU:* For the time being, OSCE cannot escape the consensus principle.

*US:* Consensus sounds much worse than it is. In reality, few Participating States are interested at the same time in the same topic, and thus a lot of them will not break the consensus. Furthermore, Participating State usually only block issues that are crucial to them.

*RF:* Consensus minus 1 or 2 is exclusion, even imposition, since it excludes participation of one country in the decision-making process.

## **Military presence of CIS Peace Keepers in Armenia**

*RF:* PKO forces act in accordance with bilateral agreements and contribute to Armenia's security.

## **What is the added value of the OSCE?**

*US:* Refers to his "what" (cf. supra).

*EU:* OSCE helps inter alia implementing UN conventions.

*RF:* Russia views three added values:

- OSCE is the only place where the "three of us" (i.e. US, Russia, France/EU) can speak together
- OSCE does a great implementation job
- This is great fun

## **What could be done to revitalize the dialogue within the Permanent Council?**

*EU:* EU's soft policy is a cliché, for there are often great divergences among the Member States.

*RF:* True, the dialogue is less visible, but does exist. Even if the times have changed and the work within the Organization has developed into routine, dialogue still continues, which is essential. Mechanisms are propaganda tools.

*US:* It is anyway impossible to discuss at 56 Participating States, which is why the real work is being carried out in the backrooms. Mechanisms are only highlighting instruments.

**Why is there no Summit anymore?**

*RF:* The big disappointment following the 1999 Istanbul Summit led to the current situation.

*US:* There is currently no need for a Summit.

*EU:* There has been no enough relevant change to discuss to have the necessity of a Summit.

Tuesday, July 1, 9:00 – 10:30 a.m.

## **Freedom of the Media**

By Arnaud AMOUROUX

The concept of the Freedom of media is a cornerstone of every democratic society. It involves variety of freedoms: freedom of expression, of opinion, of the press etc. No democratic society can exist without a free, independent and pluralistic press. Free discussions of important public issues, including legitimate criticism of government policies, serve the transparency and accountability of the political process (e.g. exposure of wrongdoings, corruption etc.).

There are several International Conventions stating the standards regarding freedom of expression. The article 19 of the UN convention on Civil and Political Rights (1948) states that “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.”

The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950) Council of Europe states the following:” The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.”

In the Case law of the European Court on Human Rights (1976) it is highlighted that “Freedom of expression applies not only to "information" or "ideas" that are favourably received [...] but also to those that offend, shock or disturb the State or any sector of the population. Such are the demands of that pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness without which there can be no "democratic society."

Later, OSCE also agreed on several International Standards for participating states: Helsinki Final Act, Chapter VII on Respect for Human Rights and fundamental freedoms, sets basic principles about “free dissemination of information” and Lisbon (1996) declaration has once more reaffirmed that “Freedom of the press and media are among the basic prerequisites for truly democratic and civil societies. There is a need to strengthen the implementation of OSCE commitments in the field of the media”.

As a result, the position of the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media was established in December 1997. This institute became a ‘Media watchdog’ for 56 OSCE participating States.

The RFoM is the only inter-governmental media freedom agency in the world. It has twofold mandate:

- RFoM Observes relevant media developments in the OSCE region, monitors violations, assesses the facts, seeks direct contacts with the concerned state authorities, seek additional information, and promotes full compliance with commitments.

- Assists countries in implementing and fostering free, independent and pluralistic media. Mainly performed through project work, legal advice, workshops, media trainings, publications etc.

The instruments used by RFoM are more of recommendations and raising awareness nature.

- Outreach to high diplomatic levels e.g. daily contact with 56 ambassadors and letters to FM; Public interventions in Permanent Council;  
- As for the broader audience, press releases are prepared and disseminated. In addition, RFoM actively cooperates with other actors like NGO's, IGO's.

Challenges that RFoM tries to work on are:

- Criminal defamation and insult laws or disproportionate fines generate a fear of prosecution for criticism of systems, opinions, and institutions (self-censorship);
- Pluralism is restricted through attempts to label offending or critical views as punishable "extremism" or "hate speech", also on the Internet;
- Harassment, physical attacks, and even murders of media workers - even more detrimental when these acts are "tolerated" by governments;
- Investigative rights for journalists are denied (secrecy laws), plus they are forced to reveal their sources to law enforcement agencies.
- Media professionals are hindered in their work in many ways: physical assault or threats; heavy fines handed down to journalists or media outlets; imprisonment;

In this regard, RFoM publicly intervenes in some 40 to 60 cases per year with OSCE participating states and calls for remedial action in order to bring the working conditions for media in line with the OSCE commitments of Participating States.

There are also some other activities carried out by RFoM which include:

- Assessment visits aiming to assess the media freedom situation in the field, to analyze it and to provide recommendations;
- Legal reviews, including assistance States in reforming their media laws;
- Training programs aiming improvement of working relations for governmental press officers and media professionals;
- Yearly regional conferences for journalists;
- International Mechanisms for Promoting Freedom of Expression (yearly joint declaration of the four Rapporteurs on media freedom).

RFoM responds to these challenges not only with intervention, but also with relevant project activities.

Since 1999, the three international mandates dealing with freedom of expression, in the OAS, OSCE and UN frameworks, have issued a yearly Joint Declaration on a specific topic of concern. These Declarations, called "International Mechanisms for Promoting Freedom of Expression", serve as valuable "soft law" tools of reference to promote reforms.

RFoM counts some success-stories, such as Georgia or Kyrgyzstan, where the first independent media-regulating body was created in February 2008.

However, concerns remain. Seven Participating States only have decriminalized all media actions, among which no European Union States. In Turkey, translation of certain foreign books continues to fall under the Article 301. Journalists are assassinated in Daghestan or accused to be hooligans in Azerbaijan. These all are additional challenges for RFoM.

Tuesday, July 1, 11:00 a.m. – 12:30 p.m.

## **The Security Dimension: Policing Issues**

By Kevin Carty

The session started with a short introduction of the speaker's biography, followed by a brief introduction by the individual Academy participants.

Why is policing important in the OSCE context? It is one of the principal features of the Rule of Law. It is very relevant to the OSCE as a security organization, though at times the work of the SPMU is frustrated by the lack of political and financial support from the Participating States.

Policing is fairly new for the OSCE, starting of in Croatia in the 1990s and spreading around South Eastern Europe (SEE), where the focus was located, slowly to expand eastward. MC 2002 decision established firmer structure within the Secretariat, a sector known as the Strategic Police Matters Unit (SPMU), to deal with policing. It has grown ever since to cover such varied issues as human and drug trafficking coupled with a research capacity that preserves the institutional memory. The Unit was formed on an ad-hoc basis to respond to the various issues that come up, in cooperation with the field missions, who have the primary responsibility in implementing the projects.

