REPORT
on the
"SEMINAR ON PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY AND PEACE-BUILDING IN SOUTHERN AFRICA"
AUGUST 9 – 28, 1998

KADOMA HOTEL AND CONFERENCE CENTRE (ZIMBABWE)

PROJECT TEAM:
Prof. Mwesiga BAREGU and Arno TRUGER: Course Directors
Renate KORBER: Programme Assistant
Silvia POLSTER: Secretary

RAPPORTEURS:
Megan ALLERDICE
Nyasha D. MASIWA

ORGANISED BY:
The Austrian Study Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution (ASPR)
Southern African Political Economy Series (SAPES) Trust

SPONSORED BY:
The Republic of Austria

PEACE CENTER BURG SCHLAINING, OCTOBER 1998
CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION 3

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 5

Overall Achievements of the Seminar 5
Kadoma Recommendations 5
  • Sources of Conflict 5
  • Approaches and Activities regarding Preventive diplomacy and Peace building 6
    • The role of Non-Governmental and Governmental Actors 7
    • The role of Intergovernmental actors such as SADC and OAU 13
    • The Role of Non-African actors such as the European Union 14

Specific Recommendations of the Seminar
  • The Namibia/Botswana Peace initiative
  • Proposals for ending the Crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo

EVALUATION 23

OUTLOOK 27

Appendix 1 - Sources of Conflict 28
Appendix 2 – Approaches and Activities regarding Preventive Diplomacy and Peace-building of Non-governmental and Governmental Actors 31
Appendix 3 – Approaches and Activities regarding Preventive Diplomacy and Peace-building of Inter-governmental actors 34
Appendix 4 – Approaches and Activities regarding Preventive Diplomacy and Peace-building of Non-African Actors 36
Appendix 5 – Preliminary Programme Outline 37
Appendix 6 – List of Participants 44
Appendix 7 – List of Lectures 47
INTRODUCTION

A regional seminar on Preventive Diplomacy and Peace-Building was held at the Kadoma Hotel and Conference Centre (Zimbabwe) from August 9th to 28th, 1998. The seminar was organised by the Austrian Study Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution (ASPR) in collaboration with the Southern African Political Economy Series (SAPES) Trust. It was sponsored by the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Austria in response to a request from the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). It is a special contribution of Austria’s Presidency of the EU in support of SADC’s drive for peaceful development and regional political and economic integration.

This was the second seminar, of its kind, organised by the ASPR in Africa. The first such seminar was organised and conducted for the Horn of Africa region and was held in Ethiopia in April 1997. The Ethiopia seminar however, focused on imparting knowledge and skills pertaining to preventive diplomacy and peace-building. The Kadoma seminar improved on the Ethiopia one in three major ways. As well as imparting knowledge and skills, this seminar adopted the following new features:

- It explicitly focused on the region and analysed contemporary regional problems with the objective of finding solutions for these problems.
- It worked in smaller workshop groups to elaborate concrete proposals intended to address real problems in the individual countries or the region as a whole, and;
- It integrated the skills and experiences of ASPR and SAPES, emerging with a much richer outcome.

The overall purpose of the seminar was to enhance a policy related discourse combined with a training workshop on mediation aiming at the elaboration of relevant recommendations on preventive diplomacy and peace-building in Southern Africa. The specific objectives were:

- To explore ways for SADC and its member states, as well as the OAU, to enhance their existing, or develop new capacities in preventive diplomacy and peace-building.
- The seminar was also intended to explore ways of improving the effectiveness of co-operation with external partners such as the European Union.
- To elaborate a number of action oriented recommendations on activities that could be undertaken by various actors, namely, non-governmental, governmental, inter-governmental and, non-African.
- To establish a network of researchers, officials and activists in peace-building in Southern Africa and thus have a platform to build on a sustained capacity for preventive diplomacy and peace-building in the region.

Participants in the seminar included high and middle level diplomats and diplomatic advisors, high level representatives of NGOs, university professors, middle level military officers, journalists and lawyers. On the whole the seminar participants were experienced in peace-building activities such as fact-finding, peaceful settlement of disputes, human rights protection and promotion as well as other types of civilian and international
diplomatic missions, including mediations, negotiations etc. The participants came from nineteen African countries, many from the SADC region but some from as far afield as Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia and Uganda. It was felt that the views and experiences of those from outside the immediate region would be conducive to the achievement of the seminar goals. At the beginning of the seminar, it was agreed that all participants join the programme in their personal capacity rather than as representatives of their governments or non-governmental organisations.

The faculty was drawn from an international group of resource persons with diverse backgrounds and experience. With the majority coming from Africa, all were familiar with activities in the realm of preventive diplomacy and peace-building in Southern Africa. A good number had first hand experiences and were currently involved in a variety of conflict management and peace-building activities. Mr. Arno Truger (ASPR) and Prof. Mwesiga Baregu (SAPES) were the co-directors of the seminar.

The seminar was divided into three main sections, each spread over one week:

- Principal civilian approaches for preventive diplomacy and peace-building;
- Major civilian functions for preventive diplomacy and peace-building, and;
- Strengthening of various actors for preventive diplomacy and peace-building.

During the first two weeks, lectures and discussions took place in the morning, while two parallel workshops were organised in the afternoon. The overall purpose of the workshops was to provide practical training in the skills essential to effective and sustainable conflict resolution/transformation and mutually beneficial relationships. The workshops were also expected to integrate of what had been learned in the morning sessions. Two panel discussions were organised in order to elaborate on various topics covered in the morning lectures. Individual participants had the opportunity to present their institutions in two additional evening classes in order to share their work and activities with the other colleagues.

During the third week participants were asked to form five working groups focusing on the following immediate objectives:
1. The protection of human rights, national and ethnic communities and, issues of gender;
2. The promotion of democratisation, good governance and empowerment for political participation;
3. Peace-keeping, demilitarisation and disarmament;
4. Pursuit and support of sustainable socio-economic and environmental development, and;
5. Propagation of education and dissemination of information.

Furthermore, participants were asked to come up with concrete, action oriented recommendations and solutions to conflicts in their countries as well as for the conflict taking place in the DRC.

At the very end, the major results of the seminar, including recommendations with regard to the crisis in the DRC, were presented to a public audience.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

I. OVERALL ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE SEMINAR

A forum for a fruitful dialogue was provided:
- for the exchange of experiences and ideas
- for inter-institutional understanding;
- for inter-ethnic and inter-national understanding;
- for gender awareness.

These achievements were realised through a careful selection process, as the result of which the invited 44 participants represented men and women from:
- 19 different African nations, supporting an intercultural process, and the understanding between representatives of governmental and non-governmental representatives from different countries and some of which were in conflict;
- a variety of governmental and non-governmental organisations which contributed to an enhancement of relations between governmental and non-governmental representatives and among those two groupings;
- various professions which aided the interdisciplinary approach of peace and conflict issues.

Both, a carefully selected venue remote enough to allow for an intensive communication process and a continuing dialogue in the evenings and during weekends, contributed to the success of the seminar. The professional events were made complete by a leisure-time programme. A integrated methodology, over the three week period, which was based on information, interaction, reflection, and geared towards results contributed to an atmosphere which enhanced an intensive learning process on both a personal and professional level.

II. KADOMA RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Sources of Conflict

It was found that sources of conflicts are many-fold and it would be a major mistake to single out a single cause. Nevertheless, a distinction was made between:
- root causes,
- secondary or exacerbating factors,
- triggering factors

The table in Appendix 1 shows the sources of conflict which were identified by five working groups. These groups were formed according to five major subjects of preventive diplomacy and peace-building.¹

¹ For the identification of the sources the working groups used notes, prepared by the seminar directors, which were based (among other sources) on the following EU study: Institut für Afrika-Kunde, EU Training programme on Peace-building and Conflict Prevention in Africa, Hamburg, 1997.
2. Approaches and activities regarding Preventive diplomacy and Peace-building

Intra-state conflicts have become more prominent on the global agenda since the end of the Cold War. The majority of recent violent conflicts have been of this kind and the targets and victims have been ordinary people rather than soldiers. In these kind of instances, the state has proved unable to respond effectively. The international community is not well equipped to address such conflicts effectively, either. Generally speaking, aid budgets are shrinking and the rising occurrence of violent conflicts in Africa has led to a situation where funds are increasingly spent on necessary, but unproductive humanitarian assistance.

Early warning is extremely important in identifying potential causes of conflict and preventing violence from breaking out. However, traditional approaches do not pick up the structural causes of large-scale violence. Instead, they constitute a crisis reaction which is both too little and too late. Regional bodies need to be mandated to act early. Effective and timely response or intervention must be based on a recognition of the need for a informed analysis of the specific socio-political context. Late-stage interventions involve high costs in terms of outlay and lives and fails to address root causes. Preventive early intervention, by comparison, offers an economical and effective operational alternative. It is necessary for SADC governments, foreign ministries and development aid agencies to develop internal frameworks for early warning analysis. Such frameworks can help structure the usual reporting from desk officers and field personnel, and can be directed more precisely to options for operational responses.

