



Austrian Study Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution  
Stadtschlaining, Austria



# Report on the 16th Summer Academy on OSCE

17 – 29 June 2012



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**ORGANISED BY**

Austrian Study Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution, Stadtschlaining

**PROJECT TEAM**

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Author's note: The opinions and views expressed herein are the result of critical, thought-provoking group discussion and should not be credited to any single participant or presenter.

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### **IMPORTANT REMARK BY THE ORGANISERS**

This Report includes information regarding the main subjects covered by the course, provided by lecturers and participants as well as additional information given to the participants before the course in form of a reader and during the course as handouts. It does not only refer to the contributions of resource persons, and time constraints related to the production of the report made it impossible to seek an agreement with them on the information given in the report.

Whereas the ASPR is greatly indebted to all resource persons who helped to facilitate the course and gives their names as references throughout the paper, the editor alone takes the responsibility for the contents of this document.

Please keep that in mind when reading the report – thank you for your understanding!

The ASPR Summer Academy Team

## ***Introduction***

The 16<sup>th</sup> Summer Academy on the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe took place June 17-28, 2012, at the Austrian Study Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution, Peace Center Burg Schlaining, Stadtschlaining, Austria. The program, which began in 1997, is held under the auspices of the OSCE and is organized in cooperation with the OSCE and the Diplomatic Academy, Vienna.

The aim of the Summer Academy on OSCE is to strengthen the participants' understanding of the organization by improving their knowledge of the history, structures, functions, values, and current activities of the OSCE. The two-week program also gives participants an opportunity to develop their thoughts as to the future of the organization, including ways it could be reformed or altered in order to engage new security challenges.

Twenty participants from twelve countries attended the 16<sup>th</sup> Summer Academy on OSCE. The group was comprised of diplomats who work with the OSCE in their respective Ministries of Foreign Affairs, staff from OSCE field presences, students, and individuals with experience working for other international organizations.

The speakers invited by the Summer Academy were mainly experts from the OSCE, as well as diplomats and scholars with a deep knowledge of the organization's history, functions, field missions, and strengths and weaknesses. The participants of the Summer Academy were invited to share their personal experience of working in or with the OSCE in the form of brief presentations.

Arie Bloed, currently senior consultant for international organizations such as the OSCE, UN and EU, was the programme-moderator. Giving himself several lectures, he provided the participants with inspiring insights into the OSCE and its work, challenging them with critical thoughts, and invited them to think about the Organization in a very interactive way.

The 2012 Summer Academy was indeed placed under the concept of peace. Participants from regions or countries which in "real life" do not share good or any relations at all used the secure forum of the Academy to exchange thoughts, discuss problems and therewith lose prejudices and fears that used to be part of their life.

Ms. Carrie Miller, Summer Academy participant and recent graduate of the University of Denver's Master's program in International and Intercultural Communication

compiled this report. The production deadline for this report did not allow for review of the draft by the lecturers. Therefore, the responsibility for its contents rests with the Austrian Study Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution.

### ***Methodology***

The curriculum of the Summer Academy comprised a combination of lectures, working groups, reading sessions, workshops, case studies and on-site observation of formal OSCE proceedings.

Lectures were divided into topics and strictly delimited within the day, often following the pattern of two theoretical lectures in the morning and one workshop in the afternoon. Lectures and workshops provided the basis to acquire an extensive knowledge in the three dimensions of the OSCE as well as in other relevant areas related to the OSCE, such as Freedom of the Media, High Commissioner on National Minorities, Office for Democratic institutions and Human Rights, etc. Long-term missions, structures and relations with IO's and NGO's were also part of the resource.

Theoretical knowledge was then applied within small working groups, mostly during workshops that gave participants the

opportunity to elaborate more thoroughly on OSCE related issues and to apply practical skills on negotiations and team-work. Simulation exercises dealing with interaction of multinational teams in conflict transformation situations were employed to highlight the importance and limits of communication skills, and to promote intercultural understanding among the participants.

In order the participants to be best prepare to the lectures, they were given a comprehensive reader comprising of all relevant material as to familiarize oneself more closely with OSCE's work and OSCE related issues.

Evaluation of the content, structure, methodology, and usefulness of the programme was carried out at the end of the programme. At the conclusion of the Summer Academy, participants engaged in an overall assessment of the programme; they discussed their impressions and offered recommendations for possible improvements.

### ***Evaluation***

On the first day the programme organisers distributed an anonymous questionnaire which participants filled in during the two weeks Summer Academy. Participants were asked to

assess the individual daily sessions, each of the two weeks, and the overall programme, as well as to provide suggestions for improvement. The organisers made a point of seeking input from the participants by offering thoughtful, provocative remarks and encouraging comments.

At the end of the second week, an oral evaluation session was conducted. Participants discussed their personal course evaluation, assessing the overall course with special regard

to organisation and facilities. The ASPR Programme Director Ursula Gamauf-Eberhardt facilitated the discussion on the evaluation. The fact that Ms. Gamauf-Eberhardt was not present during the Academy's session should enable participants to speak out freely and honestly.

The overall evaluation of the programme derived from the questionnaires can be illustrated in pie charts as follows:

## **OVERALL EVALUATION OF THE PROGRAMME**


### **Usefulness for my professional development**

Excellent	19
Good	1
Fair	0
Poor	0
No Answer	0




### Usefulness for my personal development

Excellent	17
Good	3
Fair	0
Poor	0
No Answer	0



### Basic Structure of the programme (composition of the programme in two weekly modules)

Excellent	17
Good	3
Fair	0
Poor	0
No Answer	0



### Methodology of the programme (mix of lectures, working groups, exercises)

Excellent	15
Good	5
Fair	0
Poor	0
No Answer	0



**Reader**


Excellent	13
Good	4
Fair	2
Poor	0
No Answer	1



**Facilities**


**- Hotel Burg Schlaining**

Excellent	16
Good	3
Fair	1
Poor	0
No Answer	0




**- Seminar Rooms**

Excellent	18
Good	2
Fair	0
Poor	0
No Answer	0




**- Library**

Excellent	17
Good	3
Fair	0
Poor	0
No Answer	0




**Staff of the ASPR**

Excellent	20
Good	0
Fair	0
Poor	0
No Answer	0



**Staff of hotel (helpfulness, efficiency, etc.)**


Excellent	20
Good	0
Fair	0
Poor	0
No Answer	0



## Future Development of the Programme

### Would you recommend the programme to colleagues?

Yes	20
No	0
No Answer	0



Participants tended to feel that the Academy had achieved its objective of expanding and deepening knowledge about the OSCE. Participants left the Academy with a better understanding of the purpose and future role of the OSCE, as well as of its various distinct activities, enhancing their knowledge about the OSCE as well as the OSCE participating states and providing training in working more effectively within the OSCE diplomatic and OSCE-NGO milieus. In this respect, the range of input from speakers, the experience of Professor Arie Bloed, who directed the Academy and enhanced the critical dialogue between resource persons and participants, and the multinational and diverse occupational backgrounds of the participants proved beneficial.

From the written and the oral evaluation the following points can be raised:

Overall, the methodology and the content of the programme were evaluated very positively (“Excellent” and “Good”). Participants found the focus upon different topics to be positive, though some desired greater attention to one or another specific issue depending on their personal background – as this is always the case due to different backgrounds. Participants stated that in general a proper balance had been reached between providing an overview in a lecture and deepening the knowledge in working groups. A greater practical involvement of participants as recommended in earlier evaluations proved being effective. Participants stated that interactive sessions and exercises helped them improving their communication

skills within a multicultural, international setting and provided them with crucial insights and a better understanding of other OSCE participating states. The mix of methods in communicating the content was assessed as effective, interesting and challenging.

Participants considered the excursion to the OSCE Permanent Council in Vienna as very useful (*"It's good to use the opportunity to see both the PC meeting and our fellow-mates in the delegations or the secretariat."* And *"We had the possibility to see how the OSCE really works!"*), interesting and for some of them even exciting since they had the chance to meet their delegations.

Most participants praised the selection of speakers for the two-week programme. The involvement of current and former high-ranking OSCE officials, sharing not only their knowledge and vast experience but also their specific insights in the OSCE, was considered particularly valuable. The fact that the Irish Chairmanship – in person of Brendan Ward, Deputy Permanent Representative – and the Office of the Secretary General – in person of Marcel Pesko, OSG Director – came to welcome the participants in the Hofburg was a clear highlight of the visit!

Participants also welcomed that the Academy Director made himself readily available throughout the two weeks, and that some

resource persons were able to continue discussion with them outside the seminar room. This greatly enhanced the overall learning experience.

Basically, participants were satisfied with the reader and additional reading materials. Following earlier recommendations the amount of articles was reduced, concentrating only on the most important ones, which made it possible for participants to read most of the recommended articles.

Apart from getting an extensive knowledge about the OSCE, its structure, functioning etc. the Academy was appreciated as being an opportunity to communicate with colleagues from other OSCE offices in an intercultural atmosphere.

Also the venue was assessed positively, being a perfect location for a great learning experience and for socializing.

Overall, participants felt warmly welcomed and appreciated the friendly professionalism, helpfulness and efficiency of the staff of Hotel Burg Schlaining and the ASPR.

## ***SESSION REPORTS***

### **Introduction of Participants, Team and Programme**

**17 June, 17-18:30hrs**

**URSULA E. GAMAUF-EBERHARDT, Programme Director, ASPR**

**ARIE BLOED, Director of the Summer Academy on the OSCE**

After enjoying their first coffee break, all Summer Academy participants gathered in a conference room in the Schlaining Castle for official group introductions. Ursula Gamauf-Eberhardt gave the participants an overview of the various activities and organizations that are located here in Schlaining and presented the history of the constitution of the ASPR on the background of the end of the Cold War.

In 1982 the Cold War was at its peak and Austria, considered a western country was not so far away from the Iron Curtain. On September 6, 1982, the nongovernmental organization (NGO) Austrian Study Centre for Peace and Conflict resolution (ASPR) was created. Together with the European Peace University (EPU) it now constitutes the Peace Centre Burg Schlaining, engaging in education,

training, research and peace support projects in crisis regions. The ASPR's approach is a comprehensive one, similar to that of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Gamauf made here reference to Johan Galtung's concept of *positive peace*, encompassing a wide range of fundamental, such as: human rights, rule of law, democratic development, durable economic development, civilian security, as well as a culture of peace, including education, the freedom of media, etc.

In 1992 Austria was the first country to support the United Nations (UN) Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's *Agenda for Peace*. The ASPR created a training program to support peace-keeping missions, focusing on human rights protection, democracy, media development and election monitoring.

Within the European Union's (EU) context, together with institutions from other Member States, the ASPR has developed and implemented standardized training modules for expert training in EU Civilian Crisis Management. In addition, the ASPR brings its contribution to conflict management by conducting training in the Southern Caucasus, Central Asia, the Balkans, Sri Lanka and Africa.

The first OSCE Summer Academy took place in 1997. Training of diplomats and thus contributing to the development and support of new skills in preventive diplomacy and

consolidation of peace in the OSCE area is the main objective of the OSCE Summer Academy. The ASPR also organizes seminars and courses specific OSCE issues, such as the training of trainers on project management in field operations, gender issues and combating trafficking in human beings.

Gamauf-Eberhardt herself has been with the Austrian Study Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution for six years. She is dedicated to organizing and coordinating various programmes related to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the United Nations, the European Union and other projects youth participants, as well as ensuring peace education in schools across Austria.

Ursula then passed the floor to Arie Bloed, the Director of the Summer Academy. Bloed has enjoyed an immensely colourful career, having taught law, worked with the High Commissioner on Minorities at the OSCE, expanded the Soros Foundation's legal empire, and many other fascinating tasks in between. These days, he continues his very diverse career by, among other things, consulting and training on the relationship between human rights and law enforcement. Bloed is also the Editor in Chief of the Security and Human Rights Journal, the OSCE's quarterly publication.

## **Security and Cooperation in the OSCE Area: Conflicts and New Dividing Lines**

**18 June, 9:00-10:30hrs**

**ZARKO PUHOVSKI, Professor at the University of Zagreb**

At the time the Helsinki Final Act was signed in 1975, the most pressing concerns of participating nations were borders and the security of the state. Borders had originally been designed to halt advancing armies, but at this time countries wanted to make the existing borders more open to travel and migration. By 1990, borders were designed to stop the poor of Eastern Europe from entering the more prosperous European Union. The 1990s were also a period of euphoria: the Cold War had ended, leading to a sentiment of post-history. The people of Europe forgot their problems, and held a common understanding that they had seen the end of totalitarianism. It was to be an era of liberalism

However, in the 1990s liberalism became a tool used for ethnic nationalism. Contrary to the belief that a major ideological shift had occurred, Communism and ethnic nationalism shared the same three ideologies: collective action, conflict between groups, and a paternalistic system. Thus the post-Communist states easily became bastions of ethnic nationalism. This was the first sign that, during

this period of euphoria, something had gone wrong. Today, no post-Communist countries have better election laws than United States or United Kingdom. This is because it is not enough to simply translate Western practices into Eastern contexts. In creating the new democracies of Eastern Europe, Western liberals made the same mistake that Lenin and Stalin did. They thought that five years would be sufficient time to change people.

In the midst of celebrating the fall of the Iron Curtain, no one stopped to ask, "Who are the victims?" 200,000 persons had been killed, 500,000 had been wounded, 5 million had been displaced, and 30 million had lost their jobs. In order to analyze success we must put it in context of the price paid for success. The basic questions of security were wrongly understood in the 1990s. The position shared by scientists and politicians was blind to real existing social problems. They were still using the old formula of state security and borders. However, after the 1990s there were no big enemies.

If there are no more big enemies, why does NATO still exist? Currently there is no need for NATO, and thus to ensure its preservation it is trying to invite enemies. Now there is a war against terrorism. Terrorism is the new reason for NATO to exist. But this is a war against a phenomenon, and it is the role of philosophers, not soldiers, to fight against a phenomenon. To

be sure, NATO appears confused about its role. In 1993, Croatia was not allowed to join NATO because it was at war, but was later admitted once peace had been established. Ironically, the country only needed NATO when it was at war.

The internal problems in the countries of Western Europe and North America have not been the focus of public discussion. Consequently, the economic crisis came as a surprise (but not surprisingly came from the US). Eastern Europe has had a utopian picture of the Western democracies (except Yugoslavia). The rest of the world has been watching the West to see the way into the future. There has been no real critical analysis of its economy or of social events, and no understanding of social context.