A primary task of the Unit is to support the work of the mission; about 11 currently operating in the field. Heavily involved across SEE, except Bosnia where the EU is operational in policing. Additionally, the Unit works in an advising capacity in Moldova. It has developed a big program in Yerevan, with an experimental station at the outskirts of the city, within the scope of community policing. Unit has also engaged in teaming up police academies and colleges, as is the example with Azerbaijan and the Czech Republic. Madrid MC 2007 asked the Secretariat to address policing issues in Afghanistan. The SPMU is now working on assessing potential projects. The Unit is also active in dealing with the Roma-Sinti Action Plan across the OSCE area.

Tajikistan case as an illustration of the process of how policing projects are set up: National Minister requests OSCE help to address narcotics trafficking issues. Assessment mission sent, projects proposed. A donors' conference will be held later this year to supplement the budget demands, which are more extensive than the unified budget.

At the moment, OSCE policing activities focus is in Central Asia (CA), where activities are now funded from the unified budget that is more in line with the long-term approach to policing issues. Community policing is the most prevalent approach in OSCE missions, because they address the acute problems of redefining the role of the policing in countries in the process of democratization. The term was contested by some countries at the PC, and is now rephrased as police-public partnership. However, the central issue of bringing public and police together is unchanged. The community policing process involves changing mentalities and thus takes time. The process though slow, has made tangible and significant changes in SEE, and the hope is that this will also be the case in CA.

Human trafficking education for police is gaining much interest recently, as well as narcotics, two issues that strike a resonant cord in CA. The Unit works closely with the High Commissioner in addressing the minority issues, which is very prevalent, most evidently with the Roma-Sinti who continue to suffer persecution and blatant discrimination, with the police not contributing to the contrary. The unit also supports host countries on issues to tackle organized crime, such as money laundering.

The presentation was followed by a wide-ranging discussion that covered both regional as well as general policing issues in the OSCE area. Amongst them were the projects in Azerbaijan (coupling), Armenia, Kyrgyzstan (public orders projects), as well as Kosovo, where the OSCE police academy has been successfully transferred to the local authorities. The discussion also underlined crucial necessity of having the political will in the host country to implement policing projects and overcome the stigma of the old authorities.

Tuesday, July 1, 3:00 – 6:30 p.m.

## **Regional Aspects of the OSCE Work: Participants Contributions, part I**

### **Albania**

Our colleague began her presentation by saying that all topics were problematic in Albania, which is why it was difficult to choose what she would talk about. She had decided to address the issue of the 2007 election.

Several caveats had already paved the way for troubled election, namely state-controlled media, lack of safeguard to prevent abuse and incapacity of identifying shortcomings.

Our colleague then touched upon the CEC, the Central Election Commission, whose work was put into question. Indeed, the ambiguity in the registration process is preoccupying, as well as the extremely complex rules. Laxism on financing rules and on the so-called “dead voters” issue is another caveat that hinders deepening of democracy.

Answering a question on the OSCE Field Operation, our colleague said that the latter is generally appreciated.

### **Latvia**

The topic presented was the OSCE Mission in Latvia (1993-2001).

Key issue has been the minorities in Latvia, which have often been left out without citizenship since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The mandate of the mission was to provide information and advice to the institutions, to address minority issues and to organise the gathering of government and OSCE officials.

The mission was closed once the objectives achieved, even though Russia had another opinion of that very outcome. True, progress has been made unambiguously, but both HCNM and Russia remain unsatisfied.

Non-citizens are mainly elderly people, since children born after 1991 just have to fill in a form to be granted citizenship. HCNM argues that citizenship should be granted automatically.

The question of teaching of Latvian as a second language has also been under discussion for a couple of years, in co-operation with the OSCE and UNDP.

Discussion touched upon the Latvian and Estonian refusal to grant citizenship to all people on their territory. Despite the fact that procedures are now much easier, many people also refuse to ask for citizenship because they feel they have been humiliated for years. This poses a problem for non-citizens, since they may neither become civil servants nor receive scholarships.

Finally, one must mention that Latvia one rare example of a mission’s closing, entraining the anger of the Russian Federation that felt betrayed.

### **Azerbaijan**

Our colleagues started by pointing out that Azerbaijan acknowledge the OSCE’s role of forum and that this role should be strengthened. They insisted on Azerbaijan’s good will regarding IO’s and particularly OSCE standards.

The biggest concern is obviously the Karabakh issue, which the OSCE is mainly involved with. Despite the cease-fire and the decisions taken during the Budapest and Lisbon Summits, no substantial breakthrough has yet occurred.

Azerbaijan pays particular importance to three components: withdrawal of all military forces, opportunity for Azeris to return to their home and deepening of confidence building measures. Our colleagues finally pointed out that their country was ready to grant Karabakh the highest degree of autonomy.

The discussion focused on the role of the OSCE, which acts as a convening power.

### **Belarus**

The topic was the observation of Belarusian election.

This observation is based on OSCE principles. This remains a sensitive issue, which is why Belarus has proposed measures aimed at increasing effectiveness: continue the work of ODIHR as to increase transparency, renounce to double standards, and define criteria to compose ODIHR mission, increase the accountability of the bureau and the methodology of analysis.

Our colleague finally expressed Belarus' readiness to commit to its duties in accordance with international commitments and its own legislation.

The discussion touched upon Belarus' concern of ODIHR's interference in Belarusian internal affairs. Some participants reminded that the non-interference principle was no longer the rule in the OSCE.

### **Georgia**

The topic chosen by the three Georgian participants was the mission activities in conflict prevention and the confidence building measures. OSCE monitoring is unique, since it consists of neutral small-scale assisting unit in zone of conflict, supported by both parties.

The mission in Georgia has been carrying out 34 projects in total, monitored in South-Ossetia by Georgian and South-Ossetian authorities together.

Some needs remain, such as protecting the Georgian minority in Abkhazia and defining political negotiations (which format, which agenda).

Our colleagues finally pointed out that there was no longer trust in the joint Peace Keeping Operation.

The discussion focused on the role of the OSCE.

### **France**

The topic addressed was water management in Central Asia.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the canal network in Central Asia has been deteriorating at a tremendous pace, entraining enormous waste of agricultural water resulting in environmental catastrophes. Moreover, upper stream countries have become hydroelectric powers. Since hydroelectric needs and agricultural needs are totally opposite in terms of water timing and quantity, the pattern has evolved into a conflict situation in the region, which can only be sorted out by collaboration, which means first of all by enhanced dialogue. The OSCE may be an excellent platform as to address that issue and to propose both political and technical solutions.

## **Kazakhstan**

Our colleague talked about the Kazakh OSCE Chairmanship 2010.

She began by expressing her worries about the current developments in Kazakhstan; inter alia the issue of the newly decided life-presidency, which is a delicate point if the country is to be the future Chairman-in-Office.