A successful approach to conflict transformation and peace-keeping in Africa depends upon close co-operation between actors that are non-governmental, governmental, and inter-governmental such as the OAU and the UN and other non-African organisations like the EU. The subsequent points should serve as a guideline how Africa and its partners are to approach conflict transformation:

1. Address the root causes of violent conflicts with an appropriate mix of political, social, environmental, human rights and military measures;
2. Security approaches have to emphasise the security of people and the non-military dimension;
3. Conflict transformation must employ multi-track approaches with a diversity of actors including civil society groups;
4. Women and children who bear the brunt of this violence must be at the centre of any conflict transformation strategy;
5. Africans must have ‘ownership’ of their own conflict management though the international world is not excluded from supportive initiatives;
6. Priorities must be considered for each country and region given that the tasks of preventive diplomacy and peace-building far exceed the limited resources available;
7. It is necessary to focus on preventing violent conflicts through peace-building;
8. Development assistance should form the basis of peace-building and conflict resolution, and;
9  Assistance must target the root causes of violent conflict such as scarce resources, state failure, illegitimate government, corruption and the repression of democracy, human rights and political freedom.

The following peace-building recommendations are structured with regard to the various actors involved:

- Non-governmental and governmental actors;
- Inter-governmental actors such as SADC and OAU;
- Non-African actors such as the European Union

2.1 The role of Non-governmental and Governmental Actors

If violent conflict escalation is not to be prevented, it must be transformed to a lesser violent stage. Conflict transformation should look at how we manage diversity but are there appropriate strategies for doing so? The new approach to security emphasises the security of people and the non-military dimensions. Security can no longer be understood as a condition defined and secured by arms and states alone. The responsibility lies with both, governments and civil society. The various functions they have to fulfil can be structured along the following five, major, subject groups:

- Protection of human rights, national and ethnic communities and, issues of gender;
- Democratisation, good governance and empowerment for political participation;
- Peace-keeping, demilitarisation and disarmament;
- Support of sustainable socio-economic and environmental development, and;
- Education and dissemination of information.

Protection of Human Rights and of National and Ethnic Communities and, Issues of Gender

Disrespect for the law and abuse of rights of civilian populations are major causes of conflict in the SADC region and beyond. A basic infrastructure made up of the legal system, its structures and mechanisms exist but are inhibited to function properly due to the mentality of leaders and the people, who believe that human rights are a luxury. They take the punitive approach that if a crime is committed they must administer maximum retribution. This has led to increasing incidents of retributive mob justice.

As members of the United Nations, African states should subscribe to the UN Charter. They should also ratify human rights treaties and implement them at the national level through administrative and judiciary measures. The poverty of African nations should not be used as an excuse for the abuse of human rights. Differences must be respected and diversity recognised. The challenge is to prevent diversity from generating violent conflict. The belief that it is possible to prevent conflict can lead to the misuse of preventive diplomacy and to the suppression of dissent. Where certain groups in society are excluded it is necessary to empower them through the provision of social services and other amenities, as well as by ensuring their economic and political rights.
Women are not perceived as citizens. However, citizenship is the key to entitlements and rights, without which people are vulnerable. This goes beyond considerations of class, race and ethnicity. The campaign, for the recognition of women’s rights as human rights, represented a turning point as it allowed women’s rights to become a political issue, where traditionally, women have been de-politicised and treated as private property. However, many people do not know what it means or have not taken this opportunity to move into a qualitatively new political space. A further and additional limitation is the disinclination of governments to implement human rights. Women must create new identities for themselves, beyond those of somebody’s wife or somebody’s mother.

Democratisation, Governance and Empowerment for Political Participation

There exists an important and increasing role for non-governmental actors. Civil wars require civil solutions. There is a need for multi-track diplomacy including governments, churches, media, business, women’s movements etc. The groups involved should be as diverse as the problems are complex. Once again, early warning is important. Community Based Organisations (CBOs) are able to provide such warnings, whereas governmental organisations and regional organisation such as SADC or OAU cannot.

As actors in peace-building and the prevention of violent conflict, NGOs and governments need each other. Therefore, governments must develop a non-adversarial relationship to NGOs. NGOs also need to work in collaboration with each other. The multiplicity of NGOs working for peace in Burundi, for example, significantly diminishes the chances, in the foreseeable future, for a coherent peace. To address this problem NGOs in the region should work closely together towards creating a association of NGOs.

Governance has to include not only the requirements of law and order but also address critical needs of society. To enhance this function the separation of entities of power as well as checks and balances have to be strengthened. There should be constitutional guarantees with regard to the powers and functions of the presidency in relation to the legislature and the judiciary. Limitations on tenure should also be stated in the Constitution on the basis of the wishes of the people. Periodic elections alone are not enough to guarantee democracy. A culture of democracy needs to be evolved over a long period of time and empowerment of the voters is necessary in order to ensure effective popular choice and control of those in positions of public power.

In order to provide a wider context for domestic politics, it is necessary to determine who sets the international political and economic agenda and the implications those agenda’s have for domestic politics. The internal weakness of states in Africa allow external factors to heighten violent conflicts within states. In particular, the global economic struggles, in a number of instances, encouraged weak governments to become consumers of violence.

The aim should be to create a human community in which it is possible to promote and guarantee a decent human existence. The way forward lies in the establishment of a broad
frontal coalition which includes, among others, churches, students, labour, NGOs and international agents.

Support for Sustainable Socio-economic and Environmental Development

a) Support for sustainable socio-economic development

Economic growth and development are intertwined but the latter requires both quantitative and qualitative economic and social changes which have to be measurable by clear indicators. It is defined at the personal, socio-economic and political level. At the political level, development denotes the existence of a political culture, structure and institutions. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), not donor aid is now seen as the solution to Africa’s problems. The SADC region’s external trade is still largely dependent on the EU, but this needs to be carefully negotiated in the post-Lome 5 Agreement.

It was noted that the distribution of food aid and the presence of aid givers, during a conflict situation, has in fact often prolonged conflict. The example of Somalia was raised as a situation where the priorities of donor organisations often failed to match those of the local people. This situation is believed to have improved in the last two years due to a greater involvement of local NGOs. Here and in other comparable areas where there is conflict, the reconstruction of states must create something new and not replicate the structures which led to conflict in the first place.

Key issues in the area of humanitarian assistance are:
1. The problem of protecting humanitarian operations in situations of continuing warfare;
2. Rules for the protection of civilian populations;
3. Pressing the parties to conflicts toward reconciliation;
4. The extent to which humanitarian assistance should involve the use of force;
5. The respective benefits of multilateral and bilateral assistance;
6. Provision of emergency relief as opposed to sustainable development;
7. The interface between humanitarian and political motives;
8. Where impartiality and/or neutrality are viable;
9. The cost of humanitarian assistance and who will meet it;
10. A reduction in the suffering of women and children even where conflict cannot be reduced, and;
11. Prospects for regional initiatives in humanitarian assistance.

A major player in the area of humanitarian assistance is the UNHCR. Its emphasis on repatriation is not always appropriate. It was suggested that refugees are a type of people who are in a process of transition and therefore should be treated accordingly. The bringing about of a common understanding of the history of a country and the process of national healing takes a long time and must be given due weight and consideration.
There is a need for Africans to take concepts and issues of humanitarian assistance into their own hands. The concept of humanitarian assistance only deals with the ill-effects of war or natural disaster and thus ignores over riding causal factors such as dictatorship. The OAU Charter, particularly Art 3, which rules out intervention in the internal affairs of states, should be revisited in light of the imperatives of humanitarian intervention and peace-building. It was also suggested that an African political charter be drawn up as part of the attempt to root out dis-empowerment of citizens.

b) Support for environmental development

The contemporary approach to the study of ecology, which is widely accepted as eco-pluralism. In its purest form eco-pluralism focuses on people-based solutions and advocates changing local institutional arrangements. It is inspired by notions of indigenous knowledge and mistrusts innovations introduced from outside. In its weaker form, eco-pluralism considers indigenous knowledge to be as important as scientific knowledge and is concerned with local constructions of the truth. The methodology of weak eco-pluralism involves going to affected areas and talking to the people and thus initiate a exchange of information and communication.

A number of regional environmental problems were identified as follows:
1. Construction of dams causing displacement of people and disease;
2. Land degradation including soil erosion, deforestation and siltation;
3. Water quantity and quality;
4. Waste and contamination from military activity, mining and dumping;
5. Air pollution;
6. Meteorological change;
7. Burning off of grass.

It was noted that common ownership of resources in the absence of strong leadership leads to the ‘tragedy of the commons’ (Harding), where users of resources want to collectively maximise utility which leads to a overall depletion of resources.

A SADC Regional protocol is needed over and above the various international conventions. International law is specific but there is no means of enforcement. issues Until the crisis reaches major proportions environmental issues are generally sidelined by economic concerns. It was felt that as a means to reducing conflict a Environmental Impact Assessments needed to be carried out before any new project is embarked upon.

Peace-keeping, Demilitarisation and Disarmament

There are security problems in the region brought about by the effects of poverty, drought, disease and social dislocation. The current proliferation of light weapons adds a complex dimension to these threats.
The management and control of arms has become a fundamental aid to diplomacy in the prevention and deflation of conflict and a critical component of the reconstruction process in post-conflict situations.

The Southern African region experienced protracted internal and inter-state conflicts for over two decades which left the countries polluted with arms and ammunition. Regional conflicts were seen by the super powers as extensions of the Cold War and led to a provision of weaponry and spreading of war technology. Post independence armed conflicts saw the coming of private arms dealers into the already saturated market and creating major problems of control.

Given the diminishing existence of external threats, in the region, it would be logical for armies, to downsize and thus disarm, thereby limiting the temptation to solve problems through violent means. Demobilisation and reintegration must not be regarded as isolated events but lifetime processes which require a lot of resource expenditure to ensure those demobilised are capable of sustaining themselves economically.