In the past few months it has become clear that there are new dividing lines within the EU between the East and the West. Yet borders are no longer a question. Instead, it is the EU as such that is being contested. There is a joke that OSCE stands for the Organization for Seriously Confused Europeans, but that name could just as well apply to the EU. In the wake of the West's financial crisis, Turkey and Russia now have better economies than the EU, which ten years ago would have been thought impossible. Likewise, it is now questionable whether new countries should apply for EU

membership, a decision which would have been a no-brainer five years ago. Indeed, Europe's economic crisis may be linked to the decision to accept new members due to geo-strategic reasons rather than economic ones.

We must see how rapidly the world is changing and forgo reliance on old ideologies and strategies. We cannot discuss the EU as an entity in contrast to second-class nations. What's more, to our economic dividing line, NATO and non-NATO dividing line, EU and non-EU dividing line we must add another dividing line that has always existed: rich and poor. We are watching not a crisis of capitalism, but a crisis over the best version of capitalism. The welfare state creates too many expenses for the economy to cover. Thus the rich/poor discussion has risen again. The gulf between the West and poor countries has been discussed, but we have recently begun talking about the rich/poor divide within states as well.

Western countries have failed to see the logical collaboration between poverty and terrorism in developed nations. Europe has experience with leftist terrorists who kill for principles. Terrorism based on social desperation is a possible problem for the future. Retaining hope for the future allows people to accept bad situations. When there is no hope, people accept that they have no chance within the system, and must therefore

try something outside the system (e.g. terrorism). Moreover, we are unequipped to tackle this threat because traditional security mechanisms do not function properly. The spy community cannot hold its secrets, and armies are under less control than ever in history. The real enemy is social inequality.

The EU has no coherent strategy for the next ten years, and consequently it is not clear if it will survive. It has not tackled the problem of whether or not Russia will be allowed to join, though this question does not seem to be important anymore because the EU may not last. The EU may have absorbed too much of the sovereignty of the nation states and has bitten off more than it can chew.

## **Basic Principles of Security and Cooperation: 1975-2012**

**18 June, 11:00-12:30hrs**

### **ARIE BLOED**

The OSCE originated in the Cold War era. Negotiated in Geneva and Helsinki in 1972-1975, and signed in 1975, the Helsinki Final Act became the basis of the CSCE (later the OSCE). It is important to understand OSCE history in order to explain its present features, such as its decision-making process, legal status, and agenda. Currently, perception of the OSCE is

not positive. Is it even an organization? It is not legally binding, there is no treaty, and decisions are made by consensus.

In the 1970s Brezhnev wanted recognition of the territorial status quo in Eastern Europe, as well as economic help. The West, in turn, wanted more influence in the area of human rights (i.e. to break the Iron Curtain). Additionally, the West was afraid of the USSR's military. At the time, the East was not at all interested in human rights. Brezhnev wanted a treaty that recognized the post-war borders. However, there was not much interest in a legally-binding document. The consensus method of decision-making arose because the parties did not trust each other.

The Helsinki Final Act (HFA) is still the basic document of the OSCE, as well as an example of diplomatic craftsmanship in that it is an agreement to disagree. For the first time human rights became a distinct principle recognized at this level. Issues for discussion were divided into "baskets" (now called "dimensions"), and ten principles organized relations among participating states (not to be confused with member states). Basically it was the beginning of a process, but not an organization.

The first meetings of the CSCE were held in Belgrade in 1977 and in Madrid in 1980-83. The HFA had to be widely published in its full text.

People read it in the papers, and used the HFA as the basis of asking their government for human rights. Western countries warmed up to the idea when they found what a useful tool the HFA was for attacking their Eastern opponents. The HFA became a symbol of freedom.

While in the beginning the CSCE/OSCE had a very confrontational setting, it now has an atmosphere of cooperation. In 1990 we were very skilled at killing each other, but did not know how to prevent conflict; the Warsaw Pact disappeared and NATO was in crisis. OSCE became focused on preventing and managing conflicts, and the 1990s were a period of cooperation. However, more recently the organization has become paralyzed. The Russian Federation and a number of its allies blame other countries for only paying attention to certain issues. Western countries squandered an opportunity by not granting proper respect to former Soviet countries. The real strength of the organization is up in the air.

It is a fairytale that in the OSCE we are a family. Prior to 1990, the West was always criticizing the East about human rights. Then there was a reversal post collapse as the East began making proposals to the West, but was partially denied. As a family we may fight, but at the end of the day we are there to help each other. It is a community of responsibility, the responsibility to promise and offer help. Stable

society is necessary for security. The non-intervention principle is no longer applicable. The problems of one country affect the entire region, and therefore there are no strictly domestic problems or internal affairs. The philosophy in OSCE is to assist, to always ask, “Can I be of any help?” If the fairytale is over, and we have a job to do, maybe it is time we change the rules.

The functions of the OSCE include standard setting and supervision, stabilizing (e.g. conflict prevention, crisis management, post-conflict rehabilitation, arms control, confidence and security-building measures (CSBM), assistance (ODIHR, missions, HCNM, legitimizing NATO), coordinating, and a catalyst function (e.g. in EED and terrorism). If you are successful at conflict prevention, no one knows because it does not make the news. CSBMs work well but are not well known. Interventions under OSCE’s flag have greater legitimacy. OSCE has much greater membership than EU and NATO. The OSCE has no way to force actions, and thus its power lies in its ability to promote *voluntary* actions. Still, how can this organization move forward?

## **Workshop 1: Communication and Interaction in Multinational Teams**

**18 June, 15:00-18:30hrs**

**MANANAT RAHIMOVA, Senior Training Officer,  
Department of Human Resources (DHR), OSCE  
Secretariat**

The OSCE is a field-based organization. Consequently, knowing how to communicate within multinational teams is extremely important. Working effectively in a team is a skill that needs to be built. Like a sport, you learn by doing through a process of trial and error. Whereas poor communication is akin to pushing a cart with square wheels (i.e. unnecessarily laborious), good communication allows teams to get the job done with a minimum of effort.

To practice working in teams, Ms. Rahimova divided the 20 Summer Academy participants into three groups to compete in a Viking attack game. Each group member was given several information cards which he or she could read aloud to the group, but could not show the group. The first group to amass the information and determine the day, year, and location of the attack was the winner. Each group created its own process of sharing information, which was difficult at times because it required listening, note-taking, and (for almost all

participants) communicating in a non-native language (i.e. English).

During the debrief following the game, participants discussed their methods of leadership, planning, organization, and communication, and well as their interdependence on one another. Each group seemed to have employed a different system. Participants also discussed how this game related to their work environments. They agreed that it was important to listen to each other, to select a leader or facilitator, to rely on each other, to reflect on what you have heard, and to focus on what is relevant to the task.

## **Cultural Awareness and Diversity**

### **MANANAT RAHIMOVA**

During field operations, OSCE staff members interact with many partners from different cultures and backgrounds. There is a need for cooperation and coordination among various agencies, organizations, NGOs, each with their own mandate. Our capacity to work as a team, meet mission objectives, and build relationships with local communities and authorities is dependent on our skills and attitudes in understanding and adapting to people, their culture, practices, expectations, and beliefs. Likewise, the people you meet will

relate you to your nationality. Every one of you is an ambassador, and you reflect your nation. Be aware of this. Culture encompasses many things, including language, history, rules, traditions, beliefs, values, environment, people, community, and family. It is a set of rules and values to live in a certain environment.

The OSCE code of conduct supports respect for diversity and gender. Observable signs of this include communicating with respect, gender balance, inclusion of people from different nations, and treating people with dignity. We must examine our own biases and behaviors and avoid stereotypical responses. We are who we are based on how we grew up, and when understanding others we filter information through our own values. Culture clashes come not from saying, "I'm right, you're wrong," but from thinking that we are both right. You must understand yourself to understand others. There are many layers of culture and we can only observe the top; there is much information that is hidden.

Summer Academy participants were divided into three groups to complete an experiential exercise. For the exercise, groups had to choose seven mission personnel to be evacuated from a conflict zone, and three personal to be left behind (to their deaths). After the groups made their decisions, participants met in plenary to discuss. For all

groups the debate was very heated, and some of the reasons for leaving people behind, such as age, might have been culturally linked.

There are different decision-making processes in OSCE since there are differences in diplomatic, military, and civilian cultures. Field missions must contend with the difference between host culture and organizational culture. In order to approach an unfamiliar culture one must make an observation, suspend judgment, and search for other explanations. Just as in solving a conflict, you should look for a solution, not a judgment.

## **The OSCE's Organization: Basic Features**

**19 June, 9:00-10:30hrs**

### **ARIE BLOED**

The Cold War origin is an important starting point for understanding OSCE's functioning, in particular, how it differs from NATO, the UN, and the EU. OSCE decisions are not legally binding; they are politically binding. There is no treaty which forces action, only the need to maintain reputations. However, accusations, such as charges that a country has violated the HFA, are still very serious. Documents, even ones that are not legally binding, are still considered very important, and accusations of violation are not amusing.

In contrast to OSCE's system, creating legally binding documents requires the three-step procedure of adoption, ratification, and implementation/enforcement. Parties cannot wake up one morning and violate their commitments (does not use the word "obligations"). If they violate a treaty, there is a legal means to enforce it in the form of the International Court of Justice or other legal procedures. In the OSCE you cannot go to the court, but this does not really constitute a substantial difference. There are many disputes between countries, but very few go to the "peace palace." OSCE commitments are in practice actually more binding than some legal commitments.

If there is a political consensus on a document, governments are bound immediately. This system is much more flexible than the long process of ratification. It can do things that no one else can do, and much more quickly. The OSCE has been extremely important in the development of international law. Consequently, since all states are subject to international law, OSCE documents do, in part, become legally binding. Recently the Russian Federation has been pushing for the adoption of an official charter and more concrete rules governing OSCE. The US, in turn, is against legalization of the OSCE.

Is OSCE a real international organization? An international organization has participating states, legally binding statutes, an institutional structure, and a common goal/mission (as well as rules for new member states). Hence OSCE is not a real international organization in classical terms. However, it is an international organization *sui generis*. OSCE gives guidance of other states, and has far more authority and importance than its non-binding designation would suggest.

OSCE employs a dynamic process with light institutional structure. Its budget and staff are small. It has locations deliberately spread throughout Europe to prevent it from becoming its own entity. Separate offices keep it small and dispersed. However, there is a downside to this minimalism. OSCE salaries are two-thirds of those paid by the UN, and as a result it is difficult to get accomplished staff, and the competent people are recruited away within a matter of months. Likewise, OSCE is not a career organization. In the 1990s there was a maximum term of three years, when has since been moved to five, then seven years. Consequently OSCE loses institutional memory and experienced staff.

Over the decades OSCE has degenerated from a security organization to a project organization. It was created to manage conflicts, but OSCE staff should not be blamed

for not knowing this because they are not being properly trained on the OSCE itself. This situation must be remedied. We need to ask, “What do we as a security organization need to address?” but this is not happening. If we do not move in the right direction we are wasting our resources.

A comprehensive approach to security is the most basic concept for OSCE’s function, and requires viewing security in the broadest sense. All issues that lead to a more stable society are important for security. For example, water management in Central Asia is a security issue because it is a potential catalyst for conflict. Similarly the human dimension is important because it mitigates civil unrest and discontent. Other cross-dimensional activities include election observation, HCNM, missions, and EED. Over the years, OSCE had become increasingly cross-dimensional, but has kept its structure.

The OSCE utilizes cooperative security. It does not have the power to issue sanctions or to tell other parties what to do. This soft mandate is both a weakness and strength. The news media prefers to cover overt conflict, rather than conflict prevention, so when OSCE does interesting and important work, nobody knows. The best conflict prevention occurs when parties think they found a solution without an intermediary, so OSCE’s low profile makes it effective. This is not the organization

for people with ego. Basically, OSCE's work is important to continue, but hard to sell.

There is equality among all OSCE states such that each state has one vote. Consensus is formulated as an "absence of an objection." Consensus does not mean that everyone is happy with the decision. If a participant chooses to block a decision, they will have a price to pay. OSCE also has mechanisms in the event that participants impede progress—consensus minus one (C-1) and consensus minus two (C-2)—which require them to submit to conciliation. In the history of OSCE, C-1 has been used once, and C-2 has never been used. Conciliation comes close to arbitration, but is not legally binding. The C-2 mechanism has never been used because participants worry that if they were to use it against other states it would start a precedent and the C-2 could be used against them later. The same holds true for C-1. Enacting it could weaken the functioning of the entire organization.

With 56 participating states in Eurasia and North America OSCE has a broad geographical scope, and it may be growing. The Soviet Union was part of CSCE, so former Soviet republics in Asia are allowed in, based on historical title. OSCE also includes Partners for Cooperation in the Mediterranean and Asia, but there is no clear policy behind it. Recently Mongolia has applied to enter OSCE. Although it is a Central

Asian country, it has no tie to Europe (as the rest of Central Asia does). Mongolia is fighting to remain independent as Russia and China jockey for control in the region, and is likely using the OSCE as a means of balancing these two powers. Also in Central Asia is Afghanistan, which is a huge security issue, as are recent events in North Africa. Involvement in these areas is important from a security standpoint, and therefore OSCE might consider formulating policy on neighboring non-participant countries.

## **The OSCE's Organization: Institutional Structures and Budget**

**19 June, 11:00-12:30hrs**

### **ARIE BLOED**

The political decision-making bodies include the summits of heads of states and government, followed by the review conferences, the Ministerial Council, the Economic and Environmental Forum, the Permanent Council, the forum for security cooperation, and informal subsidiary bodies. Summits should be held every two years but they are not, and people only attend if there is business to be done. Instead, Ministerials take place annually. There has not been a concluding document since 2000, but although

normal outcomes are not very positive, there is a lot going on behind the scenes.

OSCE's operational structures and institutions include the Chairman-in-Office (CiO), the Troika, the Secretary-General and Secretariat, ODIHR, and HCNM. It is helpful to have a large country within the Troika in order to provide political clout. In terms of political leadership, the Chairmanship in the OSCE is more important than the presidency in the EU. Yet the rotation system makes it a sizable burden for the foreign ministers who fill the position and consequently many states do not seek the chairmanship. The problem with the foreign ministry is that you are connected to a certain country, and that country might change its minister, or its politics may affect the chairman's ability to do his or her job (derail the conversation). To desire the chairmanship a nation likely has a political agenda.