Since Kazakhstan does not see any war or frozen conflict on its territory, the OSCE mainly helps developing the humanitarian sphere as well as the freedom of the media, which is currently endangered.

Our colleague concluded by wishing that the Chairman-in-Office would help her country resolving those problems.

The discussion went on election, which are theoretically free and fair, and on the Chairman-in-Office, whose principal objective will be stability and fight against terrorism.

Some participants questioned Kazakh democracy, arguing that the one-party system and the life-presidency could not be called democratic. Our Kazakh colleague replied by saying that the situation was still better than in other former Soviet countries.

## **Kyrgyzstan**

Our two Kyrgyz colleagues touched upon the topic of national minorities in their country. Kyrgyzstan is a multiethnic country where minorities are often much more exposed to poverty, drugs and diseases.

## **Armenia**

The topic chosen was political developments in Armenia.

Our colleagues first reminded that the OSCE Field Operation did not deal with election monitoring or with Karabakh. The mission is mainly focused on electoral reform and institutional support, assisting the authorities for the new electoral code for instance.

ODIHR's statement on 19 February 2008 triggered a series of demonstrations that ended up in 10 casualties, because it was judged too positive by the population as well as some NGO's.

The state of emergency is another concern. That induces ban of assembly, closing of media, which FoM firmly condemned.

Finally, the lack of proper means of investigation remains a deep concern.

The discussion focused on this last point of investigation power of the OSCE. The very simplistic link between the election, ODIHR and the violence terribly affect the Field Operation's credibility, since the OSCE is now made responsible for the casualties.

## **Lithuania**

Our colleague addressed the issue of the Lithuanian OSCE Chairmanship 2011, which will i.a focused on human trafficking.

Governments cannot fight this problem alone; they need IO's and NGO's.

Lithuania has been in the very first group to tackle this issue, and insists on the fact that every measure should complement the other. Regional co-operation is crucial,

since one needs to address the origin, the transit and the destination countries at the same time.

In that respect, the 2007 Vilnius Conference brought a milestone, gathering media and stakeholders on the issue.

The discussion concentrated on Lithuania, on various topics such as the reasons why the country wanted the Chairman-in-Office. It is namely to address issues important for it, such as minorities, and further Baltic interests.

The energy issue was also raised, touching upon the polemic around the Lithuanian nuclear plant whose shutting down could be postponed.

Wednesday, July 2, 9:00 – 10:30 a.m.

## **Minority Issues within the OSCE**

By Arie Bloed

### **Importance of Minority Rights**

Minority issues are crucial, since abuse of minority rights may become a threat to stability of a state or a region. Good example for that is Kosovo. That is why the OSCE pays great attention to minority rights, encouraging states to respect them. The interests of minorities cannot be realized properly within the framework of human rights in general, so a special group of rights – minority rights – has been created.

### **Aim of the international regime of minority rights**

The minority rights regime aims at achieving the full integration of minorities into social life and the economy of the state, avoiding either assimilation of minorities or separatism.

### **Character of minority rights**

Although Minority Rights are sometimes presented as very clear, numerous problems of definition and limitations occur.

Minority rights and public obligations should be balanced, however it is impossible to create a regime that would be equally applicable for all minorities, since each case is unique. That is the reason why minority rights are vague and formulated in the international documents more as principles, than as “rights”. The wording is purposely ambiguous, in order all States to accept common principles despite their very different national jurisdiction on the issue. Consequently, the respect of minority rights depends on local circumstances, implied differently from country to country.

### **Main international documents on minority rights are:**

- Copenhagen Document OSCE, 1990
- Geneva Report OSCE, 1991
- UNGA Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, 1992, which was adopted by consensus and is very much inspired by an OSCE report of 1990.
- Article 27 of ICCPR, which is only an internal legal document. France, for instance, argues that since no national minorities are living on its territory, it has no need applying the document.
- Council of Europe Framework Convention on the Rights of National Minorities, 1995.

### **Basic features of minority rights**

- Definition

There are a number of features that are taken into account to determine whether a group constitutes or not a national minority:

1. Numerical minority
2. Objective features (language, religion, culture, long lasting revelation with the territory of living)

3. Subjective feature (self recognition i.e. will to preserve group identity)

However, within the OSCE itself, there is no definition of national minorities. The words of the first HCNM sound inspiring to that respect: "I do not know what a national minority is, but I recognize it if I see one."

- Citizenship (according to the UN national citizenship is not necessary to be considered as a minority, while reality is different). Nevertheless, to be considered a *national* minority, you have to have a long-lasting and genuine relation with the so-called "country of generation". Some countries like Germany would like to introduce the question of citizenship into the features, which could, according to Dr. Bloed, undermine the "raison d'être" of minority rights.
- Self-determination. Since minorities invoke the right of self-determination of people, the debate focuses actually on whether or not minorities are included in that "people", or if this concept solely refers to all citizens as a whole. The common understanding is that minorities have no right for self-determination, since their rights should be realized within existing borders. But once again, one lacks here a definition. Two exceptions for people to within a state to call for external self-determination are a colonial regime and dictatorial rules, which are already highly controversial (e.g. Kosovo).

Wednesday, July 2, 11:00 – 12:30 a.m.

## **Work of the High Commissioner on National Minorities**

By Sabine MACHL

Dr. Machl introduced herself as an “OSCE dinosaur”, since she had been working for years within the organization, for instance in Estonia, in Kyrgyzstan, for the CPC and the HCNM.

She began her lecture reminding that the HCNM first belonged to the PoIMil dimension, as part of conflict prevention

HCNM has a strong mandate, for it can decide on its intervention without any other green light. Moreover, it is a personal mandate, for there is one HCNM. Therefore, the personality of this individual matters a lot.

The HCNM is a commissioner *on*, and not an ombudsman *for* national minorities. This allows the HCNM to build confidence, for the countries at stakes are less suspicious as for the purposes of the organization.

The HCNM office is small, only 29 people, based in The Hague. There are political and legal advisers, preparing documents and country visits, advising the HCNM through their deep knowledge on national minorities and minority rights.

It is very important to remember that the HCNM is the only office that systematically does not circulate its reports. Its work is delicate and must remain as discreet as possible, which corresponds to the concept of silent diplomacy.

One HCNM success has been the Oslo recommendations on linguistic rights, which is a pilot project that the HCNM hopes concerned countries to take on. The introduction of both Russian and Kazakh classes in Uzbek school in South-Kazakhstan are an example.

HCNM’s work is quite empirical, since it monitors networks to help governments preventing conflicts and foster the coming up of ideas through various talks with the Participating States. In practice, the main task is to convince Participating States to implement their commitments, working in order the latter to understand that the HCNM actually acts in their interests.