To facilitate disarmament, it has been suggested that the region establish a regional register to monitor small arms trade. The setting up of minimum standards for storage and control of excess weapons in the region has been proposed as a way of controlling leakage of arms into society. A well planned and managed programme of demobilisation can also have a positive impact on disarmament and the peace-building process. Landmines and de-mining must also be considered as a disarmament issue as they affect peace-building and reconstruction.

The peace dividend is the confidence building entailed in joint military exercises. There have been reductions of 30% and more in the defence budgets of the region. Consolidation by confidence building could foster economic development. The ideal now is to maintain a small regular force with the capability to mobilise, when required, extra personnel.

While the discussion focused on Africa disarmament, the question was raised what the super powers were doing about disarmament, particularly in light of the fact that they are the major producers and suppliers of weaponry. In the nuclear age, fear has been the foundation of the strategy of deterrence. But fear does not always deter the weaker party. Further, not all wars are started by those who are more powerful. Generally it was felt that the more secure a collectivity of states feels, the less prone it will be to be engage in conflict.

Those involved in peace-keeping operations have come to realize that there had been a serious omission, in terms of the role and functions, of the police in peace-building. The restoration of law and order in peace-keeping operations is partly the function of the military but, as the operation moves through the other stages, such as maintenance of assembly points and release of prisoners of war, the police must be increasingly involved so that, by the time elections are held, there is no military involvement.
In the future, training of police in a peace-building context must emphasise the legitimacy of the mission and people have to agree to being policed. Policing has to be community based. Where possible, police have to be computer literate and trained in contemporary methods of policing, taking into account drug trafficking, the small arms trade, money laundering and so on. The training of police in conflict management is a necessity but it was observed that trainers are very difficult to find.

It was also noted that the character of police cannot be divorced from the policies of government e.g. where a government is oppressive, police are used for suppression of the population.

**Education and Dissemination of Information**

It is important to disseminate information and educate people, both formally and informally, on the culture of peace. Linking the formal process to social learning ensures better understanding. Peace-building requires behaviour which entails mutual interaction, that is, it includes the other party and fosters inter-dependence. It is important that communication is seen as a two way process in which language, common interests and concerns and, the context in which it takes place are important considerations.

Non-governmental Agencies should enhance dialogue in society on foreign induced and indigenous models of democracy. It is necessary to strengthen educational or research institutions and programmes in the area of democracy. Links should be established with like minded local, regional and international actors. Non governmental agencies should build civil society through education. There should be objective and informed reporting of elections. Environmental broadcasting is also important. They should develop and run awareness campaigns. There is a need to prepare marginalised people, especially vulnerable groups and likely victims in scenarios of violence, such as women, to cope with possible conflicts and their consequences. Non-governmental agencies should provide peace education through schools, media, family and communities. Local mediation skills should be enhanced.

Governmental actors should be involved in civic, peace and human rights education. There is a need to create a culture of information and the media should be more open than is currently the case and avoid the use of stereotypes. The media should act as a monitor of government. Government should support non-discriminatory media programm's and inter-cultural learning models should be promoted. Restrictive laws with respect to information and education need to be abolished.

Non-African actors should promote local education and information resources. The OAU media network needs to be activated. Non-African actors can assist in the dissemination of relevant information by promoting democracy, human rights and the rule of law. It is necessary to provide material support for the establishment of programm's in research and education for democracy and conflict prevention. Regional, sub-regional and national institutions for gathering and disseminating early warning and action information should be supported as well as information initiatives aimed at promoting regional awareness. Confidence building measures should be supported and sponsorship offered for events.
such as peace conferences. The creation of regional and continental data bases is also important. The capacity of NGOs and education institutions should be enhanced.

The table in Appendix 2 shows the approaches and activities regarding Preventive diplomacy and Peace-building of non-governmental and governmental actors.  

2.2 The Role of Intergovernmental Actors such as SADC and OAU

It is not clear that the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security takes into account the shift to intrastate conflicts. It still seems to be focusing on the interstate level. There are also demands for informal consultations under the organ to be replaced by the formal structures and processes of SADC. The de-linking of peace and security questions from socio-economic concerns and the marginalisation of human rights poses fundamental questions on the effectiveness of SADC.

The independent initiatives of individual SADC states with regard to the DRC conflict indicate that the Organ is not working effectively. Some issues raised in respect of the SADC Organ were:
1. Centralisation or decentralisation and whether risk is spread through troika leadership;
2. The centralisation argument seems to come most often from the more powerful states while less powerful states favour decentralisation, and;
3. To what extent is there a unified, coherent security community emerging in the region? There are conflicting military, economic and social perceptions of security. The military is taking the lead at the moment.

The legitimacy of documents such as the “Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security in the SADC Region” was questioned given that some of the signatories are not, themselves, representatives of legitimate governments. However, it was pointed out that international relations are only possible on a government to government level and, therefore, have to operate on the assumption that the government is representative of the country. It was noted that the current protocol is still in draft form and thus, acts only as a guideline but is not legally binding on the parties. The protocol has not yet been ratified because of the current disagreement over how the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security should function, that is either as an independent institution or subservient to the auspices of the SADC secretariat.

It is assumed that the OAU has the capacity to prevent conflict but not to deal with peacekeeping. However, over the past three years the OAU has been grappling with peacekeeping issues. The OAU has established a peace fund but there has been very little

---

2 For the identification of the approaches and activities the working groups used notes, prepared by the seminar directors which were based (among other sources) on the EU study: Institut für Afrika-Kunde, EU Training programme on Peace-building and Conflict Prevention in Africa, Hamburg, 1997.
contribution from members, which raises the question of commitment and to what extent the OAU can set its own agenda, that is being dependent on foreign sources for funding.

Organisationally there is a pyramidal relationship with other sub-regional organisations at the base, the OAU in the middle and the UN at the top. The OAU is not clear itself on the relationship with sub-regional organisations. There is also the question of what criteria is to be used to decide whether a particular situation should be dealt with at the sub-regional or the continental level. In the Comoros the OAU sent a ministerial delegation and it came back empty handed. The OAU has now recommended that the sub-region should deal with the problem.

The OAU has not re-examined itself and has been existing on the notion of: “That it is better than nothing. “ If the OAU has proved ineffective in most conflicts or has exacerbated conflicts, therefore negatively affecting its regional capacity. It is necessary to ask, whether the OAU has achieved its original objectives, what is the vision of the OAU and is the focus on conflict prevention or economic development?

There needs to be restructuring but this has to start from member states. The OAU has failed to form a strong institutional base and to be professional. Authority is vested in the Chair, who may preside over the OAU as they do in their own countries. Part of the solution is to have a revolving Presidency similar to that of the European Union. When we begin to question the relevance of the OAU we are dealing with fundamental issues. The OAU’s emphasis on preventive diplomacy reflects what it is capable of doing. It has not outlived its usefulness but there is a gap between the knowledge of what needs to be done and the capacity to do it. Support is needed in such areas logistics and communications. The OAU has already received some funds for the enhancement of communication capacities at the OAU headquarters. Additional funds have been designated for projects sponsored by the EU. However, the OAU has failed to propose any project in this matter.

The table in Appendix 3 shows the approaches and activities regarding Preventive diplomacy and Peace-building of inter-governmental actors.3

2.3 The Role of Non-African Actors such as the European Union (EU)

Non-African Actors were criticised for the inconsistency between the principle of ‘ownership’ which operates on a bottom up basis, and Structural Adjustment Programm’s. Former EU policies were cited as a example of imposing top down, blueprints. It was acknowledged that Structural Adjustment is a concept of the early ‘80s and, in its pure form, is now considered outdated. However, the EU’s current involvement is mainly with funding efforts to counter the negative effects of adjustment programm’s.

---

3 For the identification of the approaches and activities the working groups used notes, prepared by the seminar directors which were based (among other sources) on the EU study: Institut für Afrika-Kunde, EU Training programme on Peace-building and Conflict Prevention in Africa, Hamburg, 1997.
Since 1995 the EU has adopted several documents which form the current basis of their policy on conflicts in Africa. The policy operates around four key principles:

1. The principle of ownership;
2. The principle of prevention based on six root causes, identified as potentially leading to violent conflict:
   - the imbalances of political, socio-economic and cultural opportunities among different identity groups
   - lack of legitimacy of governance
   - lack of effectiveness of governance
   - the absence of effective mechanisms for the peaceful conciliation of group interests
   - the absence of effective mechanisms for bridging existing dividing lines among different identity groups
   - the absence of a vibrant civil society;
3. The principle of coherence, and;
4. The principle of international co-ordination.

Enhancing African capacities for peace-building, conflict prevention, management and resolution is one of the cornerstones of the EU’s policy. Emphasis is put on enhancing the capacities of African regional organisations. Specific activities to encourage integration are:

1. Elaborating or setting, promoting and monitoring international standards or codes of conduct in various fields;
2. Regional management of shared scarce resources;
3. Gathering and analysis of information relating to potential and actual conflict situations;
4. Observer negotiation or mediation missions, good offices and statements with regard to potential or actual conflict situations, and;
5. Deployment of peace-keeping troops.

The table in Appendix 4 shows the approaches and activities regarding Preventive diplomacy and Peace-building of non-African actors.  

III SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SEMINAR

The following specific recommendations were initiated by working groups. They are the outcome of limited access to research material and little time for fact finding. As a summary, they do not reflect the attitudes and ideas of each participant of the seminar.