## **The Security Dimensions: Policing Issues**

**19 June, 15:00-16:30hrs**

**ROBERT HAMPSHIRE, Police Affairs Officer,  
Strategic Police Matters Unit (SPMU)**

Good policing is central to preventing conflicts, preserving social stability during crisis, and supporting post-conflict rehabilitation. It is vital to providing a secure and stable

environment, and necessary for countries to progress economically. On the flipside, organized crime is a barrier to improving life following a conflict.

The first OSCE police mission was in Croatia. The UN had focused too much on Bosnia. OSCE police officers monitored the performance of the Croatian police in connection with the return of displaced persons in the former crisis regions. OSCE was out in the community, whereas the military was isolated on a compound and taking a convoy into the area each day. The first successful policing activity took place in Kosovo, where OSCE redeveloped the Kosovar police academy. This mission was so successful that it was used as a model for later police reform by the US in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The fundamentals of democratic policing include community policing, human rights and the use of force, and police accountability. Community policing is a two-way street. It includes passing on information as well as collecting information. Police officers are great sources of information because they have the most contact with the local populace and can develop trust with the community. Police reform is an ongoing process. In the US the Rodney King incident was used as an example of incorrect policing, and did much to change policing there. Additionally, policing must

progress along with society in terms of technological advancement. Globalization creates very impressive communication possibilities, but these possibilities also have a dark side. Criminal organizations have adapted to new technologies, much like businesses, and police forces must adapt in kind in order to address new threats, such as cyber crime.

The Community Security Initiative (CSI) advises law enforcement agencies in the rule of law, monitors and reports on the security and humanitarian situation in the areas of responsibility, identifies the needs and concerns of the population, reduces inter-ethnic tensions, promotes respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and facilitates confidence-building between police and the civil population. During OSCE operations in Kyrgyzstan there was political push-back from Vienna. We were trying to deal with intense ethnic issues, both during the conflict and after. OSCE was not sent there to be a danger. If OSCE had gone with a more robust plan it would have never gotten in the country. Officers out in rural areas had not seen a police presence in a long time. OSCE has a small footprint, but perhaps has more of an impact than they are given credit for. A smaller mission was ultimately the way to go. There is a difference between being partnered with criminals and working with them. Political will,

money, and expertise are needed for reform, as well as for commitment on the local level.

Structures with police-related activities include SPMU, Action Against Terrorist Unit (ATU), TNT/Borders Unit, Gender Section, Office of the Coordinator of Economic and Environmental Activities (OCEEA), Office of the Special Representative and Coordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Being (OSR), ODIHR, and HCNM. Community policing is not effective unless it includes *all* members of the community, which is why it is important for women and minorities to be represented on the force. Economics is also important in order to halt funding and confiscate the assets of criminals. If you want your police to treat the public in a humane manner, you must make sure that you treat them with human rights as well.

The role of TNT/SPMU is to provide support in the TNT Coordinator to the Secretary General, the Chairperson-in-Office, and to the Field Operations. It responds to requests from participating states for needs assessments, expert advice, and on-site assistance. Additionally, it promotes cooperation among participating states in countering trans-national threats. TNT/SPMU's activities reflect the priorities designated by the OSCE Chairman-in-Office and are reflected in OSCE decisions. Its strategic objective is to provide a democratic

vision of policing for the entire OSCE region. Police need to have a service mindset, and be there to support the public.

TNT/SPMU's services include collecting and disseminating good policing practices and guidelines in the form of guidebooks and reports on best practices. Good policing provides an incentive for economic investment (you will be able to keep the money you make!), and economic pressure, in turn, can be a catalyst for reform.

### **OSCE and Transnational Threats (TNT)**

Transnational threats include organized crime, war, corruption, trafficking, cyber crime, energy security, and natural disasters. TNT has always been an issue for OSCE. From 1975-89 the OSCE response included building bridges during the Cold War and pioneering a comprehensive concept on security. In the 1990s it was assisting democratic transition and dealing with crisis management and conflict resolution. In 2001 there was the need to respond to the 9/11 attacks. Transnational threats are distinct from "traditional" threats in that they are cross-dimensional and multifaceted. They are trans-border, involve non-state actors, and use new technologies. In this context OSCE has an advantage over other international organizations in that it has always been about

cooperation. It is a unique forum for awareness raising, decision-making, networking, and exchange of experience. OSCE has always been about cooperation, and its comprehensive and cross-dimensional approach is adaptable to new and non-traditional threats.

### **Participants Workshop 2: Various OSCE Issues I**

**19 June, 17:00-18:30hrs**

#### **ARIE BLOED**

During this workshop Summer Academy participants were divided into three groups. Each group had a separate discussion of one of these three questions:

1. How can the OSCE improve the effectiveness of police assistance?
2. Should police reform/assistance be a priority for the CiO?
3. Is police reform important for the OSCE, including the human dimension.

After twenty minutes participants met in plenary and each group gave a short presentation on their conclusions. These presentations were then used as a basis for a large group discussion. Answers to the three questions were as follows:

1. Improved budget, political will, timeframe, expertise/capacity building, accountability, and public relations could all improve the effectiveness of police assistance. Mr. Hampshire commented that budget is currently an important issue that people are wrestling with.

2. Police reform should be a priority, especially since police are a more desirable peacekeeping force than military. Police forces limit corruption and create security.

3. Police reform is important to the human dimension because an adept police force prevents conflicts, enhances police-civilian dialogue, stabilizes society, and facilitates cooperation within communities.

## **The Security Dimension of the OSCE: Political-Military Issues (incl. Relations with other Security Organizations)**

### **Part 1: Military Aspects of Security**

**20 June, 9:00-10:30hrs**

**MARIA BRANDSTETTER, CSBM officers, FSC support/Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC)**

There are three baskets of security: politico-military, economic and environmental, and the human dimension. Traditionally, security concerns arise from conflicts between states. However, this pattern has changed. Organized

crime and terrorism are on the rise, and a new strategy has to be created. Just like military organizations all have their tools, OSCE has had to create tools of its own. Since it is advantageous to have more transparency, these tools include confidence and security-building measures (CSBM). If we know what the other side has, it leads to greater trust and predictability.

OSCE needed a body that would deal with new security issues, and the Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC) was created at the Helsinki Summit in 1992. FSC has a broad mandate and its objectives include the implementation of agreements, negotiations on new agreements, consulting European security issues, and risk reduction. FSC meets once a week on Wednesday and includes both diplomats and military personnel. The chairmanship of the FSC differs from the chairmanship of the council. The FSC chairmanship lasts only three months, and is done on a rotational basis by countries in French alphabetical order. This way even smaller countries with few resources can hold the chairmanship. Like the CiO the FSC chairmanship works in a troika.

There was no openness during the Cold War, but the ensuing meltdown allowed for the development of Confidence and Security-Building Measures (CSBM). Politically binding CSBMs create peer pressure within the group,

and FSC is a great expression of CSBM because it allows countries to address any concerns relating to their security. Gradually there has been an increase of transparency and the beginning of arms arsenal reduction.

Documents are necessary in order for CSBMs to be codified and to increase openness, predictability, and transparency. What's more, documents need to continually be updated to keep up with the modernization of armed forces. Documents provide all obligations and rights with regards to CSBMs, including brigades and formations, major equipment, military doctrine, military budget, and forthcoming exercises. They keep countries informed on what each other are doing, and this way it is easy to check that there has been no un-notified military activity. Countries have the responsibility to invites visitors to air bases and military facilities every fifth year, as well as to invite observers to notable exercises. In the period of 2006-2011 there have been 470 inspections and 230 evaluation visits. This allows a party to check that there is no un-notified military activity in an area. OSCE does not limit activities nor require destruction of military equipment; it only requires transparency.

There is also a Code of Conduct which tells the staff of the organization how to behave (i.e. dictates the rules). The Code of Conduct on

Politico-Military Aspects of Security, 1994, contains provisions both on inter- and intra-state relations, which include refraining from threat or use of force, non-assistance to aggressor state, security rights and obligations of states, democratic control and political neutrality of AF, use of AF in conformity with IL, and HR and fundamental freedoms in AF. This document still has a very broad application. The results of CSBMs include increased military transparency, reduced tensions between states, increased confidence of states' intentions, high (if uneven) level of implementation, and a decreased threat of military interstate conflict.

More recently the focus has shifted as there is a need to address new threats, such as conflicts within states and with non-state actors. This includes the availability of small arms. It is necessary to control small arms in order to prevent conflicts from re-erupting. Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) issues are important to the OSCE because most SALW producers and exporters are OSCE participating states. Selling weapons from existing Cold War surplus stocks is profitable, and there are plenty of unresolved conflicts and post-conflict area to create a market. Trafficking routes of small arms generally move from north to south (Africa is full of arms that came from OSCE countries). We must admit that not all of the OSCE area is at peace.

The OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons is comprehensive and covers the life of a weapon from production to destruction. It sets politically binding principles, as well as norms and standards, to participating states. It covers manufacturing, marking and record keeping, export criteria and controls, stockpile security and destruction, conflict prevention and conflict rehabilitation, and information exchanges. Countries must provide information on imports and exports of weapons, plus information on small arms that are destroyed. From 2001-2011 OSCE states destroyed 10,491,881 units of SALW.

The OSCE Document on Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition (2003) is important because ammunition tends to explode, and sometimes does so unexpectedly, creating a major safety risk. Thus there is a large humanitarian effect of ammunition explosion. Countries that have ammunition have about one explosion every year. While it is cheap and easy to destroy weapons, it is difficult and expensive to destroy ammunition. After the Cold War, countries realized that something had to be done, and since the 1990s 40 countries have requested assistance. Handbooks of Best Practices help countries with implementation on SALW and ammunitions, and are available in all OSCE languages.

In 2001 Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) became a huge concern. However, WMDs are really not OSCE's core business, and should be passed on to experts. In a recent development the UN Security Council passed a resolution to do all things possible to prevent non-state actors from acquiring WMDs. OSCE can help states implement this resolution, such as developing export-control legislation.

## **The Security Dimension of the OSCE –**

### **Part 2: Political-Military Issues**

**20 June, 11:00-12:30hrs**

**TRUDE JOHNSON, Operational Support Officer,  
Planning & Analysis/Operation Service, CPC**

OSCE is a regional security organization that has soft power, as opposed to hard power (i.e. no military). OSCE is also a unique organization. Its membership is broad, and all participating states are equal. OSCE engages in all four phases of the conflict cycle: Early Warning (EW), Conflict Prevention (Early Action – EA), Crisis Management, and Post-Conflict Rehabilitation. It is called a cycle because a conflict has no beginning or end. Intervention is aimed at ending this recurring cycle.

Different tools are useful in different conflict stages. The aim of early warning is to

detect the situation and determine the likelihood of escalation. The first thing you need is information, and then you need the proper intellectual capacity to use that information. The international community has a habit of reacting to conflicts after they take place. OSCE would like to activate during the early warning phase and thus prevent the following phases. If you are engaging in crisis management it means that the conflict has already begun.

The three levels of prevention are primary (before violence has broken out), secondary (preventing an escalation of the conflict), and tertiary (preventing the recurrence of conflict through peace building). Two key OSCE principles applied throughout these levels are indivisible security (the security of one state linked to that of other states) and comprehensive security (concept of security includes the three dimensions). OSCE addresses both intra- and interstate conflicts, as well as protracted conflicts, and is a platform for negotiations, thus providing political dialogue and mediation support. Its instruments include field operations, specific early warning, cooperation with other international actors, and OSCE peacekeeping.

The Human Dimension has two mechanisms: the Vienna Mechanism and the Moscow Mechanism. There are also Early

Warning and Preventative Action Mechanisms, as well as provisions relating to early warning and preventive action. The Berlin Mechanism is used for consultation and cooperation with regard to emergency situations. The Valletta Mechanism is a full-fledged conciliation procedure.

In the human dimension mechanisms were activated extensively between 1989 and 1993 in the context of East-West relations. Yet so far three out of five mechanisms have never been used. Early warning and preventative action have been used on various occasions, while the Valletta Mechanism has never been used.

Mechanisms can be advantageous because they provide a flexible and structured way to address security concerns, trigger dialogue, and provide a safety valve to diffuse tension. On the other hand, they can be less efficient if participating states do not pursue a constructive spirit, and can be used for negative purposes. Most mechanisms and procedures cannot be imposed.

Challenges for the OSCE include unequal implementation of norms and standards, varied experience of conflicts and security challenges across the OSCE area, the principle of non-interference vs. the international community's obligations to act, and differing national priorities among participating states.

## **Participants Workshop 2: Various OSCE Issues**

**20 June, 15:00-18:30hrs**

### **ARIE BLOED**

This session began with a discussion of the morning's presentations on the security dimension. The human dimension has two mechanisms (Vienna and Moscow) and the politico-military dimension has other mechanisms (Berlin and Vienna). There is a debate of whether or not the mechanisms are relevant. However, the mechanisms do get used, and therefore they are relevant. There are four stages of intervention (early warning, prevention, crisis management, post-conflict), but which is most important? During the crisis in Kyrgyzstan, OSCE was first on the scene, and then the UN came in once the conflict had erupted. OSCE is very good at rebuilding, while the UN, EU, and NATO may be better at ending existing conflicts and crises. It is important for OSCE understand what its strengths are. OSCE is good in the early stages, and good at dialogue, but once things get out of hand do not call Vienna.

Mr. Bloed then returned to an unfinished presentation from the previous day. OSCE's operational structures include the Representative on Freedom of the Media (which is important because media freedom

creates stability), the Coordinator of Economic and Environmental Activities, and OSCE field presences (missions, centers, and offices). There is no real difference between missions, centers, and project offices; the title mainly hinges on which name the host country deems acceptable. It is unclear when it is appropriate to declare "mission accomplished" on a field presence, nor how long to stay pushing a country to accept what it does not want to accept.

The Parliamentary Assembly does not belong on the list of OSCE structures and institutions. It is not an OSCE structure, but rather a related institution, based in Copenhagen, set up by the parties. It has majority decision making and is a way for parliamentarians to express their opinions and learn about the issues. Likewise, the Court of Conciliation and Arbitration, based in Geneva, does not belong on the list either. It is not part of the OSCE but simply a list of people to call; no one submits cases. Some OSCE members argue that it is unnecessary since there are plenty of other courts.

Following a break Summer Academy participants were split into two groups. One group was to defend the thesis that the consensus principle must be maintained. The other group was to defend the thesis that the consensus principle must be changed, and to

develop an alternative. The groups discussed separately for 15 minutes.

In plenary, group 1 spoke first, arguing that consensus ensures equality among countries. It creates ownership of decisions with all states, and consequently decisions have legitimacy. It also eliminates the corruption that is present in other international organizations. One state cannot have its interests breached. The consensus principle ensures that there are 56 states with one vision.

