DEMOBILISATION
DISARMAMENT AND
REINTEGRATION

Specialisation Course

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I. INTRODUCTION

The Austrian Study Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution (ASPR) has been active in Peace-building training, awareness creation and networking in Africa for the past four years offering training seminars on Peace-building in Southern Africa. Recently the ongoing programme scope was widened following an in-depth evaluation of the four Peace-building seminars. A major finding of the evaluation was the specified need of the former participants of the programme for more in-depth specialisation courses in the field of peace-building. The programme is funded by the Austrian Development Cooperation Department, Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

The first such specialisation course was designed to meet the special needs for African peace-builders in the area of Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR). The course took place in Mozambique, a country deeply involved in demobilisation and reintegration measures following the Rome Peace Accord in 1992.

This Working Paper reflects the results of a joint training endeavour of the ASPR with Mozambican partner institutions on Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration that took place in Mozambique in July 2001.

In order to achieve the objectives of the specialisation course on DDR, the ASPR joint with Propraz, Programa de Promocao da Paz and Redipaz, the Mozambican Network for Peace-building, both organisations experienced in carrying out peace-building activities, namely in the area of demobilisation of ex-combatants and the reintegration of male, female and child ex-combatants into civilian life in Mozambique.

Demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration are usually seen as important development efforts of post-war situations. Good preparation and coordination was found to be a key element in the successful implementation of demobilisation and reintegration efforts. Many different measures have been developed and used over the past decade to support post-war resettlement and reintegration of ex-combatants. However, experience shows that no blueprints exist and that demobilisation and reintegration support is best dealt with within the broader context of post war peace-building and development. It is for these reasons, that the ASPR and her partners have chosen to work with Alejandro Bendana, demobilisation expert at the Centro Estudios Internacionales Nicaragua.. Alejandro Bendana has extensive experience in the implementation of partnership projects between ex-combatants of Nicaragua and Mozambique. Since neither training blueprints, nor generally acclaimed Curricula on demobilisation and reintegration processes exist, the ASPR and her partners have chosen an innovative training approach, drawing upon available in country experiences in Mozambique, involving key players in demobilisation and reintegration from the Governmental as well as the Non-governmental sector, the former guerrilla, religious organisations, ex-combatant and war veteran organisations and psychotherapists. Major practical and methodological inputs were delivered by Alejandro Bendana, though no special course curriculum was developed so far.
The opportunity was taken to present case studies on demobilisation and reintegration from other African conflict zones as well. Thus, the case studies of Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Uganda and Zimbabwe served as further examples to shed light on the rather under-researched and under-documented topic of demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants in Africa.

The aim of the course was to train Peace-builders from a wide and heterogeneous background working in Foreign Ministries, Defence Ministries, Human Rights Organisations, as well as Conflict Resolution, Community Development, Gender Units and the Academia to play an active role in demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration efforts in Africa. The former participants of the Peace-building seminars were acquainted and exposed to the principle concepts and the practical implementation of DDR measures, were offered examples of DDR case studies of different African states for comparison purposes and could directly interact with war veteran leaders and with women and child ex-soldiers of Mozambique. Several successful economic and social reintegration projects in the post-war scenario of Mozambique were presented by their implementing organisations such as the Christian Council of Mozambique active in the collection and destruction of light fire arms and Rebuilding Hope working on trauma healing, counselling and social reintegration of children ex-combatants

Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration

The global post-Cold War scenario shows a trend in the downsizing of troops all over the world, triggered by the end of civil wars and the restructuring of post-conflict societies. In Africa clear geopolitical division and ideological disputes, such as the struggle against apartheid and alliances with either the East or the West have disappeared. Indeed, several wars in Africa have ended, but new wars, mainly internal in nature, have emerged as a result of struggles for state power, by individuals or groups, strife for the control of natural resources and frustration with corruption and ineffectiveness of the ruling elite. This Working Paper looks at the examples of Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Sierra Leone (to some extent) that demobilised part of their armed forces in the eighties and early eighties. Some of the countries are still involved in the disarmament process. The study of demobilisation and its impact is still a relatively new topic relevant in academic fields such as peace research, international relations and in development studies. Questions regarding demobilisation and reintegration should also be seen in the context of foreign policy, development cooperation, peace-keeping and broader peace-building support. Therefore the main task of the training has been to look at the recent development trends in Africa, the peace and security environment and to place the demobilisation and reintegration subject in the context of other issues of post war reconstruction. Demobilisation and reintegration are seen as important development efforts in post-war situations. Reintegration of Ex-Combatants are no longer seen as humanitarian issues but recognised as an important element of conflict prevention and peace-building and as a pre-condition of any security reform. Special attention was given to women and children who especially bear the brunt of the wars. Women and Children combatants are now being directly addressed and focused upon in the demobilisation of troops and economic and social reintegration into civilian life efforts.
Official development policy has integrated Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) as part of the broader policies on post war reconstruction and post war peace-building. The OECD have agreed on policy guidelines for development assistance in this area. The UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations published guidelines for disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration. The Brahimi Report on the reform of the UN peacekeeping operations recommends that demobilisation and reintegration programmes are to be considered for the first phase of complex peace operations in order to facilitate the rapid disassembly of fighting factions and reduce the likelihood of resumed conflict. Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes are compulsory elements of all new peace-keeping and peace-building operations.

It is against this background that we believe we need civilian experts who understand DDR processes in their complexity, understand DDR processes as part of the larger peace and security framework as well as the economic and social context of the environment. It is imperative to understand how the different actors involved in the DDR exercise work and how to achieve an integrated multi-actor approach in the implementation of DDR programmes.
II. DISARMAMENT; DEMOBILISATION; REINTEGRATION AND THE PROCESS OF PEACE-BUILDING

II.1. THE PEACEBUILDING FRAMEWORK IN THE POST WAR CONTEXT

Alejandro Bendana

Understanding Conflicts, Peace, and Violence:

Conflicts exist at all levels, within and between individuals, communities, countries and cultures. Conflicts are natural. They are experienced by people of every background, culture, class, nationality, age, and gender every single day.

What is important, is not whether conflicts themselves are good or bad, but how we wish to deal with them.

War culture, and war provoking responses to conflicts focus upon conflict the destroyer. Conflicts are seen as a struggle between good versus evil, black and white, zero-sum, where the victory of one is based upon the defeat of the other, and one actor’s gain comes only at the expense of another actor’s loss. What peace researchers, peace workers, and others have worked over several decades to promote, is an alternative culture, and an alternative approach to dealing with conflicts—one based upon conflict the creator, recognising the positive, constructive, and creative opportunities available in any conflict situation.

Crisis, or conflicts, can be understood as containing both possibilities: i) the deterioration of a situation or relationship to a negative, destructive dynamic bringing harm to one or all of the actors involved, and/or ii) an opportunity to reach towards a higher, more constructive, positive goal, working to transcend and overcome contradictions within a system, relationship, or culture.

Another assumption often made about conflict is that ‘conflict’ and ‘violence’ are one and the same. This stems from the belief that conflict and violence are indistinguishable, that violence is the only and best method of addressing conflicts, and that the only way to deal with confrontation or difference is to ‘win’, ‘destroy’, or to ‘beat’ ‘the other.’ The recognition that there are different ways of dealing with conflicts, and that violence is only one possible approach, one which is based upon a war culture and violence provoking response to difficult situations, is extremely important if we are to search and to find more creative, more constructive, and more viable approaches to dealing with conflict which seek to address and to transcend the underlying contradictions which are often at the root of conflicts between individuals, communities, countries, cultures, and within every single one of us.

A difficulty which results from automatically associating conflict with violence is that people may then assume that, if there are no direct or open acts of violence, there must not be any conflicts. This leads to journalists, politicians, ‘experts’ and others waiting until violence has already broken out before focussing on or trying to find a solution to a conflict. If a conflict has already reached the stage of violence, however, this is perhaps the clearest sign that it has been mismanaged, poorly addressed, or simply ignored until the situation has deteriorated to a destructive level.
Johan Galtung has developed the ‘violence triangle’ pointing to the distinction between three separate types or forms of violence, all of which are closely inter-related.

The first of these, direct violence, refers to physical acts of violence such as a man beating his wife, children fighting at school, or soldiers going to war. Direct violence also includes such categories as abuse, rape, battery.

The second corner of the violence triangle, structural violence, can often be far more difficult to recognise and understand. This is the violence built into the very social, political, and economic systems which govern societies, states, and the world. It is the different allocation of goods, resources, opportunities, between different groups, classes, genders, nationalities, etc., because of the structure governing their relationship.

The third form (or aspect) of violence is cultural violence. On one level, this can be taken to be those aspects of a culture which legitimise or make violence seem an acceptable means of responding to conflict. The idea that violence is ‘normal’, ‘ok’ or even ‘macho’ are all expressions of cultural violence.

These three categories, direct, structural, and cultural, can also be useful when thinking about peace, helping us to identify:

i) direct acts in support of peace and conflict transformation such as dialogue, active non-violence and non-violent struggle, and the refusal to surrender to or to allow injustices, oppression, and violence/cruelty to take place,

ii) structures which provide for the needs of all members of a community, providing opportunities for individuals and groups to develop to their full potential, not exploiting, oppressing, or denying rights to any one or group of individuals, and

iii) cultures of peace which promote peace as a value, which respect and celebrate differences and which protect/promote the political, civil, social, economic, and cultural rights of all individuals, communities, and groups, and which are inclusive (by choice and dialogue rather than by force), rather than exclusive in vision.

The Justice Element

There is a tension between reconciliation and justice, and it affects peace-building, particularly as regards the role of the United Nations. For example:

- Requirements of National Reconciliation with the need to Counter Act impunity (part of the human rights accord) and insure reparations to victims
- Dealing with Tensions between the non-negotiable principles of human rights and international law which the organisation was founded on and the pragmatic requirements and limitations of a particular process (in which some of the parties may also be perpetuators). The UN has often acted as if there is a tension between human rights and peace, and continuing impunity is the result
• The UN risks making decision for its future interventions without valid date concerning its previous experiences on which to base those decisions. Both developmental, peace-building and human rights operations fail to identify, analyse and target structural root causes of humanitarian crisis. UN operations can be perceived as being prepared to sacrifice human rights for short-term political deal falsely named 'peace'.

• Recognising and acting upon the tension between the macroeconomic requirements upheld by international financial institutions and donors (including UN donors) and the securing of economic rights and opportunities for people and national self-determination, also embodied in the Charter.

II.2 DISARMAMENT; DEMOBILISATION AND REINTEGRATION

Alejandro Bendana

Definitions

One can say that demobilisation and reintegration are two phases of one process: to "remake" combatants into civilians. Demobilisation is a formal dissolution of all military formations. For the individual the process releases him or her from his or her mobilised state. This means that the combatants are taken to specially created assembly points where their needs and desires are evaluated. A number of other activities are performed at these assembly points: medical examinations as well as health and medical care if needed; counselling; distribution of a first reintegration-package (often consisting of a certain amount of money); and transport to a destiny chosen by the combatant.

Reintegration is the part of the process that is done on a longer term and can consist of cash compensations, education and training and different types of income generating projects in order to increase the potential for socio-economic reintegration of the combatants and their families.

What makes a demobilisation and a reintegration successful? Does it depend on whether a peace agreement has been concluded or not? That the parties' willingness to really stop fighting is important for the outcome is certain. If one of the parties does not want to implement the peace agreement, the actual content of the agreement is not important. The purpose of this paper is, however, to study demobilisation and reintegration processes in cases where a peace agreement has been reached by the opposing parties.

Success or Failure of DDR - Symptom or Reflection of Success or Failure of Peace-Building?

The successful disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants after violent conflict represent the touchstone, the moment of truth, for any peace-building process.
When combatants are asked to give up their arms, they face a “point of no return”: they, and their leaders, must have faith in a future where the advantages of peace outweigh those of war. Without a vision of that future, they will not make the choice for peace—and if they remain a threat, no one will be able to make that choice. A country or a region without peace and security is doomed to a marginal existence. Neither its inhabitants nor its neighbours will risk an investment in its development, and thus the vicious circle of instability and poverty will tighten its grip.

Moreover, DDR is no substitute for a comprehensive peace process: in no case has DDR succeeded when the peace process was flawed.

If the international community wants to “restore hope” in a country or region emerging from violent conflict by supporting and nurturing a peaceful resolution, it will have to pay special attention to the long term prospects of the military and the warlords who are about to lose their livelihoods.

Supporting a demobilisation process is not a just technical military issue: it is a complex operation that has political, security, humanitarian and development dimensions as well. If one aspect of this pentagram is neglected, the entire fragile peace process may unravel.

While the violence may have been abated, the underlying sources of conflict may take years, if not generations, to overcome. If support to the demobilisation process is not matched, moreover, by the efforts required to facilitate the entire peace process, failure is again likely. Thus, the response of the international community can not be half-hearted or piece-meal.

The Post-War Setting

Typically, cease-fire and DDR will take place when a country’s crisis has reached such magnitude that even war has become unsustainable. At this stage of the emergency, humanitarian needs and assistance programs are at their utmost scale, reach and complexity. Combatants, ex-combatants and dependants, child soldiers, etc. are key actors in the peace process. Nonetheless, for humanitarian agencies and national/local authorities their needs represent only a minor share in the context of global needs. For example, in Mozambique there were approximately 150,000 demobilised soldiers and dependants, compared to 3 million members of the general population who were affected (IDPs, returnees, etc.)