---

4 For the identification of the approaches and activities the working groups used notes, prepared by the seminar directors which were based (among other sources) on the EU study: Institut für Afrika-Kunde, EU Training programme on Peace-building and Conflict Prevention in Africa, Hamburg, 1997.
The Namibia/Botswana Peace Initiative

This is a two part initiative.

1. The Kasikili/Sedudu Island dispute.

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) is to give an advisory opinion early in 1999. Both countries have agreed to accept the opinion of the ICJ.

In May 1998, Namibia and Botswana decided to establish a joint Border Delimitation Commission. This still has to be formed.

A non-aggression pact is needed and there should be regular meetings of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence Chiefs to decrease suspicion between the parties and to discuss issues of mutual concern. Mutual inspection of each other’s military facilities and bases is advisable. There is also a need to educate the population along the border on the situation and nature of the conflict.

2. The Okavango River

The river is shared by Angola, Botswana and Namibia. Botswana needs the Okavango Delta as a major tourist attraction and a unique biosphere which must not dry up. Namibia needs irrigation water and water for the capital city Windhoek.

The working group recommends the creation of two trans-boundary nature and game reserves to promote tourism and nature conservation. The first should cover Kasikili/Sedudu Island, the area of water surrounding it and an area of land on each side of the river, that is, some land from Namibia and a more or less equal amount from Botswana. The second park should include Popa Falls, as a community based tourist venture, and the Okavango Delta. Funds generated by the park should be ploughed back to improve the socio-economic conditions of local populations in all three countries. Continuous mutual liaison, inspection and exchange of ideas on how best to utilise the resources will be needed.
Proposals for Ending the Crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo

The following proposals were initiated by two working groups and presented in the final public presentation. One of the working groups concentrated on the assessment of the present situation of the crisis and made recommendations for ending the war. The other group focused on the establishment of human rights in the post-war period.

1. Assessment and Recommendations for ending the war

The current crisis in the DRC stems from a number of root causes, exacerbating factors and triggering factors. These include a lack of governmental institutions and socio-economic infrastructure, especially roads, railways and telecommunications. A culture of oppression and resistance was established during the colonial era and sustained during the long period that Mobutu was in power. The culture of militarism and violence is also deeply entrenched. There are vested external interests in the DRC such as long term economic interests and immediate security concerns. Inequity both in political power and patronage and access to material resources is systemic. The over centralisation of power typical of military dictatorships has not changed under Kabila who has exercised autocratic rule and high handedness toward his opponents. There is a general lack of political sophistication and savvy, perhaps as a result of lack of cognate and relevant experience. The apparent expectations of the Tutsis and others who assisted Kabila to power have become unacceptable to him but his abrupt attempt to expel the Rwandese and Ugandan soldiers who had helped him gain power has proved naïve and ill-advised.

a) Assessment of the Present Situation of the Crisis

The immediate alternative to the Kabila-led government is chaos and anarchy, at least for some time.

The ulterior motives of the forces which helped Kabila to gain power by ousting Mobutu would appear to exceed their desire to offer altruistic assistance. They remain unclear but are apparently unwholesome.

Kabila obviously inherited a chaotic, if not impossible, situation which would require time, expertise, and external assistance to manage.

The SADC as a sub-regional organisation failed to react appropriately to clear early warning or signals of imminent problems in the DRC. Efforts by SADC member states to help Kabila’s government to build democratic institutions etc. were on a bilateral basis and were uncoordinated or competitive rather than complementary. Consequently they were ineffectual.

The present violent conflict in the DRC has the potential to be drawn out and costly in terms of resources and lives with attendant human suffering and population displacements. It could also spread to neighbouring states if not handled carefully.
The sub-regional organ under which Zimbabwe, Angola and other SADC member states took the initiative to intervene is yet to become functional or operational.

The latent power contest or conflict inherent in the SADC has now been brought to the surface and needs to be carefully handled to save the organisation. As some SADC members have already sent troops into the DRC to prop up Kabila’s government, those disinclined to such involvement have openly expressed views bordering on criticism of those who have intervened. As the most powerful state in SADC and its current chairman, South Africa has a duty to manage the split carefully.

Beyond altruism, South Africa’s interests, if any, in the DRC crisis remain unclear. It is also doubtful that South Africa has the political capacity to intervene militarily.

The presence of some settler elements in the DRC, especially Rwandan and Ugandan Tutsis, pose a special problem which must be addressed in the peace-building process.

Zimbabwe, Angola and other countries having sent forces into the DRC, withdrawal becomes problematic unless and until some form of solution is found to the debacle.

b) Recommendations

As in all cases of violent conflict, the first and urgent step is to bring hostilities to a halt. The call for a cease-fire now can hardly be expected to be heeded unless the fight becomes a stalemate. The following steps are, therefore recommended:

1. South Africa, having reiterated its recognition of Kabila’s government should see the action of Zimbabwe, Angola and others as one possible way of ending the fighting and saving Kabila’s government. It should, therefore, adopt a ‘wait and see’ posture for now especially in the interest of SADC solidarity.

2. Every effort should continue to be made to ensure that the SADC does not become a casualty of the DRC crisis.

3. Angola, Zimbabwe and other SADC members now fighting on the side of Kabila’s government should do everything they can to achieve their objective as soon as possible. There should be no half measures as a prolonged stalemate or bog-down may be disastrous.

4. The same friends fighting to save Kabila’s government must persuade him to prepare to democratise as early as possible after the pacification of his country.

5. Kabila must be persuaded to announce his programme for democratisation as soon as practicable and be prepared to keep to it.

6. If possible, he should be dissuaded from any attempt to succeed himself by contesting the election the government intends to organise to usher in democracy.

7. If he insists on contesting, the programme should provide for his prior resignation before the election.

8. He should be prepared to open the election to international scrutiny.

9. His post-hostilities government should be as inclusive as possible.

10. As soon as hostilities cease, the SADC should establish an ad hoc committee to assist in the peace-building process in the DRC.
Following the cessation of hostilities, the building of communication infrastructure, especially roads, railway and telecommunications, to facilitate access should be given top priority. This will need external support.

The issue of nationality for settler elements in the DRC must be settled realistically soon after normalcy is restored. Those who opt to return to their original home countries should have their cases negotiated with such countries under UN or OAU auspices. All others who so prefer should be granted DRC nationality with equal rights to other Congolese.

All the normal post violent conflict peace-building measures will then follow. With the help of friendly countries within and outside the SADC, international actors, donors, NGOs and CBOs, efforts should be made to help the DRC to build a peaceful polity which could realise the enormous potential of that country. Principle objectives include:

- Disarmament and demobilisation of militias and warring group
- Rehabilitation and re-integration of erstwhile combatants;
- Education, especially vocational training, for former combatants;
- Recovery of stray firearms and ammunition from the populace;
- Rebuilding of damaged infrastructure;
- Extensive communication infrastructure development;
- Establishment of democratic institutions such as an independent electoral body, an effective and independent judiciary, a police service, media and other sources of information, educational institutions and so on;
- Enhancement of the establishment of viable NGOs and CBOs;
- A constitution making process;
- The establishment of an effective local government system to decentralise governance;
- Amnesty for erstwhile rebels except those known to have committed heinous crimes;
- Social engineering to reduce tension and depoliticise ethnicity.

All the above are based on the assumption that the government of Laurent Kabila can still be salvaged, Should the rebels succeed in overthrowing him, a period of confusion is to be expected before it is clear where to begin.

2. Establishing Human Rights in the DRC and the Region

Recognising that the violation of human rights is a root cause of violent conflict in the DRC and; in the interest of promoting sustainable peace and reducing the occurrence of violent conflict in the DRC and the region as a whole, the Kadoma Group seeks to:

1. Raise Public Awareness, locally, regionally, and internationally, of the human rights violations;
2. Protect Human Rights during times of conflict and peace, and;
3. Advocate for the implementation of international standards of human rights.

The objectives of the group are:
1 Raising Public Awareness  
2 Protection of Human Rights  
3 Observance and Implementation of International Human Rights Standards.

The strategies to achieve these objectives are advocacy, constructive media exposure, human rights campaigns, monitoring and lobbying, training and education and, advisory and consultancy services on human rights.

Advocacy is to be carried out, in part, through public interest litigation. This means that laws that are in violation of human rights must be challenged and thus changed through test cases, as a means of achieving compliance to international standards. Lobbying will take place at a local, regional and international level for the ratification of various human rights instruments by individual countries including the DRC. Where an instrument has already been ratified, advocacy will be aimed at state legislation and implementation.

Media exposure is to be achieved through press conferences to publicise the issues at hand, the production of NGO publications and supplements placed in the mainstream media to expose the general public to their human rights. Presentations on radio, television and other electronic media are a further form of exposure. Local and regional NGOs should be linked to the International Human Rights Groups network to maintain a high profile for issues in the region.

There are various types of human rights campaigns which might include demonstrations where there have been human rights violations, concerts to maintain visibility of the issue and to raise funds and, flyers, billboards and leaflets for publicity.

In terms of monitoring reporting and lobbying, human rights audits will need to be conducted on a regular basis in the DRC by local, regional and international groups. Human rights reporting and documentation of violations which allows for credible and informed lobbying and advocacy is necessary and trial watches might, perhaps, encourage adherence to human rights during trials, in particular trials where the accused is charged with political crimes such as treason. Individual contacts should be established with decision makers and stakeholders to influence policy and law making. Links should also be made with different associations and interest groups. For example, medical associations can be important partners in the monitoring and reporting of human rights if there was a perceived moral obligation to report any instances of human rights abuse that doctors encounter when treating their patients. Doctors involved in treating prisoners, children and other vulnerable groups are well placed to monitor physical human rights abuse. This recommendation stems from the legal obligation that is imposed on various professionals in many countries to report instances of child abuse to the relevant authorities.