Wednesday, July 2, 3:00 – 6:30 p.m.

**Workshop 5: Conflict Transformation**

By Ursula GAMAUF

Conflict transformation is the process by which conflicts, such as ethnic conflict, are transformed into peaceful outcomes. It differs from conflict resolution and conflict management approaches in that it recognises "that contemporary conflicts require more than the reframing of positions and the identification of win-win outcomes. The very structure of parties and relationships may be embedded in a pattern of conflictual relationships that extend beyond the particular site of conflict. Conflict transformation is therefore a process of engaging with and transforming the relationships, interests, discourses and, if necessary, the very constitution of society that supports the continuation of violent conflict".

Whereas conflict transformation involves transforming the relationships that support violence, conflict management approaches seek to merely manage and contain conflict, and conflict resolution approaches seek to move conflict parties away from zero-sum positions towards positive outcomes, often with the help of external actors.

The last part of the workshop was concentrated on the simulation of a mediation process (dispute between two NGO's), helping the participants to better understand some aspects of conflict transformation presented during the workshop.

The workshop proved to be a dynamic exchange of ideas and opinions that was perceived to have benefited the participants.

Thursday, July 3, 9:00 – 10:30 a.m.

## **Workshop: Regional Aspects of the OSCE Work: Participants Contributions, part II**

### **Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia**

One of the core tasks of the OSCE in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is the reform regarding the field of good governance. There are 3 major projects focused on the work of Parliament and the institutional reform:

1. Constituency Assistance Project is aimed to create an opened Parliament. There are 65 offices all over the country, where the meetings of the officials and the voters take place. A Memorandum of Understanding was signed by the Minister of Finance and the chairman of the Parliamentary Assembly in order to institutionalize the process.
2. The second project seeks to change the electoral law and to increase the number of women (it has already increased by 1/3) and of the minorities' representatives (other than Albanians) in the Parliament.
3. Providing technical support and training for the new MPs is the goal of the third project, developed in close cooperation with USA.

OSCE plays also an important role in the elections observation process.

### **Montenegro**

One of the major priorities of Montenegro is the defense reform process. Montenegro Demilitarization Program (MONDEM) is a joint program of the Ministry of Defense of Montenegro, the OSCE and the UNDP, started in 2007. Its aim is to reduce the national defense stockpile, to reduce the number of the locations where ammunition is stored, to improve the stockpile management capacity as well as the infrastructure development. The entire MONDEM program is worth some 6.5 million US dollars.

MONDEM is a crosscutting program, based on appropriate UN agreements and NATO standards, as well as in line with OSCE commitments, which will have a positive impact on human security, reduction of environmental pollution, counter-proliferation policy, sub-regional confidence and security building measures and the national SALW Control Strategy of Montenegro. Similar types of projects are supported by the OSCE and UNDP.

The Project Documents signed within the Montenegro Demilitarization Program (MONDEM) refer to following projects: Destruction and Recycling of Heavy Weapons, designed to destroy heavy weapons systems by recycling in a manner that complies with all relevant EU environmental legislation, and hence to international 'best practice'; SALW (Conventional Ammunition) Demilitarization, designed to dispose of conventional ammunition in a safe, efficient and effective way.

### **Poland**

A comparative analysis between the elections observation processes developed in Tajikistan (1994-1995) and Poland (2007) was presented.

The role of the OSCE and the ODIHR in the process of drafting a new constitution and a new electoral law, as well as the difficulties of the cooperation with the Tajik authorities were highlighted in brief.

At the beginning, the government of Poland was also rather diffident towards the ODIHR presence during the elections in October 2007. After some delay, the Warsaw authorities agreed to cooperate with ODIHR and accepted the elections observation mission.

## **Portugal**

The benefits of OSCE chairmanship for small countries - like Portugal - were highlighted during the lecture, as following: the improvement of the international recognition, the development of civil society, promoting real equality among the participating states, providing the status of regional stable partner, the improvement of the relations with neighboring countries, and the improvement of the relation with both international and local mass-media.

The OSCE Spillover Monitor Mission to Skopje, Macedonia, in which Portugal took part, was presented in brief. Its Police Development Unit assisted the Government in police training and institutional police reform: new officers were recruited, selected and trained in an effort to ensure that the police service would properly reflect the composition and distribution of the population of the country. The training was developed in a manner consistent with the principles of democratic policing through an educational philosophy that is based on European policing and international human rights standards.

## **Romania**

For a long time, during the Soviet period, the CSCE/OSCE represented the only pan-European forum for political and security dialog which Romania participated in. Since 1973, Romania has been actively involved in the CSCE/OSCE activities and in the evolution process of the organization over the years.

The Romanian contribution in all three dimensions of OSCE was stressed out, and two particular issues were briefly underlined: the involvement in the Transnistrian conflict and the national minorities' policies.

After 1992 armed confrontations between Moldavia, Russia and Transnistria, the conflict in the region situated on the left bank of Dniester river got the attention of the international organizations dealing with crisis management and post-conflict settlement, first of all the OSCE. One year after the ceasefire, as the negotiation process hadn't registered any progress, the OSCE decided to have a long-term mission in the Republic of Moldova, based in Kishinev (opened in April 1993).

During the Romanian OSCE chairmanship (2001), within the OSCE Troika, the Romanian leadership entrusted its partners - Austria and Portugal - with the Transnistrian dossier, an example of "good practice" in line with the OSCE principles and undertaken commitments for keeping the impartiality of the mediators.

The main aspects of the national minorities policies were pointed out, especially those regarding the Roma and the Hungarian minorities. There was noticed a major improvement of the legislative framework, as the HCNM had stated in the PC meeting on 26 June 2008.

## **Russian Federation**

On 7 November 2007, the State Duma unanimously suspended Russia's participation in the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty.

As the CFE Treaty continues to be considered a key-element for the post-Cold War military balance in Europe, Russia's decision has been received with worries and irritation by the United States and other NATO member states. Moreover, there have been repeatedly evoked the spectre of a "new Cold War" between NATO and Russia. Since November 2007, Russia is virtually free to build up conventional forces in the areas covered by the CFE agreements, as it is not bound by any ceilings and active-units limitations.

Despite such alarms, Russia stated that Moscow has neither plans to deploy additional armed forces in the European part of Russia, nor to concentrate any troops on the borders.

Moscow's decision to impose a moratorium on the CFE Treaty has to be analyzed in a broader framework. The leaders from Moscow hope to stop NATO's expansion to the neighbouring CIS countries, and the attempts of the USA to build up their BMD in Eastern European countries. In this sense, it seems clear that the BMD and CFE are diplomatically intertwined.

As a consequence, the last tensions might be turned into a new NATO-Russia strategic dialogue, for which Russia has already tabled its proposals: to compensate additional military potential acquired by NATO as a result of its enlargement, to settle a restraining frames for deployment of military forces on foreign territories, to provide the participation of new NATO members in the CFE, to enforce the adapted CFE as soon as possible.