An objective difficulty exists when attempting to plan and establish priorities with government authorities, including the Ministry of Health, donors, NGOs. There can be a perceived sense that there is an excessive focus on the needs of a few, while daunting global needs for relief and reconstruction loom on a national scale. Civilian population is likely to have suffered more during the conflict and former soldiers are easily perceived as those responsible of violence. Structures and systems which produce the impression of privilege must be avoided.
Who is Responsible--Intervention or Capacity Building?

- There is the temptation to plan DDR operations as external interventions, rather than programs in support of national institutions. This made it even more important to quickly develop a robust analytical and planning capacity at the country level. Only by working closely with the factions and institutions on the ground – not just during formal negotiations, but before, after and instead – can support be structured and tailored to meet the real needs and match the real capacities of the main protagonists of the peace process.
- What is the role of the United Nations system, and where do other international and regional organisations, bilateral donors, non-governmental organisations and civil society come in?
- How, above all, can we ensure that “ownership” of the process is not taken away from the parties to the conflict?

State of the Art – Learning to Date

When it comes to supporting countries in their efforts to disarm, demobilise and reintegrate former combatants, particularly after violent conflict, the international community has been on a steep learning curve. Numerous reports and studies have analysed every DDR effort from the early days in Zimbabwe and Namibia to recent events in Liberia and Sierra Leone. By now there is an impressive body of policy recommendations and lessons learned and many of the people interviewed expressed their concern that these cumulative insights had not led to a more informed and harmonised international response capacity. The North becomes a sort of repository of knowledge?

Maybe this has to do with the capacity of the international community to be informed and to harmonise. Can this be done internally? As a matter of principle, the main responsibility for the planning and execution of a DDR process should rest with the parties, and should involve the communities, not only official institutions. In some instances, such as the peace process in northern Somalia, large groups of soldiers have been demobilised with little or no support from the international community; more often than not, however, international support is sought.

There are at least five interconnected processes:

- political, consisting of ongoing negotiations and power shifts, well beyond the conclusion of a peace accord, leading to the integration of the former combatants into a new power structure (and possibly into a new military framework, such as a consolidated army);
- military/technical, leading from cease-fire and cantonment to disarmament and discharge, while peacekeeping mechanisms are employed to prevent conflicts from recurring;
• security, linking reductions in the threat posed by combatants with guns to broader disarmament and weapons collection efforts intended to create a climate less prone to violence, as well as to general conflict prevention and reductions in the arms trade;

• humanitarian, linking the well-being of the former combatants to that of vulnerable groups within and on the fringe of their ranks (e.g., child soldiers, female combatants, disabled soldiers and chronically ill soldiers), as well as to the well-being of other vulnerable groups in the population at large (while maintaining a balance among the various interests), and leading to their (re)insertion into society as healthy and stable citizens;

• socio-economic, linking the prospects of the various skill-based subgroups within the demobilising population to the potential opportunity structure (employment, land, credit, training), and leading to their (re)integration into the economic activities of their communities.

At that stage, it is essential that the planning and preparations for each of these five processes begin simultaneously and in a concerted fashion; if one strain is neglected, the others will by necessity suffer.

*DDR can be a sterile exercise if the overall needs of the country are not addressed or are being addressed incoherently with long-term peace-building and development.*

DDR is only a part of the overall peace-building process, and it needs to be planned in strict co-ordination with other activities (institutional reinforcement, administrative reorganisation, rehabilitation of social services such as health and education).

It therefor makes sense to establish strong linkages from the very onset of the DDR process with other ongoing or planned initiatives by various actors, with the aim of identifying and bridging gaps.

The Secretary General has outlined the role of United Nations peacekeeping in the DDR in his recent report to the Security Council on this topic (S/2000/101), and has made a number of recommendations on how this might be strengthened. These tasks can be grouped in seven major areas:

• Building political and popular support for peace and reconciliation
• Disarmament
• Negotiating the DDR aspects of conflict settlement
• Military oversight of demobilisation process
• Civilian support to demobilisation process
• Reinsertion, into new consolidated army
• Reinsertion: short term, into civilian life
• Reintegration: long-term

*Each of these sets of tasks has to be developed with an eye to their impact in the five key areas described earlier; each of these activities has potential implications for the others on the list.* Military oversight, for example, has political...
ramifications; it needs to have humanitarian dimensions, connections to broader security concerns, and so on.

Many of the respondents also stressed that this checklist, while possibly sequential in its execution, should not be sequential for planning purposes. Some activities have a long lead time: procurement, for example, to establish cantonment areas may take months, and often it can not start until budgets have been approved and funds have been obligated. Other activities, such as food aid, may play a vital role during the entire process, beginning with the cantonment of troops, and ending only with the successful reinsertion and reintegration of demobilised militaries and their dependants.

**Ensuring that each of the “tasks sets” described above is carefully managed - taking into account the five-fold range of potential implications - may be the most daunting challenge to the international community.**

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From the UN Peacekeeping Handbook:

- “(D)emobilisation can be most effectively pursued if it is explicitly agreed to in the peace agreement”
- “Demobilisation must be specifically included … in the mandate of a peacekeeping operation”
- “Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration form a continuum. Demobilisation is only possible if there is some level of disarmament”

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Brahimi Report:

- “(T)he basic objective of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration is not met unless all three elements … are implemented” (21/8/2000, p. 7).
- “If your peace settlement doesn’t cover DD&R, then you don’t have a peace settlement”

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Lessons Learned (and Training)

- so much in the area of DDR is relatively new
- there have been so many different approaches
- so many successes and so many failures,
But it is regrettable that so little effort has been made so far to learn from the experiences gained.

Literature

- academic literature on the DDR issue is mainly read by academics;
- agency evaluations, if they do exist, remain within the agency;
- returning staff are rarely debriefed and no systematic oral history is being recorded;
- lessons observed are not necessarily disseminated, and rarely learned.

Yet, some recent improvements in the evaluation and learning process must be noted. The World Bank has been a remarkable exception to the rule: its case studies on demobilisation and reintegration in Africa go back to the late 1980s, and its Post-Conflict Unit has consistently published assessments of its DDR activities, culminating in a succinct summary of lessons learned contained in its study of the “Transition from War to Peace in Sub-Saharan Africa”. Reference should be made to the findings set out in the Secretary General’s recent report to the Security Council on “The Role of United Nations Peacekeeping in Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration” (S/2000/101, 11 February 2000)."

The Lessons Learned Unit in DPKO also deserves a special mention, as it has recently developed and delivered a series of training courses on DDR for delivery, and as it is about to publish a comprehensive study (earlier mentioned in this report, and circulated among the UN system partners in draft) on “Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of Ex-combatants in a Peacekeeping Environment".
II.3. WOMEN COMBATANTS

Alejandro Bendana

II.3.1 Introduction

The role of female veterans can vary widely but one unfortunate characteristic is their little access to benefits when peace and demobilisation come. Veterans’ families, women (not only soldier’s wives) in the receiving community, abducted females (women and girls) constitute other groups of concern for which needs have been quite neglected by DRPs\(^1\). In the worst case scenario, female veterans, veterans’ families, women in the receiving community, and abducted girls/women are neglected when demobilisation comes. In the better case scenario, women and men, boys and girls are all entitled to benefits but they are all considered as a homogenous group. This is annealing any chance of addressing their specific needs. The primary objective of this work is to devote special attention to female veterans, veterans’ families, abducted women and girl soldiers (FFA)\(^2\) to ensure that their specific needs are identified and addressed. Women in the receiving community will also be considered.

II.3.2 Targeting

- Contrary to male veterans, female veterans, families and abducted girls are certainly not perceived as a threat and they are often discriminated at this targeting stage. But, some people argue that the veteran’s reintegration won’t be successful unless his/her family is also targeted. Furthermore, if fighting poverty and assisting vulnerable people is another objective of a DRP, female veterans and families should also be considered, as they face a similar vulnerable situation when demobilisation comes.

- Many actors will try to restrain the number of female entitled to veteran status, arguing that the role played by them during the struggle does not entitle them to it. A good solution could be to carefully choose selection criteria that would not result in a de facto discrimination. Experience has shown another limitation imposed on women: they usually have to rely on men to confirm their grade or status. Women should be able to rely on mixed men and women selection committees to ensure a more impartial decision.

- Experience has also shown that women have less access to information than men do. It could be quite useful to install a “safeguard” mechanism to ensure that nobody is forgotten. For example, families should have the possibility to get registered at the local level by the veterans’ office, providing that crosschecks are done.

- An intra-household analysis should be done to understand who inside the household has control over given benefits. A “husband acceptance evaluation” should also be done to evaluate if he would agree that some family benefits be given to his wife for their children and under what condition. The local community should be consulted to find cultural consistent solutions. A numerical “ceiling” should be fixed for benefiting dependants per family.

- The identification of benefits is possible when needs and opportunities are detected for each target group. The definition of each group’s socio-economical

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\(^1\) DRP: Demobilization and reintegration program

\(^2\) FFA: female veterans, veterans’ families, abducted women and girl soldiers
profile is highly recommended to identify those needs and opportunities. This implies to study samples of male veterans but also female veterans, veterans’ wives, abducted girls and boys. It is important to collect gender-disaggregated information to have a better understanding of gender specificity.

II.3.3 Demobilisation

- A general rule should be that whenever possible, all beneficiaries should go to encampment. It is the best opportunity to get registered for access to benefits and to receive information about them. But for security reasons and to avoid further trauma of child soldiers, it might be wise to assemble some beneficiary groups in different locations. It might also be less expensive and complicate to use army barracks as assembly location for families who are already living there. It is not recommended to extend the encampment period beyond several weeks.
- Women and children have different logistical needs. Encampment facilities should meet these needs.
- The dissemination of pre-discharged information must correspond to women’s needs. Following information should be given: women’s civic right, land rights, access to credit, access to education and employment, how to start an income-generating project, HIV prevention, preparation to potential difficult social acceptance in resettlement area, domestic violence, etc.
- The encampment phase is the opportunity to register beneficiaries and to collect data. Abducted women should have the opportunity to be registered separately from their partner. The person responsible for dependants shall receive a separate ID entitling him/her for benefits for him/herself and for dependants. Different questionnaires for each group of beneficiary should be prepared, as some questions might be different. Questions should be carefully chosen to reflect the specificity or each group of beneficiaries.
- Health facilities in assembly areas should be adapted to women and children needs. Services should include: reproductive health facilities, family planning and dissemination for HIV prevention. Health services for women should be separated from health services for men or many women won’t come.
- The case of child soldiers (girl soldiers for our concern in this work) should be treated separately, as it is not recommended to send them to encampment but to reinsertion camps to avoid further traumatic contacts with adults and to insert a rupture with their past. These reinsertion camps should be specially design to address their most urgent needs. Family tracing should be initiated simultaneously.
- Soldiers should be sensitised prior to returning to their community to avoid potential problems with women in the receiving community. Domestic violence and HIV prevention are important topics to be discussed.

II.3.4 Reinsertion

- Several case studies of female veterans have noted that a female veteran is more inclined than a male veteran is to spend her allowance exclusively for the subsistence of her family, instead of investing part of it into an income-generating project. Big cash amounts can put women at risk. It is thus recommended to
distribute the cash allowance in the form of several instalments and to ensure that the account is open under the name of the beneficiary.

- In many societies the housing is extremely important for women, as it is the principal geographical base for their work. Housing allowance is therefore particularly important for female veterans. Women, especially single women head of household might face problems to construct self-build houses as they often lack labour force and technical skills. Another important element for their reinsertion is the access to the land. Unfortunately, this might be problematic for female veterans. Demobilisation agreement should recognise the right for female veterans to possess land. More general measures targeting not only female veterans but also women in general should focus on following issues: constitutional reforms for women land ownership, special laws for orphans (especially girl orphans) to access the land of their parents and implementation measures for new more egalitarian laws.

- Another important element of reinsertion is the medical care provided to veterans. Specific medical needs include: reproductive health facilities and family planning, services for pregnancies, treatment of injuries resulting from sexual abuse, treatment of gynaecological complications, programs conceived to deal with sexual abuse traumas of women and girls, treatment for sexual transmitted diseases and drug addiction.

- The lack of childcare facilities affects the economical reinsertion and reintegration of female veterans and veterans’ wives. DRP programs should include support to the development of childcare facilities like encouraging self-started childcare.

- Post-discharge orientation should include information targeting female veterans’ opportunities and outreach programs because usual information poorly reaches them.

- A support for the education of veterans’ children is sometimes included in the safety net. Unfortunately, past experience has shown that parents where much more incline to send their boys. A solution could be to provide support for each veteran’s children. But, sometimes it is not sufficient because costs are not the only element causing discrimination. General education programs or flexible school timetables are more appropriated if girls are not sent to school for cultural reasons.

II.3.5 Economic reintegration

- Women have a limited access to income-generating projects: lack of skills, poor access to credit, lack of childcare facilities, etc. DRP programs should combine educational programs with access to credit projects adapted to women needs (outreach program, support to women groups). Female veterans are also characterised by a poor access to employment (low level of education, macho prejudice of employer, etc.). The private sector should be encouraged to hire them and they should be better armed to fight with male competition. Another solution is to promote the participation of female veterans and veterans’ wives to labour intensive programs. Working conditions should be gender favourable. Fixed quotas should stimulate women’s participation.