Training and education is to include seminars and workshops for the police, judiciary, administrators, military, teachers, legislators and various others in the substantive issues regarding human rights. This would help in standardising the rules of procedure and management to comply with international human rights standards. Education can be either
formal or informal. Human rights education should be a component of the traditional school curricula. Communities especially in the rural areas may be educated about their human rights and means of advocacy for and protection of these rights through, drama, film and music. Essentially, basic human rights and civic education should be accessible to all.

Legal aid services should be widely available. Once one has introduced a community to the notion of human rights on a personal level, there must be mechanisms to allow the same community to seek redress where rights are violated, to seek advice, and to seek implementation.

To enable evaluation and control, all strategies and action plans must be time bound and managed. While it may be impossible to suggest a time frame in the DRC without conducting some sort of needs assessment, it is important to note that time is of the essence both on a personal level and an institutional level when dealing with human rights. On a personal level, it is clear that indecision and lack of an implementable plan may result in great suffering for many individuals. Institutionally, it is important to set up structures that engender a culture of human rights respect to counteract a culture of oppression and resistance. For example if police officers are, upon joining the force, trained in the specifics of human rights, and there are clear and specific police policy statements and procedures endorsing adherence to international human rights, then it follows that there would be less violations on the ground.

There are a number of constraints to the implementation of the above action plan. The first is funding. When compared to defence budgets and other development projects, human rights work is often under funded. In addition, where there is a hostile relationship between government and human rights groups and workers; funding from government may be entirely impossible. The second constraint is lack of infrastructure. The DRC, through many years of regressive or no developmental policy, lacks adequate basic communication equipment, roads and bridges for safe travel, transportation, public or private, accessibility to the remote areas of the country and political will. The Kabila government which may, presumably, remain in power has, in the past, demonstrated a lack of tolerance and opposition with regard to human rights, demonstrated by the spate of banning human rights organisations earlier this year. The action plan may be frustrated by the lack of access to decision makers and stakeholders, lack of access to the media and the evident antagonistic relationship between NGO’s and government.

There is in the DRC a culture of oppression and resistance. Because of the country’s history of oppression and violent conflict, human rights may be a difficult sell even to the general public. A punitive or vengeful logic when dealing with transgressors may also prove difficult to alter to a more rehabilitative logic in conflict resolution. There is also a possibility of inter-ethnic intolerance.

Time is of the essence. As mentioned regarding the strategy and action plan phases, time spent without a human rights policy and strategy within the DRC will, in all likelihood, mean time spent without human rights observance.
It was felt that there are possible solutions to each of these constraints.

In order to obtain funding, the coalition of NGOs in the DRC should make application to the EU and the UNDP for specific human rights funding. They should also apply to individual governments and their development agencies such as, NORAD, CIDA, SIDA and DANIDA. Private foundations, such as the FORD foundation and the George Soros foundation, may also be approached for funding as may the private sector. Traditional methods of fundraising such as walks and runs may also be used locally and regionally.

Where there is overt hostility from the government, human rights education may be conducted through radio transmission from outside the DRC to which radio owners within the DRC have access. Within the country, while basic communication equipment is still scarce, two-way radio communication would assist in keeping links between NGOs and other communities.

Purchase of bicycles, motorcycles and boats would assist in travel where areas are remote, other local forms of transport should also be considered. With regard to the power supply, generators, solar power, industrial batteries and bio-gas (in the long term) are alternative means that could be used.

The solution to the constraint represented by repressive government will require linkage between NGOs, regional governments and the international community. Aid to the DRC should be uncompromisingly linked to the country’s human rights record. Diplomatic pressure by both the SADC countries and international donors should be applied to the DRC government to encourage compliance with normative standards of human rights. Regional countries, in particular SADC countries, should offer technical assistance in establishing institutions in the DRC that adhere to human rights principles. Underground radio and print may be established by local NGOs to keep the citizenry informed. Finally, the use of innovative mediation techniques is encouraged to assist in reducing the differences between government and non-governmental actors.

With respect to the culture of oppression and resistance, training and education of decision-makers, especially law enforcement officials and the judiciary, would be instrumental in transforming the culture of oppression to one of inclusion and justice. There must be stated government policy and legislation against the incitement of violence or hatred against particular groups. Government must in theory and practice seek equitable justice for all.

All action plans and strategies must begin from a needs assessment from within the DRC. They must be time bound and, as they progress, be evaluated for measurable success in line with the stated objectives. There must be solicitation of feedback from the target groups for forward planning.
EVALUATION OF THE SEMINAR

The evaluation of the seminar by the participants involved two processes: written and oral.

Written Evaluation of the Seminar:

1. Overall evaluation of the programme

1.1 Usefulness

- **Usefulness for my professional development**
  - fair: 0%
  - poor: 0%
  - good: 51%
  - excellent: 49%

- **Usefulness for my personal development**
  - fair: 0%
  - poor: 0%
  - good: 70%
  - excellent: 30%

1.2 Basic structure of the programme (composition of the programme in three weekly modules)
1.3 Methodology of the programme (mix of lectures, working groups, exercises, readings):

2. Future development of the programme

2.1 Would it be useful to run another programme like this for another group?

2.4 Would you support the idea of establishing a participants’ network and a newsletter?
2.5 Would you be ready to contribute to the newsletter?

Oral Evaluation of the Seminar

Participants were asked to consider the following questions in their evaluation:

1. What were the most important issues learnt for your personal and professional future?
2. How could future programmes be improved and where should these be held?
3. What future related activities would be useful for the current group?

Important issues for the personal and professional future of the participants were seen to be:

1. The balance throughout the seminar of practical skills and theory with particular benefit derived from the introduction to mediation and conflict analysis skills;
2. The focus on concrete examples such as issues of good governance, human rights, the difference between causes and symptoms and, negotiation skills in which participants are now more competent and which they are keen to implement in the field;
3. Recognition of the necessity to protect the human rights of groups;
4. Research interest in the area was stimulated including the possible integration of peace studies into social science curricula;
5. Access to people working in the field and to concepts and debates which were new to some participants;
6. The particular composition of the seminar group, including the presence of participants from outside the SADC region, was beneficial for the exchange of information.

It was felt that the seminar could have been improved in the following ways:

1. Participants should be able to develop practical projects based on their own experience, strengths and interests;
Resource persons must be competent and drawn from a wide range of sources, and need to produce papers in advance so that these can be circulated to participants before the presentation;

Gender awareness is fundamental and should be more fully incorporated;

The line up of presenters should reflect more of a gender balance and a broader range of ideologies;

The reader should be distributed to participants in advance of the seminar

Though all of the topics covered were important, some individual papers could be dropped to ensure more detailed coverage;

Panel discussions should be more structured with panelists each presenting on a different aspect of the same topic;

Specialist resource persons should be available for group sessions so that the discussions begin at a higher level;

A balanced mix of academicians and practitioners, who can talk about their experiences, is necessary;

In some cases, the presence of government employees constrained the discussion so that some participants felt they should not be invited;

A wider range of participants should be invited including more non-state actors, representatives of rebel groups and non-African actors such as the UN and the OAU;

Individuals should be able to make presentations but these must be confirmed early so that they are incorporated into the main programme;

All participants must take it on themselves to speak out and express their opinions;

Other media, such as video, could be effectively used to demonstrate negotiation techniques etc;

More adequate and less expensive communication facilities are needed including more computers, Internet access and a range of news media;

Evenings should be left aside for reading, not used for further sessions, to ensure participants do not become too tired;

Participants ought to be consulted about where they wish to go on excursions.

Future related activities which the participants felt would be useful were:

A follow up seminar in about three year’s time for participants to report back on what they are doing by that time;

A follow up course concentrating on more advanced skills and including specialists in different fields;

Exchange programmes between Austria and Africa and between African countries;

The formation of a SADC association founded either by SADC or by the governments represented in an effort to break free of the dependency syndrome;

Specific training in peace-keeping;

Collaborative research and networking;

A quarterly or half yearly newsletter;

A web page.
OUTLOOK

The overall success of the seminar has encouraged the Austrian Foreign Ministry to request the ASPR and SAPES Trust to explore further possibilities of co-operation for the upcoming years. A series of seminars are already in preparation. They may also take place in other countries of the region and involve other local organisations.
**APPENDIX 1**