## **Serbia**

Refugee/IDP work is one of the core tasks of the OSCE Mission to Serbia, which cooperates closely with other OSCE Missions in the region, UNHCR and the European Commission Delegation in this regard. Besides policy-making efforts, the Mission has been engaged in establishing a network of skilled lawyers from Serbia, Croatia and BiH to address human rights violations, especially in the area of refugee/IDP protection. Serbia is still hosting a very high number of refugees, despite of which it has decreased by 80% compared to 1996.

All the governments of the region, which have signed the Dayton Agreement, restated their commitment to the unconditional right to return and the need to find a durable solution for the refugees. The joint efforts of the international community resulted in the signing of the Sarajevo Declaration on 31 January 2005 by the Ministers of the three mentioned countries.

The main issues regarding the return to Croatia were pointed out, as following:

- Co validation of registered working years/pension contributions in former UN protected or controlled areas;
- Occupancy/Tenancy Rights (OTR) are not recognized as property rights in the Croatian domestic legal system, and hence, restitution is not possible;
- Housing care program inside the war affected areas faces a great number of unresolved cases;

- Housing care program outside the areas of special state concern witnesses no reliable data on the number of concluded protected lease agreements;
- Repossession of the privately owned housing units has shown significant progress;
- Reconstruction of damaged properties has seen significant progress.

## **Turkmenistan**

Water management is a crucial issue for Central Asian countries. There are two main documents considered as basis of the successful 10-year collaboration among Central Asian countries: the Interstate Agreement between Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan "On cooperation in the sphere of water resources from international sources management, use and protection" - signed in Almaty, on 18 February 1992 -, and the Nukus Declaration of the Aral Sea basin states - signed by the Heads of the five Central Asian republics on 20 September 1995.

Agriculture is one of the most important economic activities for Turkmenistan, and as it mainly depends on irrigation, access to water is essential and the control and management of the water resources has been an important factor along history. The irrigation network has been extended and large portions of desert have been cultivated. The Karakum canal is the largest irrigation canal in the world and it covers an area of approximately one million hectares.

Given the fact that Amu-Daria river basin is the main agricultural sector for Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, and also a potential source of energy for Tajikistan, and in view of potential economic development in the northern Afghanistan, the water management represents an environment and security issue that might affect both land and water resources in the basin, socio-economic conditions of the local communities, and - unless it is managed properly - might endanger the international relations among the basin countries. Therefore UNEP in close cooperation with UNDP and OSCE developed the 'Environment and Security' initiative.

Thursday, July 3, 3:00 – 6:30 p.m.

## **Workshop 6: Simulation Exercise on the OSCE Permanent Council meeting**

By Arie BLOED

The purpose of the exercise was to conduct negotiations in the framework of the Permanent Council on the establishment of a new OSCE mission in Shokdikap, an imaginary OSCE participating State, where the tensions related to the conduct of parliamentary elections resulted in violence. Paramilitary groups, apparently supported by the government, have reportedly terrorized the opposition representatives. Dozens of people have been killed and many more injured. The opposition has had hardly any chance to conduct a normal election campaign and does not accept the outcome of the election, which brought the governing party a vast majority in parliament. Tensions remain very high, posing threat to regional stability and security. The OSCE Chairman in Office (France) has undertaken many efforts to mediate between the conflicting parties within Shokdikap, without significant results. The Shokdikap authorities reacted negatively, stating that the establishment of a permanent OSCE mission is unnecessary. Shokdikap is also concerned about the interference by the proposed OSCE Mission in its internal affairs. However, vast majority of the of the OSCE participating States supports the initiative of the Chairman-in-Office and is convinced that a mission should be established as soon as possible in order to secure peace and stability within the country and in the OSCE region at large.

The Chairman-in-Office put forward the proposal to establish an OSCE Mission to Shokdikap:

*Draft proposal by the Chairman in Office:*

The Chairman in Office,

Taking into account the crucial importance of law enforcement issues in general and in election in Eastern Europe in particular, and also taking into account the need to rapidly address issues having recently led to violence as well as controversial election,

Recalling the decision of the CSCE Rome Council Meeting (1993) and the Istanbul Document of 1999 (Charter for European Security),

Acknowledging the Organization's role as a primary instrument for early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post conflict rehabilitation in the OSCE area, and the approach of the OSCE to the conduct of activities to promote OSCE principles and commitments, thereby contributing to efforts to enhance comprehensive and regional security and stability,

Proposes that:

1. The Participating States of the region agree on the establishment of an OSCE Mission to Shokdikap charged of addressing the issue at stakes and of fulfilling the following tasks:

- § To de-militarize the paramilitary groups that conducted intimidation on the local population, using physical and psychological violence;
- § To monitor the Parliamentary Assembly election;
- § To help Shokdikap carry on the professionalization of the law enforcement bodies;
- § To assist Shokdikap proceeding to an electoral reform;
- § To assist Shokdikap proceeding to a judicial reform.

\*

The general debate confirmed large support of the OSCE participating States for the establishment of the Mission, expressed inter alia in the statements of the EU and CIS States. Being under pressure Shokdikap agreed to a temporary OSCE presence on its territory, provided that the duration would be limited to 6 months. Belarus insisted that the OSCE Mission should also deal with the issue of ethnic minority rights, having in mind a large Belarusian minority in Shokdikap, which is supportive for the opposition, thus lost its representation in the parliament after the elections.

The CIS States, Serbia and Montenegro put forward alternative draft proposals for the mandate of the OSCE Mission. The EU was also trying to present its draft proposal, but it did not present a formal text. Consensus was arising on the adoption of the draft decision proposed by Montenegro. However limited time allocated for the PC Meeting did not allow finding a consensus on a final decision.

All delegations were actively participating in the PC Meeting, making both national and groups' statements, using extensively the coffee breaks to consult with Shokdikap and other participating States.

Friday, July 4, 9:00 – 10:30 a.m.

**Old problems, new challenges:**

**Interactive questions and answers, and a concluding “wrap up” speech**

By Wilhelm HÖYNCK

Ambassador Höynck had prepared a lecture, but he found it much more interesting to answer participants' questions, and had also provided them on the day before with some sample questions that they could discuss, in that purpose.

Ambassador Höynck began his lecture by reminding that nowadays, the OSCE is no longer present in the public opinion.

**The OSCE has the power to set up Peace Keeping Operations. Could it be better to do so instead of leaving this task to other organizations?**

Usually, Peace Keeping Operations have a deep political background. Politically, OSCE Peace Keeping Operations would have much more legitimacy, for they would have been agreed upon by consensus.