- The economic reintegration of female veterans and veterans’ wives is handicapped by their low level of education and professional skills. Training and transfer of skills should be adapted to market needs and female opportunities, childcare facilities would boost their participation, outreach programs should
motivate them to answer to education opportunities as fast as men do. Special programs should be designed for girl soldiers. Many girls were not able to finish their instruction and thus the level of their education is very low. A combination of remedial education, skills training and apprenticeship is recommended for this group at the threshold of the labour market.

II.3.6 Social reintegration

- Women’s participation to war contributes to the redefinition of their identities and their traditional role. It generally expresses itself among other things by their rejection of patriarchal systems and their emancipation. Many female veterans identified revolutionary movements with the liberation of women. Alas in many cases, when peace came female veterans were highly disappointed to see the cause for which they fought: their liberation, being willingly forgotten. In short, women feel betrayed and many of them reject their home community, avoid coming back to them upon demobilisation and therefore do not benefit from the family support (economical and psychical) they need so badly.

- Their home community rejects female veterans. Many veterans upon their return had married a local woman as a step toward community acceptance and reintegration. Female veterans along with veterans’ wives found it very difficult to be accepted by husband home community if they had married him without his family approval. The same rejection has sadly been noticed for girl soldiers. The community perceives her as impure and therefore ineligible for marriage. DRP should include sensitisation programs for the parents and home community to reduce the risk that they add further trauma to the returning girl. Traditional purification rites have had very good results to give girls a chance for a new start.

- Female veterans and veterans’ wives association should be encouraged as they represent an important element toward their social reintegration. Incentives for community projects involving residents, veterans and veterans’ families would enhance reconciliation. Women should also be encouraged to occupy leadership position. Not only would this measure enhance the capacity of their association but also they would have more chance to participate to the peace negotiations. Their participation at an early stage is a prerequisite to a promotion of their interests and to their future participation to the decision making.

II.3.7 Special programs for vulnerable people

- DRPs should plan for special programs for most vulnerable female veterans, girl soldiers and veterans’ families. Disabled women suffer directly from general gender based discrimination amongst the household. Female veterans have also complained that they were being discriminated by disability evaluating physicians. A recommended measure would be to ensure that female veterans have the possibility to turn to female physicians. Of special concern is the great amount of female veterans single head of household. The vulnerable situation of orphan child soldiers and veteran widows should also not be neglected. Those vulnerable cases should be prioritised to access reintegration programs.

- Counselling and communicating are vital for victims of domestic violence. Domestic violence is a direct consequence of economic instability and social
crisis, which accompany post-conflict situations. It usually affects the weakest in
the society: children and women. Programs should include group therapy, public
awareness projects and projects for the empowering of women.

- Counselling and communicating are also vital for victims of trauma, drug addiction
  or prostitution. In comparison with men and boys, women and girls suffer from
traumas caused by sexual abuses. Relying on prostitution as a survival mean and
consuming drugs and alcohol are two behaviours directly linked to trauma
resulting from sexual abuse. Here are some suggestions when designing
programs: female staff should exclusively conduct programs. Programs should
include some outreach elements. Bureaucratic procedures should be strictly
limited to a minimum to encourage victims to ask for help.

- DRP programs should use women communication channels. Dissemination
campaigns should use actors women trust and target places where women are.

II.4 CHILDREN IN ARMED CONFLICT

Alejandro Bendana

II.4.I Introduction

In recent years, the extensive impact of armed conflict on children has prompted
several significant actions to address this phenomenon. In 1990, the UN Convention
on the Rights of the Child, which contains important provisions for children affected
by armed conflict, came into force. In 1996, building on the work of non-governmental
organisations and academic studies, Graça Machel submitted a groundbreaking
report to UN General Assembly on the impact of armed conflict on children. Based on
Machel’s recommendations, the General Assembly created the Office of the Special
Representative of the Secretary General for Children and Armed Conflict in 1997.
The office is mandated inter alia to “assess progress achieved, steps taken, and
difficulties encountered in strengthening the protection of children in situations of
armed conflict; raise awareness and promote the collection of information about the
plight of children affected by armed conflict and encourage the development of
networking3; as well as “foster international co-operation to ensure the respect for
children’s rights”4 in the various stages of armed conflict. Since the publication of the
Machel report on the impact of armed conflict on children5, and the establishment of
the mandate of this office, a number of actors have worked together and made
important and tangible progress in moving forward the issue of children affected by
armed conflict. Advocacy and awareness have increased significantly; children
affected by armed conflict have been placed high on the international political
agenda; major regional organisations have adopted this issue as part of their own
agendas; the UN Security Council adopted the landmark resolution 1261 affirming
the protection of children affected by armed conflict as a peace-and-security concern;
the well-being of war affected children is now being included in peace agendas and
has become a priority concern in post-conflict peace building; international standards
have been strengthened – the adoption of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on
the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict, and the
classification of war crimes against children in the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court are particularly significant; children’s concerns are being integrated

3 General Assembly Resolution on the Rights of the Child of 20 February 1997 (A/RES/51/77), page 7: a) and b)
4 General Assembly Resolution on the Rights of the Child of 20 February 1997 (A/RES/51/77) page 7: d)
5 ‘The Impact of Armed Conflict on Children’, Report of the expert of the Secretary-General, Ms Graça Machel, submitted
pursuant to General Assembly resolution 48/157.
into UN peace operations; and there has been a major growth in the advocacy and program activities by NGOs, focusing on children affected by armed conflict.\(^6\)

In the internecine conflicts of recent years, children have featured centrally as both the targets and the perpetrators of violence. Almost one-half of the world’s 21 million refugees are children, while it is estimated that another 13 million children have been displaced within the borders of their own countries. The number of children under the age of 18 who have been coerced or induced to take up arms as child soldiers is generally thought to be in the range of 300,000. Each year, between eight and ten thousand children are the victims of landmines. It is estimated that during the decade between 1986 and 1996, armed conflicts killed 2 million children, injured 6 million, traumatised over 10 million and left more than a million orphaned.

These figures indicate that children are disproportionately affected by armed conflict, and their needs merit concerted attention. Children, caught in the midst of critical stages of personal development, are affected by war more profoundly than adults. They depend, even more than adults, on the protection afforded in peacetime by family, society, and law. Wars can threaten to strip away these layers of protection, with adverse consequences for children’s development and consequently for peace and stability for generations to come. There are many features to children’s suffering in conflict situations. Children are maimed and killed, and uprooted from home and community. Children are made orphans, separated from their parents and subjected to sexual abuse and exploitation. Children are used as combatants, made to suffer from trauma and deprived of education and healthcare. Particularly damaging for future generations is the impact of war on girls. Disadvantaged even in peacetime, girls undergo sexual abuse, rape, enslavement and other tribulations during war. When humanitarian efforts are undertaken to relieve suffering, or even during efforts to build peace in the aftermath of conflict, the particular needs and special concerns of girls tend to be forgotten, not the least because of the lack of systematic knowledge of these needs in specific cultural and social contexts.

II.4.2 Tasks head

In the internecine conflicts of recent years, children have featured centrally as both the targets and the perpetrators of violence. The number of children who are being directly affected by armed conflict is enormous and unprecedented, and their rights, well-being and protection merits special attention. While there is growing political will, and there are some resources, to tackle this issue, international response is hobbled in part by significant gaps in our knowledge. The interventions of international and local actors will benefit tremendously from deeper knowledge and sound analysis of the dynamics of this phenomenon. Knowledge and good analysis, in turn, require systematic and thorough research of the many ways in which children are affected by armed conflict. Several lacunae need to be addressed in order to enhance more comprehensive, sustained, and effective action.

This research agenda concentrates on four areas that require particularly urgent attention in order for effective programs and policies to be developed on behalf of children affected by armed conflict.

\(^6\) For further information please refer to the address of the Special Representative of the Secretary–General for CAC to the General Assembly (Third Committee), on the ‘Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Children’ on 11 October 2000.
These areas are:

- Reliable data on children and armed conflict;
- Current trends in warfare affecting children;
- Cultural norms and values concerning the protection of children in times of armed conflict;
- Assessment of program interventions and responses on behalf of children affected by armed conflict.

**Reliable Data on Children and Armed Conflict:**

At the most fundamental level, our grasp of the exact extent of the problem is inadequate. While it is generally accepted that the number of children currently affected by armed conflict is extremely high and perhaps unprecedented, the international community lacks reliable data at the global and regional levels and at the level of individual conflict situations. Currently, there are no accurate figures for the number of children affected by armed conflict in the world.

**Current Trends in Warfare Affecting Children:**

In addition to reliable data on the impact of armed conflict on children, there is also a widespread need for more systematic and empirical identification of trends in the conduct of organised violence that have led to the disproportionate victimisation of children:

- The uncontrolled proliferation of small arms
- the indiscriminate use of land mines,
- the illegal trade in minerals by armed groups that target civilians,
- the systematic use of extreme cruelty and sexual violence as weapons of war,
- the phenomenon of ‘warlords’ are some of the defining features of these conflicts.

Indeed, specialists in war studies have pointed to the distinctive character of most contemporary civil wars, and to a qualitative shift in the nature and conduct of warfare which severely affects defenceless civilians, especially children. By shedding light on current trends the participants in this research theme will provide a comparative perspective of the correlation between these trends and the victimisation of children in contemporary conflict.

**Cultural Norms and Values concerning the protection of Children in times of Armed Conflict:**

At the heart of the growing phenomenon of mass violence and social disintegration is a crisis of normative and value systems. Deficient as our grasp of the extent of the problem is, even less is known about what kinds of cultural norms and values about children and warfare exist, and how these are undermined or shattered by war. The erosion and non-observance of normative frameworks and value systems can give rise to an ‘ethical vacuum’ – a setting in which international standards are ignored.
with impunity and where normative and value systems have lost their sway". There is a need to identify norms and values that could lead to the positive protection of children from war. The propagation of international norms for the protection of children in times of armed conflict has also been hindered by an insufficient knowledge on the part of international community of the local norms and values within societies that have protected children from harm. It is of fundamental importance to try and find points of intersection between local and international norms in order to enhance the protection of children from armed conflict. Participants in this research theme will, through systematic comparison, identify cultural normative and value systems that lead to the protection of children from armed conflict, and investigate the ways in which local standards of protection have (or have not) worked to the benefit of children.

Assessing Program Interventions and Responses on behalf of Children Affected by Armed Conflict:

An equally significant gap in our knowledge relates to the effectiveness of the various types of intervention that are being undertaken on behalf of children affected by armed conflict. UN agencies, non-governmental organisations, bilateral aid agencies, national governments and community based organisations all have sought, in the midst and the aftermath of conflict to provide protection, relief and rehabilitation to children affected by armed conflict. Yet so complex and sizeable is the problem, and so great the strain on those trying to address it, that those developing these program interventions have had few opportunities to systematically and scientifically assess their impact, and thus pave the way for more effective interventions in the future. Sets of indicators that can be used to assess the effectiveness of interventions, as well as identify ‘best practices’ and ‘lessons learned’ for the benefit of future actions are needed.

A wider challenge is to assess how local cultural norms and values may intersect with broader political, economic and religious forces in ways that could lead not just to the protection of children during armed conflict, but could sometimes even cause them harm. While important new research has helped to reveal the broader causes of contemporary conflicts, we still have only a very partial understanding of why so many of these conflicts involve children as soldiers and victims. Without a deeper and more nuanced understanding of local dynamics, the capacities of international and local actors to prevent the negative impact of armed conflict on children, to protect them once they have become affected, and even to re-integrate them in post-conflict situations, will be limited. In this context, it is also critical to understand the role that children themselves can play in activities designed to assist them. Children are often active agents in processes that influence their lives and not merely passive members of “target groups” that are acted upon by others.

Through systematic comparison, they could identify the kinds of conflicts in which children have been either protected or deeply involved, shed light on the operative circumstances in each such case, and investigate the ways in which local dimensions of protection have (or have not) worked to children’s benefit.

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1 Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary General For Children and Armed Conflict to the General Assembly, 12 October 1998
Several sub-themes can be identified in this broad research area. One of them could be the direct collection of information that could lead to the identification of cultural norms and values concerning the protection of children in times of conflict and warfare: Who is allowed to fight a war, and in which circumstances? What age limits are locally considered acceptable for an individual to become a combatant? What kinds of ‘dos’ and ‘don’ts’ regulate military activity, especially in relation to children and youths? In other words, what kinds of rules or ethics of war and combat exist, and what is their rationale?

The role of girls in war is another important sub-theme in this research area. How do different value systems identify girls’ social roles, obligations and responsibilities? What is socially expected from girls? What is the extent of young women’s participation in war? What kinds of roles are assigned to them - soldiers, guards, servants, cleaners, cooks, objects of sexual pleasure, or wives? How are girl’s roles in the war socially perceived by local communities?
II.5 THE PSYCHIC RECONSTRUCTION OF FORMER CHILD AND YOUTH SOLDIERS AND MILITIA

They bury the tears
(in the plains of silence)
because they take the breath away from the innocent

The Case of Timangane

Timangane, sixteen years old asked the psychotherapist if he could take part in a play therapy session, since his friend Jose was also participating. They had been kidnapped together. During the first session in which Timangane participated, the other adolescents in the group were modelling figures out of clay. The theme of these sessions was the group's experiences since the end of the war. Timangane made a radio of clay. He said: "Now we live in peace and I can listen to the radio at night. During the war we slept in the bush, outside of our huts, afraid that we would be kidnapped. No one could listen to the radio at night. If the 'matsangas' (reference to RENAMO, the insurgency group in Mozambique which was waging a destabilisation campaign against FRELIMO, the government party) heard our radio they would have known where we were. Not even babies were allowed to cry at night."