**Sources of Conflicts**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structural root-causes of violent conflicts</th>
<th>SUBJECT 1: Protection of Human Rights and of National and Ethnic Communities (including the Gender-Role)</th>
<th>SUBJECT 2: Democratisation, Governance and Empowerment for Political Participation</th>
<th>SUBJECT 3: Support for Sustainable Socio-economic and Environmental Development</th>
<th>SUBJECT 4: Peace-keeping, Demilitarisation and Disarmament</th>
<th>SUBJECT 5: Education and Information Dissemination</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Exclusion and oppression of certain vulnerable groups and identities</td>
<td>• Over-centralisation of political power</td>
<td>• Scarce resources (such as productive land, fuel wood and water)</td>
<td>• Structural militarism</td>
<td>• Militaristic consciousness</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Pursuit of conflict management at the expense of the dispensation of justice, inequitable distribution of justice and the application of narrow definition of conflict</td>
<td>• Single party dominance</td>
<td>• Conflict over the Extraction</td>
<td>• Offensive military strategies</td>
<td>• Misinformation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Weakness of civil society</td>
<td>• Long incumbency of leadership</td>
<td>• Allocation, and Utilisation</td>
<td>• Excessive military spending</td>
<td>• Structural neglect of education</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Weakness of civil society</td>
<td>• Weak local governments</td>
<td>• Lack of skilled human resources</td>
<td>• State / military violence and dysfunction of the military</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Inadequate governance</td>
<td>• Uneven access to employment, incomes and wealth</td>
<td>• Military-government business complex</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Lack of legitimacy</td>
<td>• Uneven regional development</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Lack of effectiveness</td>
<td>• Economic stagnation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Repression</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Corruption, nepotism and patronage</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Politicised ethnicity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Tampering with the constitution</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Political and cultural legacy of colonialism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Culture of oppression and resistance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Imbalance of opportunities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Lack of access to scarce resources</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exacerbating factors</td>
<td>Suspension of human rights</td>
<td>Suspension of constitution</td>
<td>Contraction of the political arena</td>
<td>Overpopulation, poverty and natural disasters (e.g. famine)</td>
<td>Economic decline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Triggering factors</td>
<td>Brutal suppression of protest, arrests, torture, death of human rights activists</td>
<td>Assassination of key politician, religious leaders etc.</td>
<td>Mutiny/coup attempt</td>
<td>Rebellion</td>
<td>Any such events in the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deliberate provocation or incitement of various</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>groups</td>
<td>neighbouring countries</td>
<td>Sudden drop in export commodity prices</td>
<td>Acts of terrorism</td>
<td>expulsion of students from universities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Cancellation,</td>
<td>• Large (cross-border or intra-state) movement of people</td>
<td>• Sudden rise in basic food prices</td>
<td>• Boundary disputes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nullification, rigging or disputed results of elections</td>
<td>• Promises of former peace accords not held leading to crisis of confidence</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Denial of strategic resources (water, oil)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Banning of human rights organisations and other groups</td>
<td>• Local disputes (over cattle) etc</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**APPENDIX 2**

Approaches and Activities regarding Preventive Diplomacy and Peace-building of Non-governmental and Governmental Actors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject 1: Protection of Human Rights and of National and Ethnic Communities (including the Gender-Role)</th>
<th>Subject 2: Democratisation, Governance and Empowerment for Political Participation</th>
<th>Subject 3: Support for Sustainable Socio-economic and Environmental Development</th>
<th>Subject 4: Peace-keeping, Demilitarisation and Disarmament</th>
<th>Subject 5: Education and Information Dissemination</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-governmental actors</strong></td>
<td><strong>Non-governmental actors</strong></td>
<td><strong>Non-governmental actors</strong></td>
<td><strong>Non-governmental actors</strong></td>
<td><strong>Non-governmental actors</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Establishing links between national and international human rights groups and other NGOs</td>
<td>• Empowerment for political participation</td>
<td>• Enhancing economic opportunities for ethnic groupings</td>
<td>• Enhancing civilian approaches to security threats</td>
<td>• Enhancing a societal discourse on the causes of violent conflicts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Monitoring human rights and protection of ethnic groupings</td>
<td>• Strengthening of civil society associations and non-governmental legal services</td>
<td>• Supporting income generating activities</td>
<td>• Promoting demilitarisation</td>
<td>• Enhancing a societal dialogue on (imported and indigenous) democracy models</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Establishing national NGO co-ordination associations</td>
<td>• Monitoring of referenda or elections</td>
<td>• Enhancing economic opportunities for ethnic groupings</td>
<td>• Supporting resettlement and return of refugees and displaced persons</td>
<td>• Strengthening educational and research institutions and programmes in the area of democracy and human rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Political mobilisation of marginalized groups</td>
<td>• Addressing specific disputes (pre-emptive multi-track engagement)</td>
<td>• Enhancing economic opportunities for ethnic groupings</td>
<td>• Supporting victims of violence</td>
<td>• Establishing links with like-minded regional and international actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Medical and psychological help, including restitution, for victims of human rights violations</td>
<td>• Supporting resettlement and return of refugees and displaced persons</td>
<td>• Monitoring of referenda or elections</td>
<td>• Objective and informed reporting of elections</td>
<td>• Monitoring of government by the public</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Non-State actors have to comply with international human rights laws</td>
<td>• Supporting victims of violence</td>
<td>• Monitoring of referenda or elections</td>
<td>• Monitoring of peacekeeping activities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governmental actors</td>
<td>Improving judicial services</td>
<td>Accountability</td>
<td>Raising economic and environmental consciousness</td>
<td>Reducing military spending and enhance non-offensive defence strategies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Improving prison services</td>
<td></td>
<td>Correcting imbalances between different groups</td>
<td>Demobilisation of soldiers and integration of soldiers and ex-combatants into civilian life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Establishing the office of an independent Human Rights Commissioner</td>
<td>Strengthening decentralisation</td>
<td>Environmental impact assessment</td>
<td>Fair representation of all societal groupings in the armed forces and the police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Legal prosecution of human rights violators and perpetrators of genocide</td>
<td>Strengthening local government (institution-building)</td>
<td>Popular participation in economic policy and decision-making</td>
<td>Developing a code of conduct for security personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Promoting impartiality of government services and their sensitisation to questions of human rights etc.</td>
<td>Inter-ministerial coordination in the economic and environmental field</td>
<td>Enhancing civilian control of security forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Fostering awareness of conflict potential for government services</td>
<td>Provision of small loans for income generating activities</td>
<td>Training for civilian leaders in security matters, including for</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Enhancing the performance of judicial services</td>
<td>Environmental disaster preparedness and early warning</td>
<td>Disseminating civic education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Strengthening the role of parliament</td>
<td>Adjusting legislation in media</td>
<td>Reducing stereotypes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Adjusting legislation in</td>
<td></td>
<td>Supporting non-discriminatory media programmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Promoting inter-cultural learning models</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Creating more impartial information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Promoting professionalism in the armed forces and the police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Introduction of international humanitarian law in the curriculum of military and strategic training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key Areas (human rights and civil liberties; security; political decentralisation; media etc.)</td>
<td>Democratisation of electoral law</td>
<td>Planning, organising and executing of referenda or elections</td>
<td>Establishing the office of an independent Ombudsman or Public Protector</td>
<td>Strengthening the Auditor General</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## APPENDIX 3

Approaches and Activities regarding Preventive Diplomacy and Peace-building of Inter-governmental Actors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inter-governmental actors</th>
<th>SUBJECT 1: Protection of Human Rights and of National and Ethnic Communities (including the Gender-Role)</th>
<th>SUBJECT 2: Democratisation, Governance and Empowerment for Political Participation</th>
<th>SUBJECT 3: Support for Sustainable Socio-economic and Environmental Development</th>
<th>SUBJECT 4: Peace-keeping, Demilitarisation and Disarmament</th>
<th>SUBJECT 5: Education and Information Dissemination</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Monitoring and strengthening international human rights standards</td>
<td>Promotion of democratic norms, values and systems of government</td>
<td>Economic and environmental policies and measures should involve potential conflict assessment</td>
<td>Create regionally shared perceptions of threat and conceptions of peace and security</td>
<td>Promotion of research, education and dissemination of information on democracy and conflict transformation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Negotiating, ratifying and implementing UN and other IGOs declarations, protocols, instruments etc.</td>
<td>Encourage African ownership of conflict management processes</td>
<td>Forcing the conflict parties to stop the escalation of violent conflict with economic means (conditionality of aid, selective embargoes, freezing of bank accounts, preventing inflow of funds)</td>
<td>Establish credible regional mechanisms for conflict resolution and peace-building. Avoid rival or competing efforts.</td>
<td>Establishment of regional and national centres for the collection and dissemination of early warning and action information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Establishing OAU and SADC High Commissioners on human rights and national minorities with the power to compel interference</td>
<td>Strengthen mechanisms for early warning and early action</td>
<td>Supporting the rehabilitation and reconstruction of post-war societies</td>
<td>Devising strategies and tactics for regional demilitarisation through various confidence building measures</td>
<td>The production and distribution of media programmes aimed at creating a sense of regional identity and loyalty among the people of the region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Harmonisation of human rights legislation and law relating to refugees</td>
<td>Enhancement of civilian approaches and multi-track diplomacy in conflict transformation</td>
<td>Harassment and co-ordination of economic policies in order to reduce trade and investment conflicts</td>
<td>Preventive deployment of troops</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Election observation and assistance</td>
<td>Overlapping memberships in regional economic organisations</td>
<td>Reducing access of warring factions to arms</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Conflicts should be addressed in a coherent, co-ordinated and targeted manner</td>
<td>Support demining</td>
<td>Imposition of arms embargoes and also sanctions on conflicting parties</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Hence, the roles of the OAU central organ and the SADC organ on politics defence and security should be clarified and strengthened in order to</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>enhance the confidence of the member states in both mechanisms</td>
<td>should not lead to conflicts of interest</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• OAU and SADC should develop clear criteria and rules of engagement relating to inter-state and intra-state conflict management</td>
<td>• Establishing a Regional Development Bank</td>
<td>• Establishment of joint commission on equitable utilisation of trans-boundary resources</td>
<td>• Implementation of Rio summit, Agenda 21</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# APPENDIX 4