Next, group 2 argued that consensus is inefficient and cannot give an immediate response. They suggested changing the mechanism of voting such that more populous countries have more votes. For example, EU-type voting according to population but with rules against larger countries pushing their own interests. Another option would be to give countries an opportunity to make suggestions, but only allow smaller countries to vote.

Group 1 countered that crisis management is not a primary responsibility of OSCE. What's more, putting large countries in charge silences the voices of other states. Consensus helps parties to find common ground. Changing decision-making process will dramatically change the entire institution.

Group 2 countered that the desire for equality is understandable, but countries are

different (different population demographics). It disagreed with group 1's claim that it is not OSCE's mandate to respond to crisis (indeed it is). OSCE was founded in a period of confrontation, when it was very difficult to agree. Now that we are in an era of cooperation, we need to adapt to this new situation. If we want to be a more efficient organization, we need to change.

Group 1 responded that we should change other mechanisms first. NATO, for example, changed without changing its decision making process. OSCE should not forget its roots. The idea of more votes for populous countries is laughable.

Group 2 responded that consensus should be used on principles of human rights. Sometimes projects favored by smaller countries are not supported by larger countries. Technical issues should use majority voting. It is logical that countries that are more involved in an issue must agree. But when you have to gain consensus, certain conflicts will never be solved.

Mr. Bloed used the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh as an example. Who is going to speak on the issue? The Holy See? Spain? No. Russia, the US, Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan, France? Yes. Only about 8 countries will speak on this issue, and if they get a deal, and other 48 will simply go along with it. Each issue has

its own set of participants. There is no national interest in blocking decisions, and no decision is discussed by all 56 participants. Discussion hits a stalemate only when the 8 countries discussing it disagree. Changing the system would not be helpful. It is efficient in terms of decision making, but not in implementation, and making the change away from consensus would not increase efficiency. Plus, there is no consensus to change the consensus.

***On Thursday, 21 June, Summer Academy participants travelled to Vienna to observe the Permanent Council.***

#### **Welcome and Introduction to the Permanent Council**

**BEKMURAD ASTANAKULOV, Head of Conference Services**

The historical palace has been home to the OSCE since the 1990s. The OSCE mission focuses on stability, prosperity, and democracy. Although it lacks the status of an international organization, it has all the features of one, and is the biggest security presence in the region. It is a forum for dialogue and a platform for action. States can raise any issue they like, and these issues influence the political dialogue. What's more, OSCE provides a platform for information sharing. In the past, states used spies to gather information about one another.

Now that the OSCE has built trust among nations, they willingly share this information.

OSCE summits were most frequent in the 1990s, a decade in which much happened historically in Europe and Central Asia. This period of activity was followed by a break in the 2000s until Kazakhstan's proactive chairmanship in 2010. During this timeframe the nature of the dialogue has changed. In the 1990s there was arousing, and at times philosophical, debate at council meetings during which participants would defend their positions. Nowadays delegates read prepared statements that they have already sent each other in advance. In this way the real dialogue has been lost, and most of the work gets done at lunch or around the water cooler rather than on the meeting room floor.

#### **The Role of the Chairman**

**BRENDAN WARD, Deputy Permanent Representative CiO / Irish Delegation**

The Chairmanship sets the priorities for the agenda each year, but must reflect the broader field. Consensus creates a blocking power, and self-restraint seems to be breaking down. There are more and more threats, but they are ignored. Politics are influenced by the personal, so it is important to maintain good relations.

The chairmanship plays a minor role in field missions, but it must support them. Ireland will have the EU presidency next year, and consequently they are being wooed by countries that seek EU membership.

During negotiations, large countries like the Russian Federation and the US play an active role. There are also single-interest states which bring their conflicts into the OSCE and try to create odd links, which can be destructive. Then there are some countries which pay very little attention. Protracted conflicts, as well as issues in the human dimension, are especially difficult to negotiate.

### **The Office of the Secretary General**

#### **MARCEL PEŠKO, Director of the Office of the Secretary General**

All we do reflects the current atmosphere in Europe, and therefore OSCE is a mirror of the quality of relations. It provides a framework for interaction, and the issues raised during the dialogue go on to influence decision makers. OSCE has a different approach and different priorities than the EU. Peer pressure creates atmospherics. OSCE is about creating commonalities and unity of opinion.

### **Freedom of the Media**

#### **ROLAND BLESS, Principle Advisor to Head of Institution, Office of the Representative on Freedom of the Media**

OSCE is consensus driven and cannot force action from any participating states. Still, it must remind states if they are in violation of their commitments. OSCE covers the entire spectrum of media freedom. Although media freedom is only one percent of the budget, it has a lot of visibility. It is public by definition. Any state can raise a human rights issue at any time. OSCE documents cases and offers to review and/or draft legislation. There has been a 10-year honeymoon period with the internet, but legislation is catching up. OSCE and participating states need to work for (not with) journalists to improve conditions.

### **Introduction, Concepts, and General Issues of Long Term Missions**

**22 June, 9:00-10:30hrs**

#### **PASCAL HEYMAN, Deputy Director for Policy Support Service, Conflict Prevention Centre**

OSCE has most of its assets in the field. Field operations do the practical work. They are the eyes and ears of OSCE, and they witness events as they happen. The key tasks of field

operations are to assist host states in fulfilling their commitments in all three dimensions, to facilitate reforms and political processes (long-term goal), to perform stages of the conflict cycle (especially prevention, but also settling and managing issues, post conflict), and to keep the OSCE community informed about developments in country.

Two-thirds of OSCE's budget is spent in the field, and 80% of its staff positions are in the field (over 2,000 employees, including 1,700 local staff). Its point of gravity is operations in the field. OSCE missions have been very active in personnel development in host countries. Almost half (44%) of staff are female. Different missions have different budgets and numbers of staff members. Generally field missions are located in countries, but there is still debate as to whether or not Kosovo is an independent country. Likewise Nagorno-Karabakh is also a disputed territory. There are two exceptions of field operations that deal with territories, not countries.

There is a unified budget per region. In comparing the year 2003 with 2012, there have been budget increases in Central Asia, and a drop in funding to Caucasus (the large mission in Chechnya just disappeared). There was also a drop in the funding to the Balkans, which is understandable as this region is getting closer to the EU. The new budget will be more

economical in the Balkans, and free up funds for more pressing issues.

There is no general OSCE mandate. There are different types of field operations, and every operation is specific. In the Balkans it is mainly post conflict rehabilitation (i.e. countries in transition). For the protracted conflicts in Moldova and Georgia OSCE's primarily role is conflict resolution. In Central Asia there are broad mandates which are not linked to conflicts, vary in size, and help countries with their commitments. Ukraine and Uzbekistan have project offices with mandates for setting up and running projects.

There are six operations in South Eastern Europe, the largest of which is in Kosovo. What's the difference between "mission," "office," "project office," etc.? Is there a link between name and size? It has nothing to do with duration. Only the project office name is related to a task. There is no particular rationale. The names are historically defined by what the host country was willing to accept.

In the Caucasus, the Yerevan and Baku mandates are the same in order to create balance between the two countries. Neither of these offices deals directly with the conflict, however. The OSCE office in Tbilisi – Personal Representative of the Chairman-in-office on the conflict dealt with by the OSCE Minsk Conference – deals with Nagorno-Karabakh.

Mandates are the cornerstone of any operation. All mandates must be adopted by the Permanent Council via consensus, including the host country. They are tailor-made, and never the same (except in the case of Armenia and Azerbaijan). Mandates are primarily one year in duration, but once set up operations are rarely only one year (Ukraine has 6-month missions and is the only exception). Every year a draft must be submitted in order to get permission to extend a mission. However, exceptions to this rule include Turkmenistan, which does not have a time limit and does not need an agreement to extend; and the now a silent month-by-month extension on the field presence in Kosovo (unless someone brings it up, it is automatically extended). Neither Russia nor Serbia has terminated this mission because it protects the rights of Serbian and Russian minorities. Thus what looked like a bad decision has proved to be a very good decision; no discussion needed, simply runs like the energizer bunny.

Missions do not function in a vacuum. Heads of field operations have three different masters: the CiO, Secretary General, and delegations/permanent council. The budget process may be used to steer the course of field operations, possibly to ending a mission (which other delegations may dislike). There is a price to be paid for every action in a political context. When there are vacancies for head of mission,

all countries may suggest candidates. A list of applicants is sent around at the end of the month. Then interviews are conducted, during which candidates meet with the secretary general. The CiO discusses with other Troika members and gets advice. The CiO then decides what to do, and has no obligation to accept the recommendation. To the largest extent possible the views of the host country are taken into account. Occasionally the CiO goes against the wishes of the host country. In theory, CiO can do anything. However, there is always a price to be paid; he cannot act as a dictator.

Some states can be very particular in who they want as head of mission in their country. Basically, the nationality of the heads of mission is never neutral; it is political. Candidates from certain nations have more chances of getting a job than others (not norm for all locations). There is also a problem of gender imbalance since countries are not putting forward enough female candidates.

There are four points to take away from this session.

1. Field operations and their staffs are a key asset of the OSCE.
2. Field operations are present in four regions (South Eastern Europe, South Caucasus, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia).

3. Mandates are agreed upon by all 56 states.

4. CPC is a link between field operations and the rest of the OSCE family.

## **Long Term Missions: Lessons Learned**

**22 June, 11:00-12:30hrs**

### **PASCAL HEYMAN**

The challenges and constraints of long term missions can be divided into four categories: political, structural, coordination, and other.

#### *Political*

If a country has a field operation in its territory it might be interpreted that that country has problems, perhaps fulfilling its commitments. Thus there is a stigma that comes along with having a field operation. Consequently some countries will try to diminish role of OSCE field operations. Field missions need a different spin; they should not be viewed as a bad thing look at it as a bad thing. Field missions address issues that need to be addressed anyways (especially for countries seeking EU membership). It is best to think in terms of the benefits for the host countries. In earlier days it was possible to impose a field operation, but twenty years later the thinking has evolved, and countries have evolved. Host nations should think in the

mindset of getting support, and ask, "What's in it for me?"

#### *Structural*

Many field operations not set up to effectively deal with TNTs, and OSCE needs to look at improving this. Also, field operations are confined to a certain country or area. What if a neighboring country has the same type of problem? There can be spillover from one country to another. Unfortunately, when offering assistance it is not possible to set up a joint operation. Mandates are only set up for a single country. It's a limitation that needs to be dealt with. Threats are not limited to one country. Joint cooperation is needed in areas of mutual interest, but it does not happen. There is an imperfect cooperation by which mission A and mission B do the same thing and hope it works. Yet how, for example, do you cooperate between the mission to Serbia and the mission to Kosovo? General cooperation would seem to suggest that it is still one country.

#### *Coordination*

A field operation must be able to draw upon resources in the OSCE. But the OSCE is organized chaos. It is intentionally designed to be chaotic so that nobody in the OSCE has the upper hand. The CiO is in the lead, but only for one year, and cannot act without consequences. The Secretary General has an

authority to ensure that the program of activities is well coordinated, but has no authority on institutions. There are checks and balances, and no one can really give any orders or push too much. Plus different parties have different mandates. The CiO is like a captain of an oil tanker: it is a big ship and it is very hard to steer; when you turn the wheel, it will take some time for the ship itself to turn. The CiO's one year term facilitates maintenance of status quo, not turning. In the end, the authority is in the hands of the 56 countries.

How can OSCE coordinate with other international organizations? Is the OSCE a service provider? For example, is the role of the OSCE in the Balkans to foster EU membership? OSCE's work in the Balkans has its own agenda, but as the region moves towards integration, roles of shifted. OSCE addresses the same issues necessary for EU membership. For example, there are generally recognized benchmarks on the rule of law. Obviously moving toward OSCE goals will also help a country to meet EU goals. But OSCE is not aimed at facilitating EU membership; OSCE has no responsibility to prepare anybody for anything. It should not be forgotten that OSCE is always present at the request of the host country. There must be a convergence of the wishes of the host country and the OSCE mission there. Therefore the OSCE indirectly

supports meeting benchmarks for EU membership.

#### *Other*

There are other internal OSCE issues which effect long term missions. Financial issues have led to decreasing budgets. The organization loses money every year, and budgets are increasingly difficult to create. To pay for new activities, OSCE must phase out others. There are also issues in terms of human resources. Most of the people who work in the field are secondments, who generally receive a livable per diem, but there is no per diem on secondments to Vienna or the Hague. Also, the number of countries that are willing and able to suggest candidates for secondments is very limited. Changing seconded positions into contracted positions would be very costly, so it is unlikely to happen any time soon.

#### *Lessons Learned*

The view of the host country must be kept in mind. If the CiO appoints a head of mission that is undesirable for the host country there can be consequences. It has actually happened that the appointee did not receive a visa. If undesirable appointee goes to the host country, it could wreck the mission since the country does not work together with the mission. It can be very hard to set up the relationship.

Reporting can also be a problem, as it can have different meanings. Centers and offices report on conflicts they are involved in, and cannot be too negative. Reporting must be used smartly. The language of reports is not direct, very shallow, gray, and tends to beat around the bush. There is a lot in between the lines if you read it correctly. Authors must be very careful, and cannot call a spade a spade so that the report is acceptable to all 56 states. It is important for a chairmanship to interpret how serious a conflict is, and the benchmark necessary for bringing it to everyone's attention. Projects should be to support a political objective and there should be discretion in determining what types of work are appropriate for OSCE. We are not UNDP, and frankly we don't have the money.

#### *Future Approaches*

There is trouble with mandate implementation since it is difficult to determine when a mandate fulfilled. There is no uniform answer. Ideally the close of a field operation would be a success for the host country and for OSCE (e.g. Croatia). However, sometimes developments unrelated to OSCE affect the mission (e.g. Georgia). Consensus is not required to close, just to continue. The weakness of the system is that it is very easy to pull the plug. OSCE has long term goals but

short term means, so ideally the budget process would be longer than one year.

Avoiding duplication is important. In a context of diminishing financial resources, it is critical to refocus on the issues which are most important, to cut the excess and go back to the basics. Vienna should promote more regional countries and field operations. Additionally, field operations are temporary by design, and at some point must be phased out. Since field operations are currently a key asset, OSCE should look toward developing long-term alternatives. Alternative models include thematic missions, ad hoc operations, and supplement to current field missions. A regional model was tried in Central Asia but did not fly since there is no regional entity, and states in this region are rivals. This model would be even more difficult in other regions (the idea of regional offices is dead). OSCE could get rid of field operations and have everything be done from Vienna, but it is not possible to replicate field operations this way (there would be no depth), and a presence on the ground is needed to make OSCE's involvement meaningful. Field operations are the most efficient way to conduct a business. When no one is on the ground it just evaporates. Before you pull the plug you need to think hard about the alternatives.