At the end of the session, Timangane said good-bye to the psychotherapist and his friends, but he did not leave. He sat down in the shade of a tree, waiting for all of the others to leave. Then he went back to see the psychotherapist and said that he was not like the others. The psychotherapist asked who the others were, to whom he was referring. Timangane replied, "those others who were just here." His tone of voice was harsh and piercing.

He then explained the difference, saying that although he had been a soldier, he had saved someone's life. "When we were returning from a battle, the commander sent me to kill a woman, but I did not kill her. I ran away with this woman and we went to Xinavane." The psychotherapist did not question the veracity of the young man's statement, as psychotherapy focuses on the content of intra-psychic 'truth'.

Nevertheless, Timangane insisted upon introducing the woman whom he had saved to the psychotherapist. The psychotherapist reiterated that he believed Timangane's story, and so it was up to him to decide if he really wanted to introduce the woman to him. Two days later, Timangane came to the psycho-social centre in the company of a woman. The woman told the psychotherapist that she had been kidnapped by a group of soldiers and forced to carry sacks of clothing and food that the soldiers had robbed from the local people. She and some of her neighbours had been forced to walk very quickly, accompanying the marching soldiers. After a while, she became exhausted and could not keep up with the soldiers. At that point, the commander ordered a soldier to kill her. As the young soldier was getting ready to shoot, she recognised the 'child' who was about to kill her and shouted his name, "Timangane!" The child soldier was startled; it had been years since anyone had called him by his real name, "Timangane." He had received a new name, John. It was his war name. The woman repeated his name. She asked him if he recognised her. She was his
The woman took the child by the hand and together they fled. Timangane was a hero.

In the following session, Timangane explained the reason he came to the therapy session. In his nightmares, he is being pursued by the 'souls' of the people he killed. Timangane, the hero, was forced during the war to kill many people. After a while the commander at the base no longer bothered to check whether his order would be carried out because he knew that it would be. Even Timangane had lost count of how many people he had killed. He would dehumanise his victims. They were not people to him. They were enemies, prisoners. They were objects to be eliminated. By dehumanising his victims, Timangane also dehumanised himself. He was the instrument that killed them. The commander was an omnipotent being, the lord of life and death. Timangane identified with the commander. In his dreams during the war, he saw himself in the skin of his commander, and it was he who had the power to decide about life and death.

He had the power to kill all who were weak. But Timangane also hates himself. If his aunt had not saved him, he would have continued to kill. His aunt saved him because he did not kill her and they ran away together. That means that he had had, after all, options all along. He could have broken earlier with his pseudo-identity as a soldier, the one who killed but had no responsibility for his actions, who was simply 'carrying out orders'.

Timangane had not left until the moment in which his aunt had re-established a biographical link between the child soldier, John, and the child, Timangane, the Timangane from before the war.

**The Transformation of Children into Soldiers**

The case of John, or Timangane, is not unique. In 1988, international organisations estimated that between 2,300 and 10,000 Mozambican children had been 'instrumentalised' as soldiers. The actual number is likely higher, since these figures are based upon the number of children instrumentalised by the guerrillas, RENAMO. It does not include children who, for the sake of 'political mobilisation' or outright coercion, were recruited by popular militias.

Children kill. Adults force children to kill. Children are considered easier to train than adults, easier to intimidate, easier to control and less likely to desert. Technological advances have facilitated the use of children. AK-47 machine guns are light and can be used by children as young as eight years old.

Children can be, and have been, transformed into instruments of death and destruction. They are at the same time victims and perpetrators of violence. Since 1994, the Project on the Josina Machel Island (run formerly by the Mozambican Association for Public Health, AMOSAPU; since 1997 run by the NGO 'Rebuilding Hope'), has worked with 546 children and 230 families. Our work is primarily psychotherapeutic, and the reasons which children give for the acts they committed vary. Children were forced to become soldiers or join the militia. Some were forced by their own parents or by influential members of their community. Other children were kidnapped, trained and forced to kill. Those who refused to become soldiers
were killed as a punishment for their refusal, and as a way of intimidating others.

The objective of the project's therapeutic work is the psychic reconstruction of former child soldiers and militia. This work entails children and youth to transcend their trauma while at the same time not negating or denying it. It concentrates on the subjective elaboration of psychic trauma. For each child emerges from a particular experience after living through his/her own war.

The situations which resulted in children becoming soldiers or militia are different. Their ages, length of exposure to the war, the atrocities they witnessed or committed, their level of psychic development, and their perceptions of the traumatic events which they encountered all vary. Nevertheless, there are some common threads running through all of the psychotherapeutic interventions. These include the need to establish a sense of trust between therapist and child; establishing the capacity to make meaning of the traumatic events they experienced; the re-establishment of self-esteem; gaining control of their aggression; and the capacity to project one's self into the future. Below, I illustrate some examples of the psychic trauma experienced by children and youth, as well as some instances of psychotherapeutic interventions.

**The Shock to Self-Understanding and Understanding of the World**

Nelson, sixteen years old:
My father was a guerrilla and my uncle was the base commander. I grew up on the base and was trained there. I was the head of my group until I was captured. My father died in the war.

Armando, fifteen years old:
"When the bandits began to attack our area, the head of the people's militia and the secretary of the neighbourhood (bairro) came to the school to train us so that we could defend our village and our cattle."

In order to defend something, you must possess it. What children possessed was the love of their parents, the love of their village, their houses and their animals. In order to keep this love alive and secure their trust in those they love, they had to accept picking up arms and killing. Refusal would have been interpreted as a lack of loyalty and would have been punished with a withdrawal of love by parents and other significant adults in the child's life. Making sense of traumatic events is one of the central objectives of therapy sessions. There is generally a wide gap between the traumatic event and the child's capacity to understand it. This can lead to situations of vulnerability and abandonment.

For the love of his father, Nelson picked up a gun and killed for a cause which he did not understand. He was captured and considered an 'armed bandit'. He was interrogated by government forces. His confidence that his father would come to rescue him from the interrogation, since he was the one who had sent him off to fight, had vanished: "At night I would dream that my father would come to rescue me. He would have to arrive before the FRELIMO soldiers killed me and he would have to kill them." His confidence in his father remained shaken. Nelson, however, began to blame himself for having failed, for allowing himself to be captured. After being
released, he was sent to a centre for former child soldiers. There, the social workers judged him on the basis of the acts he was forced to commit and considered him a ‘bandit.’ At the end of the war, he received word that his father was dead. Nelson refused to believe it. He was faced with a double-edged sword: if he believed that his father was dead, but he was really alive, then Nelson would end up being his father's assassin in his dreams. If he continued to believe that his father was alive, but he was really dead, then he could not begin the process of mourning his father.

This dilemma could not be resolved through psychotherapy. Instead, the therapist decided it would be more effective to help Nelson find his father. His father was, in fact, dead. Nelson's mother had abandoned the base and was now living with another man. For Nelson, this stepfather had filled his father's shoes. His hatred towards his father for having left him helpless is now transferred to his stepfather and his mother. Nelson left their house and now lives in a centre for street children. Nelson has taken on a protective role with the other children; he has become a father to them and looks after them. When one of the children does something which he assumes to be wrong, and he/she is not stronger than he is, Nelson resorts to physical abuse. When someone stronger is present however, he does everything in his power to appease him/her, revealing a diminished sense of self-esteem. This is a defence mechanism; on the one hand, he seems to show no consideration for himself and others, on the other hand, he shows extreme arrogance to those who are weaker than he, an 'I' which is grandiose and omnipotent.

**Control of Aggression**

Calisto, fourteen years old:
"Whoever did not want to fight was killed...those who were lucky were only beaten. They would slice the throat of those who did not want to fight... I was trained for three days on how to march and run. Then they gave me my weapon and I got used to fighting. The orders were to kill anyone we caught and to bring back anything they had on them."

Within life and death, the pulse of life, the pulse of death, the eros (which tries to preserve life) and the thanatos (which tries to eliminate it): growing up is an act of aggression. Children learn to negotiate the conflict between the pulses of death and of life. Children learn to repress gestures and words when they understand that they hurt others. On the other hand, children internalise all that parents demand that they do or not do. This shapes their moral consciences and ideas; it is the basis upon which they judge their own actions.

Exposure to violence and the coercion to kill or be killed creates a psychological conflict for the children, whose objective is to override the super ego's prohibition of committing atrocities. It is important in therapy to help the children gain control over their aggression and re-establish the function of the super ego. The process occurs simultaneously as they regain a sense of identity and can ask and answer, "Who am I? What do I want?, " as well as begin to accept responsibility for their actions.

The psychic conflict resulting from being forced to kill or be killed engenders a mechanism of pseudo-identification with the 'soldier identity'. This pseudo-identification enables children to go along with orders, to carry them out without
feeling responsible for them. This brings to mind the affirmation, "We were not responsible. Hitler did it." This pseudo-identity is also captured by the circumstances under which children were kidnapped; the atrocities they were forced to commit; when children were drugged and forced to kill their families or other people close to them, to destroy their own houses or to reap death and destruction on their own villages. With these actions, children break important bonds with their parents' generation, with the place where they feel at home, and with all of the people and places which are important to them.

Children become wracked with guilt, characterised by self-deprecation and self-loathing, which leaves them both vulnerable to self-destruction and with the potential to destroy others. Killing and the risk of being killed become normal. Children's perceptions of the value of human life, of their life and that of others, as well as the sense that their own bodies are beautiful - something which belongs to them, - are violated. The children come to believe that they are incapable of protecting their own bodies: that a bullet or an explosion can transform their bodies into lifeless blood and bones. The notion of the world as a safe place for the foreseeable future is completely undone. Instead, the world is transformed into a jungle, where only the strongest and mightiest survive.

It is important to help children regain their ability to project themselves into the future, to think of something other than a 'non-future'. As Hans Keilson's theory of 'sequential traumatisation' suggests (Keilson, 1979), this' is not easy particularly since the post-war context does not offer children and youth many opportunities for social reintegration. Calisto lost his parents and two brothers in the war. He was excluded from the United Nations' process of demobilisation because he was under sixteen years of age - he was not considered a soldier and therefore did not have access to the material and social support resources made available to officially demobilised soldiers. The area where Calisto lives is full of anti-personnel mines, which greatly diminishes his opportunities for agriculture. The war was cruel, but, paradoxically, the post-war context, seems, 'in retrospect, even more cruel to some children.

During the war, there was solidarity amongst the soldiers, even if it took the form of the adult soldiers eating the meat and the child soldiers eating the skin. There was a sense of sharing, of keeping the child soldiers alive so that they could serve the needs of those responsible for the war and its atrocities. While a soldier kept watch at night, the others could sleep, knowing that they would be awoken in the case of danger. In times of peace, many of these children and youth were abandoned and left to survive by their own wits.

**Victims and Victimisers**

Timangane, Calisto, Nelson and Armando were forced to perpetrate violence. They are at the same time victims and victimisers. This is not always obvious at first glance. It is important for the therapists to establish a bond with these youth. They should avoid passing judgements on their actions while at the same time not dismissing the seriousness of the consequences of those actions. Armed conflict in Mozambique was resolved by guaranteeing immunity from prosecution to those responsible for the atrocities committed during the war. These persons continue to
hold positions of power and very little was done to have them make reparations for the damage which they inflicted.

During therapy, the children will often find it imperative to break their identification with the aggressor, and also to acknowledge their own roles as victims. To acknowledge one's role as a victim also means acknowledging that there were victimisers.

This can raise serious dilemmas because yesterday's victimisers may still be in positions of power today and can victimise again. These victimisers have yet to recognise the suffering they have caused. The fear which children have about identifying the victimisers can complicate the child's ability to recognise him/herself as a victim, to externalise his hatred. This conflict can, however, be elaborated symbolically.

One strategy which was used with Timangane, Calisto, Nelson, and Armando was for them to narrate stories in which none of the characters would be real persons. An animal such as a cobra can play the role of the victimisers. A rat, a rabbit can play the role of the victim. Onto these animals, chosen by the children themselves, they can project their different feelings, without the risk of naming any real victimisers.

The content and the characteristics of these symbolic animals are elaborated by the children themselves. They create monsters with their own fantasy. Calisto, for example, created an animal which was a combination of a mamba snake, a lion and a python. The characteristics which he incorporates into the monster he created include:

- the mamba is an animal who is a traitor and who hides in the bush and attacks unexpectedly;
- the mamba injects venom into the body of its victims and it is the victims own blood that transports the venom throughout the body;
- the lion is a strong animal who lacerates its victims and displays its victims innards, bones, skin and blood;
- the python grinds up the skeleton of its victims and it swallows it through its dark belly.

These images take us on a journey through the torturous labyrinth of children's psychic trauma. They are disturbances to the children's emotional life and their ability to reason. These disturbances to the child's psychic organisation can be difficult to recognise and understand. Often the symptoms are quite specific and therefore difficult to organise into specific syndromes. These symptoms only begin to reveal their significance throughout the course of therapy. Concrete representations enable us to enter into the therapeutic process of re-telling the past, of linking the rabbit with the monster that swallowed it. But it also enables us to find a crack that allows escape from the python's dark belly. Masks and representations on paper can also be effective ways to mediate this therapeutic process.
Purification Rituals

Timangane, the young man discussed at the beginning of this chapter, was pursued by 'souls' of the persons whom he had killed. This was his only symptom and motivation for seeking psychotherapy. He was also interested in participating in the self-help activities available through the Project's centre.