## Approaches and Activities regarding Preventive Diplomacy and Peace-building of Non-African Actors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Non-African actors</th>
<th>Subject 1: Protection of Human Rights and of National and Ethnic Communities (including the Gender-Role)</th>
<th>Subject 2: Democratisation, Governance and Empowerment for Political Participation</th>
<th>Subject 3: Support for Sustainable Socio-economic and Environmental Development</th>
<th>Subject 4: Peace-keeping, Demilitarisation and Disarmament</th>
<th>Subject 5: Education and Information Dissemination</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Promoting recognition and observation of human rights through encouraging accession and adhesion to international declarations, conventions, etc. of human rights</td>
<td>Promotion of democracy and good governance by supporting democratic elections, pluralism constitutional government and rule of law</td>
<td>Increase targeted economic and social assistance without having a negative impact and on the environment in consultation and partnership with the region</td>
<td>Desist from and obstruct the supply of arms and ammunition where such supplies are likely to precipitate and fuel violent conflicts</td>
<td>Dissemination of relevant information promoting democracy, human rights and rule of law</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linking foreign assistance to the observation of human rights</td>
<td>Providing capacity building assistance to nascent democratic institutions such as political parties, parliament and local government structures</td>
<td>Promote and encourage regional integration arrangements to enhance economic efficiency and mobility of resources as well as reducing conflicts in the region</td>
<td>Urge countries to reduce their military spending and link the issue with aid if necessary</td>
<td>Providing material support for the establishment of programmes in research and education for democracy and conflict prevention</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No double standards between observing human rights abroad and at home</td>
<td>Protesting strongly and consistently against actions, laws etc. that have the effect of abridging political freedoms, such as preventive detention and deportation laws</td>
<td>Strategies for reducing Africa’s debt burden through cancellation, reduction or a moratorium have to be devised in order to create conditions for a stable political environment and a predictable economic climate</td>
<td>Encourage and support regional security and conflict prevention arrangements that will tend to enhance coherence and reduce the number and intensity of violent conflicts in the region</td>
<td>Supporting regional, sub-regional and national institutions for gathering and disseminating early warning and action information</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Showing positive examples through strict adherence to international standards of human rights</td>
<td>Supporting multi-track conflict transformation activities</td>
<td>Support of peace-keeping and peace-building activities of the UN and its regional organisations</td>
<td>Support of peace-keeping and peace-building activities of the UN and its regional organisations</td>
<td>Supporting regional information initiatives aimed at promoting regional consciousness, identity and loyalty</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX 5

PROGRAMME OUTLINE

Sunday, August 9
6.00 p.m. Arrival
8.00 p.m. Welcome Dinner

WEEK 1: August 9 - August 15
Principal Civilian Approaches for Preventive Diplomacy and Peace-building

Monday, August 10
9.00 - 10.30 a.m. Official Opening of the Programme
Arno TRUGER
Deputy of the Executive President, ASPR, Stadtschlaining
Ibbo MANDAZA
Executive Director, SAPES Trust, Harare, Zimbabwe
Peter LEITENBAUER
Ambassador of the Republic of Austria

11.00 - 12.30 p.m. Introduction of Participants
Arno TRUGER
Mwesiga BAREGU
Director of International Relations Division, SAPES Trust, Harare, Zimbabwe

3.00 - 4.30 p.m. Workshop 1:
Conflict Partnership Training
Workshop 2:
Conflict Transformation Training
Dudley WEEKS
Karthi GOVENDER
Director, The Partnership Life Skills Center, Washington DC, USA
Deputy Director, ACCORD, Durban, South Africa

5.00 - 6.30 p.m. Continued
### Tuesday, August 11

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Speaker</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9.00 - 10.30 a.m.</td>
<td>Causes and Nature of Conflict</td>
<td>Laurie NATHAN Executive Director, Center for Conflict Resolution, University of Cape Town, South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.00 - 12.30 p.m.</td>
<td>Principle Concepts and Strategies for Conflict Transformation</td>
<td>Laurie NATHAN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.00 - 4.30 p.m.</td>
<td>Workshops continued</td>
<td>Dudley WEEKS Karthi GOVENDER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.00 - 6.30 p.m.</td>
<td>Continued</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Wednesday, August 12

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Speaker</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9.00 - 10.30 a.m.</td>
<td>Conflict Prevention: Towards Policy Options for Preventive Diplomacy, Early Warning and Peace-building</td>
<td>John DZIMBA Senior Lecturer, National University of Lesotho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.00 - 12.30 p.m.</td>
<td>The approach of SADC</td>
<td>Mwesiga BAREGU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.00 - 4.30 p.m.</td>
<td>Workshops continued</td>
<td>Dudley WEEKS Karthi GOVENDER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.00 - 6.30 p.m.</td>
<td>Continued</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Thursday, August 13

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Speaker</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9.00 - 10.30 a.m.</td>
<td>OAU and Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution</td>
<td>David HAMADZIRIPI Under Secretary, Africa and Middle East Desk, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Harare, Zimbabwe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.00 – 12.30 p.m.</td>
<td>The Role of SADC Governmental and Non-governmental Stakeholders</td>
<td>Mwesiga BAREGU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.00 - 4.30 p.m.</td>
<td>Workshops continued</td>
<td>Dudley WEEKS Karthi GOVENDER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.00 - 6.30 p.m.</td>
<td>Continued</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.00 p.m.</td>
<td>Panel Discussion on Concepts for Preventive Diplomacy and Peace-building in Southern Africa</td>
<td>John DZIMBA (Chair) Karthi GOVENDER Martin LANDGRAF Dudley WEEKS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Friday, August 14**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Session</th>
<th>Presenter(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9.00 - 10.30 a.m.</td>
<td>The Role of Non-African Actors</td>
<td>Martin LANDGRAF, European Commission, Foreign Policy Unit, Brussels, Belgium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.00 – 12.30 p.m.</td>
<td>Continued</td>
<td>Dudley WEEKS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.00 - 4.30 p.m.</td>
<td>Workshops continued</td>
<td>Dudley WEEKS, Karthi GOVENDER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.00 - 6.30 p.m.</td>
<td>Continued</td>
<td>Karthi GOVENDER</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Saturday, August 15**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Session</th>
<th>Presenter(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9.00 - 6.30 p.m.</td>
<td>Excursion to Chinoyi Caves and Mazvikadei</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**WEEK 2: August 17 - August 22, 1998**

**Major Civilian Functions of Preventive Diplomacy and Peace-building**

**Monday, August 17**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Session</th>
<th>Presenter(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9.00 - 10.30 a.m.</td>
<td>Protection of Human Rights and of National and Ethnic Communities</td>
<td>Amanda SERUMAGA, Human Rights Reporting and Monitoring, Uganda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Keitseope NTHOMANG, Lecturer, Department of Social Work, University of Botswana, Gaborone, Botswana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.00 – 12.30 p.m.</td>
<td>The Role of Gender in Preventive Diplomacy and Peace-Building</td>
<td>Patricia McFADDEN, Co-ordinator of the Gender Division, SAPES Trust, Harare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.00 - 4.30 p.m.</td>
<td>Workshop 1: Conflict Partnership Training</td>
<td>Dudley WEEKS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Workshop 2: Conflict Transformation Training</td>
<td>Karthi GOVENDER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.00 - 6.30 p.m.</td>
<td>Continued</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Tuesday, August 18
9.00 - 10.30 a.m. Good Governance and Empowerment for Political Participation Daudi MUKANGARA
Senior Lecturer in Political Science, University of Dar es Salaam

11.00 – 12.30 p.m. Continued Admore KAMBUDZI
Senior Lecturer in Political Science, University of Zimbabwe

3.00 - 4.30 p.m. Workshops continued Dudley WEEKS
Karthi GOVENDER

5.00 - 6.30 p.m. Continued

Wednesday, August 19
9.00 - 10.30 a.m. Cooperation with Military and Police Lt. Col. Martin RUPIYA
Director of Centre for Defence Studies, University of Zimbabwe

11.00 – 12.30 p.m. Humanitarian Assistance Mwesiga BAREGU

3.00 - 4.30 p.m. Workshops continued Karthi GOVENDER
Dudley WEEKS

5.00 - 6.30 p.m. Continued

8.00 p.m. Discussion on Humanitarian Assistance and Military Intervention Eldred DE KLERK (Chair)
Police Trainer, Mediation and Training Service, Center for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town, South Africa
Admore KAMBUDZI
Khabele MATLOSA
Senior Lecturer and Head of Department of Political and Administrative Studies, National University of Lesotho
Clever NKALA
Course Planner and Co-ordinator, Zimbabwe Staff College, Harare
Lt. Col. Martin RUPIYA
John STEWART
Project Director of the Catholic Justice and Peace Commission in Zimbabwe, Harare
Thursday, August 20
9.00 - 10.30 a.m. Support for Sustainable Economic Development
Khabele MATLOSA

11.00 - 12.30 p.m. Ecological Dimensions
Dan TEVERA
Senior Lecturer at the Department of Geography, University of Zimbabwe

3.00 - 4.30 p.m. Workshops continued
Dudley WEEKS
Karthi GOVENDER

Friday, August 21
9.00 - 10.30 a.m. Disarmament and Demobilisation
Brigadier General S. B. MOYO
Brigadier Administrative Staff, Zimbabwe National Army, Harare

11.00 - 12.30 p.m. Information Dissemination and Education
Arno TRUGER

2.00 - 4.00 p.m. Workshops continued
Dudley WEEKS
Karthi GOVENDER

4.30 – 5.30 p.m. Introduction of the 3rd Weeks Programme
Arno TRUGER
Mwesiga BAREGU
Dudley WEEKS