OSCE Peace Keeping Operations capacity has not been tested yet, except maybe in Karabakh (in the 1990's, a High Level Planning Group had been agreed upon but never implemented). The “division of labor” with other IO's seems to be more relevant, among other for financial reasons.

**Is this Peace Keeping Operations capacity a disadvantage, in respect of the lack of enforcement?**

No, on the contrary, it is easier to convince Participating States to agree on a Peace Keeping Operation if they do not fear any enforcement against their will. The example of Karabakh is relevant; the OSCE and the UN have probably the only agreeable plans for a peaceful settlement of the issue, despite a lot of reluctance from the interested Participating States.

**Is it possible and relevant to set up an investigation mission for internal issues?**

Georgia's proposal to give the Chairman-in-Office autonomous investigation power is political, and has to be understood in the context of the incident between the drone and an officially still unknown plane. This idea could work out, but would depend a lot on the credibility of the investigation team. Moreover, the mindset of the OSCE is to first try to calm the situation down, to only then think of finding facts.

M. Höynck encouraged the participants to always look several steps further in the giant chess game that are interstate relations. Knowing that, one is able to see that a short run solution might bear a long run problem. Finding facts capacity could create problems, especially within the organization itself. Two important factors are never to forget: timing and legitimacy.

**Can the OSCE make recommendations to other IO's?**

The consensus principle would hinder the PC to do so, but the Chairman-in-Office might take this initiative.

**How do you assess the OSCE's work? What has changed? What do you would you do if you were Secretary General again?**

The budget has increased by three, due to the proliferation of Field Operations and activities. The tremendous blow-up of various ethnic situations has led to an increase of the number of personal. The level of political importance of the PC has decreased, so that the real political problems do not often come up for discussion in PC sessions. The diplomats in Vienna usually have the impression of a good work, because they oversee the caveats.

A major change also concerns the missions, which were built up in the 1990's and are built down today.

Finally, back to the beginning, the OSCE had the capacity to work where other IO's could not, for instance in Yugoslavia. This position of a big player is no longer the reality.

Ambassador Höynck did not know if he would accept to be Secretary General again... He quoted a phrase saying that the Secretary General is more a secretary than a general, because they depend on the Chairman-in-Office. Nonetheless, the Secretary General has the possibility to influence things through speeches where they suggest solutions, and through the budget.

**Is the OSCE in crisis? (The question recalled the group 2's reform proposal to strengthen the Secretary General, etc... cf. supra)**

The reform is of course a burning issue within the organization. Visions of consensus and Field Missions have radically changed. The 1995 set up of the mission in Chechnya would no longer be possible today.

In the OSCE, crisis usually start on Friday and stop on Monday noon.

One must keep in mind that all IO's are today in a difficult situation all over the world. This reminds us that the key responsibility in all organizations lie in the very Member States.

Even though Ambassador Höynck acknowledged that the absence of OSCE Summits might be a problem, he pointed out that a Summit without result would be a much worse outcome.

The fact that only middle-sized and small countries are Chairman-in-Office is not such a problem, since these Participating States often do a great job as Chairman-in-Office. Ambassador Höynck believes that the Chairman-in-Office should listen more carefully to the Secretary General's advice. However, one must understand that the main problem does not lie in the Chairman-in-Office itself but within the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Chairman-in-Office country.

**What about the political dialogue, US-Russia relations, and the CFE Treaty?**

The political dialogue is deficient, which is even more a pity that the OSCE could be a most relevant forum for it.

However, the OSCE remains a particularly relevant forum for small countries, which have the opportunity to meet among themselves as well as with the big ones.

As for the US-Russia relations, they are currently in an inter-reign period. One should wait until the next US President has been elected.

### **What do you think of co-operation with non-Participating States?**

Afghanistan and Central Asian countries wanted the International Community to intervene. If the latter had done so, 9/11 might possibly have been avoided. But let us face it, OSCE's possibilities are limited, and the organization should maybe concentrate only on matters such as border management or individual issues like drugs (supporting then the UNODC for instance).

Above all, the OSCE should be careful not to degenerate into a kind of label without concrete aims.

### **Are we facing a crisis of IO's in a post-Cold War setting?**

The lack of political will induces the question of how one can generate it. Maybe Participating States do not feel the threats anymore. Moreover, the tendency to blame big partners such as the US or Russia is insane, since it hinders Participating States to look at their respective shortcomings. European Union's low and boringly unified voice in the PC also causes problems for the OSCE.

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Ambassador Höynck then elaborated on the Future of the Organization, which depends for him on challenges, such as new divisions arising in the OSCE area, and the progressive abandon of common values that have shaped the relations between the Participating States since the beginning.

Indeed, despite the nice words President Medvedev had recently in Berlin, Russia remains unsatisfied with the OSCE's current developments, which Moscow considers incompatible with Russia's basic interests. European Union's increasing uncertainties add another dividing factor to the already awkward situation. The OSCE wording reveals hidden paradigms; speaking of "East/West of Vienna" reminds actually of divisions dating back to the Cold War. The competition of Alliances (NATO, OSCE, Commonwealth of Independent States,) and their related issues (Polish missiles) contribute to fuelling the troubles.

It has consequently become particularly crucial to develop answers to those questions. In that respect, OSCE has a role to play even though it is only a piece of the puzzle.

Nonetheless, one must consider the current situation with pragmatism.

The OSCE continues to work and to be able to mobilize consensus for decisions. In this regards, the Finnish Chairman-in-Office is performing a very fruitful work, using the OSCE as it is.

Moreover, consensus-based organizations tend to be quite conservative, which is why the OSCE also remains in the system that has been its own since the beginning. Finally, the Madrid Ministerial Council is maybe the right starting point to think big again, and to ask the relevant questions as to whether the organization is still well suited to achieving its goals. It is maybe the chance to create an "organic community" (Medvedev) aimed at comprehensive security, which includes all aspects.

The security must be comprehensive in terms of substance and structures, which takes time, needs preparation, and demands a high degree of confidence.

A new role for the OSCE may perhaps be summarized in Kissinger's phrase: "This is maybe the most favourable period for Russia's foreign policy. Don't say anything at the beginning, let it mature."

Finally, even though the role of the very OSCE is important, what really matters is European security, whatever the organization.