Timangane lived like a 'displaced person' in a nearby town. He was scared that he would be killed by his former captors and companions in arms, since he had not complied with his commander's Order; even worse, he had deserted. He was afraid to return to his village or even to the town where he had initially taken refuge because he thought he might be recognised as a 'former guerrilla' as an enemy spy by the government soldiers. There was no place where Timangane felt safe.

He returned to his parents' village only after the cease-fire in 1992 and only when his father came to look for him. Before entering his family's house, his father called for the religious leader of the local traditional 'Zionist' church, so that Timangane might undergo a ritual of purification. Through this ritual of transformation the child soldier John and the displaced Timangane returned to the child that he was before he was kidnapped. During the ritual, Timangane was covered with the blood and ashes of a pigeon. Afterwards, the ashes and the blood are washed away. The blood symbolises the dead. The ashes symbolise destruction.

According to the explanation of the religious leader who performed the ritual, the community had been involved in conflicts long before the one in which Timangane had participated. At the end of the wars, the soldiers returned back to their villages. The people of the villages knew that the soldiers had killed, burned down huts and had blood on their hands. They had nevertheless struggled to defend the interests of the village or of its chief. These soldiers had the right to be incorporated back into the community to which they belonged. The prisoners captured by these soldiers also came to live with the families of those who had defeated them.

However, the religious leader explained, the behaviours which are allowed in times of war are different from those allowed in times of peace. And so, it became necessary to 'wash' the soldiers and their prisoners of the blood which covered them. This was done through this ritual of purification. The soldiers who went through this rituals pledged to live their lives as they lived them before the war. It was in this way that the ritual came to be used at the end of the war in which Timangane participated. John became Timangane again. No one asked 'John' what he had done during the war. John pledged to return to live as Timangane.

This ritual enabled Timangane to return to the village from which he came and once again share his daily life with other 'Johns' and also with youth, who had fought in the government's paramilitary forces. The symbolic bath of blood and ashes washed away the undesirable memories of the past. The memories of war were to be repressed.

The Repression of Traumatic Memories

Other similar practices to those discussed above exist. In these instances, the behaviours and memories which are considered to be negative are symbolically
placed into a bottle which is then cast out to sea. Another variant calls for the bottle to be thrown backwards where two roads meet, without looking back. The river and the crossroads remove from the child unwanted memories and behaviours. Timangane's parents and the village authorities in this way attempt to repress memories of the past. It is taboo to speak of these past experiences. The taboo protects the parents from speaking about a situation in which they failed in their roles as their child's protectors. In this way, Timangane's parents do not have to confront their feelings of guilt for not having prevented their son's kidnapping and for his being forced to commit atrocities.

But Timangane continued to live with the fear that his captors would come looking for him. His fears only began to diminish when he found out that the party of the former government (FRELIMO) won the elections. During his therapy session, Timangane nevertheless continued to recount his experiences as a soldier. He felt he had just as much right as the adult soldiers to receive the monetary subsidies distributed as part of the demobilisation campaign.

The ritual had not eliminated his memories of the war. Timangane had broken the silence; he had broken the taboo. He spoke with his father about his sleep disturbances, about his attempts to keep from falling asleep in fear that he would have nightmares, and of the pain inflicted by these nightmares which caused him to wake up in a state of terror. Timangane's parents ignored his pleas for help; they punished his break of the taboo by feigning indifference. Timangane began to have episodes of sleep walking. In the middle of the night he would get up and go to his parent's hut, which is explicitly forbidden by cultural norms. He would walk around his parents and mechanically repeat to them, "Don't be afraid. I am the sentinel." This is probably a 'defence hysteria' through which he could defend himself from the forces which provoked disagreeable feelings. These forces may include fear and anxiety, emotional remnants of traumatic feelings he experienced during the war.

Timangane and his parents consulted the local traditional healer (curandeira) or shaman. The curandeira gave Timangane's mother some roots. These were wrapped up in a cloth and placed under the mat on which Timangane slept. These roots were to expel the evil spirits haunting him. For about a week, Timangane managed to sleep without any disturbances. After some time, his nightmares returned. Timangane explains, "It was on the day that my father insulted me for not having gone to get water from the well. That's work for women and children." The discussion escalated until, Timangane explains, his father said to him, "if I already think of myself as a man and I don't want to take his orders, then I need to get out of the house and find a wife who can get water for me." The fight between Timangane and his father re-ignited his psychic conflict. This had already been coming out during the consultation with the curandeira, in which she indicated to Timangane's father that his son's nightmares might be the result of the child having witnessed death, mutilation, kidnappings, and for having committed 'inappropriate things'. In this way, the spirits of the dead had entered his son's body. Since these spirits do not pertain to the child's family, they wish to be well received. The nightmares meant that the spirits were in the child's body and wished to speak with his parents. In this case, it would be necessary, through the curandeira, to call these spirits so they might talk with Timangane and his parents.
These spirits must be appeased. The parents must discover why they are pursuing their son and must give the spirits whatever they want in order to appease them and as proof of appropriate veneration. They had to convince the spirits to leave Timangane alone. Despite his son's sleep disturbances and episodes of hysteria which suggested they were deeply linked to Timangane's war-time experience, Timangane's father refused to accept the war as an explanation for his son's problems.

The curandeira then suggested that it might be a family spirit which was tormenting Timangane. When it is a family spirit, the curandeira could initiate 'Kufemba', a ceremony in which the dead speak with the living. Through 'Kufemba', the spirit could tell Timangane the reason why he was having nightmares and what had to be done in order to resolve the conflict. This suggestion was also vetoed by Timangane's father. He opted for herbs and the cloths which could be used to expel wandering spirits without having to speak with them. In this way, the possibility of engaging in a cathartic process of psychic elaboration, in which Timangane and his parents could discuss and relive the traumatic events that were causing such a conflict, was denied.

This struggle re-emerged during Timangane's fight with his father regarding the water. The relatively banal context of their clash evoked a strong emotional response in both father and son, reactions that were disproportionate to the significance of the conflict per se. The father-son bond, which was already strained, suddenly was in danger of experiencing a complete rupture. The father thought he would be able to resolve the conflict with his son by throwing him out of the house. This choice, to initiate a break in their relationship by declaring his son an adult and therefore that he had no responsibility for him, permitted him to engage his son in a direct confrontation regarding the origin and reason behind his conflict with his son.

Like the majority of children in his culture, Timangane received a traditional name from his paternal grandfather when he was born. This ceremony reflects the community's conception of life and humanity, in which the ancestors continue to live in the children named after them. These ancestors protect the children and determine their luck and misfortunes in life. The parent-child relationship is also marked by these conceptions. Parents will find traces of these ancestors in the faces and behaviours of their children.

Timangane was kidnapped. Timangane was forced to kill. Timangane's father never asked him to speak about what he went through. Timangane was always waiting for his father to speak to him. He was certain that his aunt, whom he had saved, would tell his father the circumstances under which the two found themselves; with Timangane, that is, the soldier 'John', having been sent to kill her in cold blood. Timangane's father blamed himself for not having been able to protect his son, for not having prevented his kidnapping. This guilt was projected onto his son: Timangane could have run away, he could have avoided getting captured, he could have refused to kill.

Yet Timangane's refusal to kill would have meant his certain death. Could it be that Timangane's father thought it was preferable to have a dead son than a son who had been transformed into a killer? His incapacity to answer this question for himself led him to construct a solution in the imaginary realm: in his fantasy, he himself wanted
to kill his son. He wanted him to disappear. If Timangane would be a man, he could rebuild his life far away from him. This intense love and hate coexisted in his father, and they were the reasons for his ambiguity.

‘Kufemba’ would allow the family to talk about the trauma. It could help Timangane rediscover his childhood and adolescence, without denying the reality of the trauma. On the other hand, Timangane’s father was utilising a large amount of psychic energy to repress his own traumas with respect to his own father. “I did not have a father!” he said. His father had abandoned him and his mother and went to work in the South African mines. There, he had started another family, occasionally sending some money to him and his mother. His mother had thought that if he had never been born, she would be free to do as she wished. She could have returned the money from the ‘lobolo' (bride-price) and returned to her parent's house. With no possibility of confronting his own father about his feeling of having been abandoned, Timangane's father had directed all of this frustration onto his son.

Timangane, therefore, is not just a victim. He had also been powerful; he had been forced to commit barbarous acts, acts that were far worse than those his father imagined in his fantasies. Real violence substitutes for the phantoms.

Timangane was brutally confronted with the loss of his illusions. He had prematurely experienced solitude and the loss of parental protection. The image of the omnipotent parents had been gone. The death of this illusion, his introduction into the world of adults, his access to sexual intercourse with female prisoners and the murders he committed, all occurred in a context of real violence. They had not occurred within the context of traditional practices, where these acts would have been protected and codified. In addition to the struggles with his illusions, Timangane must also struggle with the strife in his family. When Timangane came to his first play therapy session, he was being pursued by the souls of the persons he had killed. With individual psychotherapy, it was possible to uncover the significance of some of these nightmares. Timangane and John are two persons sharing one biography. Family therapy sessions were held in conjunction with individual therapy sessions. These were ‘family visits’, which allowed Timangane to involve his father in the healing process. This process is far from over.

They bury the tears
(in the plains of silence)
because they take the breath away from the innocent
In their fear of the sacrifice
they hand out hypocritical kisses
to children of skin and bones
And they hide the voices
that whisper in the silence of the days
with their eyes shamed by grief

Elton Rebello, from Opinion
III. Case Studies

III.1 Mozambique – A Country in Transition from War to Peace

Boaventura Zita

Mozambique attained its statehood in 1975 after a long-lasting war. Under the leadership of Frelimo a ten year struggle was fought for national independence.

The agreement granting Mozambique's independence was signed on 7 September 1974 in Lusaka, Zambia. A transitional interim government led by Frelimo and Joaquim Chissano as Prime Minister was installed on 20 September in 1974. But it took until 25 June 1995 to reach independence. Samora Machel became the first president of Mozambique and Joaquim Chissano foreign minister.

Mozambique followed a Marxism-Leninism system of government which to certain extent was not friendly to the neighbouring countries of apartheid South Africa and ex-Rhodesia. After independence the newly established government committed itself to assist the liberation movements (mainly ANC in South Africa and Zapu and Zanu in Zimbabwe) fighting for independence against colonial and minority rule in Southern Africa.

Through a popular mobilisation undertaken by the Government Mozambique managed to attain significant gain in health, education. Indeed, the World Health Organisation (WHO) placed Mozambique as one of the country that had good record in child-mother care assistance in the 1970s and mid 1980s.

All main industries were abandoned by Portuguese who did not came to terms with the newly independent Mozambique. The majority of industry was nationalised and became state-owned.

From 1977 Mozambique started to be crippled by floods, drought and above all war - one would call it destabilisation from the minority regimes of South Africa and Rhodesia and also the activities of Renamo which called their efforts a struggle for democratisation and end to communism.

Renamo activities were to a certain extent almost paralysing the country. All the social, economic and political gains from the 1970s were destroyed because of one of the most brutal wars in Third World countries.

Since the middle 1980s the country was experiencing hardships. Some actors cautiously started to talk about the need to put an end to this war which had (internally and externally) displaced five million Mozambicans; one million people had died as a direct consequence of this war; the destabilisation war and the civil had caused economic costs of nearly five billion US$.

On 16 March 1984, Mozambique and apartheid South Africa signed the Nkomati agreement. Under the terms of this agreement South Africa would stop supporting Renamo and Mozambique pledged to halt ANC military operation from its territory. Needless to say that this agreement did not bear desirable fruits to Mozambicans.

* The case studies represent the views of the author.
since the escalation of death and destruction worsened.

In search for a peace solution within SADCC, Machel and some of his key advisors died in a plane crash in Africa on the way home from a Frontline States meeting in Zambia. Chissano was chosen by the Central Committee of Frelimo to take over as a leader of the party and the head of state.

As a diplomat Chissano gave a new impetus to peace initiatives. He toured the country, organising mass meeting asking populations whether to talk or not with those in the bush causing death, as a reference to Renamo.

Against this background CCM church leaders were given green light to continue using their services to contact the "other side" about peace initiatives. CCM leader went to Kenya, Malawi, Switzerland and the USA trying to pave ways for peace talks.

Formal talks started with a document called "12 Principles for Dialogue". A delegation of CCM church leaders met with the Renamo leadership in Nairobi where they presented a government document outlining the proposals to initiate a dialogue.

President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe and President Daniel Arap Moi of Kenya agreed to act as mediators. Renamo after accepting to start talks in Malawi, later claimed that the security of its members could not be guaranteed and this move delayed the process. After some development talks started in Rome, Italy, on 8 July 1990 under the leadership of the "Santo Egidio". This community is attached to Roman Catholic Church and acted as mediators. This long process lasted for twelve rounds and the peace accord was signed on the 4 October 1992 in Rome.