## **Economic and Environmental Dimension of the OSCE**

**22 June 15:00-16:30hrs**

**GABRIEL LEONTE, Economic and Environmental Adviser, Head of the Economic and Environmental Unit (OCEEA)**

There is a link between environmental degradation and security. For example, the environmental damage caused by the Aral Sea disaster has cost millions of dollars to repair, has put the former fishermen out of work, and has made water rights a major issue in the region. Likewise there is a link in the opposite direction. The environment can be a platform for cooperation, dialogue, and confidence building. It could potentially lead to cooperation on other issues as well. Mr. Leonte, for example, had worked on promoting (eco) tourism, and ended up talking about visas (which is a political issue).

OSCE's second basket contains environmental and economic issues. Some people think that the other baskets are more important, and that the environment and the economy are not related to the politico-military dimension. Nevertheless, the 2<sup>nd</sup> dimension has evolved over the years. The 1990 Bonn Document was an important milestone that discusses the transition to a market economy. In 1993 the 1<sup>st</sup> Economic Forum convened in

Prague. This annual forum is a platform for dialogue. Participating states felt that it was not enough, and established the office of the Coordinator of Environment and Economic activities in 1998. The 2003 Maastricht Document is the bible of the second dimension, and includes list of challenges and how OSCE should potentially react.

Issues on the OSCE/EED agenda include transport, energy, migration, corruption, water, and women's economic empowerment. Decisions do not come out of the blue; they are negotiated. Sometimes the NGOs that participate in the forum make interesting proposals. Sometimes items are adopted in response to other issues.

The Economic and Environmental Forum is not a decision-making body but rather a conference. It focuses on a specific issue, which may then be translated into ministerial decisions. It is the broadest high-level gathering of decision makers and experts, and holds several meetings a year. This year's topic was promoting security and stability through good governance. Previous topics which have been repeatedly discussed include water management and transport. There is no added value if issues become repetitive. There are also limits in the capacity of OSCE to deal with certain issues, such as those that might be too technical.

What should be put on the agenda of this year's meeting? Summer academy participants suggested making updates to the OSCE Guide on Best Practices in Combating Corruption and improving border crossings. There is also the Environment and Security Initiative (ENVSEC). Private investments and/or banks may need to contribute large amount to clean up environmental threats (e.g. nuclear waste).

### **Workshop 3: Mediation, Negotiation, and Diplomacy**

**23 June, 9:00-18:30hrs**

**WILBUR PERLOT, Training and Research Fellow, Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael**

As a mediator one should have to have more knowledge about what the other parties want than they do. Negotiation is a process, and a mediator must include everything related to the negotiation. The elements involved in mediation include history, constituency, interest, perception, empathy, mutual understanding, issue linkage, relationship, and trust. Americans perhaps too focused on finding a solution than appreciating the process. Mediators must figure out how to get people to focus on their interests, not on their pain. People talk about what they want instead of

what they are willing to give. No parties want to move until the deadline comes in sight, and then they hurry to look like they are trying. Negotiated mandates are usually superficial and ambiguous, and leave participants asking, "What exactly did we decide?" Diplomats work for their countries; their careers are made in their capitals. They do not work for international organizations. They work on their personal interests, not national interests. Sometimes behavior in negotiations can be people effectively applying for jobs.

What's the difference between a position and an interest? If you visualize an onion, interest is second layer, while position is third layer. It is possible to have opposite positions but complementary interests. Needs are the innermost layer of the onion. Parties generally have a need for credibility, respect, and recognition. While mediating between conflicting parties, it is necessary to satisfy their needs. Sometimes the position becomes so strong, parties forget about their interests. If you are too focused on one element (i.e. your own interests), you will miss what's going on. If there is no common interest, there is no reason to be talking. Parties must accommodate each other by focusing on common interests above opposing interests. In a mutual hurting stalemate it is preferable for each party to resolve the conflict rather than continue it. However, if there is not a mutual hurting

stalemate both sides think their biggest benefit is in continuing the conflict. When negotiating with rebels, you have to recognize that they are not evil. If you are the rebels, you must admit at the government does have some legitimacy. In diplomatic situations, do not lie. You will likely see these people again, and need to build trust.

Bargaining over price also negotiation experience most of us are familiar with. It is a cultural element, and it helps to know the correct price ahead of time. Preparation is important in order to gain knowledge; it leads to 80% of the result. You have to have arguments, for these are what drive the process, but do not let your emotions determine your interests. It is important to develop rapport with your interlocutor because if you do not like the other person you will be unhappy with the result, even if you got a good deal. Do not mix the people with the problems. If the people have a problem with you, it is their problem. If they insult you, shrug it off. Also, realize what it is that makes you so upset, and do not fight old wars.

Reflect on your own behavior, and what has worked and did not work. If successful, be aware of the circumstances that made you successful. If you do not do this and enter a new situation over-confidently, you may lose. Also remember that if you get too emotional

and leave, the negotiation goes on without you, and this is not in your interest. Be very careful with your emotions. If someone insults you, you can try to use it against them. There are, however, a few occasions when it may be in your interest to walk out.

## **Distributive and Integrative Negotiations**

### **WILBUR PERLOT**

During this session Summer Academy participants engaged in a simulated negotiation. They were divided into pairs to negotiate the buying and selling of a car. One participant was the first secretary at the Belgian embassy in Addis Ababa, and had been asked to purchase a vehicle for transporting delegates. The other participant was the first secretary of the Swedish embassy, who had been tasked with selling a van to augment his or her embassy's finances.

Following the negotiations the group met in plenary and recorded each pair's results on the board (first offer, second offer, final price). The bottom line for the Swedes was \$11,000, and the Belgians could not pay more than \$14,000. The zone of possible agreements (ZOPA) lay between these two numbers. The Belgians also had a best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA): they could buy a van from

the Japanese for \$14,000. Making extreme offers is risky because if the seller goes too high, he or she has to make very big jumps to get back to the contract zone. If the buyer starts too high, he or she has no room to move. Anchoring (i.e. the initial bids) determines room to maneuver. If you call the other side's bluff, they are in trouble. In this simulation, Sweden is in a weaker position, yet does relatively better. Why? For Sweden, the goal and BATNA are clearer. For the Belgians, the instructions are less clear, and there is less motivation to bargain hard (anything under \$14,000 is acceptable). The Swedes have an incentive to get highest price possible.

Summer academy participants took part in a second negotiation simulation, this time creating a Trade Cooperation Agreement between the EU and the [fictional] nation of Sylvania. Participants divided into pairs, and used worksheets to make concessions. Each concession had a point value such that Sylvania lost points for each concession it made, and gained points for each concession the EU made (and vice versa for the EU). It was possible for both Sylvania and the EU to achieve a positive score.

Following the negotiations participants met in plenary and recorded their results on the board. Scores differed, since even negotiations based on interest can be influenced by other

factors. Sylvania won more often since it had more points available from the EU than the EU had from Sylvania. In the simulation, the EU wanted to continue negotiating after Sylvania had gotten everything it wanted. One lesson of this negotiation is that it is useful to try to learn what things are worth (to the other side) before you give them away. The optimal solution (all possible points) in this simulation is 47 points for the EU and 33 points for Sylvania. The BATNA for both sides was 26. Scores below 26 represent a lose-lose situation (in which hurting the opponent is more important than winning). Some people cannot accept not winning as substantially as the other side won ("egotiation"). Do not let your personal feelings or ego get in the way of accepting a deal that is beneficial to you. You should try to push toward creating value (in this case, there were 80 possible points).

## **Self-Assessment Plus Discussion on Culture**

### **WILBUR PERLOT**

Sometimes the best way to facilitate cultural awareness is to make a comment on it. Ask, "How do you do it in your country?" There are cultural differences in masculinity, individuality, uncertainty avoidance, non-verbal behavior, and the types of language used (e.g. What do 'yes' and 'no' mean?). All of these

things are important to think about in your dealings with people of other cultures. Pay attention to what people are saying and doing because it might mean something.

Summer academy participants individually completed a negotiation styles self-assessment. The assessment scored responses in line with four value orientations: Action, Process, People, and Idea. There can be difficulty if, for example, someone who is strongly action-oriented negotiates with someone who is strongly process-oriented (basically your strength becomes a weakness). A good negotiator might be someone who is average in all areas. There are national stereotypes associated with these dimensions. For example, Americans are action-oriented, Germans and Austrians are process-oriented, and the French might be idea-orientated. Someone with a people orientation likely believes that you must be friends before you can do business together. Someone with an idea orientation typically has a million ideas but is not able to make a deal.

Following a discussion of the usefulness of the self assessment tool, summer academy participants split into two groups and engaged in a simulation on status settlement between the [fictional] nations of Carpathia and Transcarpathia. The goal of the simulation was for participants to understand the playing field, to negotiate with difficult counterparts while

maintaining a working atmosphere, to coordinate with (reluctant) coalition partners, and to make use of the informal moments during the negotiations. Carpathia gained independence in the early 1990s following the collapse of the USSR. However, a small part of Carpathia, Transcarpathia, reacted immediately by declaring independence from Carpathia. In the simulation participants played the roles of representatives from both of these nations, Russia, the EU, and of mediators. The delegations negotiated both formally with mediators, and informally during “breaks.”

### **Debriefing Exercise, Conflict Mapping, Onion Model**

#### **WILBUR PERLOT**

The two groups reported back on their negotiation processes. One group wrote and signed an agreement, while the other group ran out of time and did not reach an agreement. The mediators ran the two simulations very differently. It is not the responsibility of the mediator (i.e. OSCE) to come to an agreement; it is the responsibility of the parties. If there is a mediator present, the parties can actually become more reckless and/or difficult, knowing that the mediator will hold them back. Instances of creativity can have a positive

impact on creativity. Having a text in front of you can limit creativity.

During the simulation it was observed that the conversation began by discussing positions, not needs. This is likely because needs are difficult to discuss in public. Opening statements are boring, but still need to be done, although the real work happens informally. You can simply get more business done in informal meetings away from the public eye. There are certain issue linkages that you do not want in public. The first thing to do is to establish relationships with your interlocutors and to build trust, but do not believe that you automatically build trust by spending time talking. It is in a crisis when you find out if you can really work with one another. After a breakdown in trust, you may rebuild. Do not finalize agreement on easy issues so that you still have room to move on the difficult issues (package deal).

In preparing for negotiations it is useful to make a map of the conflict. Doing this allows you to see things you may have missed, and to formulate new strategies. Time and money constraints (i.e. resources) can impact negotiation; larger OSCE countries that contribute more money may have a larger influence on the mandate. Most importantly, mediation is an interaction with people; you cannot learn it in a book. It takes intuition. The

more you do it, the better you become (it is a skill to be developed).

## **The Human Dimension of the OSCE: Standard Setting & Monitoring**

**25 June, 9:00-10:30hrs**

### **ARIE BLOED**

The human dimension sets OSCE apart from other international organizations. They talk more about freedoms. The human dimension is much broader than human rights; it includes politics, economics, environment, culture, trafficking, minorities, and media freedom. This is what differentiates it. But in the OSCE there is a special focus on security, of course. All of the aspects of the human dimension lead back to the security dimension. The agenda for the human dimension is set by security needs. Consequently there is no court on human rights, because it is out of scope. OSCE is trying to build a framework, and individual issues are not its mandate.

What are the advantages and disadvantages of OSCE's political nature? Making it a legal organization would make the process much, much longer. Also, OSCE's community of values has an intrusive character; it demands democratic behavior from all participants in the "family." The concept of democracy has been

elaborated in great detail. Democracy is something the eastern countries (i.e. Warsaw Pact countries) want in order to do away with the past. It is not just the West pushing it upon them.

Why do we need the human dimension? Why not just stick to security and let the Council of Europe deal with it? Council of Europe has far fewer members, and therefore does not have much of an overlap with OSCE. Also, we do not want to create a class system in OSCE that separates EU members and non-EU members. Making this distinction would undermine equality. Basically OSCE and the Council of Europe have different approaches. OSCE is more of a “project farmer” or “catalyst.” Its field presence especially makes OSCE unique.

## **ODIHR/Election Observation**

**25 June, 11:00-12:30hrs**

**ARMIN RABITSCH, Senior Election Advisor,  
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human  
Rights (ODIHR)**

Mr. Rabitsch asked Summer Academy participants to stand along a continuum from ‘strongly agree’ to ‘strongly disagree’ in response to the statement “Every adult resident should be able to vote.” The group discussed

the voting rights of the disabled and criminals, what age constitutes adulthood, and methods of absentee voting.

Summer Academy participants formed four groups and discussed the following questions:

1. Why observe elections?
2. Where to observe elections?
3. Which international/regional standards or commitments regarding elections do you know?

Following the discussions, groups reported these answers:

1. Observing elections creates legitimacy (especially important post conflict) and prevents corruption (such as vote buying and incorrect vote counting). Election observation also allows for the creation of future recommendations which facilitate improvement. Finally, election observation reminds participating states of their commitments and obligations.

2. Put simply, elections should be observed everywhere. There are no privileged countries or perfect democracies, so there is always room for improvement. However, election observation requires financial resources, and consequently it would be a waste of resources to observe in a host country that does not have the political will to change.

3. Voting should be universal and anonymous. Likewise people should have the right, but not an obligation, to vote.

OSCE has both international and regional commitments, and must determine where to observe elections. The budget voted on by permanent council, and the decision is made by the director of ODIHR. There is a rolling calendar of elections drawn from the invitations of participating states. There are minimum conditions for effective election observation because if there are no democratic principles in a country, observation there would be a waste of resources. OSCE is increasing its attempts to follow elections in countries with established democracies and has observed elections in 53 of the 56 states. ODIHR's mandate and tasks come from the 1990 Copenhagen Document in which participating states expressed commitment to the ideals of democracy, including universality, equality, fairness, secrecy, freedom, transparency, and accountability.

The Electoral Observation Cycle consists of needs assessment (2-4 months before election), observation (5-6 weeks before election), a preliminary statement (day following election), a final report (2 months after election process; includes recommendations) and follow up (possible advice and assistance). There are several types of observation missions: no

mission, expert team, election assessment mission (EAM), limited election observation mission (LEOM), and election observation mission (EOM/IEO).