Saturday, August 22
7.00 – 6.30 p.m. Excursion to Harare

WEEK 3: August 24 - August 28, 1998
Strengthening of Various Actors in Preventive Diplomacy and Peace-building

Monday, August 24
9.00 – 10.00 a.m. Summary and presentation of the first two weeks results
Mwesiga BAREGU

9.30 – 10.30 p.m. Presentation of the Guidelines for the Working Groups and Introduction with regard to the Major Subjects of Preventive Diplomacy and Peace-Building in Southern Africa
Mwesiga BAREGU
11.00 - 12.30 p.m. Working Group 1: Protection of Human Rights and of National and Ethnic Communities (with a special focus on the Gender Role)  
Working Group 2: Democratisation, Governance and Empowerment for Political Participation  
Working Group 3: Support for Sustainable Socio-economic and Environmental Development  
Working Group 4: Peace-keeping, Demilitarisation and Disarmament  
Working Group 5: Education and Information Dissemination

3.00 – 4.30 p.m. Continued

5.00 - 6.30 p.m. Plenary Session: Discussion of the Mwesiga BAREGU Results of the Working Groups

Tuesday, August 25
9.00 - 9.30 a.m. Introduction with regard to the Mwesiga BAREGU Capacity building of Governmental and Non-governmental Agencies in Southern Africa

9.30 - 12.30 p.m. Working Groups 1 to 5

3.00 - 4.30 p.m. Plenary Session and Discussion on the Mwesiga BAREGU Results of the Working Groups

5.00 - 5.30 p.m. Introduction with regard to Mwesiga BAREGU Strengthening of Intergovernmental Capacity in Southern Africa

5.30 – 6.30 p.m. Working Groups 1 – 5
Wednesday, August 26
9.00 - 10.30 a.m. Continued
11.00 - 12.30 p.m. Plenary Session: Discussion of the Mwesiga BAREGU Results of the Working Groups

3.00 - 3.30 p.m. Introduction with regard to the Mwesiga BAREGU Capacity building of Non-African Support for Southern Africa

3.30 - 4.30 p.m. Working Groups 1 – 5

5.00 – 6.30 p.m. Continued

Thursday, August 27
9.00 - 10.30 a.m. Plenary Session on Discussion on the Mwesiga BAREGU Results of the Working Groups

11.00 - 12.30 p.m. Evaluation of the Seminar Arno TRUGER
Mwesiga BAREGU

2.00 - 4.00 p.m. Public Presentation and Discussion of the Results of the Seminar Mwesiga BAREGU Arno TRUGER (Co-Chair)

4.30 p.m. Official Closing Ceremony Georg LENNKH
Ambassador, Austrian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Vienna, Austria

8.00 p.m. Farewell Dinner

Friday, August 28
9.00 a.m. Departure
## APPENDIX 6

### LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>PRESENT POSITION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. ADEN, Mohamed (Mr.)</td>
<td>SOMALIA</td>
<td>Executive Director of Havoyoco (LNGO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. AFITUMUKIZA, Beatrice Stella (Ms.)</td>
<td>UGANDA</td>
<td>Teacher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. AJAKAIYE, Ayorinde (Mr.)</td>
<td>NIGERIA</td>
<td>Ambassador, Director of Training and Programmes, Centre for Peace Research and Conflict Resolution, National War College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. ALLEN, Hayden (Mr.)</td>
<td>SOUTH AFRICA</td>
<td>Research Assistant to the Executive Director (ACCORD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. SISYA, Charity (Ms.)</td>
<td>ZAMBIA</td>
<td>Assistant to the Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Prevention and Resolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. BRADSHAW, Gavin (Mr.)</td>
<td>SOUTH AFRICA</td>
<td>Senior Lecturer, Political Studies University of Port Elizabeth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. BWANGA, Margaret M.N. (Ms.)</td>
<td>ZAMBIA</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary, Ministry of Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. CAMACHEE MARDAYMOOTOO, Sandesh (Mr.)</td>
<td>MAURITIUS</td>
<td>Trade-Unionist/Consultant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. CHABOOKA, David Beny (Mr.)</td>
<td>MOZAMBIQUE</td>
<td>First Secretary, Research and Planning Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. DE KLERK, Eldred (Mr.)</td>
<td>SOUTH AFRICA</td>
<td>Police Trainer, Mediation and Training Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. DIAMONDS, Herman Pule (Mr.)</td>
<td>NAMIBIA</td>
<td>Chief Foreign Relations Officer, MFA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. DLUDLU, Fidza (Mr.)</td>
<td>SWAZILAND</td>
<td>Head of Personnel, Defence Force Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. EL MAGHRABI, Laila (Ms.)</td>
<td>SUDAN</td>
<td>Secretary General Assistant in media, information and research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. HAMADZIRIPI, David (Mr.)</td>
<td>ZIMBABWE</td>
<td>Under Secretary, Africa and Middle East Desk, MFA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. JAGARNATH, Nilkanthsing (Mr.)</td>
<td>MAURITIUS</td>
<td>Second Secretary, Mauritius Embassy in Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. KASIRYE, Martin (Mr.)</td>
<td>UGANDA</td>
<td>Foreign Service Officer, MFA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Gender</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>KAU, Moses A.K. (Mr.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>LAMB, Guy (Mr.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>LITHEBE, Mokhali (Mr.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>LUAMBIA, Eunice (Mr.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>MACUACUA, Jacinta (Ms.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>MAGANGA, Kellen (Ms.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>MARAVANYIKA, Solomon C. (Mr.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>MAREKA, Thoriso (Mr.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>MAWAYA, Patrick Harry (Mr.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>MOGBOH, Veronica (Ms.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>MOLL, Negash (Mr.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>MSIBI, Sibusiso Lucky (Mr.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>MUMBA, Andrew Dean Mwansa (Mr.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>MUTELO, Anne N. (Ms.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>MWARAMBA, Barnabas Z. (Mr.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>NANGALEMBE, Veronica (Ms.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>NKALA, Clever (Mr.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>NTHOMANG, Keitseope (Mr.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>OJAKOL, Moses (Mr.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36.</td>
<td>RIAK, Pauline (Ms.)</td>
<td>JAMAICA/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SUDAN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37.</td>
<td>RIBEIRO, Joao António (Mr.)</td>
<td>ANGOLA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38.</td>
<td>RUNANGA-GUMBO, Emmanuel (Mr.)</td>
<td>ZIMBABWE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39.</td>
<td>SEBUDUBUDU, David (Mr.)</td>
<td>BOTSWANA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40.</td>
<td>SERUMAGA, Amanda K. (Ms.)</td>
<td>UGANDA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41.</td>
<td>SOMBIÉ, Hortense Hien (Ms.)</td>
<td>BURKINA FASO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42.</td>
<td>VON SEYDLITZ-KURZBACH, Bernhard (Mr.)</td>
<td>NAMIBIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43.</td>
<td>YA NANGOLOH, Phil (Mr.)</td>
<td>NAMIBIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44.</td>
<td>ZITA, Boaventura (Mr.)</td>
<td>MOZAMBIQUE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PROGRAMME DIRECTORS:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Position/Role</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>BAREGU, Mwesiga (Mr.)</td>
<td>TANZANIA</td>
<td>Director of International Relations Division, SAPES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>TRUGER, Arno (Mr.)</td>
<td>AUSTRIA</td>
<td>Deputy Director of the Executive President, ASPR</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PROGRAMME ASSISTANT:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Position/Role</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>KORBER, Renate (Ms.)</td>
<td>AUSTRIA</td>
<td>Programme Assistant, ASPR</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**RAPPORTEURS:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Position/Role</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ALLARDICE, Megan (Ms.)</td>
<td>NEW ZEALAND</td>
<td>SAPES Consultant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASIWA, Nyasha (Mr.)</td>
<td>ZIMBABWE</td>
<td>Research Assistant, SAPES</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## APPENDIX 7

### LIST OF LECTURERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Function</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BAREGU, Mwesiga (Mr.)</td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>Director of International Relations Division, SAPES Trust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DZIMBA, John (Mr.)</td>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>Senior Lecturer, National Univ. of Lesotho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOVENDER, Karthi (Mr.)</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>Deputy Director of ACCORD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KAMBUDZI, Admore (Mr.)</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Senior Lecturer in Political Science, Univ. of Zimbabwe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LANDGRAF, Martin (Mr.)</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>European Commission, Foreign Policy Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATLOSA, Khabele (Mr.)</td>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>Senior Lecturer and Head of Department of Political and Administrative Studies, National Univ. of Lesotho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McFADDEN, Patricia (Ms.)</td>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>Co-ordinator of the Gender Division, SAPES Trust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOYO, S.B. (Mr.)</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Brigadier Gen., Brigadier Administrative Staff, Zimbabwe National Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MUKANGARA, Daudi (Mr.)</td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>Senior Lecturer in Political Science, Univ. of Dar es Salaam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATHAN, Laurie (Mr.)</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>Executive Director of the Centre for Conflict Resolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RUPIYA, Martin (Mr.)</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Director of the Centre for Defence Studies, Univ. of Zimbabwe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STEWART, John (Mr.)</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Project Director of the Catholic Justice and Peace Commission in Zimbabwe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEVERA, Dan (Mr.)</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Senior Lecturer at the Dep. of Geography, Univ. of Zimbabwe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRUGER, Arno (Mr.)</td>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Deputy of the Executive President, ASPR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEEKS, Dudley (Mr.)</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Director of the Partnership Life Skills Center</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>