The key point of the peace agreement were as follows:

- a general cease-fire to come into effect immediately after ratification of the treaty by the concerned parties;
- a new electoral law and both presidential and parliamentary elections within a year of the signing of the peace accord;
- the formation of political parties, stressing that these should not promote "sectoral interests" of a particular social class or group and must be non-regional, non-tribal, non-separatist, non-racial and non-religious,
- the establishment of a joint force, the Armed Forces for the Defence of Mozambique (FADM) with an army of 24,000 people, an airforce of 4,000 and a navy of 2,000 people with both parties contributing equally to these force. Those not incorporated into a new army were to be demobilised;
- a cease-fire commission that included representatives of the United Nation, called UNIMOZ, the government and Renamo to supervise the implementation of the peace accord.

Francisco Madelra, a member of the government that participated in Rome Accord said that:

"that during the negotiations to implement General Peace Accord both in Rome and Maputo (in the latter he was referring to the sessions of the Commissions of Supervision and Control)
there existed a permanent element of distrust. The search for understanding consisted, therefore, of repairing this radical basic distrust and moving beyond it towards a basic trust, of shifting from mutual tolerance towards consensus." (Small Arms, Big Impact, A Challenge to the Churches, World Council of Churches, 1998, Salpy Eskidjian, page 86).

This statement illustrates a situation where the talks took into consideration that both parties had been fighting for a long-time and could not come to terms in a linear way.

We all know that United Nations operations are known for their red tape which led to its in-operability. This was clearly stated by Virginia Gamba from the Institute for Security Studies, South Africa:

The lack of an effective disarmament and demobilisation component in the ONUMOZ peacekeeping operation and the fact that collection did not necessarily lead to destruction of existing weapons stocks have not put national stability and regional peace in peril. (Small Arms in Southern Africa, Reflection on the extent of the problem and its management potential, Virginia Gamba, No 42, November 1992)

ONUMOZ was deployed in 1992 as a UN peacekeeping mission in Mozambique. The mandate included the demobilisation of both governmental and Renamo troops. The UN reported that ONUMOZ collected 189,827 weapons from military and paramilitary forces, as well as from the general population, most of these weapons were transferred to the new Mozambique Defence Force with only a small number being destroyed.

First multiparty election were held from 27 to 29 October 1994 based on a framework agreed upon in the peace treaty. The turnout was more than 85% of the registered voters. On the eve of the elections Renamo decided to boycott the polls. Chissano obtained 53.3% and Dhlakama 33.7%.

In the second elections in 1999 Chissano won with 52,29% and Dhlakama was second with 47,71%.

Whereas in first general elections the electoral process had gone well, though, Renamo had claimed technical problems; the second general elections encountered real problems. Renamo did not accept the outcome of the result. They claiming fraud and submitted a complaint to the Supreme Court that acts as a Electoral Court. Renamo's claims were rejected. However, Renamo did not accept this position causing negative effects on the nation. For example, on the 9 November Renamo's verbal attacks finally expanded into nation-wide demonstrations by its supporters. Some of these ended in violent clashes in Montepuez, Cabo Delgado province, where about 85 people died. Till today things are not clear who started the shooting. A Commission of Inquire was established by the Parliament and still working on its findings.

Present Main National Problems: The high hopes in democracy did not improve the situation of poverty, i.e. economic and social problems. As a consequence, there is a
certain apathy of people in participating in political activities since they do not see immediate result from their participation.

Social, economic and political conflicts are emerging and sometimes with an ethnic tendency due mainly to economic problems. People need to have equal sharing of resources and the benefits of the multiparty democracy. However, these expectation can not be fulfilled within the framework of open market were competition dictate the rules.

According to econometric statistics of IMF and World Bank Mozambique is doing well. Yet more than ever before the gap between the few rich and majority poor is widening. Political instability is derailing the national currency in the last three months. Consequently, prices are rising but salaries can not be increased as the government always must receive a green light from IMF for pay-rises.

Floods worsened the situation. Last year the Southern part and Central part were affected and received attention of international community. This year the Central and Northern regions were affected this time, but did not receive the same attention as the South.

Mozambique is now following an Open Market Policy which attracts some white farmers from South Africa and Zimbabwe who are investing in Mozambique. In some places there are emerging problems of misunderstanding that need to be taken seriously by the government and the civil society.

Demobilised troops similar to ordinary citizens are poor and need attention by the community. What makes the situation grim are the draconian means of credit facilities that do not give poor rural people access to loans and credits. Hence, the road system and marketing system are very poor.

Civil society is very incipient and is still taking first steps. The only active main players are Frelimo and Renamo. Other political parties are still fighting to have a floor. This situation is not good for Mozambique since there is a need for all to participate and by participating I mean to have a voice and to make a difference.
III.2 Zimbabwe - The Land Question and the War Veteran Movement

Munyaradzi Saruchera

III.2.1 Introduction

Zimbabwe has a total land area of 39.6 million hectares, 33 million of which are reserved for agriculture and the rest is reserved for national parks, forests and urban settlements. The country’s economy is diversified, but dependent on stable agrarian growth where industry and mining contribute about 43 percent of Gross Domestic Product, services 46 percent while agriculture accounts for 11 percent. At the same time, agriculture contributes 33 percent of formal employment and in good years the same sector accounts for 40 percent of total exports (Government of Zimbabwe, 1998).

More than 20 years after independence, the structural roots of Zimbabwe’s current political crisis and economic downturn remain rooted in racially based inequalities in land ownership and access to other resources. It is against this background that Zimbabwe seeks a socially just, economically viable and yet politically stable framework for land and agrarian reform among competing approaches.

Out of the country’s population of 12.5 million people, more than six million people live in marginal rural lands with infertile soils and unreliable rainfall. The same people have restricted access to the vast natural resources of the country. Unequal access to the country’s natural resources means that a few thousand large-scale farmers who are predominantly white, dominate Zimbabwe’s largely agrarian economy (Moyo, 1997/8).

At independence in 1980, the division of land was extremely inequitable, with some 700,000 smallholder communal farmers occupying 16.4 million hectares (49 percent of all farming land), 75 percent of which was located in natural regions IV and V with poor soils and low unreliable rainfall. At the same time, about 6,000 large-scale commercial farmers occupied 15.5 million hectares (46 percent of the total) of prime land in mostly natural regions I, II and III. Small-scale commercial farmers comprising 8,500 black farmers held 5 percent of agricultural land in natural regions IV and V and state farms held the balance of farming land (Kinsey, 1999 and Government of Zimbabwe, 1998).

The current land distribution in Zimbabwe is such that out of 39 million hectares of land, 32.74 million is classified as agricultural land. Of the 32.74 million hectares, 16.35 million hectares is communal land and farmed by more than 1 million households. The communal lands have the lowest agricultural potential with 74% of the land under Natural Regions IV and V with less than 650mm of rainfall per year and soils of the lowest natural fertility.
### Table 1: Size Structure of Large Scale Commercial Farms – 1998

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category (Ha)</th>
<th>Farms</th>
<th>Total Area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Below 400</td>
<td>1 314</td>
<td>28.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>400 – 999</td>
<td>1 096</td>
<td>23.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 000 – 3 999</td>
<td>1 736</td>
<td>37.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 000 – 7 999</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 000 and more</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4 660</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Government of Zimbabwe, 1998.

White agrarian interests complemented by transnational capital remain in control of key sectors of the economy such as tourism, forestry, commodity exports and agro-industry. The above imbalances reflect an unchanged legacy of colonial rule and a dramatically skewed income distribution structure between blacks and whites. Such a skewed distribution structure undermines the growth of rural incomes where over 60% of the rural people are poor and hardly afford basic services.

Land reform in Zimbabwe aims to redress past land alienation through promoting equal access to land by the majority of people with the objective of achieving political stability and acceptable land property rights. Through land reform, it is hoped that economic growth will be achieved through wider equity from land redistribution (Moyo, 2000a).

### III.2.2 Background

In discussing the land issue in Zimbabwe, it is appropriate to contextualise it against the background and history of land policy over the years. The British South Africa Company (BSACo) established rule over Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) in 1890 leading to appropriation of land by white settlers that subsequently triggered the First Chimurenga war of 1896. The British government passed an Order in Council which required the BSACo to create Native Reserves for the native indigenous black people in 1898, thereby leading to the creation of the dual agrarian structure that has been maintained to the present day. These Native Reserves are known as Communal Areas today.

The creation of Native Reserves was a task of Native Commissioners who largely allocated drier and more remote areas deemed unsuitable for white settlement. The creation of Native Reserves marked the change in focus of the economic strategy of the BSACo from mining to agriculture, whose policy was based on attracting whites from abroad and settling them on large farms in high potential areas (Land Tenure Commission Report, 1994). According to Herbst (1990), the economic strategy change represents a fundamental policy decision that guaranteed white economic dominance and black poverty during the colonial period. Table 2 below chronicles the background and history of land policy in Zimbabwe from 1891 to 1994.
### Table 2: Zimbabwe’s History of Land Policy, 1891-1994

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Land Act/Commission</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1889</td>
<td>The Lippert Concession</td>
<td>White settlers to acquire land rights from native Zimbabweans</td>
<td>BASCo buys concession and uses it as basis for land appropriation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1898</td>
<td>Native Reserves Order in Council</td>
<td>To create Native Reserves in the face of mass land appropriation by white settlers</td>
<td>Native Reserves created haphazardly in low potential areas &amp; which later became Communal Areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>Land Apportionment Act (LAA)</td>
<td>To separate by law, land between black &amp; white</td>
<td>The high potential areas become white large scale privately owned farms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>Native Land Husbandry Act</td>
<td>To enforce private ownership of land, destocking &amp; conservation practices on black smallholders</td>
<td>Mass resistance to legislation fuelling nationalistic politics. Law scrapped in 1961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>Tribal Trust Lands (TTL) Act</td>
<td>To change the name of Native Reserves &amp; create trustees for the land</td>
<td>Due to population pressure TTL became degraded “homelands”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>Land Tenure Act (LTA)</td>
<td>To replace LAA of 1930 &amp; finally divide land 50% white and 50% black</td>
<td>Combined with the TTL Act, Rhodesia had equivalent of apartheid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Communal Lands Act</td>
<td>To change Tribal Trust Lands to Communal Areas</td>
<td>Change of land authority from traditional leaders to District Councils</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Land Acquisition Act</td>
<td>To give Gvt first right to purchase large scale farms for resettlement</td>
<td>Limited impact on resettlement programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Land Acquisition Act</td>
<td>To acquire 5 million hectares of land for resettlement</td>
<td>Target not achieved due to various factors, but gradual impact realised on resettlement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Government of Zimbabwe, 1994.

Despite the British government order of 1898 which required that native Zimbabweans access adequate land for cultivation, grazing and watering, the Basic disregarded the provision under pressure from white settlers and allocated better parts of the Native Reserves for white settlers on the recommendations of the Native Reserves Commission of 1914 (Land Tenure Commission Report, 1994).

With the passage of the Land Apportionment Act in 1930, the dual agrarian structure and system that favoured whites against blacks was formalised. Land was racially segregated between white and black, reinforcing the 1890 structure. Land that was owned by whites was private and remains within the Large Scale Farming Areas today while the land owned by blacks was state land held under traditional tenure and user rights, a system that remains in force in Communal Areas to date.

In 1944, the Land Settlement Board stepped up efforts to evict blacks in white areas by reserving all land for settling white ex-servicemen returning from World War II which saw the number of white farmers increase from 3 699 in 1945 to 6255 in 1955. It is important to note that the number of white farmers peaked in the 1950s as new production technology (maize and tobacco) was released for commercial farmers (Nelson, 1975).
At independence there was considerable political pressure to redistribute white owned land since the liberation war had mainly been fought on this issue. Owing to its new policy of national reconciliation and reconstruction as well as a restrictive Lancaster House independence constitution, the majority rule Zimbabwean government opted for a land resettlement programme based on a ‘willing-seller-willing-buyer’ basis. In 1981 there were 162,000 black families needing to be resettled by 1985. However, this could not be achieved largely owing to lack of funds which saw only 52,000 families being resettled by 1990 on 3.3 million hectares of land (Government of Zimbabwe, 1994).

Table 3: Zimbabwe’s Land Use Classification by Sector and Natural Region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Natural Region</th>
<th>Sector (1000 hectares)</th>
<th>Communal</th>
<th>Large Commercial</th>
<th>Scale Commercial</th>
<th>Small-scale Commercial</th>
<th>Resettlement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I &amp; II</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,410</td>
<td>3,890</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>620</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,820</td>
<td>2,410</td>
<td>530</td>
<td>1,240</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td></td>
<td>7,340</td>
<td>2,430</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>810</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td></td>
<td>4,780</td>
<td>2,490</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>620</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>16,350</td>
<td>11,220</td>
<td>1,380</td>
<td>3,290</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Given the above scenario, it is clear that land policy remains one of the most challenging issues facing independent Zimbabwe. The majority of Zimbabwe’s human capital is largely constrained by an inefficient economic structure that underutilises its people and degrades their quality of life. The need for land among blacks, particularly those in communal areas that are directly dependent on land income, consumption and subsistence cannot be overemphasised. Zimbabwe’s land question fuels the growth of poverty, unemployment and income disparities in the face of under-utilised vast parts of the country’s land and natural resources.

The majority of Zimbabweans will continue to rely on land for survival given that the slow industrialisation process and growing poverty and unemployment cannot be overcome in the short term. Inequitable access to resources means that the skewed income distribution structure of the Zimbabwean economy will continue to undermine growth of rural incomes.