Which aspects of the electoral process should an election observation mission look at? Summer academy participants discussed this question in three groups. In plenary, Mr. Rabitsch went around the room and asked each person to contribute one item that should be observed. Responses included voter registration, fraud prevention, candidate registration, media coverage, the people allowed to be present in polling station, voter security (including freedom of expression and assembly), training staff of polling stations in correct procedures, observe electoral committee, transparent vote counting, adherence to international standards, voting technologies, identifying other observers, freedom to campaign (i.e. a level playing field), observation outside polling stations, and participation in political process.

## **New Human Dimension Challenges**

**15 June, 15:00-16:30hrs**

**ARMIN RABITSCH**

There are many existing as well as new challenges to the Human Dimension which

OSCE must respond to. How should the OSCE react to these challenges? OSCE needs to do a better job of making recommendations and following up, which is a weak point for international organizations in general. What, for example, have recommendations done for Tajikistan? It has had the same president for 20 years. A lot depends on the political will of the state, but we can encourage follow up by making it a standard procedure to report back. If there is no sincerity to implement recommendations, nothing changes.

### **Panel Discussion “Assessment of OSCE from an EU and National Point of View”**

**25 June 17:00-19:00hrs**

**DMITRY MALTSEV, Third Secretary of the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the OSCE**

**TIM FINGARSON, Political Officer of the US Mission to the OSCE**

**ARIE BLOED, Moderator**

Mr. Maltsev spoke first, noting that there are three stages of working in the OSCE: first you go to meetings and cannot write anything, next you go to meetings and can write something, and finally you write and do not go to meetings. OSCE shows incapability to cope

with problems, and after a few years there you become very skeptical about it. There is an irony about the OSCE acronym; it is a forum, not an organization. The OSCE has many shortcomings. ODIHR seems to only monitor elections in post-Soviet countries. Field missions too often do unnecessary work. It has also shown an incapability to prevent conflict on many occasions. In the end it is not about Europe because we end up dealing with conflicts outside of Europe. There is a pervading opinion that conflicts do not occur west of Vienna, or that EU problems are internal. But things are far from perfect in EU countries and North America. Russia should remain in the OSCE, though, because there is no other organization like it (and Russia is not a NATO member). If Russia were to leave OSCE, it would have greater difficulty combating transnational threats.

Mr. Fingarson responded by reading the US mission statement, which conceptualizes OSCE as a major forum for issues of peace and human rights, the only trans-Eurasian political organization, and unique in its approach to security. OSCE is not a duplication of the Council of Europe because many OSCE nations are not in Council of Europe (such as the US). While it may seem odd that the US is interested in European security and human rights in Central Asia, looking back on the two world wars should provide adequate proof that the US

has a stake in Eurasian security. As Disraeli said, “States don’t have friends, they have interests.” Of the three dimensions, the US is most interested in the Human Dimension (although all three dimensions are important, and if one is taken away, security will fall apart). In the 1990s, many countries made progress in this area, but some moved backwards. Since then, others have backslid. Russia bristles at human rights criticisms and suggests a shift away from the human dimension, west of Vienna. The US is also critical of EU countries and the EU rule that it does not criticize itself. While Russia desires a legal charter for OSCE, the US believes the lack of charter makes OSCE unique, flexible, and quick to respond. The US is also appreciative of OSCE’s ability to include NGOs.

Mr. Maltsev responded that there should be increased focus on drug trafficking over human trafficking. There is heavy drug trafficking through Balkans, so it is unclear why there was a call to close missions in that region. While Russia agrees with the US about engaging NGOs, this is difficult when one of the NGOs might be a terrorist group. Which is more important, security or freedom (e.g. personal safety or freedom of assembly)?

#### *Questions*

One of the Summer Academy participants asked the guests about their main priorities for TNT and their position on future agendas. Mr.

Maltsev answered that drug trafficking is a priority, but the idea keeps getting shot down (this should be in the interest of the EU). OSCE is like a pub. Everyone has the goal of getting a drink, but they all want to go to a different pub. Basically we all have the same idea but cannot agree on the place and end up in the worst bar in Austria. Mr. Fingarson reiterated this point by saying that the US and Russia generally have the same goals, but have different ways to get there.

Another participant asked why the US is so interested in security in Central Asia and Europe when they are so far away. Mr. Fingarson responded with a single word: Afghanistan. Securing its borders will prevent the movement of illicit materials and hopefully stabilize the region after the US troop withdrawal in 2013.

One participant noted that the Russian representative had a lot of pessimism in his speech, and asked how he could make OSCE better rather than criticizing it. Mr. Maltsev responded that he has a responsibility to call on OSCE institutions to do their jobs better. It is time to stop shaming and blaming (i.e. blaming individual countries) because doing so is not going to help. OSCE also needs to make the best use of its resources by avoiding unnecessary spending. The Americans are also critical of OSCE for being ineffective and making poor financing choices.

Since election monitoring in Norway was mentioned earlier, one participant remarked that perhaps other countries should be glad to have the same problems as Norway does, since the Norwegian problems are trivial by comparison. Mr. Maltsev responded that the Norwegian example showed that, in the end, Norway was not a best practice. Russia had an election this year during which everyone could watch process, and ODIHR did not even mention this in its report. Russia has best practices, and ODIHR is not using them; no one is taking what Russia wants to share.

Another participant noted that there is an economic crisis and the OSCE budget does not increase. How will OSCE act in the future to increase its budget? Also, should OSCE increase its role in crisis management? Mr. Maltsev responded that crisis is good because it allows us to get rid of things we do not need, and that it is best to keep our potentials in the hard security area. Mr. Fingarson responded that a budget increase is unlikely, and that deploying crisis aid is being discussed.

Summer Academy participants also reacted to the prior US comment on the importance of the human dimension. If OSCE is a stool and one leg is much longer than the others, the stool will not be stable. Mr. Maltsev replied that in the end you cannot impose decisions which countries find unacceptable, and that

there is nothing wrong with OSCE responding to third basket issues such as natural disasters. Mr. Fingarson replied that if there is imbalance among the dimensions, it is the fault of the US. It is disappointing that a decision on the human dimension could not be reached in Vilnius last year. Mr. Maltsev added that OSCE is capable of fighting problems (in hard security), but is too focused on the human dimension.

One participant asked about OSCE's response to the 2010 events in Kyrgyzstan. What could OSCE do to make a difference? Mr. Maltsev answered that early warning mechanisms could have been utilized, and OSCE overslept. Mr. Fingarson agreed that better early warning was needed. OSCE could be more flexible in crisis response; a great deal of time is spent discussing.

The moderator, Mr. Bloed, added that early warning is a tool, not a response. It all comes down to the political will to make things work. If we want to work, we work quite well. OSCE develops the tools, but at the end of the day it is up to each country to decide what is in their national interest. We must always look back to our common interest.

## **Minority Rights and Minority Issues within the OSCE**

**26 June, 9:00-10:30hrs**

### **ARIE BLOED**

In OSCE everybody is claiming minority rights, but there is a huge misunderstanding about what actually constitutes minority rights. Why are minority rights so important to OSCE? It is a security issue (although a human rights lawyer would answer the question differently). The High Commissioner is *on*, not *for*, national minorities. He is not an ombudsman, but rather a conflict prevention instrument. The HCNM was set up to address potential conflicts. In 1992 there was a war in the middle of 'civilized' Europe (i.e. Yugoslavia) and the international community had no tools to address it. In the beginning the US did not want the high commissioner, nor did Turkey, nor the UK (who wanted to dissuade intervention in Northern Ireland).

Why is there a special focus on minority rights, and why are human rights in general not sufficient? Having minorities on your territory always leads to problems (OSCE offers no platitudes about the benefits of diversity). Minority rights were not a popular idea following WWII, however in 1966 there was an international covenant on civil and legal rights.

It was determined that non-discrimination is not enough; we need special action.

The main aim of the international regime of minority rights is to promote security by offering a control mechanism to protect national identity against assimilation. It is important to offer identity to those who want it, but not to force someone into an identity or minority group. The minority rights regime seeks integration (rather than assimilation) into society and the right to participate in all social, political, and economic aspects of civil life.

The Copenhagen Document states that OSCE "will endeavor to ensure that persons belonging to national minorities, notwithstanding the need to learn the official language or languages of the state concerned, have adequate opportunities for instruction of their mother tongue or in their mother tongue wherever possible and wherever necessary for its use before political authorities." This language is very vague, full of loopholes and open to interpretation. In contrast to the common understanding, there is no list of explicit rights. If you have a right you also have a responsibility, not obligations or commitments, but a common understanding. The Copenhagen Document is vague because it is oriented more towards principles than rights. Governments sometimes think minority rights are only there for the benefit of minorities,

which is not true; minority rights also benefit the majority. There is a vital interest in having a stable society, and minorities are here and they are not leaving. There may be historical reasons to violate minority rights, but at the end of the day doing so violates the interest of the majority.

What kind of minority rights do we have? The three major categories are identity, participation, and special measures. Special measures include programs such as affirmative action, and perhaps should have a time limit. Once minorities are raised to a certain level, special measures could be retired. There is no precise definition of a national minority since there are more than just linguistic, cultural, and ethnic groups. Basically, any group which is non-dominant is a minority, and this classification can be based on subjective and objective criteria. There is also a relation between the group and the place they are living, and therefore migrants are not a national minority.

## **Monitoring the Human Dimension**

**26 June, 11:00-12:30hrs**

**ARIE BLOED**

The most important features of the human dimension's monitoring process are field

missions and participating states. The biggest monitoring body is the human dimension implementation meeting. The Vienna Mechanism in 1989 became the first monitoring mechanism and allowed one government to raise an issue with another government, and then get a response. This mechanism was elaborated in Moscow in 1990. The Moscow Mechanism allows countries (or groups of countries) to establish a roster of experts or rapporteurs who can be invited to come and give expert advice.

The Human Dimension Implementation Meeting (HDIM) and Review Conference is the biggest human rights meeting we have in Europe. There is a registration process for NGOs, and NGOs that publicly condone terrorism are excluded. This meeting is reminiscent of a talk show (there is only the rapporteur's report to show for it), but it does raise issues and could influence other aspects. HCNM does monitoring for conflict prevention, and the main power of the High Commissioner is to issue an early warning. An early warning was issued recently in Kyrgyzstan, in 2010, and in 1990 in Macedonia. An early warning means that the issue goes to the permanent council, and it is something that should not be done often. In effect an early warning is unnecessary because if a conflict is getting out of hand everyone already knows about it. Normally the High Commissioner does not issue an early

warning because it does not have much of an impact. Recommendations are more effective. The mandate of the High Commissioner only covers the period before a conflict erupts. Once a conflict is underway, the mandate is over.

#### **Workshop 4: Practical Exercise – Regional Aspects of the OSCE work**

**26 June, 15:00-18:30hrs &**

**27 June, 9:00-10:30hrs**

**ARIE BLOED**

During this workshop, Summer Academy participants gave short presentation on OSCE's role in their home countries.

##### *Lithuania – Asta Gulijeva*

Ms. Gulijeva spoke about her experience as part of an election observation mission in Belarus. It is difficult to get on the database to become an election observer, but Ms. Gulijeva was lucky to be included in the database 5 years ago. The mission to Belarus was one of the biggest with 30 observers from Lithuania. Lithuania has vested interest in Belarus as a neighboring country. As an observer it is exciting to see who you will be teamed up with and which region you will go to. Ms. Gulijeva

started observation three days before Election Day in December 2010 and worked at polling station on election observing counting process.

##### *Bulgaria – Kamelia Dimitrova*

Bulgaria has been an OSCE participant since 1975, and in 2004 held the Chairmanship-in-Office. Bulgaria plays an active role in election observation, and Ms. Dimitrova presented an overview of CiO election observation missions, as well as a case study of ODOHR election observation missions in Bulgaria.

##### *Montenegro – Milica Abramovic and Ana Tomkovic*

The OSCE mission in Montenegro was established in 2006, same year the country gained independence and entered OSCE. It is a small mission with few employees, and focuses on the legal status of the Roma, democratization, human rights, rule of law (judicial reform), and law enforcement. Ms. Abramovic observed the 2009 parliamentary elections along with Roberto Battelli, head of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly delegation. The mission's final report concluded that elections went very well, but public confidence and lack of trust in the electoral institutions

were noted as key challenges. The electoral process will be strengthened in the future.

*Tajikistan – Farzona Nazrikhujueva and Nazarbakht Davlatbekova.*

First, Ms. Davlatbekova spoke about her experience with the Border Management Unit. She is part of the Patrol Programming and Leadership Project, whose objective is to facilitate joint cooperation between Afghan and Tajik border troops and to curb drug trafficking. There are approximately 20-35 people involved in project. There is a training center in Hissar, which is separate from OSCE office in Dushanbe and located outside the city on a military base. Currently there are 92 Tajik students and 92 Afghan students undergoing training modules in patrol leadership, patrol medical, patrol management and analysis, and the training of trainers.

Next, Ms. Nazrikhujueva spoke about the Border Management Staff College (BMSC) in Dushanbe, where she is employed. The project officially opened in May 2009, and has a five-year duration (2009-2013). It aims to enhance the knowledge of senior managers of border management and to promote cross-border dialogue. Thanks are owed to donor countries since this is an extra budgetary project. The Academic Advisory Board (AAB) gives advice on

improving curriculum and reduces costs. BMSC is also lucky to have its own in house translators. Border management is divided into three pillars: the staff course, outreach, and the research and development center. There is even an alumni website on which participants can discuss border-related issues.

*Turkmenistan – Gurbanmuhamed Amanliyev, Nurmuhamet Berdiyev, and Jennet Charyyeva*

Activities at the OSCE Center in Ashgabat commenced in January 1999 and cover all three dimensions. In the politico-military dimension there is a Train-the-trainer course and seminars on security management and airport security. In the economic dimension there is training on prevention of money-laundering. In the human dimension there is support of the election process and working visits to Norway. The Ashgabat Center presented commentary on the Criminal Code of Turkmenistan, and on a continual basis the centre organizes trainings, seminars, and workshops.

The participants from Turkmenistan also presented a photo book of Ashgabat to Mr. Bloed as a gift, and gave a slideshow of general information about Turkmenistan.

*Moldova – Inga Botnari*

The OSCE mission in Moldova was established in 1993 and deals primarily with the Transdnestrian conflict. Ms. Botnari gave the history of this frozen conflict, including the 5 + 2 Talks. It is the goal of both the country and OSCE to reach a comprehensive, durable settlement. In 1990 a separation was declared. In 1992 there was an armed conflict, resulting in 1000 deaths and 130,000 refugees. Then, in July 1992, a ceasefire agreement was countersigned by Russia. There was a resumption of the official negotiations in 2011 in Vilnius, and both sides are committed to a peaceful settlement.