## APPENDICES

### APPENDIX 1

### PROGRAMME

**FIRST WEEK : JUNE 23<sup>RD</sup> – JUNE 29<sup>TH</sup>**

#### Monday, June 23<sup>rd</sup>

15.00-16.00	Arrival of Participants
17.00-18.30	<b>Introduction of Participants and Team</b> URSULA E. GAMAUF <b>Introduction to the Programme</b> ARIE BLOED
18.40	Group photo with the Secretary General in the courtyard of the castle or the Knights' Hall
19.00	<b>Official Opening Ceremony</b> (Knights' Hall) AMBASSADOR MARC PERRIN DE BRICHAMBAUT Secretary General of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) ARIE BLOED Director, Summer Academy on OSCE URSULA E. GAMAUF Programme Director, ASPR, Stadtschlaining
20.00	<b>Welcome Dinner</b> (Hotel Burg Schlaining)

#### Tuesday, June 24<sup>th</sup>

09.00-10.30	<b>Security and Cooperation in the OSCE Area: Conflicts and New Dividing-Lines</b> ZARKO PUHOVSKI Professor at the University of Zagreb and Chairperson of the Croatian Helsinki Committee for Human Rights
11.00-12.30	<b>Basic Principles of security and co-operation: 1975-2007</b> ARIE BLOED
13.45	Visit to the Institute's Library
15.00-16.30	<b>Workshop 1: Communication and Interaction in Multinational Teams</b> GALYA DIMITROVA-ZDRAVKOVA Training Officer, Department of Human Resources (DHR), OSCE
17.00-18.30	<b>Continued</b>
19.00	Social Event

#### Wednesday, June 25<sup>th</sup>

09.00-10.30	<b>The OSCE's Organisation: Basic Features</b> ARIE BLOED
11.00-10.30	<b>The OSCE's organisation: institutional structures and budget</b> ARIE BLOED
13.30-14.30	Self-study Time

15.00-16.30 **Workshop 2: Negotiation and Diplomacy - Practical Skills**  
PAUL MEERTS  
Deputy Director of the Netherlands Institute of International  
Relations "Clingendael"

17.00-18.30 Continued

**Thursday, June 26<sup>th</sup>**

07.00 Departure to Vienna

09.30-09.55 **Welcome and Introduction to the Permanent Council**  
HANS-MICHAEL PLUT  
Deputy Director for Conference Services, Department of  
Management and Finance, OSCE / Hofburg

10.00-13.00 **Visit to the OSCE Permanent Council**

13.00-16.45 Free time in Vienna

17.00 Departure from Vienna / Hofburg

19.00 Dinner outside Vienna

**Friday, June 27<sup>th</sup>**

09.00-10.30 **The Security Dimension of the OSCE: Political-Military  
Issues**  
MARK WERTH  
Senior Communications Network Officer, Conflict Prevention  
Centre (CPC), OSCE

11.00-12.30 **Relations with other security organisations**  
CHRISTO POLENDAKOV  
Deputy Director / Chief Recruitment Section, Department of  
Human Resources (DHR), OSCE

13.30-14.30 Self-study Time

15.00-16.30 **Workshop 3: Various OSCE Issues**

17.00-18.30 ARIE BLOED  
Continued

**Saturday, June 28<sup>th</sup>**

09.00 -10.30 **Introduction, Concept and General Issues of Long-Term  
Missions**  
SEAN MCGREEVY  
Associate Project Coordination Officer, Conflict Prevention  
Centre (CPC), OSCE

11.00 -12.30 **Long-Term Missions: Lessons Learned**  
DOUGLAS DAVIDSON  
Ambassador, Head of OSCE Mission to Bosnia-Herzegovina

13.30-14.30 Self-study Time

15.00-16.30 **Gender Issues in the OSCE**  
Linda KARTAWICH  
Gender Officer, Office of the Secretary General (OSG), OSCE

**Sunday, June 29<sup>th</sup>**

**Day Off**

**SECOND WEEK : JUNE 30<sup>TH</sup> – JULY 5<sup>TH</sup>**

**Monday, June 30<sup>th</sup>**

09.00-10.30	<b>Economic and Environmental Dimension of the OSCE</b> KILIAN STRAUSS Senior Programme Officer, Office of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities (OCEEA)
11.00-12.30	<b>The Human Dimension of the OSCE: Standard Setting &amp; Monitoring</b> ARIE BLOED
13.30-14.30	Self-study Time
15.00-16.30	<b>Election Observation</b> NICOLAS KACZOROWSKI Deputy Head for Operations, Election Department / OSCE- ODIHR
17.00-19.00 (in the conference hall)	<b>Panel Discussion “Assessment of OSCE from an EU and national point of view”</b> DIDIER GONZALEZ Deputy Head of Delegation, Permanent Representation of France to the OSCE (EU: French Presidency July-December 2008) ALEXEY POLISCHUK Counsellor, Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the OSCE SAMUEL C. LAEUCHLI Political Counsellor, Mission of the U.S.A. to the OSCE

**Tuesday, July 1<sup>st</sup>**

09.00-10.30	<b>Freedom of the Media</b> ARNAUD AMOUROUX Project Officer, Office of the Representative on Freedom of the Media (FOM), OSCE
11.00-12.30	<b>The Security Dimension: Policing Issues</b> KEVIN CARTY Senior Police Adviser, Strategic Police Matters Unit (SPMU), OSCE
13.30-14.30	Self-study Time
15.00-16.30	<b>Workshop 4: Regional Aspects of the OSCE work: Participants Contributions I</b> ARIE BLOED
17.00-18.30	<b>continued</b>
19.00	Social Event

**Wednesday, July 2<sup>nd</sup>**

09.00-10.30	<b>Minority Issues within the OSCE</b> ARIE BLOED
11.00-12.30	<b>The Work of the High Commissioner on National Minorities</b> SABINE MACHL

	Senior Adviser, Office of the High Commissioner for National Minorities (HCNM), OSCE
13.30-14.45	<b>Guided Tour through the European Museum for Peace / Schlaining Castle</b>
15.00-16.30	<b>Workshop 5: Conflict Transformation</b> URSULA E. GAMAUF
17.00-18.30	continued

**Thursday, July 3<sup>rd</sup>**

09.00-10:30	<b>Workshop 4: Regional Aspects of the OSCE work: Participants Contributions II</b> ARIE BLOED
11.00-12.30	continued
15.00-19.00	<b>Workshop 6: Workshop: Simulation Exercise on the OSCE Permanent Council Meeting</b> ARIE BLOED

**Friday, July 4<sup>th</sup>**

09.00-10.30	<b>Old problems /new challenges - making (better) use of OSCE (interactive Q&amp;A session)</b> <b>WILHELM HÖYNCK</b> Former Secretary General of the OSCE (1993-1996) and former Ambassador to the United Nations in Geneva
11.00-12.00	continued
12.05-12.30	<b>The Future Role of the OSCE (Wrap up speech)</b> <b>WILHELM HÖYNCK</b>
13.30-14.30	<b>Oral Evaluation</b>
18.00	<b>Closing Ceremony</b> (Knights Hall) LAURA KANSIKAS-DEBRAISE Minister Counsellor, Permanent Mission of Finland to the OSCE, on behalf of the OSCE Chairmanship 2008
19.00	<b>Farewell Dinner</b> (Hotel Burg Schlaining)