Table 4: Current Land Demand/Rights Profile in Zimbabwe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Demand Category</th>
<th>Sub-Groups</th>
<th>Types of Land Use Required</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Youths</td>
<td>i. Untrained &amp; unmarried school leavers</td>
<td>- Communal crop land allocation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ii. Agricultural graduates</td>
<td>- Reclamation land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Safaris &amp; tourism opportunities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War Veterans &amp; Ex-detainees</td>
<td>i. War Veterans</td>
<td>- Reclaim lost lands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ii. War Collaborators</td>
<td>- Reclamation land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>iii. Detainees</td>
<td>- Commercial land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>iv. Spirit mediums</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communal Households</td>
<td>i. Landless peasants</td>
<td>- Access resettlement &amp; cropping land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ii. Landshort peasants</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farm workers (proxy citizenship</td>
<td>i. Former farm managers</td>
<td>- Access resettlement &amp; leasehold land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rights)</td>
<td>ii. Former farm workers</td>
<td>- Land rights for settlement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>iii. Farmworkers’ children</td>
<td>- Cropping land in communal &amp; resettlement areas</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Black elites (racial balance of Large Scale Commercial Farmers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Subcategory</th>
<th>Resources/Access</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>i. High income (civil servants, academics, private etc) persons</td>
<td>- Public leasehold</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ii. Middle income persons</td>
<td>- Access to safari/tourism land leasehold</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Urban males

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Subcategory</th>
<th>Resources/Access</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>i. Elites</td>
<td>ii. Retrenchees</td>
<td>- Peri-urban farm plots</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iii. Homeless</td>
<td>iv. Old Age/Retired</td>
<td>- Small irrigation farmlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Residential land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Collateral, social security</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Women

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Subcategory</th>
<th>Resources/Access</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>i. Elites</td>
<td>ii. Ordinary urban women</td>
<td>- Large farms, business plots &amp; residential</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iii. Poor rural women</td>
<td></td>
<td>- Small business plots, urban farming</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Rural croplands</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Rural District Councils (RDCs) Provincial Structures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Subcategory</th>
<th>Resources/Access</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>i. District Development Committees/RDCs</td>
<td>ii. Councillors/Governors</td>
<td>- Income generating projects &amp; services (schools, clinic &amp; housing)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Leasing out for investment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### NGOs/Churches

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Subcategory</th>
<th>Resources/Access</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>i. Project committees</td>
<td></td>
<td>- Training farmers &amp; projects purpose</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### State Real Estate Parastatals, agencies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Subcategory</th>
<th>Resources/Access</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Parastatals, agencies</td>
<td></td>
<td>- Commercial farm development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Peri-urban land: town expansion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Private Companies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Subcategory</th>
<th>Resources/Access</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>i. Foreign &amp; Domestic</td>
<td></td>
<td>- Commercial agriculture, tourism &amp; industry</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Moyo, S., 2000a.

The Zimbabwe government’s land reform policy is based on the need to establish a more efficient and rational structure of farming, efficient use of land and natural resources and lastly redress inequitable access to resources in search of justice and social stability.

#### III.2.3 Resettlement Program

Zimbabwe’s land resettlement program is more than twenty years old now, with the first families having been resettled a few months after independence in 1980. Under the program more than 70,000 families have been resettled to date, a figure far from the target of 162,000 families set at the beginning.

Officially the land resettlement and reform program comprises two phases, the first one being the 1980 to 1996 and the second one from 1997 marked by the designation of 1471 farms for compulsory acquisition. As from June 2000, the current third phase program, the ‘fast-track’ spearheaded by war veterans commenced (Moyo, 2000a).

Zimbabwe’s first land resettlement program was officially launched in September 1980 with the objective of alleviating problems related to the dual structure of the rural sectors and aimed at resettling people from overpopulated communal areas. The overall concept of resettlement was to make use of available commercial farming areas in a manner that allowed the poor and landless peasants to increase their productivity and hence the objectives, target group and model were deliberately designed to meet the overall objective.

The initial three year program, jointly carried out by Zimbabwe and Britain envisaged settling 18,000 families on 1,1 million hectares of land at a cost of Z$60 million. The land for resettlement came from former commercial land abandoned after the war as well as that sold to government on a willing-seller-willing-buyer basis as enshrined in the Lancaster House constitution. The initial target was later redefined in the 1982/3-1984/5 three year transitional development plan which called for the resettlement of
162,000 families on 9 million hectares at a cost of Z$500 million (DERUDE & GFA, 1988).

The long-term objectives of the resettlement program were to; eliminate the country’s dependence on the numerically small commercial farm sector, fully realise autonomous self-management units by the settlers themselves with government workers only playing an advisory role, and achieve the socialist transformation of agriculture.

The short and medium term objectives of the resettlement program were; alleviating population pressure in the over-populated communal areas, extending and improving the base for productive agriculture in the peasant farming sector, and improving the standard of living of the largest and poorest sector of the population of Zimbabwe and promoting their well-being (MLRRD, 1981/3/5).

The target group initially considered for resettlement consisted of refugees and people displaced by war and subsequently peasants, landless or those with inadequate land to maintain themselves and their families. However, the intended beneficiaries were broadened during implementation to include a full range of people from landless peasants to master farmers but strictly excluded formally employed persons (DERUDE & GFA, 1988).

When compared to the need for land and set out objectives, the land resettlement program in Zimbabwe met limited success in terms of areas and population resettled owing to varied factors. In terms of area, the program realised about 29 percent of the set target of 9.0 million hectares while in population terms it realised 28 percent of the target of 162,000 families from 1980 to 1985. Despite the ambitious targets, the overall resettlement program was reasonably successful when viewed in relation to the total rural environment. Communal areas are of importance given they represent 42 percent and hold about 70 percent of the country’s population (DERUDE & GFA, 1998).

However, regardless of the challenges, agricultural growth in Zimbabwe substantially increased agricultural output among smallholder farmers. Communal areas maize output rose from 35 to 63 percent of total national output while cotton share increased from 26 to 50 percent between 1980 and 1990 (Government of Zimbabwe, 1998).

Other challenges were the acquisition of land, which was hampered by lack of financial resources against the background of high land costs and the willing-seller-willing-buyer clause of the Lancaster House Agreement. For example the target of settling 15,000 families per year envisaged in the 1986-90 plan was not realised due to lack of funds. The willing-seller-willing-buyer clause meant that not enough land was made available for resettlement while at the same time where it was made available it was on a single farm and fragmented basis, making it difficult to plan and set up necessary infrastructure (Mutizwa-Mangiza & Helmsing, 1991).
Table 5: Periodisation of Land Acquisition in Zimbabwe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Total No. of Hectares Acquired</th>
<th>Average Ha per year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constitutional Constraints 1980 – 1984 (5 years)</td>
<td>2,147,855</td>
<td>429,571</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998 – 2000 (3 years)</td>
<td>228,839</td>
<td>76,279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (19 years)</td>
<td>3,614,130</td>
<td>190,217</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Moyo, S., 2000a

III.2.4 Disarmament, Demobilisation & Reintegration

Following the 1979 cease-fire of the Second Chimurenga war that was waged by the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) Patriotic Front (PF) led by Robert Mugabe and the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) led by the late Joshua Nkomo against the colonial Rhodesian Defence Forces (RDF) led by Ian Smith, the combatants that were fighting for majority rule and independence surrendered their weapons and joined the assembly points while the RDF soldiers also gave up their guns and kept in the barracks. The process was largely monitored by the British (Lord Soames) and advised by the Americans (Kissinger). Apart from ZANU PF and ZAPU, there were also other smaller political parties, most of whom did not have combatants on the ground, such as the United African National Congress (UANC) led by Bishop Muzorewa, National Democratic Union (NDU) led by Chikerema and ZANU Ndonga led by the late Ndabaningi Sithole.

At independence in 1980, willing combatants that belonged to both ZANU PF and ZAPU merged with the RDF soldiers to form the Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF) while the refugees that had been to the front and those combatants and soldiers not willing to serve in the force or be career soldiers were disengaged. Upon disengagement, the ex-combatants were given no more than Z$300 (then Z$1 was equivalent to 1 pound sterling) and a choice of joining an agricultural co-operative, go back to school free of charge (the likes of Chindunduma, Mavhudzi etc), join commercial/agricultural colleges (Kushinga, Mupfure etc), training institutes (for example nursing) or simply return to their homes and start a new life. Former RDF soldiers retired under slightly better packages while refugees did not receive money although they were offered training/schooling and co-operative opportunities.

Some of the former combatants that had secondary school education or better training were offered employment in the public service. Medical care and education were offered free of charge to all Zimbabweans after independence and hence the former combatants accessed the services like anybody else.

Whether or not the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegation strategies employed by the international agencies and the transitional national government were successful, there were soon indications of varying extents. Firstly, disarmament was not effective because sooner than the first national majority rule government
formed by ZANU PF was in place had some disgruntled ZAPU leaders and their combatants back to the bushes to fight the government. Whether for real or fiction, the national ZANU PF government discovered several alleged ZAPU arms caches (others believe some of the arms caches belonged to ZANU PF which meant to use them in the event of being dissatisfied by the settlement and elections outcome). The years that followed independence until 1987 saw an armed internal insurgence (the dissident era) by former ZAPU elements culminating into the late Joshua Nkomo’s exile.

On the demobilisation and reintegration level, some of the former combatants who were discharged from the regular force faced problems of failing to cope with their new situations and demands in schools, colleges and co-operatives and abandoned them. For those allocated land for co-operative farming, issues of mismanagement, poaching, deforestation and theft of farm implements for sale took centre stage while some of those that went to school and colleges challenged their teachers and the systems under which they learned. With the euphoria of independence and war time promises, some ex-combatants believed all was free and waiting for their access hence did not appreciate the use of the colonial administrative system in employment, education etc.

There are reports that for those who returned to their homes, some could not make the social adjustment or cope with the new civilian life because their families had perished in the war, war trauma settled in, poverty set in and the receiving society was disdainful and mental derangement caught up with some of them. Also among those that went home, a good number immediately joined their families and relatives and in due course when they had their own families, the need for land grew while at the same time they had no money or access to credit hence either resettled or remained squashed with extended families and languished in poverty. The coming of the Economic Structural Adjustment Program (ESAP), at a time government had withdrawn and was now disinvesting from social services (education and health), did not make the situation any better for both the former combatants in urban areas (some had just been retrenched) and those already struggling in the rural areas.

III.2.5 The Rise of Ex-Combatants’ Movement

The war veterans’ movement is a formidable critical mass in Zimbabwe’s politics that no government, today or in future, can afford not to recognise and duly give audience. For better or worse, the war movement’s active role in Zimbabwe’s politics today is largely a creation of politicians’ machinations on one hand and an ugly reminder of a post-war legacy on the other.

About 1996, the ex-combatants began to organise themselves to engage and lobby government to look into their plight following funds (the National War Victims’ Compensation Fund) that had been made available by donors for compensation of those injured in the war. This development led to the formation of Zimbabwe National War Veterans Association (ZNWVA) which was charged with vetting and registering its members across the country. The war compensation funds were abused and largely claimed by top government officials who knew about the existence of the fund and claimed huge war-related disabilities and medical reports that entitled them to access varying amounts of money.
Using its own structures and medical doctors (the late Dr. Chenjerai ‘Hitler’ Hunzvi was the leading one), the ZNWVA soon began to help its membership access the national war victims’ compensation funds, most of whom did so fraudulently ending up in court. It was during one of the court cases of the late Dr Hunzvi that the war veterans organised themselves to rally behind their leader against a government commission of inquiry into the war victims’ fund. The developments around this time marked a transition of the ZNWVA into a formidable force that subsequently forced President Mugabe to submit to unbudgeted demands of ex-combatants’ gratuities of Z$50 000 (once off), Z$2000 monthly pension for each war veteran and free medical service and education for the war veterans. At this juncture, the war veterans were threatening to go back to the bush and wage a war against the government and the national army had to be alerted on several occasions.

With the gratuity, the war veterans formed their investment company, Zexcom, where each member was encouraged to invest about Z$10 000 of their gratuity money for money market investment purposes and purchase of tractors and grinding mills under a special arrangement with a Chinese firm. Today, Zexcom is currently riddled in corruption charges and counter charges among the leadership following unconstitutional use of the money by the top leaders.

Following the arraignment of their late leader before the courts and imprisonment, the war veterans were exposed and did not have much choice but to align with the ruling party for a vigorous and violent parliamentary elections campaign after the triumph of the “No” vote in the constitutional referendum in February 2000. Since then the ruling party has gone into a pact with the ZNWVA where the latter’s members campaigned and are still campaigning for ZANU PF against the opposition political party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) which won 57 of the contested 120 parliamentary seats in June 2000.

The campaign strategy of the ZNWVA has been centred on land as a key unresolved issue since the liberation struggle. In 1999, the war veterans, accompanied by landless and landshort peasants invaded commercial farms and game farms where huge tracts of land are located to demonstrate their need for land. The land invasions led to the government’s “fast-track” land resettlement program in 2000 to date. While government is designating extra farms of those who own more than one farm in a preferred area, war veterans have been indiscriminately occupying farms and slaughtering livestock and game belonging to white commercial farmers around the country, throwing the whole exercise into confusion and gaining political mileage for the ruling party in the process.

Government has flatly refused to pay any compensation for the land it is acquiring except for developments made on the property, on the grounds that the same land was compulsorily acquired from the indigenous people in the past. Following the introductory remarks and background of the land question in Zimbabwe above, there is no doubt on the need for equitable land redistribution that should eventually alter the economic structure and control from a minority to the majority. While the government of Zimbabwe should be applauded for the unwavering steps it has taken in dealing with the land question once and for all, the timing, over-politicisation of the issue and selective engagement along political party lines as opposed to a more collective, national and non-partisan approach is suspect. The land question should
never be a vote-winner issue but a matter of survival, inheritance and for posterity, beyond political gimmick.