*Russian Federation – Dimitry Semenov*

There is currently no OSCE presence in Russia, although there was an OSCE presence in Chechnya. Many of Russia's priorities were discussed in the prior day's session, including the county's desire for an official OSCE charter and better freedom of movement across borders. A common way to change the rules is to set a precedent. Russia is especially concerned with the principle of territorial integrity vs. the right of nations to self-determination. Kosovo was a precedent, as was the 2008 war in Georgia. Any country has the right to self-defense, and Russia has had to

make difficult decisions in order to uphold self determination.

*United States – Carrie Miller*

Since OSCE has never had a presence on American soil, Ms. Miller presented on terrorism in Central Asia, which relates to the United States' vested interest in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Terrorism can be a politically useful tool and is therefore likely caused by the suppression of political and civil rights. However, in Central Asia the threat of terrorism is used as an excuse to further suppress the rights of citizens. This approach is supported by Russia, which hopes to create a stable buffer between itself in Afghanistan. In contrast, the US (though not without its own human rights violations and concessions) ultimately hopes to curb terrorism by fostering democracy and capitalism.

*Kyrgyzstan – Lira Duishebaeva and Diana Mamatova.*

The OSCE Centre in Bishkek was established 1998 and opened in 2000. There was a broad mandate in six strategic areas. Demonstrations began in Bishkek on April 6<sup>th</sup>, 2010, to convey discontent with President Bakiev. Bakiev fled the city on April 7<sup>th</sup>, and an interim government

established. The CiO sent a Special Envoy, and later visited Bishkek himself. The OSCE Centre made 14 spot reports in April. Then in June 10-14 inter-ethnic violence sprang up in the southern regions. Kyrgyzstan requested OSCE assistance on June 14<sup>th</sup>. The post-conflict response from OSCE included the Police Advisory Group and ODIHR and PA observed parliamentary elections. OSCE had further involvement, monitoring the situation on minority rights and the freedom of peaceful assembly.

*Turkey – Berak Colak*

Knowing the history of the country is necessary for understanding the Kurdish issue. Turkey was founded in 1923 after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire (Treaty of Lausanne). There are many conflicts on its borders, as well as conflict between the military and government. The Kurdistan workers party (PKK) was initiated in the 1970s, and it is a terrorist group recognized by the US, UN, and NATO. Kurds and Turks founded the country together, and have lived together for hundreds of years. It is unclear why they want separation. The Kurds and Turks dispersed throughout the country, and there are plenty of non-Kurdish minorities (e.g. Bosnians). While the military rulers did not give the Kurds their rights, this situation has reversed, and today the Turkish

government is working towards granting them their rights.

*Belarus – Alesia Varabyova and Irina Divakova*

Belarus has been an OSCE participating state since 1992. The field missions in Belarus provide monitoring advice on the application of Belarusian laws, and assist with human rights education and the establishment of democratic institutions. Belarus also supports the introduction of an OSCE charter. OSCE activities in the country engage all three dimensions and include working on border management, nuclear security, implementation of Kyoto Protocol, rehabilitation of Chernobyl-affected areas, anti-trafficking, gender equality, trial monitoring, and improving freedom of the media. However, there have been challenges, such as a lack of cooperation between the OSCE office in Minsk and governmental structures, the fact that ODIHR election observers have never considered Belarusian elections to be democratic, and the invocation of the Moscow Mechanism on Belarus by a minority of participating states. These are not good ways to continue cooperation in the OSCE.

*Ukraine – Olha Budko, Antonina Karnaukhova, and Mykhaylo Palahitsky*

Ukraine is currently preparing for its upcoming chairmanship in 2013. There is not

much competition for this position because the chairmanship requires a fair amount of resources, but does not provide many benefits in return. Ukraine sought the chairmanship because OSCE is a unique organization with a network of field operations. Important issues in the politico-military dimension include TNT, border security, and fostering a dialogue on conventional arms control regime. In the economic and environmental dimension, issues include energy security, energy efficiency and renewable energy, and the review of the Maastricht Strategy Document. In the Human Dimension, issues include freedom of the media, cyber security, human trafficking, youth education, and gender equality.

The participants from Ukraine also requested proposals from the group. Ideas included policing the waterways around Turkey, border management, changing the financing of the Border Management College in Dushanbe so that more countries can participate, energy security/efficiency and critical infrastructure protection, the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, migration, conflict prevention, and creating a balance among the three dimensions and ensuring that there are not too many goals/objectives on the agenda.

## **Simulation of an OSCE Event**

**27 June, 11:00-18:00hrs**

### **ARIE BLOED**

Participants in this simulation were tasked with setting up a new OSCE mission in the [fictional] country of Nargistan. Violence erupted in Nargistan following national parliamentary elections. This violence was directed against minorities, who belong to the political opposition. Nargistan is not interested in hosting a mission, and does not want OSCE to interfere. It is a small country with a population of 10 million (2 million of which are minorities) that borders Belarus, Russia, Ukraine, and Bulgarian. Its military is insignificant, and Nargistan is flirting with the idea of joining NATO. The CiO would like to get a consensus on a field presence and mandate, and examples of former mandates were distributed to the participants. The parties participating in the negotiation included:

Chairman-in-Office	Nargistan
Secretary General	Belarus
European Union	Ukraine
United States	Tajikistan/Turkmenistan
Russian Federation	

Participants began the simulation with small group meetings.

#### *First Council Meeting*

During this meeting, speaking order was discussed and delegates gave their official statements. Nargistan assured the group that it is aware of events in the country, and is working on resolving the conflict. Nargistan is capable of solving the issue by itself and believes that tensions could lead to separatism. The country does not want to draw too much international attention.

The US, in contrast, supports a strong mandate. It views the conflict as a regional issue, and is willing to provide funds contingent on the EU also providing funds. The US believes that an OSCE mission will be an effective way to combat separatism with integration.

Bulgaria is worried about the resulting diaspora, but stability is an even more important issue. Bulgaria also has an economic interest, and strongly supports an OSCE field mission with a mandate to promote cooperation.

Belarus expressed support for the US position, and would like to put special focus on the human dimension; there are Belarusian minorities living in Nargistan.

The EU has high interest in creating a mission to prevent further conflicts. It is also willing to contribute financial resources.

Ukraine is concerned about the current situation, which represents a threat. It supports the mission and wants to focus especially on the 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> baskets. The only solution is to open the field mission, which will strengthen regional security

Russia is highly concerned and supports Nargistan's promise to solve the problem internally. Russia is not refusing to contribute, but it does not think an OSCE presence in Nargistan is a pressing issue.

Tajikistan and Turkmenistan are also highly concerned. They support Nargistan's decision, whatever it might be. Other countries should not interfere in Nargistan's political affairs.

#### *Informal Meetings*

Following the first council meeting, participants took a break for lunch. Informal meetings were conducted during this time.

#### *Second Council Meeting*

Nargistan stated that it is only interested in democratic development since it was parliamentary elections that led to the situation they are trying to resolve. It is the country's own responsibility to protect the rights of its citizens.

The US reiterated its support for an immediate mission. Nargistan is too focused on its position and has forgotten about its needs and interests. The US and EU are willing to fund the mission, but will not give funds directly to Nargistan. If the latter does not agree, possible consequences include economic and political sanctions, an international investigation, and taking the issue to the International Criminal Court.

The EU also reiterated its support of opening a mission to uphold Nargistan's OSCE commitments,

Russia expressed its support of Nargistan in their position. No country likes external pressure. Participating states should stop threatening Nargistan and become part of the solution. There needs to be trust between the international community and Nargistan. The issue should be reconsidered after six months.

Belarus wishes to establish mission to protect human and minority rights. This is the only way stability may be reached.

Tajikistan and Turkmenistan continue to hold their position of support for whatever Nargistan decides.

Ukraine seeks a peaceful settlement and believes that an OSCE presence would be positive step.

The Troika proposed that this issue should be solved based on trust and cooperation. They also support the opening of a field mission since it would contribute positively to democratic development and a multicultural society. Parties should focus on their common interest.

The CiO asked Nargistan to reconsider its position, or to at least express its position more clearly. Nargistan replied that its position is not changing.

The US made a clarification of the sanctions it intends to impose on Nargistan if an OSCE mission is not allowed.

Ukraine said that it once faced a similar situation, and Russia helped settle it peacefully. They do not understand why a country would shun international help.

Russia reminded the group that diplomacy does not consist of threatening sanctions; it is about being part of the solution. Imposing sanctions is just the easiest way for a country to get what it wants.

The US agreed that sanctions are not the best way. However, the US and EU have both offered funds. What has Russia offered?

Russia responded that the US should not bully people with its money, but rather help them with its ideas.

The CiO made a plea to think about the people of Nargistan. Their civil rights are being violated, and the current financial situation there is far from excellent. She asked Tajikistan and Turkmenistan to agree on establishing the mission, reminding them that sanctions do not help the problem. The Troika proposed a fact-finding mission to Nargistan.

Nargistan responded that sending in a fact-finding mission does resemble an OSCE mission and would not promote a resolution. It would give an incorrect signal of support for an OSCE mission. This action would not help with political consent.

Ukraine declared that we must find a way out of this deadlock. It suggested a 3-month hiatus to solve all diplomatic issues. If no progress is made after three months, a mission will be opened automatically.

Russia stated that trust of Nargistan's government needs to be retained. Nargistan is committed to resolving its minority issues.

The US gave its support for a 3-month wait followed by an automatic opening. Waiting for 3 months and then starting over at the beginning of the negotiation process is not progress.

The EU expressed its support what the US said.

The CiO stated that the OSCE is strongly disappointed about the position of some of the delegations on the Nargistan mission question. It would like to establish mission after 3 months if the situation is not changed.

Nargistan reminded the group that a CiO's statement can only express concern, not a decision.

## **Simulation Debrief**

**27 June, 18:00-19:00hrs**

### **ARIE BLOED**

Hopefully this simulation was a worthwhile experience. It is important to give feedback so that participants can reflect on their roles and actions. Additionally, everyone should have the opportunity to blow off some steam.

The CiO said that she never thought that it would be so difficult, and that she's not sure that she's very good at mediation; easier to criticize. Thank you to everyone who was constructive. Unfortunately the simulation was not very fair, which is disappointing. Not all delegations were following their mandate.

Secretary General said that she learned a lot, and can say that the Secretary General is not a very important person. Perhaps she did poorly because she could not find the

time/opportunity to have an informal meeting and give advice to the CiO. However, the aim of the simulation is to learn.

Nargistan commented that this is a good way to learn the atmosphere of negotiations. Perhaps Nargistan overplayed its role, but it was hard to decide how much they could speak out, and protect their rights and their vision. Being a small country, in real life may have gone differently. Since Russia promised economic support, Nargistan thought they did not need mission. During the negotiation they forgot about their desire to join NATO. They agree with their critics that Nargistan did not follow its mandate. Faced with great pressure it did not concede, and based its decision on financial support from Russia, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. It was also clear that the CiO is not neutral and had her own interests.

Belarus suggested that it would be good to paraphrase; it is not nice to keep repeating the same argument ad nauseam.

Tajikistan and Turkmenistan found the simulation very interesting. They knew their position, but not the interest behind the position. It is crucial to have a big country/main actor supporting you during negotiations; without Russia they would have been undone. Thanks everyone for your ideas and participation. They gained a lot of practical knowledge which will be helpful for future jobs.

EU members reflected that it was difficult to balance between EU position and national interest. If OSCE cannot solve the problem, EU and UN need to be involved. The negotiation process was exhausting and took more time than expected, plus the role of the Troika was unclear. Informal meetings were more useful and more interesting than formal meetings. The EU should have put on more pressure (e.g. mention NATO).

US felt the simulation was very realistic, although Nargistan definitely overplayed its hand. The CiO did well mediating. The 3- or 6-month hiatus was a creative suggestion. To what extent is it the job of the US to put on pressure? Russian position seemed contradictory, giving the Slavic minorities living in Nargistan.

Once of the Russian delegates found it interesting to view things from the perspective of a big country (in real life this participant is from a small country). Russia was there to support Nargistan's position, but when asked to reconsider this position, they really felt the pressure. During the simulation Russia never had bilateral talks with the US, which could have made the game different. Playing the NATO card would have been a game-changer. The Russian mandate had more bilateral interests than international interests.

Ukraine had a good discussion within the Troika over lunch. However, after lunch they over-simplified the situation. The NATO card was lost, which was a mistake. Delegations did not really understand their needs, interests, and positions, and failed at building trust.

Mr. Bloed commented that this is the first time he has seen the game end without consensus. There were some suggestions that were not picked-up. It was a good example of a non-response to a crisis. *Formally*, no one was actually violating the mandate, however Nargistan seemed to have forgotten to read the second half of its mandate, and took huge economic and political loss. The people who blame Nargistan for violating its mandate are, in practice, correct. During this simulation a man from a big country had to represent a small country, and did not behave realistically. The US and EU could have played more aggressively (many people do not understand that that is the way it works). It always comes down to interests and needs, and this is the way you find arguments to take them down.

## **Old Problems/New Challenges – Making (better) Use of OSCE (interactive Q & A session)**

**28 June, 9:00-11:30hrs**

**WALTER KEMP, Director for Europe and Central Asia, IPI – International Peace Institute (Vienna office)**

Strategic forecasting identifies issues the organization must face in the future. If these things do happen, OSCE will be in a better position to react. Summer academy participants divided into groups to look at different regions: the Euro Zone (plus the US), Eastern Europe, and Central Asia. Groups were asked to identify the threats and challenges in their part of the OSCE area. What are the priorities, and what can the OSCE actually do?

After discussion, groups reported back in plenary.

### *Euro Zone + US*

Threats include internal and external terrorism, border security, human trafficking, and environmental issues. Priorities include new types of energy and diversification of sources, territorial disputes in the Arctic, economic crisis, migration (from N. Africa), socio-economic tensions/austerity, populism and extremism, the Roma, autonomy movements, and TNT.

### *Eastern Europe*

Threats include energy security (supply and diversification), organized crime, human trafficking, legal and illegal migration, corruption, and political and economic instability. It is important to determine if countries will get closer to the EU or start backsliding.

### *Russia*

Threats include conflicts in the northern Caucasus, terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking from Afghanistan, missile defense and NATO enlargement, and corruption. It will be interesting to see where will Russian interests diverge or converge with OSCE interests.