**Saturday, July 5<sup>th</sup>**

09.00	Departure to Vienna
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## APPENDIX 2 LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

NR	MR/MS	NAME	CITIZEN	PRESENT POSITION
1	Ms.	BELLO Laura	Albanian	Ministry of Justice of Albania, Legal Expert in the General Directorate of Codification
2	Ms.	AVAGYAN Gohar	Armenian	OSCE Office in Yerevan, Senior Press and Public Information Assistant
3	Mr.	SARGSYAN Armen	Armenian	MFA, Third Secretary of Information-Analytical Department
4	Mr.	MACHANOV Ulfat	Azerbaijan	MFA of Azerbaijan, Attaché, Department of Human Rights, Democratisation and Humanitarian Problems, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
5	Mr.	KARIMOV Anar	Azerbaijan	MFA of Azerbaijan, Second Secretary of the Department of Human Rights, Democratization and Humanitarian Affairs
6	Mr.	KRIVOSHEEV Dmitry	Belarusian	MFA of the Republic of Belarus, First Secretary of the OSCE and CoE Unit of the Department of Europe
7	Mr.	TÉNAUD Raphael	French	Student at the Diplomatic Academy in Vienna, Rapporteur (intern)
8	Ms.	TOROTADZE Izolda	Georgian	OSCE Mission to Georgia, Documents and Records Management Officer
9	Ms.	MAMUKELASHVILI Tamar	Georgian	OSCE Mission to Georgia, National Rule of Law Officer
10	Ms.	SIGUA Irina	Georgian	OSCE Mission to Georgia, Senior Project Assistant, Project Coordination Cell
11	Ms.	DUBOVITSKAYA Mariya	Kazakhstan	Project Assistant at Women Support Centre, Petropalovsk
12	Ms.	ABDYNASYROVA Djamilia	Kyrgyz	Program specialist in NGO "Intercultural education", coordination of projects on national minorities, worked in cooperation with OSCE
13	Ms.	KABYLBKOVA Gulkayr	Kyrgyz	International Ataturk Alatoo University, International Relations Department, Teaching Assistant
14	Ms.	SMITE Sintija	Latvian	UNODC, National Project Officer in United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
15	Mr.	BUTKUS Donatas	Lithuanian	General Consulate of the Republic of Lithuania in Kaliningrad (Russian Federation), third secretary, will start in Aug.08 working for OSCE Mission in Vienna
16	Mr.	GJORGIEVSKI Hristijan	Macedonian	Student at The Johns Hopkins Universtiy's Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS)
17	Ms.	SCEPANOVIC Dragana	Montenegrin	MFA of Montenegro, Attaché, Sector for Multilateral Relations, Directorate for UN and other International Organisations
18	Mr.	WAWRZYNIUK Janusz	Polish	MFA, Counsellor, Non-Proliferation Division, Department of Security Policy
19	Mr.	COUTHINHO DE ALMEIDA Luis Gonzaga	Portuguese	Guarda nacional Republicana, Headquarter, Lisbon, Portugal, Human Resources Department - Law Expert
20	Ms.	POPA Elena Luiza	Romanian	Ministry of Defence, Referent for cooperation and international relations, Referent for external relations, "Elie Wiesel" National Institute for

NR	MR/MS	NAME	CITIZEN	PRESENT POSITION
				Study of the Holocaust in Romania
21	Mr.	LITVINOV Maxim	Russian	MFA of the Russian Federation, Department on New Challenges and Threats, Third Secretary
22	Ms.	VUJOVIC Milica	Serbian	MFA of the Republic of Serbia, Attaché
23	Ms.	MARINKOV Emilija	Serbian	OSCE Department in MFA of the Republic of Serbia, Attaché
24	Ms.	DJUKANOVIC Natasa	Serbian	Ministry of Interior, Senior Inspector in the Bureau for International Co-operation and EU integration, Cabinet of the Minister
25	Ms.	GURBANYAZOVA Kumysh	Turkmenistan	Ministry of Justice, Head of International Legal Relations Department
26	Mr.	HALLIGULIYEV Dovran	Turkmenistan	Ministry of Internal Affairs, Inspector of Personnel Department
27	Mr.	BERDYEV Batyr	Turkmenistan	MFA, First Secretary of the Department of the Law of Treaties

### APPENDIX 3 LIST OF LECTURERS

MR/MS	NAME	INSTITUT	FUNCTION
Mr.	AMOUREUX Arnaud	Office of the Representative on Freedom of the Media (FOM)	Project Officer OSCE
Mr.	BLOED Arie		Director of the Summer Academy on OSCE
Mr.	CARTY Kevin	Strategic Police Matters Unit (SPMU)	OSCE's Senior Police Adviser
Mr.	DAVIDSON Douglas	OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina	Ambassador, Head of OSCE Mission to Bosnia-Herzegovina
Ms.	DIMITROVA-ZDRAVKOVA Galya	OSCE Secretariat - Training Section	Training Officer, OSCE Secretariat
Ms.	GAMAUF Ursula	ASPR Austrian Study Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution	Co-ordinator of the Summer Academy on OSCE
Mr.	GONZALEZ Didier	Permanent Representation of France to the OSCE	Deputy Head of Delegation
Mr.	HÖYNCK Wilhelm		Former Secretary General of the OSCE
Mr.	KACZOROWSKI Nicolas	OSCE/ODIHR	Deputy Head of the Election Department
Ms.	KANSIKAS-DEBRAIS Laura	Permanent Mission of Finland to the OSCE	Minister Counsellor
Ms.	KARTAWICH Linda	OSCE Office of the Secretary General Gender Section	Gender Officer
Mr.	LAEUCHLI Samuel C.	Mission of the USA to the OSCE	Political Counsellor
Ms.	MACHL Sabine	Office of the High Commissioner for National Minorities	Senior Adviser OSCE
Mr.	MCGREEVY Sean	CPC, Conflict Prevention Centre	Associate Project Co-ordination Officer
Mr.	MEERTS Paul	Director's Office, Clingendale Institute	Advisor to the Director International Negotiation Analyst
Mr.	PERRIN DE BRICHAMBAUT Marc	OSCE Office of the Secretary General	OSCE Secretary General
Mr.	POLENDAKOV Christo	OSCE Secretariat Department of Human Resources	Deputy Director/Chief Recruitment Section
Mr.	POLISHCHUK Alexey	Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the OSCE	Counsellor
Mr.	PUHOVSKY Zarko	University of Zagreb	Professor at the University of Zagreb and Chairperson of the Croatian Helsinki Committee for Human Rights
Mr.	STRAUSS Kilian	Office of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities (OCEEA)	Senior Programme Officer Head - Good Governance Unit
Mr.	WERTH Mark	OSCE - Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC)	OSCE Communications Group Chairman (leaving June 30, 2008)