References

Moyo, S., Land Reform under Structural Adjustment in Zimbabwe: Land Use Change in the Mashonaland Provinces, Nordiska Afrikanstetet, Uppsala, 2000b.


III.3 Sierra Leone - Trauma Work
Aisha Fofana Ibrahim

The DDR program in Sierra Leone came into effect in 1999 after the Lome Peace Accord of July 7, 1999. There were several peace initiatives during this ten-year civil war, but they all failed mainly because the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) had only one aim, and that was, to fight their way into power. They had control of the mining areas and were therefore able to sustain the war with proceeds from mining diamonds. In effect they had nothing to lose and plenty to gain when all peace efforts failed. The DDR program aimed at demobilising and disarming plus/minus 45,000.00 combatants.

Sierra Leone Army (SLA) 6,000.00
Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC) 7,000.00
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) 15,000.00
Civil Defence Force (CDF) 15,000.00
Paramilitary Force 2,000.00

The war in Sierra Leone lasted for ten years and is reported to be one of the most dehumanising war experiences of our times. It can therefore be argued that because of the nature of this war and the atrocities committed, most Sierra Leonine that survived this war, experience some form of trauma. Children were abducted, drugged and forced to commit atrocities against their own people; women and girls were raped, abducted, forced into combat, used as slave-slaves and luggage carriers; men were forced to rape family members; there were amputations of hands and feet, the cutting off of body parts such as noses, tongues, ears... The list goes on. These are very unusual and unnatural acts and therefore very traumatic experiences for victims of such crimes.

In Sierra Leone, the traumatic experiences are far and varied. Most women found themselves in economic and social conditions they could not handle. Some became widows saddled with the responsibility of taking care children and extended households; some that had been raped faced family/societal rejections and stigmatisation and yet others became mute or bedridden with no apparent medical conditions. It is reported that there were instances of parents refusing to accept their own children during family tracing and reunion interventions. Because of the atrocities some of these children had committed in their communities, these parents could not bear to face other community members for fear of rejection or revenge.

Traditional methods in trauma healing.

- Traumatised children are enrolled in Islamic schools where they spend most of the time reciting verses from the Quran. Quranic Verses written out on slates are then washed out in a bowl and the water is then given to the students to drink. This water is believed to have healing powers because it is from the holy book of God. This water can also be prepared for other members of the community based on needs.
- Herbalists/traditional healers also play a part in trauma management. Victims can be out or in patients of such healers based on severity and persistence of their illness. Methods vary and mainly include the use of herbs.
• Secret societies distinctly catering for boys or girls are also other forms of traditional healing systems. Initiates undergo rituals and ceremonies that help them to bond with their groups and communities. This in effect fosters a sense of loyalty to community and country.

• Fostering: Children (ex-combatants) are sent to live with relatives or friends residing in other areas or communities. This tends to reduce hostilities as they grow up in areas where they are not constantly reminded of their past.

Conclusion

In a society like Sierra Leone, where drugs made it possible for certain atrocities to occur, there is a great probability of ex-child soldiers suffering from post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Because some of these children at this point in time show no sign of remorse or trauma there chances of suffering from PTSD is greater and healing at that time becomes very problematic. The aim is therefore to engage ex-child soldiers in holistic forms of healing at this stage rather than when they are older.
I started my session by giving a brief background to the work of the Center for Conflict Resolution (CECORE). Though a local Ugandan organisation, its work extends far beyond the geographical borders. We carry out training and advocacy for peace work in the whole of Africa and into the Asia/Pacific region. Often we are contracted by international bodies such as the World Bank, the UN agencies and western governments to facilitate work in any part of the world.

My presentation revolved around a Responding to Conflict (RTC) video on the war in northern Uganda. The video depicts activities in the camp of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) of Joseph Kony in Southern Sudan. The footage of activities in the camp is courtesy of the LRA itself. The video begins with a BBC radio interview with the combatants saying President Museveni came to power with the use of the gun and that he will be removed by the gun. The interviewer wonders how the combatants want to save their own Acholi people by killing them. The conflict in northern Uganda has been raging for more than ten years, in which the government had first refused to talk with the rebels but later opened up that possibility because of pressure from Ugandans themselves, especially the Acholi people themselves who are not only the relatives of the rebels but also their victims. The government consequently has declared a blanket amnesty to all groups which have armed against the government. The conflict in northern Uganda is one of about three major ones being fought against the government; one in north-western Uganda with rebels hiding in the north-east of the DRC and the Sudan (mainly remnants of Iddi Amin); and the other in the west, with rebels also hiding in the DRC, in the mountains between the two countries. The amnesty covers all these and any others that might be existing in smaller measure.

Right now the government of Sudan is assisting in returning the abducted children who had been forcibly recruited in the rebel ranks. The rebels use the abduction strategy to increase their ranks as they have found it had to have voluntary recruits.

This is later followed by more pictures of activities in the camps, especially rituals carried out by new recruits, who are effectively abducted children, boys and girls. Boys are made into fighters while most of the girls are made into wives and sex slaves of the male commanders who hand the girls around, from one to another. These images are followed by interviews and pictures of child soldiers, both boys and girls, who have been rescued from the Sudan. They tell of the atrocities they both committed and watched being committed and how they felt.

Officials of one NGO, ACORD, based in Gulu, tell of the programmes being carried out by themselves and other organisation in the re-integration and reconciliation process, and the problems encountered. Interviews with these children as well as with other victims of the conflicts, such as women who were raped by both the combatants and government soldiers and what they are trying to do for themselves are highlighted. Conversations with counsellors working with the ex-child soldiers and staff of organisations helping in their re-integration process are also recorded, looking at their challenges, obstacles as well as their successes.
Soldiers of the government army feature highly in this video, indicating that the whole process involves all players. One soldier is shown addressing the community in which he says reconciliation with and integration of the ex-combatants, both young and old, will not be possible unless the whole community is involved.

At some point the disabled women (victims of the conflict) are shown saying they do not need new skills, but assistance to better what they already know. This is quite a positive move, which shows that the women do not see themselves as victims only but as people still capable to lead normal lives, re-affirming what they already are good at.

The role of traditional rituals is placed at the center of the reconciliation and forgiveness process. The video highlights a reconciliation ritual in which two clans are reconciling following the killing of a son of one tribe by another. They stress the rapture of an otherwise vibrant relation in which the two clans had been eating and drinking together, which is no longer possible because of the killing. In the explanation, it is seen how the strength of the aggrieved family prevented them from carrying out revenge killing against the other clan. A ritual whereby symbols are used and a drink shared is captured. This is the Mato Oput ceremony in which sap from the roots of a bitter plant is mixed in alcohol and shared in drink. This particular plant is significant in that it does not grow in isolation, it grows in clusters, indicating the togetherness that should be aimed at by communities. The bitterness of the sap is also significant in that it symbolises the difficulty of admitting wrong and granting forgiveness. If we want to re-build broken relationships we must be ready to sacrifice and be strong.

One feature of the amnesty to fighting combatants against the government is that some have been allowed to remain with their guns as a form of confidence-building. Some have chosen to live in camps within the Ugandan border before returning to their homes. Programmes by NGOs and other civil society organisations are carrying out different intervention activities to help in the re-integration of these ex-combatants.
## Specialisation Course: Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration

**Annex 1. Programme Outline**

### PROGRAMME OUTLINE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Day</th>
<th>Monday July 9</th>
<th>Tuesday July 10</th>
<th>Wednesday July 11</th>
<th>Thursday July 12</th>
<th>Friday July 13</th>
<th>Saturday July 14</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>9:00-10.30</strong></td>
<td><strong>Official opening</strong>&lt;br&gt;Introduction to the Programme&lt;br&gt;Susanne Fuchs-Nebel&lt;br&gt;Alfiado Zunguza&lt;br&gt;Alejandro Bendana</td>
<td><strong>Disarmament, Demobilisation</strong>&lt;br&gt;Alejandro Bendana</td>
<td><strong>Economic Reintegration, Disabled Combatants and Demobilised Women</strong>&lt;br&gt;Alejandro Bendana</td>
<td><strong>Social Reintegration, Child Soldiers, Trauma Work</strong>&lt;br&gt;Alejandro Bendana</td>
<td><strong>Ex-Combatants as Peace-builders</strong>&lt;br&gt;Network Development Workshop</td>
<td><strong>Round table with veteran organisation leaders</strong>&lt;br&gt;Susanne Fuchs-Nebel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>10.30 - 11.00</strong></td>
<td>Break</td>
<td>Break</td>
<td>Break</td>
<td>Break</td>
<td>Break</td>
<td>Break</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>11:00 - 12.30</strong></td>
<td><strong>Concepts of Post-Conflict Peace-building (Reconstruction and Transition)</strong>&lt;br&gt;Alejandro Bendana</td>
<td><strong>Case Studies Central America</strong>&lt;br&gt;Alejandro Bendana</td>
<td><strong>Case Studies Uganda Zimbabwe Participants</strong>&lt;br&gt;Case Studies&lt;br&gt;Sudan&lt;br&gt;Sierra Leone)&lt;br&gt;Participants</td>
<td><strong>Case Studies</strong>&lt;br&gt;Continued</td>
<td><strong>Workshop continued</strong>&lt;br&gt;Workshop continued</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>12.30 - 14.00</strong></td>
<td>Lunch Break</td>
<td>Lunch Break</td>
<td>Lunch Break</td>
<td>Lunch Break</td>
<td>Lunch Break</td>
<td>Lunch Break</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>14.00 - 16.00</strong></td>
<td>Case Study Mozambique&lt;br&gt;Zita Boaventura, Christian Council of Mozambique&lt;br&gt;Lt.Col. Lazaro Mathe</td>
<td>Case Study Mozambique&lt;br&gt;UNDP</td>
<td>Case Study Mozambique&lt;br&gt;Participants</td>
<td><strong>Case Studies</strong>&lt;br&gt;Conclusions&lt;br&gt;And Action Planning&lt;br&gt;Susanne Fuchs-Nebel</td>
<td><strong>Action Planning</strong>&lt;br&gt;Susanne Fuchs-Nebel</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>16.00 - 17.00</strong></td>
<td>Break</td>
<td>Break</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>17.00 - 18.00</strong></td>
<td>Arrival</td>
<td>Discussion</td>
<td>Discussion</td>
<td>Discussion</td>
<td>Course Evaluation&lt;br&gt;Fuchs-Nebel</td>
<td>Continued</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>19.00</strong></td>
<td>Welcome dinner</td>
<td>Dinner</td>
<td>Dinner</td>
<td>Informal Dinner Session with Ex-Combatants</td>
<td>Informal Dinner Session with Ex-Child Soldiers</td>
<td>Dinner</td>
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</table>
Annex 2: List of Organisers and Trainers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Family Name</th>
<th>First Name</th>
<th>Citizenship</th>
<th>PRESENT POSITION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Bendana</td>
<td>Alejandro</td>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>Trainer and Demobilisation Expert, Director, Centro de Estudios Internationales, Nicaragua</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Zunguza</td>
<td>Alfiado S.</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>Programme Director, JustaPaz - Centre for the Study and Transformation of Conflicts Coordinator, Redipaz, Mozambican Network for Peace-building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Mungoi</td>
<td>Salomao Tirgo</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>Programme Officer, Programa de Promocao da Paz (Propaz)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms. Fuchs-Nebel</td>
<td>Susanne</td>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Program Director, Peace-building in Africa Program, Austrian Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 3: List of Participants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Family Name</th>
<th>First Name</th>
<th>Citizenship</th>
<th>Present Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Abdirahman Aideed</td>
<td>Abdillahi</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Projects Manager of Hargeisa NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Mohamed Elmi</td>
<td>Aden</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Executive Director of Havoyoco (LNGO),</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Demenongu</td>
<td>Agev</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Senior Counsellor, MFA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Jean-Chrys</td>
<td>Bisetsa</td>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>Program Director of Agir-Dufatanye, NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Noel</td>
<td>Chicuecue</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>UNESCO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Michael Aban</td>
<td>Chol</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Deputy Director General Directorate for Peace, MIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Charles M.</td>
<td>Fombad</td>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>Senior Lecturer in Law, Univ. of Botswana</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ms. Nada</td>
<td>Habash</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Trainer of gender issues, Lecturer Ahfad University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms. Aisha Fofana</td>
<td>Ibrahim</td>
<td>Nigeria, Sierra Leone</td>
<td>Women's Support Centre, South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms. Jacinta</td>
<td>Macuacua</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>Kulima, Community Development NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Salomao Tirco</td>
<td>Mungoi</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>Program Officer, PROPAZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Juliano Victoria</td>
<td>Picardo</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>Head Office, RENAMO Political Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms. Stella</td>
<td>Sabiiti</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>Founder/Executive Director, Center for Conflict Resolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Munyaradzi</td>
<td>Saruchera</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Senior Researcher, IRDC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Shakespeare</td>
<td>Siatakwi</td>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>Investigations Officer, Permanent Human Rights Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Rinos</td>
<td>Simbulo</td>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>National Co-ordinator, Southern Africa Network of Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Boaventura</td>
<td>Zita</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>Civic Education, Christian Council of Mozambique</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>