### *Central Asia*

Threats include competition over natural resources (e.g. water and energy), Afghanistan, border security, terrorism, small arms and drug trafficking, geo-political rivalries, border demarcation, natural and man-made disasters, food security, environment (e.g. nuclear waste), security of dams, Aral Sea, authoritarian vs. democratic regimes, intolerance and discrimination (there are approximately 80 different ethnic groups in region), migration, religious extremism, globalization, and succession processes (what happens when old presidents die?).

Some issues are the same across regions, while other issues are region-specific. All together it is a massive list. Being comprehensive, yet also focused, is a challenge for the OSCE. At some point the OSCE needs to look at its priorities; it should focus on the things that it does best. Determining priorities should not just be up to the chairman, but discussed in the budget process.

Together with Mr. Kemp participants compiled a list of priorities ranked from most important to less important: conflict resolution (prevention, mediation, post-conflict) [gender mainstreaming], human dimension, Afghanistan, TNT, border management/freedom of movement, technical assistance, coordination with other int'l actors, integration, energy security, peacekeeping, environmental cooperation, and SALW.

## **The Future Role of the OSCE**

**28 June, 12:00-12:45hrs**

### **WALTER KEMP**

Let's analyze the four letters in "OSCE" and hopefully pull together what we have been talking about and be forward-looking and provocative. Firstly, OSCE is actually more of a community than an organization. There are so many turnovers within OSCE that everyone

always thinks that they can run it better, and do a bit look to the past. Next, OSCE is the Woody Allen of security organizations; it is neurotic and obsessed with its own health. It should focus on security and doing what it does well, and embrace its niche as a soft security organization. It is arguable that there never was cooperation in OSCE, but perhaps the cooperative spirit could be recovered by changing the mission model to better meet the needs to host nations.

Finally, what is the limit of OSCE's area? The "E" stands for "Europe," the there are participant states in North America and Central Asia, as well as Partners for Cooperation in other regions. This area is too big for there to really be shared values. OSCE has been in crisis since it was created, and that is why it was created. However, crisis may provide an opportunity for the OSCE to look at itself and trim the fat, converging its interests in a few key areas.

The bottom line is that the OSCE needs to adapt. Darwin did not say that the biggest or strongest survive, but rather the ones that adapt. A decade ago the OSCE started to lose its relevance because it started to lose its ability to adjust. Unless the OSCE can demonstrate added value, it will die out.

The list of threats that Summer Academy participants created is not unique to one

country, thus OSCE still have a niche. It simply needs the courage to make some cuts and use crisis to find a new way to thrive.

## APPENDIX 1 PROGRAMME

### FIRST WEEK: 17 – 24 June

#### Sunday, 17 June

15.00-16.30	Arrival of participants
17.00-18.30	<b>Official Opening</b> <b>Introduction of Participants and Team</b> URSULA E. GAMAUF-EBERHARDT Programme Director, ASPR
	<b>Introduction to the Programme</b> ARIE BLOED Director of the Summer Academy on OSCE
	Group photo in the courtyard of the castle
20.00	<b>Welcome dinner</b> (Hotel Burg Schlaining)

#### Monday, 18 June

9:00-10:30	<b>Security and Cooperation in the OSCE Area: Conflicts and New Dividing-Lines</b> ZARKO PUHOVSKI Professor at the University of Zagreb
11:00-12:30	<b>Basic Principles of Security and Cooperation: 1975-2010</b> ARIE BLOED
14.30	Visit to the Institute's Library & Introduction LISA FANDL Head of Peace Library
15:00-16:30	<b>Workshop 1: Communication and Interaction in Multinational Teams</b> MATANAT RAHIMOVA Senior Training Officer, Department of Human Resources (DHR), OSCE Secretariat
17.00-18.30	Continued

## Tuesday, 19 June

09.00-10.30	<b>The OSCE's Organisation: Basic features</b> ARIE BLOED
11.00-12.30	<b>The OSCE's organisation: Institutional Structures and Budget</b> ARIE BLOED
13.30-14.30	Self-study time
15.00-16.30	<b>The Security Dimensions: Policing Issues</b> ROBERT HAMPSHIRE Police Affairs Officer, Strategic Police Matters Unit (SPMU)
17.00-18.30	Continued
19.00	Social Event

## Wednesday, 20 June

09.00-10.30	<b>The Security Dimension of the OSCE: Political-Military Issues (incl. Relations with other Security Organizations)</b> MARIA BRANDSTETTER CSBM Officers, FSC Support/ Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC) TRUDE JOHNSON Operational Support Officer, Planning & Analysis / Operation Service, CPC
11.00-12.30	Continued
13.30-14.30	Self-study time
15.00-16.30	<b>Participants Workshop 2: Various OSCE Issues</b> ARIE BLOED
17.00-18.30	Continued

## Thursday, 21 June

06.45	Departure to Vienna
<b>10.00-10.30</b> Hofburg	Welcome and introduction to the Permanent Council OSCE Conference Centre / Hofburg (Room 201) BEKMURAD ASTANAKULOV Head of Conference Service
10.45	<b>Visit of the PC, Neuer Saal</b>
11:45 Hofburg/Ratsaal	<b>Assessment of the Chairmanship</b> BRENDAN WARD Deputy Permanent Representative, Permanent Mission of Ireland to the OSCE / Ireland Chairman-in-Office

12:30  
Hofburg/Ratsaal **Words of Welcome**  
MARCEL PESKO  
Director, Office of the Secretary General (OSG)

13.00-14:00  
Hofburg/Ratsaal **Freedom of the Media**  
ROLAND BLESS  
Principle Advisor to Head of Institution, Office of the Representative  
on Freedom of the Media

14.00-16.45  
17.00 Free time in Vienna  
Departure from Vienna / Hofburg & Dinner outside Vienna

### **Friday, 22 June**

09.00-10.30 **Introduction, Concepts and General Issues of Long Term Missions**  
PASCAL HEYMAN  
Deputy Director for Policy Support Service, Conflict Prevention  
Centre (CPC)

11.00-12.30 **Long Term Missions: Lessons Learned**  
PASCAL HEYMAN

13.30-14.30 Self-study time

15.00-16.30 **Economic and Environmental Dimension of the OSCE**  
GABRIEL LEONTE  
Economic and Environmental Adviser, Head of the Economic and  
Environmental Unit (OCEEA)

### **Saturday, 23 June**

09.00 -18.30 **Workshop 3: Mediation, Negotiation and Diplomacy**  
WILBUR PERLOT  
Training and Research Fellow, Netherlands Institute of  
International Relations Clingendael

**Sunday, 24 June**                      **Day Off**

**SECOND WEEK: 25 - 29 June**

**Monday, 25 June**

- 09.00-10.30      **The Human Dimension of the OSCE: Standard Setting & Monitoring**  
ARIE BLOED
- 11.00-12.30      **Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights – ODIHR / Election Observation**  
ARMIN RABITSCH  
Senior Election Advisor, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR)
- 15.00-16.30      **New Human Dimension Challenges**  
ARMIN RABITSCH
- 17.00-19.00      **Panel Discussion “Assessment of OSCE from an EU (in the conference hall) and National Point of View”**  
DMITRY MALTSEV  
Third Secretary of the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the OSCE  
TIMOTHY FINGARSON  
Political Officer of the US Mission to the OSCE
- 19.00              Social Event “Barbecue & Music”

**Tuesday, 26 June**

- 09.00-10.30      **Minority Rights and Minority Issues within the OSCE**  
ARIE BLOED
- 11.00-12.30      **Monitoring Mechanisms in the Human Dimension**  
ARIE BLOED
- 13.30-14.30      Self-study time
- 15.00-16.30      **Workshop 4: Practical Exercise – Regional Aspects of the OSCE Work**  
ARIE BLOED
- 17:00-18:30      Continued

**Wednesday, 27 June**

- 09.00-10.30      **Workshop 4 – Continued**  
ARIE BLOED

11.00-18.30      **Simulation of an OSCE Event**  
ARIE BLOED

### **Thursday, 28 June**

09.00-11.30      **Old Problems / New Challenges - Making (better) Use of OSCE (interactive Q&A session)**  
WALTER KEMP  
Director for Europe and Central Asia, IPI – International Peace Institute (Office Vienna)

12.05-12.30      **The Future Role of the OSCE (Wrap up speech)**  
WALTER KEMP

13:30-14:30      **Oral Evaluation**

14.30              **Guided Tour through the European Peace Museum at Schlaining Castle**  
LASZLO W. FARKAS  
Academic Director, European Peace University (EPU)

16:00-18:00      Excursion to Oberwart

19.00              **Closing Ceremony** (Knights Hall)  
ALEXEY LYZHENKOV

Director, Addressing Transnational Threats (TNT) Department/  
OSCE Secretariat

ARIE BLOED

URSULA GAMAUF-EBERHARDT

20.00              **Farewell dinner** (Hotel Burg Schlaining)

### **Friday, 29 June**

09.00              Departure to Vienna

**APPENDIX 2: List of Participants**

<b>Nr</b>	<b>Mr/ Ms</b>	<b>NAME</b>	<b>citizen</b>	<b>Present Position</b>
1	Ms.	VARABYOVA Alesia	Belarus	Student at Belarusian State University in Minsk, International Relations Department, specialization International Public Law (4 year)
2	Ms.	DIVAKOVA Irina	Belarus	Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Belarus - Third Secretary, Global Policies and Humanitarian Cooperation Division, Department of Multilateral Diplomacy
3	Ms.	DIMITROVA Kamelia	Bulgaria	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Bulgaria, International Security Directorate, OSCE and Regional Security Department - Attaché
4	Ms.	DUISHEBAEVA Lira	Kyrgyzstan	UNDP United Nations Development Programme, Bishkek, Kyrgyz Republic Coordinator, Peace and Development Programme
5	Ms.	MAMATOVA Diana	Kyrgyzstan	Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development, Osh, Kyrgyz Republic Senior Programme Development Officer
6	Ms.	GULIJEVA Asta	Lithuania	Swedish International Liberal Centre (SILC), Lithuania Programme Officer, Head of Vilnius Field Office
7	Ms.	BOTNARI Inga	Moldova	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration of the Republic of Moldova, International Security Division - Attaché
8	Ms.	ABRAMOVIĆ Milica	Montenegro	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration - General Directorate for coordination of EU funds, Montenegro – Second Secretary in the Directorate for Programming & Monitoring of Pre-accession assistance of EU
9	Ms.	TOMKOVIĆ Ana	Montenegro	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration - General Directorate for EU Integration, Montenegro - Trainee
10	Mr.	SEME NOV Dmitry	Russia	Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Russia, OSCE Unit of the Department for European Cooperation - Second Secretary

<b>Nr</b>	<b>Mr/ Ms</b>	<b>NAME</b>	<b>citizen</b>	<b>Present Position</b>
11	Ms.	NAZRIKHUJAEVA Farzona	Tajikistan	OSCE Office in Tajikistan - Senior Programme Assistant to Border Management Staff College
12	Ms.	DAVLATBEKOVA Nazarbakht	Tajikistan	OSCE Office in Tajikistan, Border Management Unit - Administrative Assistant
13	Mr.	ÇOLAK Berat	Turkey	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, Arms Control and Disarmament under the Deputy Directorate for OSCE, Arms Control, Disarmament - Attaché
14	Mr.	AMANLIYEV Gurbanmuhamed	Turkmenistan	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkmenistan, International Organisations Department - Referent
15	Mr.	BERDIYEV Nurmuhammet	Turkmenistan	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkmenistan, Diplomatic Protocol Department - Referent
16	Ms.	CHARYYEVA Jennet	Turkmenistan	OSCE Centre in Ashgabat, Office of Head of Centre - Personal Assistant to the Head
17	Ms.	BUDKO Olha	Ukraine	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, Directorate General for Political Affairs – Second Secretary
18	Ms.	KARNAUKHOVA Antonina	Ukraine	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, OSCE Division, Directorate General for International Organizations - First Secretary
19	Mr.	PALAHITSKYI Mykhaylo	Ukraine	Intern with the Ukrainian Delegation to the OSCE, Vienna, Austria
20	Ms.	MILLER Carrie	USA	Graduate Student at the University of Denver, Intern at The Conflict Center, Office Assistant at the English Language Center

**APPENDIX 3: List of Resources Persons**

<b>Mr/Ms</b>	<b>NAME</b>	<b>Institut</b>	<b>Position</b>
Mr.	ASTANAKULOV Bekmurad	OSCE Secretariat Conference Services	Head of Conference Services
Mr.	BLESS Roland	Office of the Representative on Freedom of the Media	Principle Advisor to Head of Institution
Mr.	BLOED Arie	Freelance	Director of the Summer Academy on OSCE
Ms.	BRANDSTETTER Maria	OSCE Secretariat - Conflict Prevention Center (CPC)	CSBM Officer
Mr	FARKAS László W.	European Peace University (EPU) – Private University Stadtschlaing, Austria	Academic Director
Mr.	FINGARSON Tim	United States Mission to the OSCE	Political Officer
Ms.	GAMAUF- EBERHARDT Ursula E.	Austrian Study Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution (ASPR)	Programme Director
Mr.	HAMPSHIRE Robert	Strategic Police Matters Unit (SPMU)	Political Affairs Officer, Police Matters
Mr.	HEYMAN Pascal	OSCE Secretariat - Conflict Prevention Center (CPC)	Deputy Director for Policy Support Unit
Ms.	JOHNSON Trude	OSCE Secretariat - Conflict Prevention Center (CPC)	Analyst/Researcher
Mr.	KEMP Walter	IPI - International Peace Institute (Office Vienna)	Director for Europe and Central Asia

<b>Mr/Ms</b>	<b>NAME</b>	<b>Institut</b>	<b>Position</b>
Mr.	LEONTE Gabriel	Office of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities (OCEEA)	Economic and Environmental Adviser, Head of the Economic and Environmental Unit
Mr.	LYZHENKOV Alexey	OSCE Secretariat	Director, Addressing Transnational Threats (TNT) Department
Mr.	MALTSEV Dmitry	Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the OSCE	Third Secretary
Mr.	PERLOT Wilbur	Clingendael Academy	Senior Training and Research Fellow, International and European Negotiations
Mr.	PUHOVSKI Zarko	Universtity of Zagreb	Professor at the University of Zagreb
Mr.	RABITSCH Armin	OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR)	Senior Election Adviser
Ms.	RAHIMOVA Matanat	OSCE Secretariat - Department of Human Resources (DHR)	Senior Training Officer
Mr.	WARD Brendan	Permanent Mission of Ireland to the OSCE	Deputy Permanent Representative